The United States Army in World War Two

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By September of 1945, the United States Army was perhaps the strongest in the world, numbering 8,300,000 out of a total of 12,350,000 of the U.S. Armed Forces. It was only exceeded in manpower by the Russians, and it led the world in weaponry, strategic mobility and logistic capabilities. Winston Churchill described it thus:

“I saw the creation of this mighty force, victorious in every theater against the enemy in so short a time and from such a very small parent stock. This is an achievement which the soldiers of every other country will always study with admiration and envy.”

“But that is not the whole story, nor even the greatest part of the story. To create large armies is one thing, to lead them and to handle them is another. It remains to me a mystery as yet unexplained how the very small staffs which the United States kept during the years of peace were able not only to build up the Armies and the Air Force units, but also to find the leaders and vast staffs capable of handling enormous masses and of moving them faster and further than masses have ever been moved in war before.”

When compared to the pitifully inadequate state of the U.S. Army in 1939 (sixteenth in size, right after Romania), most of whose units were still trained in the combat methods of 1918, rather than those needed to meet the oncoming onslaught that the Germans were prepared to unleash, then the true magnitude of this achievement can be seen in its proper perspective.

On June 30, 1939, the U.S. Army was made up of three elements. The Regular Army consisted of 187,893 men, including 22,387 men in the Army Air Corps. This force manned 9 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, and a single mechanized cavalry brigade. The National Guard totaled 199,491 men forming 18 infantry divisions. All of these units were at minimal peacetime strengths, available equipment was sorely lacking, and most of what was available was either obsolescent or obsolete. The Regular Army was well trained, but the training of the National Guard was regarded with suspicion by their regular counterparts, as they only drilled for only forty-eight evenings a year and attended a mere two weeks’ of field duty every summer.

The third element of the Army was known as the Organized Reserves. Although this only existed in the mobilization plans, it provided a pool of over 100,000 trained officers, mostly graduates of the Reserve Officer’s Training Corps, it was to prove to be a invaluable asset to the Army when the expansion program began.

On September 8, 1939, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared a limited national emergency, which raised the strength of the Regular Army to 227,000, although this was mostly taken up by enlarging the garrison in Panama and increases in the Army Air Corps. The National Guard was also authorized to recruit to a strength of 235,000. These were small concessions, but they did enable the General Staff to establish several tactical corps headquarters and enough army troops to create a fully functioning field Army. This was followed in April 1940 by the first corps maneuvers to be held since 1918, and in May 1940, corps vs. corps exercises took place, testing new weapons and tactics. The emergency proclamation permitted the expansion of the officer corps, by allowing the assignment of reserve officers to active duty as well as emergency expenditures that were used to purchase badly needed motor transport.

On August 27, 1940, Congress authorized the induction of the National Guard into federal service for a period of twelve months and then increased the authorized strength of the Regular Army. The new Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall ordered a reorganization of the infantry division moving from the old four regiment ‘square’ division and into the new three regiment ‘triangular’ division, allowing for greater maneuverability and flexibility. Once the new organization had been fully tested in the Spring 1940 maneuvers, all divisions, including those of the National Guard, were reorganized as triangular.

During May and June of 1940, the Germans swept across Europe, eliminating France as a world power and leaving Britain to stand alone, facing imminent invasion. The gravity of the situation finally struck home with the people of the United States. The public began to demand urgent and enormous increases in the armed forces. On September 16, 1940, the first peacetime draft in US history was passed by Congress. However, the draftees were limited to one year of service. The Selective Service Act authorized the strength of the Army to be raised to 1,400,000 men, of which 500,000 were to be Regulars, 270,000 National Guard and 630,000 Selectees. A month later, in public buildings all over the country, men between the ages of 21 and 35 began registering under the new law. Between October 1940 and July 1941, 17,000,000 men were registered, but of these, only 900,000 were permitted by the SSA to be inducted for service in the Army. General George C. Marshall appeared before Congress on August 7, 1941 and Congress approved (by one vote) an indefinite extension of service for the Guard, draftees and Reserve officers.

By the summer of 1941, the Army had increased eightfold and had almost reached the new ceiling of 1,400,000 men. The ground force in the continental United States now consisted of four armies, containing nine corps and made up of 29 divisions, plus overseas garrisons. The picture on new equipment and weapons was still far from good, due to the President’s lend-lease policy, assisting Britain and any other effective enemies of Germany, even at the expense of American rearmament.

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, the United States of America was dramatically brought into the war with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. The first bombing run was made at 0755 hours and was over with within two hours. The U.S. Pacific Fleet lost 18 warships, including eight battleships sunk or damaged, 188 aircraft had been destroyed and 3,581 service members killed or wounded. This attack, followed by the declarations of war by Germany and Italy, involved the United States in a global conflict the likes of which had never been seen before. There was now much to do and precious little time to do it in. Mobilization had to be completed as quickly as possible, so as to develop the full potential of the whole of the country. Men had to be inducted and trained, industrial capacity and output expanded and all military facilities increased to unheard-of proportions.

During this initial period of the war, the U.S. was forced to stand on the defensive and endured many humiliations at the hands of the Axis powers because she was too impotent to strike back. All of the nations efforts were directed to the rapid deployment of the available men and equipment in an effort to slow the momentum of the enemy attacks. At the same time protected lines of communications had to be established around the world, while a vast expansion of the military establishment was begun. It took the U.S. eight months to accumulate the weapons and equipment needed, to train the men that were needed initially and then to transport them to the various theaters where they could be employed in offensive operations against the enemy. The end of this end of this initial phase was marked by the first U.S. amphibious assault in August 1942 against the Japanese, at Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands.

