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#1
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Remember that the 4th Guard Tank Army was running on Gasoline, but remember unless they trucked it wall with them on their movement, it had probably been stages along their route of march for what some suspect to be their attack into Southern Germany. The normal route probably didn't call for cache of supplies in Central Poland.
I do see the 3rd Shock Army and the Frontal HQ nearby being one of the last supplies caches in the Legnica and Wraclaw regions and part of the reason why these the 3rd Shock Army and it component units were unwilling to move much. Especially if they had KGB Officers over watching these units with orders to protect the fuel dumps at all cost.... |
#2
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What I got from the V1 scenario was that the 124th MRD was caught in transit by 3-70 Armor and 3-10 Infantry backed by 6 155mm of 2-19 or 2-21 Field Artillery. What I got from the encounter is that the bulk of the effective combat power of the 124th (i.e. the bulk of its AFV's) were destroyed in the initial exchange or the subsequent counterattack on 3-70's positions. My read was that the bulk of the Soviet armor passed by (due to timing) or was allowed to pass by (due to discipline). From what I've studied I get that in the command, main combat, and most of the supply elements of the 124th were totally shattered, causing the bulk of the survivors to desert, flee in total panic, loot, etc., and that it would be some time before it represented anything akin to a cohesive unit.
With that said, I honestly don't get the feel that there were supply dumps of any magnitude west of the Warta and north of the Kalisz-Sieradz road. Looking back at my material, narrative, and maps, I think that with a little luck and fire discipline (the tankers of 3-70 are by now seasoned veterans and most likely alive because they're good at what they do), you could assume that at least anough of the tankers carrying fuel/water within the 124th's column could survive. If 3-10 Infantry can secure the far side of the road, you can set upon anything that isn't actively exploding like a plague of locusts. You're a long way from home, if you had a chance to get some fuel and water from your enemy, wouldn't you? hell, I'd pick clean anything of everything. When you have no chance of regular supply, I assume anyone in a similar situation would. My guess is that the men of 3-70 had a bit of time to see what was below them on the road. After 4 years of seeing Russian trucks and markings, my guess at least some of them knew what Water and Fuel vehicles (be they tankers or trucks hauling jerry cans) are marked like. The vehicles in the task force that engaged the 124th were all low on fuel, which means to me that conversion to gasoline would be as simple as activating the proper control at the driver's station and pumping in enough to get you by. Excess captured or salvaged (siphoned/pumped or pulled from those handy barrels on the back of Soviet tanks) could be forwarded back to help other units escape. What I don't quite get is the 21st MRD seemed to either be very lucky or have a much better idea where the 5th was....more so than the others, especially the 124th. They sure seemed to just drive into it blind. That's all I've got for now...time to put the girls down for bed. Thanks, Dave |
#3
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It's my belief, looking at the Referee's info detailing the aftermath, that the Americans opened up on the combat units of the 124th. It seems extremely unlikely that the 124th would have been advancing with their supply vehicles enmeshed in their combat units.
Also, the combat units represent the greatest threat to the Americans and therefore would attract the bulk of the fire. This would possibly allow any supply vehicles amongst the combat units to flee. Shattered doesn't necessarily mean destroyed either. It could be applied equally well to disbursed to the four winds, fleeing in panic as far as they could go. These units may have been picked up by other Soviet units in the region and absorbed rather than sent back to the 124th - who in T2K would send a truck full of diesel away when they can run their own vehicles on it for a while? Looking at the capabilities of the various vehicle types, we can see that onroad a T-72M running on diesel can go approximately 540 km on one load of fuel. In other words, they've probably refueled just once since setting out from the Ukraine, and still have a hundred kilometres or so of range left in their fuel tanks. With say 20 T-72s that's ony about 32,000 litres - three truckloads. Add in softskins, APCs and the like and it's probably only about 6 trucks used - no need for a stockpile. Of course they need fuel for their intended mission, so I suppose quadruple that to about 25 trucks for the division, or approximately 250,000 litres - still not enough to warrant supply dumps and the necessary security protecting them would require. The 3-70 had nothing but fumes in their fuel tanks. There reserves were totally gone. If somebody had squirrelled away a few jerry cans, then would have been the time to use them rather than fight and be destroyed in place as they were. Yes, multifuel engines such as the M1's don't take a lot of time to convert, but don't forget the multitude of other vehicles within the formation. Each and every one of them according to the rules needs 8 hours work by a competant mechanic to convert. That's one hell of a lot of manhours when the enemy could come down hard at any minute. Also, we know that the pact frontline units had a difficult time and suffered plenty of casualties against the Americans, however what about their artillery? We know that the US were short of a lot of things by the last day and had virtually no way to get additional ammo from the supply units to those who needed them. Therefore counterbattery fire would be limited at best and the mechanics in constant danger. Once the combat elements of the 124th were destroyed, and the Americans essentially exhausted, they'd still have to face the Pact artillery. I for one wouldn't like hanging around syphoning fuel tanks while 122mm HE was raining around my ears, and as already indicated, it's very unlikely they'd be any 10,000 tanker trucks sitting about the battlefield.
