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#1
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I think that you get the soviet supply line wrong. Of course the main supply bases are Vladivostok and Komsomolsk-na-Amure but you forget about Magadan.
In addition, the entire Kamchatka and most of the soviet area near Alaska was a military zone at the time, possibly allowing them an alternate supply line to start the invasion. Yes the invasion is conducted by third line units but it is spearheaded by a small elite force of artic and naval units, perfectly suited for the job. The soviets might have had prewar plans to invade Alaska. Of course, I agree with what you say about the navy but IMO the russians are using mostly large air cushion vehicles and if these operate under winter condition they simply cannot be intercepted by the US Navy. Another point comes from the fact that the allies underestimate the soviets. The attack is entirely unexpected and probably considered impossible: too few units are deployed to meet that threat. In addtion, they arrive late. At last, I don't consider that the soviet were concerned with long term supply. This attack is to succeed or fail and the units would have to survive mostly on supplies found in the conquered area most like the Rundstedt offensive in the Ardennes (1944). Their only concern would be ammunitions. |
#2
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I'm positive that they did. I mean, otherwise someone at the Red Army is totally slacking off. At some point wasn't there some plan of Stalin's in the late '40s or early '50s to invade across the Bering Sea? Something like 1/2 million men were supposed to be stationed in the Chukotski Peninsula? A plan like that sounds miserable for the men and bit naive of Stalin. Maybe their rusty old supplies, still left in storage from the Korean War era, are scrounged up and used for the Twilight War invasion? Quote:
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And considering how "gentle" the Red Army is at the best of times, I can't imagine their "inventory and requisition" activities among the Alaskan and Canadian locals are going to win them any friends. In fact, if I move the invasion back to the winter of 1997-1998, then much of the fuel and food the commandeer is going to result in locals starving and freezing during the winter. That's going to breed some very bitter, determined partisans... and when you consider how well armed Alaska is as a state... the Mujahedeen won't have nothing on Alaska's Sourdoughs. So, do you have any other suggestions as to how the invasion's plausibility can be raised? A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing |
#3
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None at all; the main objections are given in the thread that was from the previous board. While the Soviets may have had plans for an Alaska invasion, it's highly unlikely that those plans could've been implemented. Even if Stalin told his planners to draw up a plan for an invasion of Alaska, I'll bet they came up with one just to please the dictator and keep their asses out of a Gulag, even if the planners knew that any Soviet invasion of Alaska was practically impossible. Lack of basing infrastructure in the Soviet Far East (and those bases can be hit by carrier air), dependence on sea and air supply (which can be interdicted), few roads in Alaska, and U.S. Air and Naval power that would make the entire adventure a very bloody mess, and result in Soviet defeat. Even if some airborne and amphibious forces do get into Alaska successfully, without resupply of ammo and fuel, they're not going anywhere, and U.S. forces would eventually mop them up.
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Treat everyone you meet with kindness and respect, but always have a plan to kill them. Old USMC Adage |
#4
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In addition, the West always underestimated the soviets supply capability there which is IMO insane. Just as a reminder, a large part of the Russian factories were transfered to Siberia in 1941 after the Nazi attack. That transfer took place in the worse of time and these factories were fully back in line only in a matter of month. Whatever your opinion on the USSR, this is outstanding and remain outstanding. The Northern Sea Route was also always important. During WW2 it was very active and instrumental in soviet victory. |
#5
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I agree with everything you are saying but as you said, the idea is mainly fun. Nevertheless, I still think that several of the difficulties can be overcome.
First, I always assume that the attack took place in winter in order to negate the naval threat. The other reason being the one you gave: the Soviet Pacific Fleet lay at the bottom of the sea. Second, numerous teams could have been landed or shipped long before the attack to ease the troops progression. I agree that Magadan is fairly remote but it's not only linked by road, it is also linked to the Transiberian. I agree that these forces are cut from industrial centers but, by the time of the attack, most of these are gone anyway. Stockpiles might not be that old because the soviet always had a tendency to maintain well equipped units in the far east regions. In addition, this has always been the trial area for new equipments. The first units to be equipped with BMP-3 and T-80 were located there. At last I forgot about one supply line which proved to be very important in past war for Russia (WW2). It is also largely neglected by everyone else: it is the Northern Sea Route. We talked about it with Jester who ran an interesting campaign around this (saddly I had no time to play it). This was traveled already in the early 1900's and opened by the Russian as early as the 1930's. As a result, every small harbor on the northern soviet coast is designed to support convoys going that way. As a matter of fact, even to these days, Russia remains the only country with the capability to maintain that route open. http://athropolis.com/arctic-facts/fact-nepass.htm Even during the cold war, US had no real way to stop that traffic as it had too few icebreakers. The soviets, however, had about 10 nuclear icebreakers and several dozen regular ones. In addition, given the time of the supposed landing, they would not have to fear much from airstrike. With the failure of the NATO attack on Murmansk, this route will remain open and it is doubtful that NATO destroyed these small unimportant fishing ports. |
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