Little Big Horn, A Study of a Cavalry Regiment in the Indian Wars

[Legbreaker]

I think it's worth noting that in Vietnam where the Australians were issued with L1A1 SLR rifles, "first line" ammunition load was just 60 rounds of 7.62N, 200 rounds of 5.56N (for those handful who found themselves with an M16) and 600 rounds belted for the M60s.

The US Cavalry with their 100 and 24 were much better supplied when you think about it.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

I think it's worth noting that in Vietnam where the Australians were issued with L1A1 SLR rifles, "first line" ammunition load was just 60 rounds of 7.62N, 200 rounds of 5.56N (for those handful who found themselves with an M16) and 600 rounds belted for the M60s.

The US Cavalry with their 100 and 24 were much better supplied when you think about it.

Yeah, but coming from a time in which you would have at min over twice as much 5.56N rounds.

Then again we didn't have supply trains following us everywhere in the field...

[Grimace]

While a very small portion of the information is likely incorrect (as time changes so much in history, it seems) this is a very good display of the information for the Battle of Little Big Horn.

Two years ago I made the trip to the Battle of Little Big Horn. If you guys ever get a chance, it's a rather sombering place to visit that really drives home what these guys in the 7th Cavalry experienced. Seeing the grave markers placed where (supposedly) each man fell, the white stone with the individual name on it standing out against the golden wild grass of the hills, it really gives you an idea of not only where they were, but what they were up against. I can also say, based on the chase-kills and surrounded death-pockets where the men died, there was well more than a thousand indians. Five to 1 odds would be something that the cavalry would have handled better. 10 or 20 to 1 would certianly cause the panic, the desperation, and the last ditch attempts to survive on terrain that offered no real place to hide or escape.

It's a whole different experience when you put yourself into the battle and see what they saw. Very enlightening, yet very sombering.

[bobcat]

Originally Posted by Grimace

While a very small portion of the information is likely incorrect (as time changes so much in history, it seems) this is a very good display of the information for the Battle of Little Big Horn.

Two years ago I made the trip to the Battle of Little Big Horn. If you guys ever get a chance, it's a rather sombering place to visit that really drives home what these guys in the 7th Cavalry experienced. Seeing the grave markers placed where (supposedly) each man fell, the white stone with the individual name on it standing out against the golden wild grass of the hills, it really gives you an idea of not only where they were, but what they were up against. I can also say, based on the chase-kills and surrounded death-pockets where the men died, there was well more than a thousand indians. Five to 1 odds would be something that the cavalry would have handled better. 10 or 20 to 1 would certianly cause the panic, the desperation, and the last ditch attempts to survive on terrain that offered no real place to hide or escape.

It's a whole different experience when you put yourself into the battle and see what they saw. Very enlightening, yet very sombering.

i completely agree. these brave riders where screwed as soon as they stepped out. one can argue weapons and tactics all day long but at those odds, even if they could have carried twice as much ammo. they would have been slaughtered. the purest sign of how overwhelmed they were is the fact they resorted to killing their mounts to use as cover. something everyone under a stetson knows is only done when you know you not coming out alive.

[Abbott Shaull]

Yeah that is one things we don't realize when we look back in history. The modern Fire Team, Squad, Platoon, and Battalion organization that we take for granted today weren't used as they are today. Even in today standards Regiment and Battalion are used to mean the same thing.

Many of times when Battalions were mention it was just a collection of Companies being lead by either the senior Company Commander or one of the staff officers from Regiment with whatever resource the Regiment Commander would offer for support.

Yes 1st Lt, 2nd Lt, and many of the NCOs were there to make sure that troops on the firing line followed orders.

Also it wasn't uncommon for Officers in the various regiments to be seconded for other duties leaving most Regiments short of their TO&E for Officers. There was full Colonel listed as member of the Regiment, but it seems for most of the 7th Cavalry existence that Lt Colonel Custer was "acting" commander something that I hadn't known. That was even doing a report on the battle back in school. Then again there wasn't this thing called the internet to find all of this information either...

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

Yeah that is one things we don't realize when we look back in history. The modern Fire Team, Squad, Platoon, and Battalion organization that we take for granted today weren't used as they are today. Even in today standards Regiment and Battalion are used to mean the same thing.

Many of times when Battalions were mention it was just a collection of Companies being lead by either the senior Company Commander or one of the staff officers from Regiment with whatever resource the Regiment Commander would offer for support.

Yes 1st Lt, 2nd Lt, and many of the NCOs were there to make sure that troops on the firing line followed orders.

Also it wasn't uncommon for Officers in the various regiments to be seconded for other duties leaving most Regiments short of their TO&E for Officers. There was full Colonel listed as member of the Regiment, but it seems for most of the 7th Cavalry existence that Lt Colonel Custer was "acting" commander something that I hadn't known. That was even doing a report on the battle back in school. Then again there wasn't this thing called the internet to find all of this information either...

