Somewhat OT: Harriers and Helicopters

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Panther Al

I agree that the Harriers did well over the South Atlantic, but do remember they was playing defence against aircraft that was there to attack ships, not play with the defenders any more than they have to: never did any Argie aircraft go out with the specific mission of peeling back the CAP. If they had, I think the record of the Harrier wouldn't have been as good down that way, and they might have done better at knocking back the RN with their attack aircraft.

That said, they did do better than a lot of folks would have guessed before the whole thing got kicked off.

I don't know how other countries teach Harrier fighting, but the US Marines are heavy into "VIFFing" -- Vectoring In Forward Flight. A Harrier can do things with VIFFing like rolling over and dropping right onto the six of an enemy, push the Harrier into tighter turns, pitch the nose up or down quickly, do short faster climbs, or perform an Immelman easier then a normal aircraft. The downside is that when VIFFing you can easily bleed off airspeed faster than you expected, leading to an unexpected stall, and that the heat signature of the Harrier blooms when VIFFing.

[Webstral]

It seems that my initial thinking is supported by many of the comments here. Harriers aren’t the ideal platform for attacking strategic targets, but they can do the job with limitations. Helicopters are even further from the ideal, but they can move some ordinance to the target. Wise use of these assets would involve steering clear of defended targets. The MI types will have to identify all the nodes in the defender’s strategic assets, and the operations people will have to figure out which nodes can be attacked with the greatest negative impact on the enemy’s disposition with acceptable risk/losses to friendly forces. Nothing new, really. The limits on the air assets means that the supply chain might have to be attacked in unconventional ways.

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Webstral

It seems that my initial thinking is supported by many of the comments here. Harriers aren’t the ideal platform for attacking strategic targets, but they can do the job with limitations. Helicopters are even further from the ideal, but they can move some ordinance to the target. Wise use of these assets would involve steering clear of defended targets. The MI types will have to identify all the nodes in the defender’s strategic assets, and the operations people will have to figure out which nodes can be attacked with the greatest negative impact on the enemy’s disposition with acceptable risk/losses to friendly forces. Nothing new, really. The limits on the air assets means that the supply chain might have to be attacked in unconventional ways.

A prime example of that was the air war against Vietnam. Virtually the entire campaign against North Vietnam was done by using tactical aircraft for strategic bombing. Meanwhile, a good many of the B-52 strikes were against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, NVA, and Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

A prime example of that was the air war against Vietnam.

Good point!

Tangentially, it's funny how we lost sight of the lessons that came out of Vietnam at the strategic level. The leaders who fought and won Desert Storm believed in applying overwhelming force AND having an exit strategy. We won the conventional parts of Iraq and Afghanistan, but we had no exit strategies. We got stuck fighting another pair of Vietnams, despite our advances in technology, tactics, and troop handling. We had no idea what it would take to win the peace in either place because we had no idea that Western democracies wouldn't spring out fully grown like Athenas from the heads of the respective Zeuses. Tactical aircraft for strategic bombing, mechanized units for peacekeeping, riflemen for nation-building. Oy!

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Good point!

Tangentially, it's funny how we lost sight of the lessons that came out of Vietnam at the strategic level. The leaders who fought and won Desert Storm believed in applying overwhelming force AND having an exit strategy. We won the conventional parts of Iraq and Afghanistan, but we had no exit strategies. We got stuck fighting another pair of Vietnams, despite our advances in technology, tactics, and troop handling. We had no idea what it would take to win the peace in either place because we had no idea that Western democracies wouldn't spring out fully grown like Athenas from the heads of the respective Zeuses. Tactical aircraft for strategic bombing, mechanized units for peacekeeping, riflemen for nation-building. Oy!

In Desert Storm, we stuck to the Powell Doctrine. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we largely ignored it.

I'm teaching my juniors about the Vietnam War this week and the parallels I see to the current war in Afghanistan are staggering.

• An elusive enemy who fights "dirty" (i.e. guerilla tactics) and hides in plain sight (VC=Taliban).
  
• A cross-border refuge that more or less allows the enemy to come and go unmolested (Cambodia/Laos=Pakistan).
  
• Civilian casualties (most unintentional; a few shocking exceptions, deliberate)
  
• Winning most pitched battles, but losing the stomach for the seemingly endless grind and attrition.
  
• No real end in sight- at least none with a very happy ending

.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Raellus

In Desert Storm, we stuck to the Powell Doctrine. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we largely ignored it.

The civilian leadership bears the responsibility for most of of the ignoring, and this fact highlights one of the great weaknesses of our system of government. Continuity can be nearly non-existent. When we vote for a leader based on his charisma and positions on tax cuts, we get no guarantees about his willingness to hear unpleasant things from his officials--including his generals. This applies to the Left and the Right. Generals are stuck working with whatever the elected leadership gives them.

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I'm teaching my juniors about the Vietnam War this week and the parallels I see to the current war in Afghanistan are staggering.

I think you left out: a host country whose government seems too weak/corrupt/inept to win over the population.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

I think you left out: a host country whose government seems too weak/corrupt/inept to win over the population.

That's a good addition. We could discuss at length the dynamics of the RVN governments and the Kabul government vis-a-vis the NLF and the Taliban, respectively. However, in neither case could our allies draw on sufficient goodwill or sheer brutality to line up the citizenry behind them.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

I think you left out: a host country whose government seems too weak/corrupt/inept to win over the population.