In spite of these measures, expansion was slow. By December 31, 1941, 24 days after the Pearl Harbor attack, the Army consisted of 1,685,403 men ( including 275,889 in the Army Air Corps) in 29 infantry, 5 armored and 2 cavalry divisions. While an increase of 433% in two and a half years was a magnificent achievement, shortages of equipment and trained personnel were serious. Over the next three and a half years, the Army would expand by an additional 492%, to a total of 8,291,336 men in 89 divisions: 66 infantry, 5 airborne, 16 armored, 1 cavalry and 1 mountain division.

On December 16, 1944, 43 of these divisions were deployed in the European Theater of Operations (ETO), including 2 airborne, 10 armored, and 31 infantry divisions. At the same time, an additional 16 divisions were preparing to join them. One armored division had already deployed to Europe and was on its way to the front, and one airborne division was in England, awaiting shipment to France, these would be committed into the fighting by January 16, 1945. One airborne, 3 armored and 7 infantry divisions were completing training in England or in the United States in anticipation of deployment to the ETO.

The Chief of the Army Ground Forces, Lieutenant General J. Lesley McNair was the final decision maker on Army organization. He campaigned tirelessly to reduce overhead in US divisions, insisting on as much streamlining as possible. There were two reasons for this approach. First, shipping space was a premium for not only combat but support units, and all supply items (including food to feed the population of Britain) had to be shipped from the United States to England. Second, McNair and other planners realized that the US manpower pool was not inexhaustible. Industry and farming in the US, as well as the massive expansion of the Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Corps all absorbed vast numbers of men. The Victory Program of September 25, 1941 called for an Army of 213 divisions, this goal was never even close to being achieved; it proved difficult to man the 89 divisions that were eventually fielded

An adjunct to McNair’s efforts to streamline the division was his effort to pool all non divisional combat assets in the Army into homogeneous battalion-sized units. Pooled units were to be held by corps/armies and were to be attached to divisions as required. Artillery, engineers, armored, tank destroyers, antiaircraft artillery and infantry units were all components of the pool.. Group and brigade headquarters units were created to control manageable aggregations of the large number of pool units.

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By the end of December 1941, the U.S. had activated 29 infantry, five armored and two cavalry divisions. Of these, only two were deployed outside the continental United States, the remaining 34 were all short of equipment and only 17 had received sufficient training to be considered ready for combat (had all of the necessary equipment been pooled, then there would have been enough equipment to equip five infantry and two armored divisions). The initial plan (the Victory Plan) called for an army of 200 divisions, with an immediate target set to raise 72 divisions by the end of 1942.

The original mobilization and expansion plan had been carefully worked out in the inter-war years, in its simplest terms it had the following main features:

a. Regular Army units would be brought up to full TO&E scales.

b. The National Guard would be inducted into Federal service and its units brought up to full TO&E strength.

c. The Organized Reserve would be activated.

d. The training cadre for each of these new units would be drawn from existing units.

e. Enlisted and new units would be brought up to full strength by voluntary recruitment or draft and before assignment would be brought through a basic training course at replacement training centers.

f. Officers for these new units would be drawn mainly from the Officer’s Reserve Corps to supplement the cadre officers.

g. Armies would be brought to full strength and activity and would be responsible for the preparation of tactical units for combat.

h. A General Headquarters, United States Army, would be activated as the high command of the field forces.

By July 1940, the nucleus of a General Headquarters had been established with the initial task of organizing and training the field forces within the continental Untied States. This meant that General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, now assumed a second major post, as Commanding General of the Field Forces. This was a formal appointment only and the Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, Major General Lesley J. McNair exercised day-to-day control (on Marshall’s behalf). General McNair was a strong opponent of too much specialization, believing that “special” units usually lacked basic military skills. He also hated the waste of men and material and was especially watchful and highly suspicious of any proposed changes to the Tables of Organization and Equipment.

The War Department planned to activate three to four divisions each month, starting in March, 1942. It would use the cadre system with experienced personnel being drawn from an existing division to form the organizing and training nucleus of a new one. These cadre had to attend special training at the service schools, while the divisional commander and his staff had to attend the Command and General Staff School. Most of the remaining officers would be assigned, directly from the officer candidate schools and the enlisted men from replacement training centers. General McNair opposed this policy as he felt that the new divisions should be built upon men who had just finished their basic training, but the sheer scale of the expansion plan meant that this was impossible to achieve. The War Department allowed only 10-12 months for a division to be formed, staffed, equipped and trained to combat readiness. This period consisted of 17 weeks for establishing the initial organization and completing basic training; 13 weeks for unit training up to regimental level and 14 weeks of combined arms tactical training, to include at least one divisional level exercise.

With such a tight schedule, problems soon emerged. There were severe equipment shortages, so that divisions would be activated with insufficient equipment for proper and realistic training. A system of priorities were worked out, with the categories A, B and C being allocated to the divisions. Those due for immediate shipment to a combat zone received Priority A (their full TO&E organization of personnel and equipment). Priority B units received up to 50% of their authorized RO&E and Priority C units were at 25% or less of their authorized TO&E. On numerous occasions, divisions would receive their A priority so close to their embarkation date, that they did not have time to train with their new equipment. In spite of these problems, the mobilization proceeded at a murderous pace and by the end of 1942, virtually all of the ground combat units had been mobilized. All told, the Army mobilized only 91 divisions (compared to 313 for the Germans, 120 Japanese, 550 Russian and 50 British), just under 50% of the original GHQ estimates. However, these divisions were all maintained up to strength throughout the war, in spite of heavy casualties, a major achievement when the student realizes that by early 1945, 57 infantry regiments in 19 different divisions had suffered between 100% and 200% casualties! With only three exceptions, none of the divisions activated after Pearl Harbor saw combat prior to 1944.

