OT; The Longest Day

[dragoon500ly]

Source material drawn from “Omaha Beach, A Flawed Victory” as well as “Operation Plan Neptune, Western Naval Task Force, Assault Force ‘O’, Annex E, Gunfire Support Plan”.

The Allies approached D-Day convinced that they would have both tactical surprise as well as the greatest possible firepower ever assembled for an amphibious assault. Overlord would be the largest amphibious assault in history, therefore the planners had no standard that they could measure the adequacy of their plans or of the firepower resources allotted to the task. The only information that the Allies could use was the American Pacific theater doctrine and the British Mediterranean theater doctrine. Yet, in spite of this knowledge, the Overlord planners approached their task by developing a new, untested, hybrid doctrine. This doctrine rested on the combination of naval gunfire support from both warships and converted landing craft and the use of heavy bombers in a tactical situation.

The Royal Navy and the U. S. Navy provided a mix of battleships, cruisers and destroyers to conduct the pre-invasion bombardments. The warships assigned to Omaha Beach included the battleships USS Texas and USS Arkansas, the cruisers HMS Bellona, HMS Glasgow, FFS Georges Leygues and FFS Montcalm, the destroyers USS Baldwin, Carmick, Doyle, Emmons, Frankford, Harding, McCook, Satterlee, Thompson, HMS Melbreak, HMS Talybont, and HMS Tanatside.

The battleships and cruisers were assigned the task of engaging the fourteen German artillery batteries that could threaten Omaha Beach. These batteries would be engaged in accordance with a priority list and the warships spotter planes would be used to correct fires. This would commence at first light and last until the batteries were silenced.

The next phase would be the neutralization of beach defenses commencing at H-20 minutes. The destroyers and armed landing craft would deliver the initial fires to be supported by the cruisers and battleships as they completed their counter-battery assignments. At H Hour, the naval fires would switch towards targets further inland or on the flanks of the beach.

The last phase of the naval bombardment program was the close support fire on call. This phase would commence as the naval shore fire control parties landed and set up, at approximately H+30 minutes. Each of the four initial assault battalions had a naval fire control party that would accompany it. Each battalion would have two destroyers in direct support.

All told, the naval gunfire program was slated to last a total of thirty minutes.

The air phase of the bombardment program is, perhaps, the most misunderstood. Many histories written after the war have the bombers being assigned to drop their ordnance directly onto the beach. Nothing could be further from the truth. The air support for Operation Overlord was intended to attack the battery positions, beach defense localities, bridges, road embankments, cable junctions, command posts and communications centers. This would be assigned to the heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force. Close air support would be conducted by the fighters of the Eighth Air Force and it is in this mission that the air forces failed.

Every regimental landing team was assigned an air support party. They were assigned VHF radios, but were not permitted to talk directly with the overhead aircraft unless they were specifically authorized to do so. Nor were they allowed to intervene in stopping attacks on friendly troops or on wrong targets. To request air support, each party would have to call a headquarters hip and the request was then relayed to a central control facility in Uxbridge, England. There the decisions was made whether to support the request. So cumbersome was this process that on June 6, 1944, Uxbridge received only thirteen requests. Targets of opportunity were attacked by aircraft on station above the battlefield, however, these aircraft could not communicate with ground units and could not assist in any meaningful tactical situation.

Additional fire support would be provided by tanks, machine guns, artillery, naval guns and rockets mounted or loaded on variety of landing craft. Their mission was to “furnish during the approach to the beaches and prior to touchdown, area fire on and in the rear of the beaches, fire on strong points, beach defenses and to take part in drenching fire on the beaches.” To support the Omaha Beach landings were
9 LCT(R)s, 5 LCG(L)s, 7 LCFs, 18 LCT(A)s and 32 LCP(L)s.

The LCT(R) or landing craft, tank, rocket were fitted with 1,064 5-inch rockets. They were intended to deliver a large volume of preparatory fire on the landing beaches at the last moment before the assault. The intent was to start launching the rockets while the assault troops were 300 yards out from the beaches, the rockets would clear lanes through the obstacles and minefields.

The LCG(L) or landing craft, gun, large were fitted with two 4.7-inch naval guns and two 20mm AA guns. Manned by Royal Marines, they were intended to provide direct fire against beach positions and surface attack for the initial assault waves. Each LCG(L) had specific targets to neutralize and an area of responsibility for targets of opportunity.

LCFs or landing craft, flak were fitted with either eight 2-pdr and 4 20mm AA guns or four 2-pdr and 8 20mm AA guns. Their mission was to provide air defense to the landing craft as well as to engage surface targets prior to and during the landings.

LCT(A)s, or landing craft, tank, armored each carried two M-4 Sherman medium tanks. As part of the leading assault waves, they were to land their cargo directly onto the beach. The tanks were tasked with opening fire as soon as range and visibility permitted, take part in the beach drenching fire and then join the assault.

LCP(L)s or landing craft, personnel, large were equipped with smoke generators and had the mission of screening the assault waves in the last moments before the landing.

When I first read Flawed Victory I was certain that the author had erred in many ways...until I was able to see a copy of the Gunfire Support Plan. One is left with the impression that General Bradley who oversaw the planning, had dropped the ball, badly.