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If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem |
#4
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So since the 4th GTA had a months output in their supply chain, how many liters would that be?
The 5th Mechanized start their Offensive action when? It took the 4th GTA until after the start of July to catch up and pin the 5th Mechanized Division. Seems like to me if they had really been totally running and carrying all of the fuel with them they should of probably slammed into the Division when it was much closer to the IX Corps and not in the middle of Central Poland. |
#5
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Romania in the mid 90's was producing approximately 135,000 barrels per day, or about 27,000,000 litres.
http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.asp...aph=production Ploesti is a refinery rather than a field and according to wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroch...try_in_Romania refines approximately 3,200 cubic metres of oil per day. That's 3,200,000 litres per day. At 1% of prewar figures (as we're told in the books) that's still 32,000 litres per day, or close to a million litres a month. Note that during refinery (a process I don't understand 100%) you can actually get more volume out than you put in! We also know that an entire months production was dedicated to shifting a couple of divisions. Using my earlier example of about 250,000 litres for the 124th, I think we can agree that the 4th GTA had more than enough to keep them going for weeks of activity.
__________________
If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem |
#6
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The only argument that I have with that analysis is that no mention of pact artillery is made that I can see. That doesn't surprise me, given that it is stated that the 124th lost its Co, XO, and a Regimental Commander (the "three top officers") during that engagement or within the next twelve hours. My money is that it was within minutes of the ambush being sprung. With the loss of command and control, if there was artillery (say a couple of D-30's or 120mm mortars, as it was a low grade formation) still attached to the 124th, or any other artillery that could be brought to bear in support (from the 21st, most likely), it couldn't be called for, much less targeted.
it would certainly seem from this scenario and others (Black Madonna being one) that Pact artillery took fearfull losses againts NATO. before the AVGAS and parts ran out, the jabos must have been busy unlike anything seen since Normandy in 1944! In addition, it is mentioned that there were significant fires and explosions from ammo vehicles in particular, which tells me that there is at least part of the divisional supply train in attendance at this party. The status report for the 124th for the next day states that the bulk of the forward supply vehicles of the 124th have been destroyed, which reinforces my perception. If the US task group/battlegroup/whatever didn't move significantly from it's position until before dawn, my guess is that the losses were encurred in the road killing ground. Lastly, I think it was mentioned that the counterattack came from the Americans' right flank, which tells me most of the remaining AFV's/Tanks belonging to the 124th were well beyond the killing zone when the shooting started, exposing the division's supply vehicles. Thanks for the feedback! LOL, this was the highlight of the day! Thanks- Dave |
#7
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You're welcome. It's what we're all here for!
__________________
If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem |
#8
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Forward supply vehicles - company and maybe battalion. Brigade and divisonal assets would most certainly have been held back/removed from danger at the first sign of trouble.
Agreed-whatever forward transport was caught in the killing ground stayed there and either died there or was captured. The 124th's rear area supply dump and hub was listed as Piotrkow. They will have to beg/borrow/steel/trade for trucks to bring what they do have in their supply dump forward, though. Of course, their most pressing concern is rounding up the scattered and shattered formations and trying to get them back into some form of fighting trim. Given the "Mobilization Only" status (aka "cannon fodder") of the division and the losses at the top of the command structure, this could take a while. This alone removes them from the pursuit phase of the operation. After studying the situation further, I'm baffled as to why the division, having had contact with the 5th earlier, seemingly bludered into this ambush in the first place. Yes, there could have been more detail to the story that was left out, and perhaps they DID deploy a recce screen to secure their flanks and try to find the enemy division that was known to be out there somewhere, but it sure doesn't seem like it. Thanks- Dave |
#9
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All the more likely for things to be screwed up for the Division, being a Mobilized Only Division, discipline probably wasn't the best. I think by 2000 most of the remaining Soviet troops aren't in hurry to move because the lack of confidence that they will be resupply, so adding transport to follow with a Battalion or Regiment would help ease minds. Of course, these transports have to be protected, hence taking away recon troops from their job, and detail to help protect forward supply transport, could explain why and how it happen.
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