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Ground combat in World War II called for many complex and technical skills. An infantryman, just to name one example, had to be able to use and maintain any number of different weapons. He had to have a good grounding of camouflage and concealment; of mines and bobby traps; of patrolling; map reading; AFV and aircraft recognition; how to use captured enemy equipment; how to deal with POWs; of field hygiene and first aid; of how to live under primitive conditions for extended periods of time. All of these skills were essential for the soldier and they had to be taught to the soldiers from scratch. They also had to be taught how to become a member of a team, be it of a rifle squad, a tank or gun crew. Mobile warfare required a high standard of physical fitness and mental alertness and intelligence, skill and stamina were need for both personnel survival and eventual victory on the battlefield.

BASIC TRAINING
The only military training establishments in the inter-war years were the General and Special Service Schools, small organizations with the task of training very limited numbers of key individuals. The much larger task of basic training of the newly enlisted soldiers was left to the units. With the onslaught on new selectees, this system was unacceptable. In 1940, the War Department organized the Replacement Training Centers (RTCs) all over the United States. The mission of the RTC was to provide a steady flow of trained men to the tactical units, thus relieving those units of their training burdens during mobilization and combat. By March, 1941, there were twelve RTCs: three for the Coast Artillery, one Armor, one Cavalry, three Field Artillery and four Infantry. During 1941, these RTCs trained over 200,000 men. With the declaration of war, the RTCs had to fulfill two missions: first to supply “filler replacements” to occupy initial vacancies in units being activated or brought up to strength; secondly, to provide “loss replacements” for units already in training or engaged in combat. More RTCs were established to cover the new “arms” such as Anti-Aircraft Artillery and Tank Destroyer. They trained the newly inducted men in basic military subjects and in the elementary specialist techniques of their arm of service. Courses initially lasted for 12 to 13 weeks, but immediately after Pearl harbor, many RTC programs were cut to 8 weeks. This did not last for long and by the fall of 1943, with a few exceptions, all courses had been fixed at a 17 week period.

SERVICE SCHOOLS
Between July 1940 and August 1945, some 570,000 men completed courses designed to give them the necessary skills for a wide variety of jobs ranging from, for example, infantry battalion commander to anti-aircraft control technician. The Army Ground Forces operated eight schools, four (Cavalry, Coast Artillery, Field Artillery and Infantry) had been formed during the inter-war years and, until the March 1942 reorganization, had been controlled by the chiefs of their respective arms. The remaining schools, established to teach new skills and tactics were Armored, Anti-Aircraft Artillery, Tank Destroyer and Parachute (this was really more than a service school, as all airborne training required specialized training, in effect it was both a school and an RTC).

OFFICER TRAINING
Future officers were trained an selected for commissions in a sub school of each of the service schools known as Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). The mission of the OCS was to convert enlisted men into combat officers to meet the mobilization requirements that could not be filled by Regular, Reserve of National Guard officers. These sources varied from 12 to 17 weeks and trained the candidates in the basic duties of a junior officer of there particular branch, and evaluated whether or not they were fit to recommended for a commission. By 1942, the OCS also took on the task of training the Reserve Officer’s Training Corps (ROTC) who had left college to enter the Army before completing their full ROTC course. This later group represented about one-tenth of all OCS graduated from the AGF schools and thru received Reserve commissions after graduation. When the Army began to mobilization in 1940, it had only some 14,000 regular officers, by the end of 1943, an additional 19,000 National Guard officers were in Federal Service, some 180,000 officers had been drawn from ROTC and nearly 100,000 civilians had received direct commissions (slightly less than half as doctors, dentists and chaplains, the rest in technical and administrative posts). Another 300,000 new officers had been commissioned from OCS or aviation cadets. There was additional pressure, especially from the Army Service Forces, to increase the length of the OCS course to six months, but this was never approved and no major changes were ever made to the course. AGF always maintained that the mission of OCS was to provide the initial and individual phases of officer training, which was then continued when he arrived at his unit.

TACTICAL TRAINING
GHQ developed a program of tactical training which included the phases of small unit training (the coordination of the various weapons of the regiment and the division) and large scale maneuvers. This program remained virtually unaltered throughout the war. This program included proficiency tests at every stage, and an emphasis on elementary training and general proficiency before advancing to specialized training. Maneuvers were conducted with the fewest possible frills and stressed realistic battle simulation, meticulous umpiring and immediate debriefs so that the maximum amount of benefit could be gained by all taking part. A rough idea of the distribution of training time suggested for an infantry division was: 13 weeks of individual training; 5 weeks for unit training; 4 weeks for combined arms training; 7 weeks for maneuvers. and a 6 week period of post-maneuver training.

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When General Marshall assumed his position of Chief of Staff in 1939, the Army was operating under its inter-war organization and plans, both of which were hopelessly antiqued. During the 1920s-30, the War Department had operated under the assumption that any future war would be fought in a manner similar to that of World War One, thus using similar command and management techniques. Needless to say, this theory was wrong. One of General Marshall’s first tasks was to adopt the Army’s pre-war structure to a constantly changing world situation. Following the Pearl Harbor attack, General Marshall was even more determined to discard the creaking, old-fashioned structure and create a new one which would be capable of dealing with modern, global war.

Among the many assumptions of the pre-war War Department was that any war would be fought in a single theater of operations and that the Chief of Staff would automatically take to the field as Commander in Chief. It was also anticipated that the President and the Secretary of War would follow the Great War practice and delegate their authority to the professional military officers. This as latter assumption could not have been more wrong as President Roosevelt, in his role of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, chose to play an active part in directing the military. Indeed, General Marshall soon found himself in the role of the President’s advisor on military strategy and operations.