LOL, internet is a wonderful thing, but I got always get more satisfaction from a good book, I've been collecting manuals and books on various topics since I was 13. My wife keeps threatening to open a library just to get the books out of the house!

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

LOL, internet is a wonderful thing, but I got always get more satisfaction from a good book, I've been collecting manuals and books on various topics since I was 13. My wife keeps threatening to open a library just to get the books out of the house!

Yeah I understand what you mean. I wish I had all the book that I have purchased on military history. I don't know where they would all go, but it would be nice to have the entire collection on hand. One thing with these new eBook have over the physical book is that your collection is condense, on the other hand sometimes the physical page is better to show too...lol

I remember 20 years ago how computers were suppose to turn us into paperless society. In reality it has only made it where it uses more paper, because everyone has to have their own hard copy of things. Maybe eBooks trend will help some of that out, and you don't have to load box after box of often heavy books when you move too.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by bobcat

i completely agree. these brave riders where screwed as soon as they stepped out. one can argue weapons and tactics all day long but at those odds, even if they could have carried twice as much ammo. they would have been slaughtered. the purest sign of how overwhelmed they were is the fact they resorted to killing their mounts to use as cover. something everyone under a stetson knows is only done when you know you not coming out alive.

One of intresting things about LBH is that there is very little reference to the cavalry shooting their mounts and using them as breastworks with the exception of a dozen or so mounts on Custer Hill.

The Upton manual stresses that the horses were to be pulled back behind cover, this distance was to be anywhere from 50-200 yards behind the skirmish line.

There is a lot of reference to horses having been shot during the course of the battle, but Indian oral tradition has always held that the mounts were shot in the course of the battle or were stampeded by various warriors.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

One of intresting things about LBH is that there is very little reference to the cavalry shooting their mounts and using them as breastworks with the exception of a dozen or so mounts on Custer Hill.

The Upton manual stresses that the horses were to be pulled back behind cover, this distance was to be anywhere from 50-200 yards behind the skirmish line.

There is a lot of reference to horses having been shot during the course of the battle, but Indian oral tradition has always held that the mounts were shot in the course of the battle or were stampeded by various warriors.

That was one of the things that I always found discouraging when I was doing my report back in grade school. This was back like 1979 or 1980 time frame, that one book would say that horse were shot and used as improvised breast-works with drawing to that effect. While others made reference to the oral history that they were chased away...

I guess in many ways the little things that added up to Custer defeat there as add to the legend and myths that persist to this day of what happen there.

[Grimace]

that one book would say that horse were shot and used as improvised breast-works with drawing to that effect. While others made reference to the oral history that they were chased away...

Or, the more likely situation, there was some of each. All those men means there were a lot of horses as well. Some may have been run off, others may have been kept, shot by indians (though that would be somewhat doubtful that they would do such a thing on purpose...the Indians treasured horses) or killed by desperate cavalryman who wanted some sort of cover when they realized they were literally surrounded by indians and their fellow troopers were dying all around them.

Being at the battle site showed very plainly that there was NO cover for Custer's men. The trees that are within a mile of the place where Custer fell are all probably only 40-60 years old. So those trees weren't even there during the battle and they were only in a location where Benteen could have used them had they existed at the time. Where Custer was...no trees. Simple, exposed hillside.

[Punkpogoer]

Have any of you been to the LBH battle site? I've been there, very interesting stuff. Of course they take you on the tour and give you the "official" story, but you can gather quite a bit from just wondering around the place. I've not done an indepth study like dragoon500ly has here, but from my experience of touring the site I would have to make the assumption that Custer was an incompetent.

[dragoon500ly]

The sad thing about LBH is not that Custer was an idiot. Custer had been fighting Indians off and on since 1867. He was regarded as being an advocate of the Indians, and had earned their respect as a warrior.

There is no doubt that Custer failed to believe his scouts about the true size of the villages in the valley. In accordance to his instructions from Terry and his on instincts as a fighter, he decided to attack. In all fairness, throughout the entire history of the Indian Wars (1866-1891) whenever any army column attacked an Indian village, the Indians broke and ran, except for this one time at LBH. Custer went into battle expecting to win, Indian testimony shows that he maneuvered his battalion to support Reno. But when Reno broke and routed out of the valley, then the Indians were able to focus on Custer and his battalion. The very layout of the slaughtered cavalrymen shows that Custer expected Benteen to bring up his squadron and the pack train with its ammo reserve.

From Custer Hill, down Battle Ridge and Calhoun Hill, the positions of the fallen speak of an attempt to hold a line to allow reinforcements and resupply to join Custer. When the Indians managed to overwhelm the cavalry on Calhoun Hill and then start rolling up the line towards Custer Hill, then the cavalry men, on foot, running out of ammo, and demoralized by the sudden turn of events, started running for safety. At some point, a company of cavalry made an attack down Deep Ravine trying to make for the river only to be stopped and cut-down.

