LAV-75; Stingray; M8 AGS

[HorseSoldier]

Being able to provide effective fire support for infantry units and engage soft targets was the big criteria driving the 105mm gun for the Stryker MGS (well that and a desire to capitalize on existing stocks of 105mm ammo). Makes sense that a 105mm version would have been considered, possibly even fielded alongside the 75mm version in some quantity. A 105mm armed system, for instance, would be a better replacement for the Sheridans in the 82nd for contingency operations, etc.

[Legbreaker]

What sort of weight different could there be between the 75mm and 105mm?
With an airdroppable/transportable vehicle, every last kilogram could be important.

[James Langham]

I think I can see my next write up coming.

Rough outline:

1980s - RDF Light Tank proposed and trialed Not a huge success but workable. Not adopted
Late 1980s M8 proposed and prototypes built
1993 ish - M8 getting nowhere, Congress orders off the shelf package
1994 trials of Sherridan with 105 Stingray turret, RDF Light tank (slightly improved), Sherriden with ARES gun, Scorpion 90, maybe a couple of others (THM301?)
1995 Sino-Soviet War, rapid numbers needed, Sherridan with Stingray turret, LAV75 adopted as little impact on M2 production. Standard Sherridans also refurbished
1996 LAV75A1 with 105mm gun adopted, some LAV75 with Stingray turrets tried
1997 M8 trial vehicles pulled from storage and issued

Thoughts?

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by HorseSoldier

Being able to provide effective fire support for infantry units and engage soft targets was the big criteria driving the 105mm gun for the Stryker MGS (well that and a desire to capitalize on existing stocks of 105mm ammo). Makes sense that a 105mm version would have been considered, possibly even fielded alongside the 75mm version in some quantity. A 105mm armed system, for instance, would be a better replacement for the Sheridans in the 82nd for contingency operations, etc.

My thinking exactly. The fighting in the Far East would have shown the value of a modern assault gun for light forces. During the main Chinese counteroffensive in late 1995, Chinese light infantry would have gone up against at least some prepared fighting positions occupied by Soviet troops. While the Chinese would have employed large numbers of RPG firing HE against Soviet fighting positions, the fighting would have revealed the value of having self-propelled guns to help reduce the enemy's fortifications. A few perceptive folks in the Pentagon might have recognized that while SP guns are available to the heavy divisions, the light divisions would have no weapons acting in the assault gun role. (The Sheridans of the 82nd Airborne are a noteworthy exception, if they remained in service through 1995) Assuming that the LAV-75 had been approved for deployment in the light divisions prior to the start of the war, the same logic that applied to our earlier discussion about refitting all of the LAV-75s would apply to refitting, say, half of them for the assault gun role. The TO&E wouldn't even have to be reorganized. Each battalion of LAV might contain two companies of LAV-75 acting in the tank destroyer role and two companies of LAV-105 acting in the assault gun role. Against most of the enemy's AFV, the assault gun variant would have been reasonably effective with the added bonus of greater flexibility.

The Soviet offensive in 1996 might have served to reinforce the value of the assault gun, depending on how things worked on the battlefield. We know from the v1 chronology that the PLA made good use of the respite between the main Chinese counteroffensive in late 1995 (Operation Red Willow) and the Spring 1996 offensive launched by the Pact. Tying into previous discussions on the matter, the Chinese almost certainly made extensive use of mines and other obstacles, plus hardened fighting positions. Where Soviet assault guns were available, they would have been in high demand to knock out bypassed Chinese strong points (since the tanks, in accordance with Soviet doctrine, would have been pushed through gaps in the enemy's defenses to keep the offensive moving forward). Depending on how this worked out, Western observers in-country probably would have seen the value of a heavily mechanized force using specialty weapons instead of diverting SP guns for the job. There's a lot of room for interpretation here, though.

Nonetheless, the Chinese experience of using light infantry forces against mechanized forces would have caught the attention of the command and staff of the light US divisions, of not the higher-ups.

Webstral

[Grendel]

I could definately see the LAV-75 upgunned with the predecessor of the MGS' 105mm turret in the assault gun role under the designation LAV105. I would organize them as 3 plts of 75mm armed LAV75's with 1 plt of LAV105's per company to facilitate the destruction of bunkers and other fortifications. The LAV105 would travel in the middle of the formation and could swing forward to engage fortifications. They could even have flechete or "beehive" rounds to take care of infantry. This tactic was used in Vietnam when NVA sappers would swarm an M48 in an attemot to remove the hatches and drop grenades into the turret, another M48 would fire a behive round at the M48 which would quickly dispatch the sappers with no damage to the M48's armor integrity.

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by Grendel

I could definately see the LAV-75 upgunned with the predecessor of the MGS' 105mm turret in the assault gun role under the designation LAV105. I would organize them as 3 plts of 75mm armed LAV75's with 1 plt of LAV105's per company to facilitate the destruction of bunkers and other fortifications. The LAV105 would travel in the middle of the formation and could swing forward to engage fortifications. They could even have flechete or "beehive" rounds to take care of infantry. This tactic was used in Vietnam when NVA sappers would swarm an M48 in an attemot to remove the hatches and drop grenades into the turret, another M48 would fire a behive round at the M48 which would quickly dispatch the sappers with no damage to the M48's armor integrity.

I keep trying to avoid the term LAV105. How about LAV75(105)?

As for organisation, I suggest it is done as the Sherman 76s were used in WW2, each division can make it's own plan, some will have separate companies to ease logistics, others will have them integrated within troops for flexibility, others will compromise with separate companies. Most will just slot them in wherever they can get a vehicle as a replacement.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by James Langham

I keep trying to avoid the term LAV105. How about LAV75(105)?

I think Paul calls it the LAV-74A4 on his website.

[Grendel]

Originally Posted by James Langham

I keep trying to avoid the term LAV105. How about LAV75(105)?

As for organisation, I suggest it is done as the Sherman 76s were used in WW2, each division can make it's own plan, some will have separate companies to ease logistics, others will have them integrated within troops for flexibility, others will compromise with separate companies. Most will just slot them in wherever they can get a vehicle as a replacement.

The only reason I suggested it is that it is obvious the guys at GDW renamed the HSTVL the LAV75 was the weapon it carried. But hey LAV75(105) works to. Of course I would have expected had it actually entered service it would have recieved a "M" designation.

[James Langham]

Well here we go...

[Grendel]

Originally Posted by James Langham

Well here we go...

Nice!!