By the end of June 1943, the Army had expanded to over 5,000,000 men. This unbelievable expansion caused a fundamental reorientation within the War Department and they way in which it conducting its business. Various services and supply agencies had to be integrated into the command organization, in order to insure the efficient assembling in the U.S. of all the means of waging and its transportation and distribution to the combat areas overseas. This not only required an enormous training organization to train the ever growing new army, but for this to be done in an orderly and efficient manner, centralized under one authority. Early in 1942, after over a year of exhaustive study, a committee headed by General Joseph T. McNarney completed a plan that established three great commands under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff. These were to be known as: the Army Air Forces (AAF), the Army Ground Forces (AGF) and the Services of Supply, latter called the Army Service Forces (ASF). This was approved by the President on March 9, 1942. To give an idea of the scale of these commands, a decision was made in the summer of 1943 to expand the Army to an effective strength of 7,700,000. In 1945, the operating strength was 8,300,000, but this figure included 600,000 ineffectives (500,000 undergoing hospitalization or in the process of being discharged as unfit for active or limited service). Another 100,000 were en-route overseas as replacements, making up the 600,000 total. The following table shows the breakdown of the 7,700,000 effectives between the AAF, the AGF, the ASF and the Theater Forces (personnel directly attached to the theater HQs and the major command installations worldwide):

Army Ground Forces 3,186,000
Army Air Forces 2,340,000
Army Service Forces 1,751,000
Theater Forces 423,000

The Army Air Forces are a work in progress at this time, but a brief look is included. The 1942 reorganization carried previous reorganizations to their logical conclusion, establishing them as an entirely separate command from the ground forces. They now had their own Air Staff, with its own chief, General Henry H. Arnold. It administered its own personnel and training, it organized and supported the combat air forces employed in all theaters of war and exercised considerable influence over both strategic and operational planning. When World War Two began in 1939, the Air Corps had a strength of less than 24,000. By 1945, the Army Air Forces had a strength of nearly 2.4 million. The United States produced nearly a quarter of a million aircraft. Following the end of the war, it would take another two years for the AAF to achieve completely separate and equal status, as the United States Air Force, with General Henry H. Arnold at its first five-star general.

The Army Service Forces have always been the unsung heroes of World War Two. A detailed list of their organization, and units, and indeed, all of their duties would require several books. In summary, they were responsible for the supply, equipping and movement of troops both at home and overseas; for food, clothing, equipment, ammunitions and the medical services; for road, rail and sea transportation; for personnel records and the mail service; they coordinated the production requirements of military munitions in the U.S.; the actual issue of weapons and equipment; plus everything else that affected the efficient and regular maintenance of this equipment; and the steady stream of supplies to all theaters of war. They were also responsible for many aspects of the troop’s morale, such as movies, educational programs and newspapers. Their supply lines extended for over 56,000 miles and they had authority over the seven technical services, eight administrative services, nine corps areas (later called service commands), six ports of embarkation and nine general depots. HQ ASF was responsible for coordinating the work of all this and for the very first time, full recognition was given to the vital importance of logistics and to the tremendous advantages which could be gained by concentrating logistics operations in a single command. How well the ASF fulfilled their mission can be measured by the fact that there were no major supply failures during the course of the war. Troops were successfully transported all over the world and no battle or campaign was lost through a major logistic failure.
For planning purposes and distribution, supplies were broken down into five classes:

Class 1: Those supplies used up at a regular rate, regardless of conditions, principally food.

Class 2: Items (including clothing and weapons) for which there was a laid down scale of entitlement by units and individuals.

Class 3: All classes of petroleum, oils and lubricants, known collectively as POL.

Class 4: A miscellaneous category, used to cover everything not covered elsewhere.

Class 5: Ammunition, explosives and chemical agents.

While the requirements of the different theatres varied with local conditions, it took, on average, 1,600 tons of supplies daily to maintain a divisional slice. This slice consisted of a full strength division, plus a proportional share of all the necessary supporting and service troops, plus two air wing slices, making a total of 500,000 men in all. This 1,600 tons was broken down into: 1,100 tons of all types of dry cargos, 475 tons of POL products and 25 tons of vehicles. Out of this total, 595 tons went to the combat zone for the ground forces, 65 tons for the air forces and 365 tons went into the divisional area. On average each man assigned to Europe received 66.81lbs of supplies per day (67.4lbs in the Pacific). In the ETO, this was broken down into 7.7lbs of rations (6.71lbs in the PTO), 0.426lbs of clothing and equipment (1lb in the PTO), 7.821lbs of construction materials (11.9lbs in the PTO) and 3.64lbs of ammunition (5.14lbs in the PTO).

The Army Ground Forces is the real subject of this paper. During the war HQ AGF administered 230,000 officers and 4,194,000 enlisted men. The AGF suffered 80% of the Army’s battle casualties, took part in more than forty amphibious landings and captured over 3.5 million prisoners. A total of 92 divisions were activated before and during the war. In 1940, there was only eight Regular Army and Philippine divisions active, between 1940 and 1942, another 65 divisions were activated. 90 divisions were prepared for combat and 88 of these were actually committed. In spite of heavy casualties in some divisions, the AGF maintained them all at or near their TO&E strength.

NON DIVISIONAL UNITS, HEADQUARTERS AND THE STAFF

NON DIVISIONAL UNITS
Fewer than half of the tactical troops of the AGF were actually organic to divisions, instead, they were in non divisional combat and service units. On March 31, 1945, the AGF had 1,468,941 personnel assigned to non divisional units and 1,194,398 personnel assigned to divisions. Typically, these non divisional units were grouped at three levels; Corps, Army and GHQ Reserve. In the early years of World War Two, each army and corps had its TO&E organization, for example:

Type Army (July 31, 1942):
Antiaircraft: 1 Brigade

Chemical Warfare: 1 Maintenance Co., 1 Depot Co., 1 Impregnation Co., 1 Lab Co., 3 Decon Cos.

