OT? A New Cold War

[Webstral]

It’s clear that others understand the basic problem of escalation relative to the prospect of fighting in Estonia. One would hope that fear of the unknown would cool the ardor of all parties involved. Unfortunately, the unknown can have the opposite effect. Whereas Putin might be put off an Estonian adventure by the idea that NATO might attack important strategic assets throughout the country pursuant to prosecuting operations in western Russia, he also might decide that the Americans are more likely to be put off taking the steps that might be necessary to liberate Estonia. In the latter case, the uncertainty of the situation becomes an asset because said uncertainty is believed to affect American thinking deeply enough to offer a window of opportunity. I don’t know nearly enough about Putin to make an educated guess about how he will look at the situation.

Getting back to the American response, I want to shift tracks to the ground offensive. Once Russia is in full possession of Estonia, it’s unlikely that anything short of a major ground offensive will put them out. For the same reasons that the liberation of Kuwait obliged Coalition forces to operate in an adjacent portion of Iraq, a liberation of Estonia will involve ground operations in nearby portions of Russia. If the POTUS isn’t prepared to fight on Russian soil, albeit near the Estonian border, then the whole business is off. At the same time, the liberation will take a large contingent of US forces. It’s hard to imagine that the European allies will be willing to put their ground forces into action while the US supplies no ground troops. At the end of the day, it’s going to take US heavy divisions to liberate Estonia. How many is a question for the Pentagon. I can’t imagine that anything less than 8 divisions will suffice, along with 12 or more NATO heavy divisions. Putting 8 US heavy divisions (mechanized infantry or armored) on the ground in Europe would mean mobilizing part of the National Guard, as well as part of the Army Reserve to provide support units.

The timetable would revolve around getting the required number of divisions to their assembly areas in Eastern Europe, along with their supplies. Let’s call the entire US ground force committed to the liberation Seventh US Army for the sake of argument. Seventh Army is going to have to come over in stages, because even during the height of the Cold War the US could sealift no more than a strong corps (4 divisions) at a time. Nowadays, I would not say that any more than 2 divisions could be sealifted in the first lap between CONUS and Europe. I would be willing to be proven incorrect.

Getting the required equipment to Europe might take 3 trips. We probably can expect that each trip would involve more transport shipping as ships are diverted from their normal civilian routes and otherwise brought out of mothballs in the Naval Reserve. I used to know all the facts and figures for reinforcing Europe by sea off the top of my head, but now I don’t. Under the best conditions, the CONUS-Europe leg would take no less than 6 days. That’s assuming the troops are embarking at Northeastern ports like New York or Boston. If they are embarking at Houston (which is the closest major port to Ft. Hood), one can double the time for transit.

Then there is unloading at the other end. I really don’t know how long that would take. I suppose the answer depends in part on which European ports are being used. If US forces are unloading in several European ports, the unloading will go much more quickly. If they are using only 1 port, unloading is going to take longer. How many ports are being used will depend in part on how many and which NATO allies are on board. Also, physical security will be a concern. Whether the Russians oppose the crossing or not, NATO has to assume the Russians might oppose the crossing. While air and submarine attacks against sealift vessels within 100 miles of the Atlantic/North Sea coast of Europe are unlikely, one simply doesn’t know. Also, mine countermeasures may necessitate using fewer ports because there are never enough minesweepers available. It would be unreasonable to assume that the Russians would not take an interest in mining the approaches to Western European ports once they conclude the Americans mean business about liberating Estonia.

Once the unloading is complete, there is the return trip. The mere prospect of Russian air or submarine attack on shipping in the North Atlantic will compel a convoy system, which will mean that the ships unloaded first will wait for the ships unloaded last before heading back across the Atlantic. Thus a round trip from New York might take 3 weeks. A trip starting in Texas and ending in New York could take a month. At the end of this first reinforcement effort, Seventh US Army may have received 2 divisions, plus whatever assets were airlifted in. The number of divisions could be lower.

While the first reinforcement mission is underway, we should expect the bean counters to have been doing their jobs. Other heavy divisions identified for the mission in Europe will be en route to their ports of embarkation. This is where the exact timing of things is in the hands of the logistics types. How long does it take to move 4th ID from Ft. Carson to whichever port is going to be used? The best ports to use are going to be the East Coast ports, preferably as far north as possible: Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City, Boston. Rail capacity, port capacity, available shipping, convoy mandates, and other factors will determine which divisions and what supplies are loaded when and where. It may be that after the first flotilla returns, the USN has the assets available to send 2 separate convoys.

Mobilization of the National Guard divisions needed to beef up Seventh US Army will have to be factored in as well. Ideally, each mobilized division would receive 90 days of training before being sent overseas. It’s hard to see how that will happen. I suspect whichever divisions are sent will get more like 45-60 days of training before shipping out to Europe. These divisions will go in the third wave of sealift.

Once a given heavy division is on dry land in Europe, it will have to go forward to Poland at the minimum. This will take some time.

The point of all this is that getting Seventh US Army ready to push the Russians out of Estonia will take some time. I’d be very surprised if 8 US heavy divisions were ready for action in anything less than 90 days. Everything would have to go perfectly for that to happen. Depending on a variety of factors, this could take 6 months—maybe more. Both sides will be very aware of this timeframe. If the Russians decide that NATO isn’t bluffing, they may go to full mobilization. It’s hard to say just how things will go at this juncture. The willingness of the Russians to stay in the fight will depend on what has been going on in the air war up to that point and on the willingness of the other NATO partners to stay the course with the US.