The more I research LBH, the more I shift through the Court of Inquiry documents, the reports filed after the battle, the more I get the sense of an effort to white-wash the whole affair, to blame the dead for the failure and to release the living from any sense of responsability.

No, Custer was not an idiot, seeking glory on a battlefield, if any officer every deserved that title, then it would be Captain Fetterman. Was Custer perfect, by no means is this so. Did he make mistakes, certainly, but no more than any other cavalry officer serving in the West.

[dragoon500ly]

This is the makeup of the Terry Column on May 18, 1876:

The fighting element
7th Cavalry: 28 officers, 747 enlisted
2 companies, 17th Infantry & 1 company, 6th Infantry:
8 officers, 135 enlisted
1 section of Gatling Guns (drawn from 20th Infantry):
2 officers, 32 enlisted, 3 .50-caliber Gatlings
45 Indian Scouts

The supply train
114 six-mule teams, 37 two-horse teams, 70 other wagons and 85 pack mules with 179 civilian packers.

[dragoon500ly]

The Terry Column had joined with the Gibbon Column at the mouth of the Rosebud River. An officer's call was held to plan the next course of action.

The current situation was this: General Terry knew of the presence of General Crook's column, but did not know just where Crook was presently operating. The operations of Gibbon's Montana Column and Terry's Dakota Column could only be coordinated in the most general way. At the conference, Terry was very doubtful of the ability of the two columns to assist each other in case of contact with the hostile Indians. Terry ended a dispatch to General Sheridan with the words; "I only hope that one of the two columns will find the Indians. I go personally with Gibbon..."

It was believed that the Indians were encamped at the head of the Rosebud River or on the Little Big Horn River, a divide of only 15-20 miles of ridges separating the two. Terry decided that Custer would strike the blow. This was a disappointment to Gibbon and his column, elements of which had been in the field since February 22nd, monitoring the movements of the Indians until the three columns could get into position to attack.

Terry's reasons for selecting the Seventh for the honor of the attack were good ones. The Seventh was all cavalry and could pursue the Indians if the attempted to escape while Gibbon's column was half infantry and in the rapid approach march to the Indian camp, could become separated. The Seventh was the numerically stronger than Gibbon's column and Terry made the decision that the strongest unit should strike.

The most recent report from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in regard to the number of hostiles absent from the agencies, estimated a figure of not more than 1,500 warriors. Custer stated at the conference that this figure was not correct and that there probably three times that number. The conference broke-up around sundown and Custer followed Terry to his tent where the two spent some time in converstation.

Officer's call brought his subordinates to Custer's tent. Orders were given to prepare the pack mules (there were 12 assigned to each troop) in the morning with 15 days rations of bard bread, coffee and sugar and 12 days rations of bacon. Twelve of the strongest mules were to carry the 24,000 rounds of the regiment's reserve ammo. Each trooper was to be issued 100 rounds of carbine ammo and 24 rounds of pistol ammo. For every horse, 12 pounds of oats were to be carried, with care to ration it after lengthy marches. Custer also suggested that extra forage might come in handy, but the troop commanders foresaw difficulties in packing the extra forage. "Well gentlemen," Custer replied, "you may carry what supplies you please; you will be held responsible for your companies. The extra forage was only a suggestion, but this fact bear in mind, we will follow the trail for 15 days unless we catch them before that time expires, no matter how far it takes us from our base of supplies. We may not see the supply steamer again. You had better carry along an extra supply of salt, we may have to live on horse meat before we get through."

While the troopers made their preparations, Custer was accosted by Major James Brisbin, Gibbon's second in command. Brisbin offered Custer four troops of the 2nd Cavalry, but Custer declined. Stating, "The 7th can handle anything it meets." An plea was made by Lieutenant Low to take all or part of his Gatling detachement was also refused, on the grounds that the cumbersome guns, pulled by condemned horses might impede the 7th's march.

[dragoon500ly]

By mid-morning of July 22nd, 1876, the Seventh was ready for its 15 day planned march. Custer received Terry's written orders. The instructions wer implicit and fixed the location of the hostiles. This is the order:

Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory
June 22, 1876

Lieutenant Colonel Custer
7th Cavalry

Colonel,

The Brigadier General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken leads. Should it be found, as it appears almost certain that it will be found,to turn towards the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn towards the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course, its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.

The Department commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should throughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's column, with information of that result of your examination. The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon's command. The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks if the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the mean time you receive further orders.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant

E.W. Smith, Captain 18th Infantry
Acting Assistant Adjutant General

[Legbreaker]

"Condemned horses" to pull the gatlings?
Does this mean they were no longer suitable for riding?