Engineers: 3 General Service Regts, 6 Engnr Bns, 1 Depot Co., 1 Topographical Bn, 1 Water Supply Bn, 4 Lt Ponton Cos., 2 Dump Truck Cos., 1 Camouflage Bn, 1 Maintenance Co., 2 Hvy Ponton Bns.

Medical: 3 Medical regts, 1 Vet Co., 4 Surgical Hospitals, 10 Evac Hospitals, 1Conv Hospital, 1 Lab, 1 Supply Depot.

Military Police: 1 MP Bn

Ordnance: 2 Ammunition Bns, 1 Maintenance Bn

Quartermaster: 3 MM Bns, 1 Motor Trans Co, 1 Trk Regt, 6 Service Bns, 1 Gas Supply Co., 1 Car Co, 1 Depot Co.

Signal: 1 Construction Bn, 1 Photo Co., 1 Pigeon Co., 1 Radar Intercept Co., 1 Operations Bn, 1 Depot Co.

Tank Destroyers: 3 TD Bns

Aviation: 1 Observation Group

Type Corps (July 31, 1942):
Divisions: 3

Antiaircraft: 1 Regt

Chemical Warfare: None

Engineers: 2 Combat Regts, 1 Corps Topographical Co

Medical: 1 Medical Bn

Military Police: 1 MP Co

Ordnance: 1 maintenance Bn

Quartermaster: 2 Trk Cos., 1 MM Coy, 1 Gas Supply Co., 1 Service Co.

Signal: 1 Signal Bn

Tank Destroyers: 5 Bns

Aviation: 4 Observation Squadrons

The AGF was never happy with this rigid system, feeling that the “type” concept set up false preconceptions with regards to tactical and logistical operations. What was needed was a far more flexible system, and while AGF plans were never officially approved, it did go into piecemeal effect in 1943. This plan did away with all organic corps and army troops, and made all non divisional units part of the GHQ Reserve. The only elements retained by corps and army were those over which they needed to exercise proper command, headquarters and signal personnel. Troops were grouped in the smallest and most efficient size possible (usually battalion sized). These units would then be assigned, as needed to the corps and army. Brigade and regimental levels of command were abolished.

In their place was organized the “Group”. Group headquarters were activated in the ratio of one to every four/five battalions. Group headquarters were supposed to avoid administration, being tactical headquarters, being responsible solely for training and combat operations. Battalions would deal directly with army on administrative matters.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS
The United States Army maintained three levels of field command above the division, Corps, Army and Army Group. Twenty eight corps were organized during World War Two, including four converted from armored corps. A listing of all the corps is as follows:

I Corps
Papua; New Guinea; Luzon
I Armored Corps
Casablanca; French Morocco. Deactivated following the TORCH landings.
II Corps
Algeria-French Morocco; Tunisia; Sicily; Naples-Foggia; Rome-Arno; North
Apennines; Po Valley
II Armored Corps
Redesignated as XVIII Corps in 1943
III Corps
Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
III Armored Corps
Redesignated as XIX Corps in 1943
IV Corps
Rome-Arno; North Apennines; Po Valley
IV Armored
Redesignated as XX Corps in 1943
V Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
VI Corps
Naples-Foggia; Anzio; Rome-Arno; Southern France; Ardennes-Alsace;
Central Europe
VII Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
VIII Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
IX Corps
Pacific Theater without inscription
X Corps
New Guinea; Southern Philippines; Leyte
XI Corps
New Guinea; Southern Philippines
XII Corps
Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XIII Corps
Rhineland; Central Europe
XIV Corps
Guadalcanal; Northern Solomons; Luzon
XV Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XVI Corps
Rhineland; Central Europe
XVIII Airborne Corps
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe. XVIII Corps was redesignated
as XVIII Airborne Corps, August 25, 1944.
XIX Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Central Europe
XX Corps
Normandy; Northern France; Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XXI Corps
Rhineland; Ardennes-Alsace; Central Europe
XXII Corps
Rhineland, Central Europe
XXIII Corps
European Theater without inscription
XXIV Corps
Leyte; Ryukyus
XXXVI Corps
Continental United States (to be deployed with Operation CORNET)

One of the driving purposes of the battalion and group system was to keep down the size of headquarters staffs, reducing the routine administration they had to deal with, thus keeping them as tactical as possible. The TO&E of a Corps Headquarters (January 19,1945) shows that less than 200 men served in the headquarters.

Corps Headquarters
Entire HQ: 196
Commander and Aides: 4
General Staff Section: 60
Engineer Section: 12
Signal Section: 10
Chemical Warfare Section: 5
Adjutant-General’s Section: 28
Inspector-General’s Section: 7
Judge Advocate-General’s Section: 5
Finance Section: 8
Medical Section: 9
Ordnance Section: 18
Quartermaster Section: 9
Special Services Section: 4
Chaplain’s Section: 6
Public Information Section: 11

The Field Army (to give it its full title), was composed of a headquarters, two or more corps as well as the necessary support and service units needed to achieve its mission. Unlike the corps, the army was both a tactical and an administrative organization. In administration and supply, it bypassed corps HQ and to a certain extent, the division as well. It was responsible for the normal distribution of food, fuel and ammunition. The army would push its supply points forward to easily accessible positions for the trucks of the user units. Army personnel would sort and load supplies into unit loads and place them on their trucks. In order to give an idea of the number of administrative units, the following is a listing of units assigned to the US Third Army (November 10, 1943):

Corps: 5

Divisions: 19

Antiaircraft: 2 Brigade HQ, 4 Group HQ, 8 Bns

Armored: 2 Group HQ, 13 Tank bns

Cavalry: 1 Brigade, 3 Mechanized Regts

Chemical: 5 Decon Cos, 1 Depot Co., 2 Chemical Mortar Bns

Engineers: 9 Group HQ, 1 Sep Bn, 24 Combat Bns, 1 Topographic Bn, 1 Water Supply Bn, 2 Camouflage Cos, 1 Depot Co, 1 Depot Trk Co, 3 Lt Equip Cos, 5 Lt Ponton Cos., 5 Maintenance Cos, 4 Treadway Bridge Cos.

