Summer 2000 [Poland] Offensive Revisited

[Raellus]

I know we've discussed this topic quite a bit here, but the discussion has been scattered amongst various threads and I thought it might be a good idea to dedicate a thread solely to this issue. I would also like to present a new take on the strategic thinking behind Summer 2000 offensive.

I've been studying the [American] Vietnam War quite a bit lately and my understanding of this conflict has significantly coloured my interpretation of events in Europe of the v1.0 Twilight 2000 timeline. The invasion of Cambodia in 1970 especially influenced my thinking. After campaigning behind a promise of securing "Peace with Honor" and his later "Vietnamization" initiative, Nixon was looking to strengthen the U.S./RVN hand prior to an eventual U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. I've taken this strategic thinking and applied it to the U.S.' position in Poland, c. 2000.

This alternative explanation presupposes that U.S. MilGov was already seriously considering (if not actively planning) to pull the bulk of its forces out of Europe in the fall of 2000 prior to the Summer 2000 offensive.


Summer 2000 [Poland] Offensive Revisited

By the early spring of 2000, it was clear to the JCS that the war in Europe had reached a stalemate- neither side appeared to be strong enough to achieve a decisive strategic victory in Europe and American troops were needed elsewhere, where decisive results were thought possible. Furthermore, field reports were revealing an alarming dip in morale amongst the troops in Europe- cantonment life was proving quite frustrating to some. The endless cycle of garrison duty, patrols, raids, and counteraids was wearing on a lot of the troops. Many field commanders believed that a large-scale offensive would inject some fighting spirit and lift morale, preventing any large-scale mutinies and making the news of an impending large-scale withdrawal from Europe in the fall of 2000 easier to stomach.

It was decided at this time to pursue "Peace with Honor" (a term coined by former President Richard Nixon during the later years of the Vietnam War) in Europe, immediately prior to withdrawing the bulk of American troops back to CONUS for domestic use or redeployment elsewhere overseas (the Middle East or Korea). To claim "Peace with Honor" would require a clear-cut military victory on the decisive front of the European theatre of operations, Poland. Feelers were put out to America's NATO allies, especially Germany. Germany, suffering from serious war fatigue, was found to be quite ammenable to the idea of a U.S. pullout, despite some innitial relservations. When the JCS sweetened the pot by offering Germany a significant quantity of American heavy weapons and equipment, the German government quickly acquiesced. This hand was strengthened when contacts in the pro-Western Polish Free Congress reported that several high-ranking officers in several significant Polish military units were strongly considering either turning coats or, at the bare minimum, refusing to fight attacking American and German units. The case for a large-scale summer NATO offensive in Poland would never be stronger.

The elephant in the room was the possibility that a large-scale, successful NATO offensive in Europe would result in the Soviets unleashing its remaining tactical nuclear weapons, and, in a chilling worst-case scenario, launching a final, strategic gotterdammerung. DIA operatives in Soviet-controlled territory present reassuring reports indicating that the Soviet leadership would be unwilling to use its remaining nuclear arsenal so long as the fighting remained west of the Vistula.

Joint planning began to launch a large scale U.S.-German raid into WTO-held territory in the early summer of 2000. This raid would seriously disrupt WTO military capabilities and logistical capacities and would, if successful, give the appearance of a resounding U.S. military victory. U.S. MilGov could thenceforth claim to be leaving Europe on its own terms, thereby allaying the appearance of having retreated from the European continent with its tail between its legs.

In effect, the essential concept for the offensive was basically that of a massive spoiling attack. If successful, any potential WTO offensive operations would certainly be put off until the spring of 2001. In the interim, Germany would reorganize and strengthen its forces and diplomatic attempts would be made to secure an armistice with the Soviets.

As history would have it, the plan fell apart when a carefully masked Soviet/WTO summer offensive smashed into the spearheads of the NATO one. It was later discovered that NATO's PFC contacts had overstated their case, as had DIA agents working in Soviet-controlled territory. The ensuing battles would seriously weaken the Soviet military in Poland, leading to an eventual Soviet withdrawal from Poland.