I knew I'd forgotten something. My list didn't look quite long enough. I get pretty frustrated with Mr. Karzai sometimes.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

I don't know how other countries teach Harrier fighting, but the US Marines are heavy into "VIFFing" -- Vectoring In Forward Flight. A Harrier can do things with VIFFing like rolling over and dropping right onto the six of an enemy, push the Harrier into tighter turns, pitch the nose up or down quickly, do short faster climbs, or perform an Immelman easier then a normal aircraft. The downside is that when VIFFing you can easily bleed off airspeed faster than you expected, leading to an unexpected stall, and that the heat signature of the Harrier blooms when VIFFing.

Yup, the technique was pioneered by the Royal Navy and battle tested in the Falklands.

It was the reason the Harrier could beat the Mirage. On paper the Mirage had all the advantages but when you take into account the harrier's unique characteristics the Argentines couldn't compete.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

It was the reason the Harrier could beat the Mirage. On paper the Mirage had all the advantages but when you take into account the harrier's unique characteristics the Argentines couldn't compete.

I think if the Harrier was that good, then a whole lot more would be in service. I think it's far more likely that the Harrier's success in the Falklands was due to the Argentines playing into it's strengths and not exploiting it's weaknesses.

Much the same was the case with the Zero early in the war in the Pacific. Allied pilots tried to dogfight it like any other fighter and suffered for t. The two main keys to dealing with the Zero were to not try to out-turn it* or to out-climb it. It's weaknesses? It had virtually no protection for the pilot or fuel tanks (most Allied fighters were better protected). It was slower than many Allied land-based fighters in level flight (the P-40 was 20-30 mph faster, depending on models being compared) and couldn't keep up with them in a dive (the P-40 could out-dive the Zero by about 125 mph).

The Zero was successful during most of 1942 not because it was the best plane, but because Allied pilots played into it's strengths and often failed to exploit it's weaknesses. I think much the same can be said of the Harrier vs Mirage.

* At low speeds, anyway. As the Zero's speed decreased, it's turning ability declined, until at around 350 mph when a P-40 could out-turn it.

[Webstral]

Pilot experience had a lot to do with the balance between the Zero and its American rivals. At the beginning of the war, the Japanese naval pilots had more flying time than their American counterparts. For reasons that I don’t understand, the Japanese were not successful at replacing the pilots lost at Midway. The Japanese filled the cockpits, but their pilots were lacking in flying time. The Marianas Turkey Shoot was more a context between veteran Americans and freshman Japanese than a referendum on airframes.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by Webstral

For reasons that I don’t understand, the Japanese were not successful at replacing the pilots lost at Midway.

The Japanese pilot training program was not geared to producing trained pilots in a fairly short time (unlike the Americans and most other major combatants). I don't think the Japanese every really modified their pilot training program sufficiently to account for having to quickly replace losses.

The Japanese filled the cockpits, but their pilots were lacking in flying time. The Marianas Turkey Shoot was more a context between veteran Americans and freshman Japanese than a referendum on airframes.

by the end of the war (1944-45), the main barrier to Japanese (and German) pilot training was lack of fuel, so the trainees were getting insufficient flight time before being thrown into combat. The Germans had a partial solution by retraining pilots of aircraft types of marginal use late in the war as fighter pilots; I don't know if the Japanese did this.

[Raellus]

Training a combat pilot takes a lot of time and money. Typically, the more time and money spent on pilot training, the more effective the pilot. That's one reason U.S./NATO airforces had so little trouble with the Serbs and Iraqis.

After Midway, the Japanese really didn't have enough of either (time or money/fuel) to replace the experienced core of naval pilots that it lost. At the same time, American pilots were finally beginning to amass the valuable combat experience and technical expertise that would give them the edge against the Japanese flyers.

The Japanese worked around their mid-to-late war limitations by expanding their Kamikaze program. Kamikaze pilots didn't need to learn dogfighting skills so it took a lot less time (and fuel) to train them. Contrary to ridiculous myth, Kamikaze pilots were taught how to land.

Although not particularly well-written, this here book does a really good job describing Kamikaze training and the mentality it took to "volunteer" to kill oneself for Japan and the emperor.

http://www.amazon.com/Dangers-Hour-B...5380386&sr=1-1

[Canadian Army]

On January 17, 1991, Task Force Normandy began its attack on two Iraqi anti-aircraft missile sites. The purpose of this mission was to create a safe corridor through the Iraqi air defense system. The attack was a huge success and cleared the way for the beginning of the Allied bombing campaign.

Task Force Normandy
9 x AH-64 Apache Helicopter
1x UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter
4x MH-53J Pave Low Helicopter (USAF)

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

Yup, the technique was pioneered by the Royal Navy and battle tested in the Falklands.

It was the reason the Harrier could beat the Mirage. On paper the Mirage had all the advantages but when you take into account the harrier's unique characteristics the Argentines couldn't compete.

Well, yes and no. As hard as it is to learn how to turn and burn in a conventional fighter, it takes an awesome, outstanding pilot to learn to use VIFF in a dogfight -- it's part of the reason why Harrier trainees have a much higher drop-out and casualty rate than F/A-18 and F-18E pilots do. The Harrier is the "sexy aircraft the Marines never told you about." If you think about it, several of the new fighter designs the past years have had some degree of thrust vectoring or routes to uncoupled flight -- Harrier pilots have been doing that for a good 30 years or more.