Field Artillery: 16 Group Hqs, 4 Observation Bns, 40 Field Artillery Bns

Infantry: 2 Infantry Regiments

Medical: 5 Grp HQ, 2 Ambulance Bns, 9 Medical Bns, 1 Gas Treatment Bn, 2 Ambulance Cos, 14 Clearing Cos, 28 Collection Cos, 1 Depot Co, 1 Sanitary Co, 3 Vet Cos, 6 Evacution Hospitals, 2 Labs, 2 Vet Evac Hospitals

Military Police: 3 MP Bns, 2 MP Cos.

Ordnance: 2 Ammunition Bns, 1 Ordnance Bn, 20 Group HQ, 8 Ammunition Cos, 8 Depot Cops, 2 Evac Cos, 7 Hvy Auto Maint Cos, 10 Hvy maint Cos, 4 Hvy Maint Cos (Tank), 1 Lt maint Co, 1 AA Maint Coy, 19 Med Auto Maint Coys, 13 Med Maint Cos.

Quartermaster: 1 Trk Regt, 13 Group HQ, 2 Gas Supply Bns, 1 Service Bn, 1 Ster Co, 4 Bakery Cos, 3 Car Cos, 4 Depot Cos, 2 Laundry Cos., 6 Pk Trs Cos, 5 Railhead Cos, 1 Salvage Collection Co, 24 Troop Transport Cos, 33 Trk Cos.,

Signal: 6 Signal bns, 2 Construction Bns, 2 Operations Bns, 1 Construction Coy, 1 Depot Co, 2 Pigeon Cos, 1 Photo Coy, 2 Repair Cos, 2 Radio intercept Cos

Tank Destroyers: 7 Group HQ, 21 TD Bns

Miscellaneous: 7 Bands, 14 HQ Special Troops, 1 MRU (fixed), 4 MRU (Mobile)

The Army Headquarters (TO&E of October 26, 1944) had the following assigned personnel:
Entire HQ: 778
Commander and Aides: 7
General Staff Section: 180
Engineer Section: 72
Signal Section: 73
Chemical Warfare Section: 26
Adjutant-General’s Section: 91
Inspector-General’s Section: 18
Judge Advocate-General’s Section: 9
Finance Section: 25
Medical Section: 61
Ordnance Section: 55
Provost Marshal’s Section: 9
Quartermaster Section: 83
Special Services Section: 3
Chaplain’s Section: 7

During the Second World War, the AGD organized eleven armies:

First Army
European Theater of Operations
Second Army
Continental United States (Training)
Third Army
European Theater of Operations
Fourth Army
Continental United States (Training)
Fifth Army
European Theater of Operations
Sixth Army
Pacific Theater of Operations
Seventh Army
European Theater of Operations
Eighth Army
Pacific Theater of Operations
Ninth Army
European Theater of Operations
Tenth Army
Pacific Theater of Operations
Fifteenth Army
European Theater of Operations

The largest headquarters was the army group, which would control several armies. The army group was primarily a tactical headquarters, that eased the burden of the theater commander by reducing the numbers of commanders that he had to directly deal with. During World War Two, the United States Army formed only three army groups: the 12th (General Omar N. Bradley); the 6th (General Jacob L. Devers) and the 15th (General Mark W. Clark).

Only one superior headquarters was ever established to control the Army Groups, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHEAF) was commanded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower and commanded the Allied military efforts in the ETO. At its peak, SHEAF had some 6,000 personnel assigned.

THE STAFF
At the top of any of the major headquarters was the commanding general; normally a major general commanded a corps, a lieutenant general an army and a full general an army group, but this pattern was not always followed. No matter his rank, the commander was ultimately responsible for everything that went on in his command. He was assisted by his Chief of Staff (COS) who was the chief assistant and the coordinator of the staff. The COS had, in turn, a deputy chief of staff. Beneath them were the staff, who were comprised of two groups (and their responsibilities):

The General Staff:
Chief of Staff; G-1 Personnel; G-2 Intelligence; G-3 Operations; G-4 Supply and G-5 Civil Affairs and Military Government.

The Special Staff:
Adjutant-General; Artillery; Antiaircraft; Chaplain; Chemical Warfare; Engineer; Finance; HQ Commandant; Inspector-General; Judge Advocate; Medical; Ordnance; Provost Marshal; Public Relations; Quartermaster; Signal; Special Services and Tank Destroyers.

Each of the General Staff sections, at army level, was lead by an assistant chief of staff in the rank of colonel. The Special Staff sections was led by either a colonel or a lieutenant-colonel.

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“Armor as the ground arm of mobility, emerged from World War II with a lion’s share of the credit for the Allied victory. Indeed armor enthusiasts at that time regarded the tank as being the main weapon of the land army" (US Army Lineage Series: Armor-Cavalry).

