OT; The Longest Day

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

The real crime was not acknowledging it was a lost cause early on and continuing to waste men in a hopeless attempt to force the way inland against prepared positions and heavy fire.

That sin was a trademark of British operations throughout WW2. There was a view that if we could throw enough men at a problem we would make it go away.

[dragoon500ly]

source material from "D-Day" and "Cross-Channel Attack"...

Churchill pushed for an invasion of Southern France as an alternative to striking the Atlantic Wall directly. The Americans agreed to this in order to secure the key ports of Toulon and Marsielle. Further operations into France and towards Germany would have run into the Volges Mountains (the region along the French-Swiss-German border). It was recognized early on that any major efforts into the Volges would have quickly bogged down, the ground was simply excellent for conduct of a defense (it litterly would have been up one ridge after another).

[Adm.Lee]

As it happened, the Seventh US Army went through the Vosges fairly easily in November, even though the German defenses had solidified in September. Eisenhower had to push very hard to get Churchill to agree to the southern France landings, he wanted them very much to draw pressure off the Normandy front. The landing was originally code-named "Anvil," later changed to "Dragoon." Churchill quipped that it was because he had to be dragooned into it!

The capture of Marseilles was fortuitous, since its port was nearly intact, and it was able to supply both the Seventh US and French First Armies, and even some of Patton's Third.

[dragoon500ly]

According to the Green Book, the Vogles fighting was some of the hardest that the Seventh Army had to endure. The 442nd RCT earned most of its decorations in the Vosges (just to one example). I've walked the ground there once and its damned good defensive terrain, almost impassable to vehicle traffic off road and with lots of nasty little ridges and draws to disrupt any advance.

But if I've learned anything from researching military history, its that you will always find conflicting reports on every battle! One battalion can report foot-by-foot defense by well-led defenders and another battalion on the other side of the ridge, gets greeted by swarms of defenders all to ready to surrender. Go figure!

As for dear Winston, I've seen books and articles stating that he argued for or against every decision made in the war. So I have no doubt that we are looking at different views from one of the 20th Centuries premier politicans!

[dragoon500ly]

There was an article in the #27 issue of World at War that caught my eye. Its an indepth examination of the Atlantic Wall, one of the tables sheds a little light on something that is all too often ignored.

Logistics

Each Allied division required about 644 tons of supplies daily, this was not only to support the division, but an equal "slice" of the corps/army troops supporting each divisions.

By August 5, 1944 this is what the Allies were shipping into Normandy:

Utah Beach: 4,506 tons per day; enough to support 7 divisions.

Omaha Beach: 7,582 tons per day; enough to support 12 divisions.

Four Small Ports: 3,390 tons per day (total); enough to support 5 divisions.

Mulberry B: 7,000 tons per day; enough to support 11 divisions.

British Beaches (Gold, Juno and Sword): 4,000 tons per day; enough to support 6 divisions.

Cherbourg: 13,500 tons per day; enough to support 21 divisions.

[dragoon500ly]

So just how well defended were the Normandy Beaches?

The Atlantic Wall defenses were made up of two types of fortifications; the Stuetzpunkten (StP or strongpoints) were roughly company-sized positions that included a mix of heavy and light fortifications set up for 360-defense. Obstacles (mainly barbed wire and AT ditches) and minefields surrounded their perimenter, as well as formed internal barricades within the position. Heavy fortifications included combat and supporting bunkers while light fortifications were mostly open positions, such as weapon pits and trenches. Many of the StP also included artillery batteries and flak postions.

The most common positions were the Widerstandsnest (Wn or resistance nests). For the most part, these were rouyghly platoon-sized postions that contained a "shell-proof" postions. These mostly consisted of machine gun and mortar positions as well as postions with artillery ranging from 37mm up to 88mm in caliber.

StP and Wn were sited in areas most suited to amphibious landings and were usually placed in one or two defensive lines. The so-called Fortress Areas simply conisted of seveal StP and Wn which were placed to cover not only the beaches, but the landward approaches as well.

The StP and Wn also suffered from two critical weaknesses. First, so short of weapons was the Third Reich that the Atlantic Wall had to rely on a large number of foreign or older weapons, this created major logistical problems in the supply of ammunition and spare parts.

The second critical weakness lay in the troops assigned to defend the wall. A large number of the troops came from the Ost Battalions, units formed up non-German troops, mainly Eastern European "volunteers", whose reliability was questionable. Those German units present in the west often had their ranks filled out with soldiers recuperating from wounds suffered on the eastern front. Many of these units also included large numbers of young and elderly soldiers, often only partially trained. Many of the beach defense units were from Bodenstaendug (Static) Divisions that lacked almost any organic transport.

The number of divisions assigned to the Atlantic Wall was in a constant state of flux, as the best formations were sent to the east to heelp stabilize the deteriorating situatuion. Shattered and depleted divisions from the east took their place.

Hampering the troops was Rommel's decision to focus on the setting up of obstacles and the laying of mines, at the expense of the training of the troops.

Source material is World at War #27 "Atlantic Wall Analysis" and the "German Army Handbook"

[dragoon500ly]

The defenses of lower Normandy (defined as west of the Seine River and including the Cotentin Peninsula) were at their strongest near Cherbourg and included numerous coastal artillery emplacements. The area that would be known as Utah Beach did not include even a small fishing harbor, so it wasn't fortified as heavily. The primary defense was the flooding of the area behind the beach, this left four causeway exits from the beach itself.

The original planned invasion beaches were defended by a Wn and a StP with two 88mm guns placed that flanked the beaches. Fortunately, the loss of several command and control craft and a heavy current pushed the initial waves further south by several hundred yards, an area that was defended by only a single Wn.

Behind the flooded areas, the Germans built two (and third under construction) battery positions, the two active positions were at Azeville (105mm guns) and further north at Crisbeq (210mm guns).

Omaha Beach was defended by a dozen Wn, some of which had 75mm guns, while the one at Vierville had an 88mm gun that flanked the beach. A flooded area also existed beind the beach, but the topography placed this further inland. Many of the Wns were positioned on the bluffs, but some were also placed to flake the beach. Further west was a casemated battery position at Pointe de Hoc, its 155mm guns could fire into Omaha and Utah. Inland was another battery poisition at Maisy (also 155mm and able to fire into Omaha and Utah). Just east of Omaha is the small fishing harbor of Port-en-Bessin, defended by a battery of 155mm guns in a casemated battery at Longues.

The British/Canadian beaches included some small fishing harbors. Shoals covered large portions of Juno and Sword beaches. Sword was defended by a StP (with two 155mm guns), two Wn flanking the beaches and several more Wn inland, guarding the exits from Sword.

Juno Beach was defended by three Wn (one at Courseulles-sur-Mer, with two flanking it) As well as two additional Wn (Bernieres-sur-Mer and St. Aubin)

The British forces landing on Gold Beach would have to deal with four Wn on the beach, with two additional ones inland near Mont Fleury. These positions had a mix of 88mm, 75mm and 50mm guns. East of the Orne River was Battery Merville which had four 100mm guns covering the beach. Further east was Battery Mont Caisny (155mm guns), designed to provide flanking fire for Le Havre.

Too recap, the invasion beaches were protected by elements of three divisions, support by some 7 StP and over 60 Wn, the largest coastal batteries were 210mm and most were 155mm.


Source material is World at War #27 "Atlantic Wall Analysis" and the "German Army Handbook"