Stupid GI Tricks

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

The sheer concept of sending an armored corp up a narrow two-lane road that for most of its length is several feet above the polder insured the failure of Market-Garden far better than anything that the Germans could have done. Considering that most of the forces that were committed to cutting the highway were ad-hoc kampfgruppes should speak volumes about the tactical situation that XXX Corps and 1st Airborne Army faced.

To be sure the intelligence failed in warning of the presence of two understrength, battered SS Panzer Divisions. These divisions proved the key to encircling and slaughtering British 1st Airborne Division and holding the key bridge at Nimegen. But it is also true that the decision to drop the Brits over 12km from their target, and then to drop the division over three days doomed the Arnhem fight to a certain conculsion.

The failure to drop a regiment on the bridge at Nimegan was a operational failure...but the 82nd Airborne always had the primary mission of seizing a low ridge mass that provided plenty of positions for artillery observers on that damned highway.

The loss of a key bridge early in the fight also speaks volumes about the difficulty of running "a one track railroad". Airborne divisions have minimal engineer support and none of what they had was dedicated to building bridges to support armor. The failure of the Guards Armored Division to assign engineer bridging support to the front of their column was a major failure...but one forced on them by the tactical situation that they faced. But then when one throws armor up a highway covered with over a dozen bridges, would it not be fair to assume that the enemy would get lucky, at least once?

Finally, Monty did have access to a wonderful source of intelligence. The Royal Dutch Army. A full brigade was operating with the British and yet their knowledge of local conditions was ignored. And to add insult to injury, the pre-war Dutch Army staged their field exercises in the Nimegen/Arnhem area, they were well aware of the difficults of the terrain and they even knew about the Driel ferry and how it could have been used to transport reinforcements and supplies north of the Rhine.

I have always felt that Market-Garden accomplished several things; first it created a sixty-mile long bulge that led nowhere (and indeed several miles of it had to be abandoned during the fall when the Germans started flooding the Rhine); it destroyed one airborne division and shot up two others; it diverted attention from the vital clearing of Antwerp and the clearing of Antwerp's even more vital passage to the sea, causing further supply problems for the Allied forces. The planning and execution of Market-Garden showed Monty at his worse.

The plan would of worked much better if one would of cut it down and executed in three separate segments. The Allied Airborne Army would of been put to better use with smaller hops instead of trying to capture and enemy held route deep towards the Rhine.

The one thing to remember it was success overall but at a very high cost. Much like Malta was success for the Germany but at a very high cost.

Also it delayed other operation for clearing ports that were needed.