The first armored formations larger than brigades were formed on July 15, 1940 when the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions were activated. The Armored Force was expanded by 3 additional divisions in 1941; nine in 1942 and two in 1943. The initial divisional organization was tank-heavy, with one three regiment armored brigade (a total of 6 light and 3 medium battalions, with 368 tanks) and a single two battalion armored infantry regiment. Field tests and reports on early operations soon proved that this organization was too cumbersome and efforts to streamline the armored division began. The March 1, 1942 reorganization replaced the armored brigade with two “combat command” headquarters, armored strength was reduced to two three-battalion regiments (with one light and two medium tank battalions each) and the armored infantry regiment was expanded to three battalions. This became known as the “heavy” armored division. Combat experience resulted in another major organizational change on September 15, 1943. The existing heavy armored divisions were reorganized to the new “light” division organization. By August 1944, all armored divisions were organized as lights, except for the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions, which retained the heavy organization. All tank battalions in the light divisions and in the separate tank battalions were organized similarly, in theory, they were interchangeable, in practice, they never were exchanged.

The light armored division was organized with a Divisional Headquarters and Headquarters Company, two Combat Command Headquarters (known as CCA and CCB), a Reserve Combat Command (CCR), three tank battalions (each of one light and three medium tank companies), three armored infantry battalions, thee armored field artillery battalions, a cavalry reconnaissance squadron, an armored engineer battalion as well as divisional services. The division was commanded by a major general, the combat commands by a brigadier general (the assistant division commander) and two colonels. The division included 77 light tanks, 168 medium tanks, 18 assault guns, 17 M-8 HMC, 54 M-7 HMC and 54 armored cars. Total personnel strength was 10,754 men.

The heavy division organization was almost the same, except that the three tank battalions were replaced by two three-battalion tank regiments (first battalion was made up of three light tank companies and the second and third battalions each had three medium tank companies) and the three armored infantry battalions were organized as a regiment under a single regimental headquarters. While the light division had 3 light and 9 medium tank companies, the heavy had 6 light and 12 medium tank companies. The heavy division’s equipment included 158 light tanks, 232 medium tanks, 25 assault guns, 17 M-8 HMC, 54 M-7 HMC, and 79 armored cars. Total personnel strength was 14,664 men.

Separate tank battalions were standardized as medium battalions, which were identical to those in the light armored division or as light battalions, which were identical to the light tank battalions of the heavy armored division. The medium tank battalions fielded 17 light tanks, 54 medium tanks, and 6 assault guns. Personnel strength was 724. The light tank battalion of three companies, fielded 56 light tanks and 3 M-8 HMC. Personnel strength was 532 men.

Normally, one armored division was assigned to a corps. An additional armored group headquarters would be assigned to control any separate tank battalions assigned to the corps. In practice, the massing of these separate battalions was rarely done in the ETO, the armored groups were therefore administrative units only, although ETO practice was to assign these organizations to the armored divisions to augment the capabilities of the combat commands.

Theoretically, armored divisions were to act as the maneuver reserve for the corps and were to be employed to break through enemy fronts ruptured by the infantry divisions. The armored division was then to be used to conduct deep pursuit of the enemy once the front was broken through. In practice, the width of the front meant that armored divisions were often used in defensive roles, for which they were not designed. A critical weakness was the fact that the infantry component of the division was too small to withstand the attrition of long-term defense or offensive missions.

In spite of its flaws, the flexible organization of the armored division permitted it to be adopted to may situations. Typically, CCA and CCB acted as headquarters to which battalion task forces were assigned. US armored tactics stressed the combined arms approach. Cross-attachments of tank and infantry companies into battalion task forces and company combat teams were a routine practice. While the Reserve Combat Command was not intended as a combat unit, with the addition of an armored group headquarters, CCR was often used as a third combat element.

Forty separate armored battalions served in the ETO. They were normally assigned on the basis of one per infantry division. However, not all infantry divisions had a tank battalion attached. In theory tank battalions could be assigned to an armored group headquarters, in practice, this was seldom done. Usually when a separate tank battalion was assigned to an infantry division, it retained that affiliation throughout the war. As a result, many infantry divisions developed a high degree of coordination with their associated tank battalions.

The standard US medium tank was the M-4 Sherman. The Sherman was designed in April 1941 and the first prototype was completed that September. Following testing, it was standardized for production in October 1941 with production beginning in early 1942. At the time, the Sherman was highly advanced; however, under the drive of wartime experience, tank design was evolving rapidly; thus the armor and firepower of the Sherman, adequate for the conditions of 1942 and 1943, were insufficient by 1944. The tank was originally designed with a short-barreled, medium-velocity 75mm gun. The armor piercing capability of this piece was adequate to penetrate the German PzKpfw MkIII and MkIV at the time, As the new Panther tank entered production, the Sherman could knock out the tank by attacking from the flanks and rear, its frontal armor was impervious to the 75mm APC round. The Tiger could only be destroyed by firing into its rear.

By late 1944, the 75mm gun was being replaced by a long-barreled, high-velocity 75mm gun (commonly called the 76mm) with good penetration and increased accuracy. But supplies of the up-gunned Sherman were short and the older 75mm gun remained in service until the end of the war. The combination of weak armor protection, and a poor gun was only partially made up for by the Sherman’s mechanical reliability, its high speed electric-hydraulic turret traverse and its numbers.

A number of Shermans were designed or specially equipped for specialized roles. These included standard M-4s equipped with dozer blades, mine-clearing tanks, recovery vehicles and an assault gun variant armed with a 105mm howitzer. Six M-4 assault guns were assigned to the assault gun platoon of the standard tank battalion headquarters company. A important variant was the M-4A3E2 “Jumbo”. This was a standard M-4 that was fitted with additional armor, substantially increasing its protection. The Jumbo was, in fact, better protected than the German Panther, although the Panther was fitted with a superior cannon. The M-4A3E2 was built in limited numbers (254). In the ETO, Ordnance workshops, working with armor plate produced by French steel mills or with salvaged armor, converted a number of M-4s to the Jumbo standard. It is uncertain exactly how many were available in Europe (Third Army workshops alone converted some 200 Shermans by December 1944), but, despite their small numbers, the Jumbo helped even the odds in tank-vs.-tank combat. The Jumbos were scattered throughout the ETO; Most of the armored divisions had 20-30; separate tank battalions would field a platoon of 4-5.

