OT: Nuclear Situation in Korea

[Webstral]

In an effort to look at things without my usual rose-colored glasses, I’ve thought of a middle ground possibility for the nuclear situation in Korea—assuming that the North Koreans do in fact have one or more nuclear warheads that can be launched on a missile they currently field. We talk about extremes; i.e., if the North Koreans pop a nuke, we’ll turn the DPRK into a parking lot. Therefore, there will be tons of nukes or none. Kim may have a more nuanced thought process. Let’s suppose that he actually nukes a target—an important target, like a US base in Japan. The US response may not be total escalation. Even if the DPRK has no more long-range nukes, or even if we are confident we can get them all before launch, large-scale use of nuclear weapons in Korea would have very significant repercussions for our allies. Fallout and other radioactive debris would affect the ROK and Japan, at the very least. Also, a strike package in excess of 50 devices would cause stupendous loss of life in North Korea. Our mismanagement of the occupation of Iraq notwithstanding, I hope that we are still a moral people not inclined to the kind of wholesale slaughter the Allies turned on German and Japanese cities in WW2 if such slaughter can at all be avoided. For these reasons, we should not opt to “turn North Korea into a parking lot” regardless of the North Korean ability to continue a nuclear (or simply WMD) exchange.

However, if the North Koreans possess additional deliverable nuclear weapons, then the situation changes completely. Massive retaliation by the US for the use of a single device by the North Koreans would lead fairly directly to the deployment of the remaining North Korean nuclear (and probably WMD) arsenal. Whether any additional US targets were hit or not, the ROK and Japan would suffer. Therefore, the most reasonable US response to a single nuclear strike by the DPRK is a single nuclear counterstroke of comparable yield against a comparable target. Even if Kim didn’t think of this himself, one of his advisors will have. After all, I thought of it—and I was the last one to realize that the female “interpreters” at the checkpoint who spoke little English were not actually interpreters.

Taken together, all of this means that a single-device nuclear exchange between the US and the DPRK may be part of an astronomically cynical effort by Kim to consolidate his power and wring supplies out of the international community. A single US nuclear strike against a North Korean target would demonstrate beyond all domestic North Korean argument that the US is eminently hostile to North Korea. This would silence all opposition, just as Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran solidified Khomeini’s power in Iran. At the same time, the nuclear attack against North Korea would be the rationale for refusing to negotiate on nuclear weapons in the future. The legions of nuclear casualties could be used to put pressure on the international community to provide humanitarian relief. Doubtless many countries would respond to that pressure, which would put the US in an awkward position. The North Koreans might even allow Western press into the strike zone for this purpose.

In the end, then, the use of a nuclear weapon by the DPRK need not lead to the demise of Kim, the communist regime, or the DPRK. It might actually strengthen his hand domestically and confuse the issue internationally. Unfortunately, such an event also might reinforce dangerous ideas about limited nuclear war.