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#1
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The US does realize that urban warfare is a big part of tactical operations moving forward. However, the US has to be careful which lessons it takes from the IMI.
The IMI does not necessarily face the future of modern warfare; they face a tactical scenario that the US will find a lot of commonality with in the future (urban environment). The difference is, from a ground force perspective, the Israelis do not require a lot of strategic mobility. Hence, the IMI is heavy armor centric. This will produce an experience that will be fundamentally different from what the US will face. Because the US needs a high degree of strategic mobility, most of the BCTs will be Infantry and Stryker of which the tactics will differ greatly. If the US buys the AGS, it will simply be the current product with a digital package. The Army is in no mood to spend money developing hybrid engines. The AGS right now is cheap, it gives the early entry force a good punch, it’s ready to go, and it keeps the Bradley production line up and running. Additionally, the AGS is conducive to the US’s strategic shift to the Pacific. Something that the Army likes because they are taking a big budget hit because of it (any reason to get a bigger piece of the pie). I hope this makes sense because I’m really tired right now.
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#2
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I think that was a good summary. So for the US it's all about mobility, in terms of being able to deploy globally?
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#3
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I always thought the casevac capability the Merkava had was for other nearby tank crews that'd lost their vehicle and/or had non-ambulatory wounded that needed a "hard" extract off the battlefield, but hey, whatever works.
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#4
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Israel places a high value on its soldiers. I would venture to say probably more so than most other nations (they have launched invasions over missing soldiers). So, casevac is one of the primary intentions.
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#5
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There was a quote that was attributed to Confederate General Forest that went something like "Get there first with the most." The US armor community through the 70s, 80s, and 90s used this quote as a lynch pin of sorts around which they argued about heavy and light armor. Light armor supporters argued the quote at face value - get there fast with lots troops and equipment. Combat power through numbers and speed. Heavy armor supporters surrendered the first point about getting there first, but defined "most" in terms of armor thickness. They stated that it was not worth getting there first if all your vehicles get destroyed - you have to be able to take a hit. For some time the heavy force advocates continued to win the argument. Two events forced a change though: Desert Storm and Kosovo. After Desert Storm ended the Army took a look at what it had done. In the early weeks of Desert Shield the only US combat unit on the ground was the 82nd Airborne. The consensus was that had Saddam's troops come across the Saudi border those troops would have been rolled. Hence, the AGS program picked up a little more steam only to stop dead on the eve of production five years later (I'm glossing over a lot in this sentence). In 1999 the idea of adopting medium armor (Strykers) was beginning to take hold again, but it had not lifted off yet. When the Kosovo war ended the US and NATO were all set to waltz in and unilaterally dictate terms. That was until the Russians dropped an armored airborne division into Serbia and the US had no answer (the heavy force could not get there fast enough to impact diplomacy). Hence, the SBCT. Being able to deploy fast with enough combat power is essential to holding the proverbial beach head for follow-on forces or impacting diplomacy. But you also need light armor with those early entry forces so that you don't risk them being rolled by a local mechanized force. Clear as mud?
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#6
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#7
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I was using broad brush stokes in my description, but I will say that I can't remember the final size of the Russian deployment, so I wrote "division" for brevity.
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#8
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After rereading my post I want to clarify my comment on the Russians a little more.
I was commenting more on the strategic mobility of the American armor force; not the Russian's. In reality, could the 82nd Airborne beat up on the Russian contingent? Yes. However, at that point the shooting was over and the US was not about to fight the Russians. The fight had become diplomatic and the Russians had armor on the ground. In a diplomatic fight it does not matter as much what kind of armor, or even so much to quantity, what is needed is some kind of parity. Had the US been able to rapidly plant some form of armor on the ground the outcome might have shifted a little. As it was the Russians had diplomatic leverage on the US. Hence, the comment on impacting diplomacy.
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