The standard light tank was the M-5 Stuart. It mounted a 37mm cannon and was lightly armored. Like the M-4, the M-5 had a number of variants, most important of which was a Howitzer Motor Carriage. The M-8 HMC was equipped with a 75mm howitzer and was found in the cavalry reconnaissance squadrons and in the armored infantry battalions. The usefulness of the M-5 had long been in question and it was slowly being replaced by the M-24 Chaffee, which had heavier armor and a 75mm cannon. Those units equipped with the Stuart were mostly used as reconnaissance units or as escorts for convoys. So light was the Stuart’s armor, and so underpowered was its 37mm gun, that they were seldom deployed in the front line.

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An important adjunct to the armored formations was the Tank Destroyer Force. The example of the awesome power of the German Blitzkrieg in 1940 resulted in the creation of separate antitank battalions within the US infantry Division in 1940. In 1941, General McNair decided that the ideal method of countering massed armored formations would be to deploy a highly mobile reserve of antitank guns, grouped at the corps or army level. As a result, the antitank battalions were removed from their divisions and, in an effort to foster an aggressive image of their role, were renamed tank destroyer (TD) battalions.

The first TD battalions were all self-propelled, a collection of 37mm armed weapons carriers (the M-6 Fargo) and old French 75mm field guns mounted on half-tracks (the M-3 Gun Motor Carriage). Following the Tunisian campaign a number of TD battalions were converted from SP to towed guns. This was a deliberate imitation of German practice. Unfortunately, it was not realized at the time that the Germans made extensive use of towed antitank weapons only because of necessity; they desired SP carriages for all of their antitank guns but had insufficient means to produce them.

By 1944 the error had been recognized. Towed guns had proven to be too heavy and immobile for efficient use in a mobile combat environment. By late 1944 many of the towed TD battalions in the ETO were being reconverted to SP guns as the weapons became available.

Tank Destroyer Battalions were all organized with three companies, each equipped with twelve guns, for a total of thirty-six in the battalion. The guns employed by the TD battalions in late 1944 included the M-5 3-inch towed gun; the M-10 3-inch Gun Motor Carriage, the M-18 76mm Gun Motor Carriage and the M-36 90mm Gun Motor Carriage. The M-10 was the first standardized self-propelled TD gun, it was lightly armored, its chassis was a variant of the standard M-4 tank and it had poor cross-country mobility and speed. By late 1944 it was being replaced by the new M-18. While still lightly armored and with a open-topped turret, its improved suspension system gave it excellent cross-country mobility and impressive speed (it was the fastest AFV in the world until the introduction of the M-1 Abrams in the 1980s). Its 76mm gun was an improved long-barreled design that had greater hitting power than the 3-inch gun. The M-36, which was deployed in July 1944, was the most powerful antitank weapon in the US arsenal. Experience with heavy German armor had showed that the 75mm, 3-inch and 76mm series of weapons had insufficient penetrating capability. The M-36 was a stopgap measure. It was a marriage of the M-10 chassis with the powerful 90mm gun. With the newly developed high-velocity armor-piercing (HVAP) round, the 90mm was easily capable of defeating current German armor, if it could off the first hit. Unfortunately, there were few of these weapons available in late 1944.

Like the mass employment of separate armor battalions, the deployment of the tank destroyers in mass to defeat enemy armored attacks was never actually practiced. Fifty-six TD battalion eventually served in the ETO. However, a number were inactivated so as to provide personnel for infantry replacements, and others served in other roles. In the Ardennes campaign the Third Army deployed one TD battalion as an augmentation to the army’s Military Police force. One TD battalion was normally assigned to each division: SP battalions were always assigned to armored divisions, while infantry division might have either a SP or a towed battalion attached.

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CAVALRY
Reconnaissance duties in the US Army were performed by mechanized cavalry units. Normally a corps would have a mechanized cavalry group assigned to it. This consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company and two mechanized cavalry squadrons. Squadrons were organized with three cavalry troops, each equipped with thirteen M-8 armored cars and jeeps; an assault gun troop with eight M-8 HMCs and a light tank company with seventeen M-5 light tanks. The heavy armored division’s armored reconnaissance battalion and the light armored division’s cavalry reconnaissance squadron, mechanized were almost identical (adding a fourth cavalry troop). Infantry divisions each had a single cavalry reconnaissance troop. In addition, the heavy armored division’s two armored regiments had a reconnaissance platoon attached to regimental headquarters; tank battalions had a reconnaissance platoon in the battalion headquarters, while towed TD battalions had a reconnaissance platoon in each TD company.

The cavalry groups were often attached either in whole or by squadron to divisions, but would also operate independently under direct control of a corps. For most missions, the group would be augmented by corps or divisional tank, tank destroyer, engineer and/or artillery assets.

Interestingly, the cavalry groups were almost never called to perform their primary duty; post-war analysis showed that pure reconnaissance missions accounted for only 3% of their activities. The remaining 97% of missions assigned to cavalry groups were as follows: Defensive operations made up 33%; special operations (mobile reserve, rear area security and operations as an army information service); made up 29%; security missions (blocking, screening, flank protection, maintaining contact between units and filling gaps) made up 25% and offensive operations made up 10%.