OT? A New Cold War

[Webstral]

It’s clear that others understand the basic problem of escalation relative to the prospect of fighting in Estonia. One would hope that fear of the unknown would cool the ardor of all parties involved. Unfortunately, the unknown can have the opposite effect. Whereas Putin might be put off an Estonian adventure by the idea that NATO might attack important strategic assets throughout the country pursuant to prosecuting operations in western Russia, he also might decide that the Americans are more likely to be put off taking the steps that might be necessary to liberate Estonia. In the latter case, the uncertainty of the situation becomes an asset because said uncertainty is believed to affect American thinking deeply enough to offer a window of opportunity. I don’t know nearly enough about Putin to make an educated guess about how he will look at the situation.

Getting back to the American response, I want to shift tracks to the ground offensive. Once Russia is in full possession of Estonia, it’s unlikely that anything short of a major ground offensive will put them out. For the same reasons that the liberation of Kuwait obliged Coalition forces to operate in an adjacent portion of Iraq, a liberation of Estonia will involve ground operations in nearby portions of Russia. If the POTUS isn’t prepared to fight on Russian soil, albeit near the Estonian border, then the whole business is off. At the same time, the liberation will take a large contingent of US forces. It’s hard to imagine that the European allies will be willing to put their ground forces into action while the US supplies no ground troops. At the end of the day, it’s going to take US heavy divisions to liberate Estonia. How many is a question for the Pentagon. I can’t imagine that anything less than 8 divisions will suffice, along with 12 or more NATO heavy divisions. Putting 8 US heavy divisions (mechanized infantry or armored) on the ground in Europe would mean mobilizing part of the National Guard, as well as part of the Army Reserve to provide support units.

The timetable would revolve around getting the required number of divisions to their assembly areas in Eastern Europe, along with their supplies. Let’s call the entire US ground force committed to the liberation Seventh US Army for the sake of argument. Seventh Army is going to have to come over in stages, because even during the height of the Cold War the US could sealift no more than a strong corps (4 divisions) at a time. Nowadays, I would not say that any more than 2 divisions could be sealifted in the first lap between CONUS and Europe. I would be willing to be proven incorrect.

Getting the required equipment to Europe might take 3 trips. We probably can expect that each trip would involve more transport shipping as ships are diverted from their normal civilian routes and otherwise brought out of mothballs in the Naval Reserve. I used to know all the facts and figures for reinforcing Europe by sea off the top of my head, but now I don’t. Under the best conditions, the CONUS-Europe leg would take no less than 6 days. That’s assuming the troops are embarking at Northeastern ports like New York or Boston. If they are embarking at Houston (which is the closest major port to Ft. Hood), one can double the time for transit.

Then there is unloading at the other end. I really don’t know how long that would take. I suppose the answer depends in part on which European ports are being used. If US forces are unloading in several European ports, the unloading will go much more quickly. If they are using only 1 port, unloading is going to take longer. How many ports are being used will depend in part on how many and which NATO allies are on board. Also, physical security will be a concern. Whether the Russians oppose the crossing or not, NATO has to assume the Russians might oppose the crossing. While air and submarine attacks against sealift vessels within 100 miles of the Atlantic/North Sea coast of Europe are unlikely, one simply doesn’t know. Also, mine countermeasures may necessitate using fewer ports because there are never enough minesweepers available. It would be unreasonable to assume that the Russians would not take an interest in mining the approaches to Western European ports once they conclude the Americans mean business about liberating Estonia.

Once the unloading is complete, there is the return trip. The mere prospect of Russian air or submarine attack on shipping in the North Atlantic will compel a convoy system, which will mean that the ships unloaded first will wait for the ships unloaded last before heading back across the Atlantic. Thus a round trip from New York might take 3 weeks. A trip starting in Texas and ending in New York could take a month. At the end of this first reinforcement effort, Seventh US Army may have received 2 divisions, plus whatever assets were airlifted in. The number of divisions could be lower.

While the first reinforcement mission is underway, we should expect the bean counters to have been doing their jobs. Other heavy divisions identified for the mission in Europe will be en route to their ports of embarkation. This is where the exact timing of things is in the hands of the logistics types. How long does it take to move 4th ID from Ft. Carson to whichever port is going to be used? The best ports to use are going to be the East Coast ports, preferably as far north as possible: Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City, Boston. Rail capacity, port capacity, available shipping, convoy mandates, and other factors will determine which divisions and what supplies are loaded when and where. It may be that after the first flotilla returns, the USN has the assets available to send 2 separate convoys.

Mobilization of the National Guard divisions needed to beef up Seventh US Army will have to be factored in as well. Ideally, each mobilized division would receive 90 days of training before being sent overseas. It’s hard to see how that will happen. I suspect whichever divisions are sent will get more like 45-60 days of training before shipping out to Europe. These divisions will go in the third wave of sealift.

Once a given heavy division is on dry land in Europe, it will have to go forward to Poland at the minimum. This will take some time.

The point of all this is that getting Seventh US Army ready to push the Russians out of Estonia will take some time. I’d be very surprised if 8 US heavy divisions were ready for action in anything less than 90 days. Everything would have to go perfectly for that to happen. Depending on a variety of factors, this could take 6 months—maybe more. Both sides will be very aware of this timeframe. If the Russians decide that NATO isn’t bluffing, they may go to full mobilization. It’s hard to say just how things will go at this juncture. The willingness of the Russians to stay in the fight will depend on what has been going on in the air war up to that point and on the willingness of the other NATO partners to stay the course with the US.

[jester]

You've got the bottle necks of shipping.

The American Merchant Marine and the civilian ships that support the military for such operations have been chronically undermanned. About 8 years ago it came out that in order to pass their inspections they would fly personnel from the East Coast to the West Coast so they could pass. And that is at a moderate to low operational tempo, not one of full mobilization.

So, where do we get the personnel and now the vessels for this increased shipping? As you said, civilian assets may work for personnel and even light vehicles. But your heavy lift to move your armor I doubt will be able to be shipped on the standard car carrier. So, armored units may be a bit on the light side or take longer to form.

Sadly, pulling civilian or retired will give you a lag of skill set until they get up to par as well.

Bringing vessels out of mothballs. Depending on its level of mothball status could mean at the least several months in a shipyard to almost rebuilding the vessel. Sadly in a time of limited drydock and shipyard space since we've closed to many we no longer have those assets of skilled people. (Same for our aviation capacity)

Rail capacity....again, the bottleneck of the railheads. I know how long it takes to load a mech brigade on railcars. A division, a lot longer. The space inside the railhead and the cars available and where they are stored is an issue while the train is being assembled. Then the nightmare of keeping those trains moving cross country....even though military traffic always has right of way. We hit the port facilities. The rail head for off loading.

In ports, we have civilians and their assets working with military at off loading. 2 new crews working together who have not done so before. And again SPACE. How many vehicles and conex boxes belonging to a Brigade or a Division? You will need to clear out vast areas of your ports to make room for this equipment as well as for a security aspect. I can see the ports being slightly more organized than a Chinese fire drill.

Next, convoy, do we have the assets for that in theater and to conduct other operations? And do we have the skills? I recall about 2 years ago, an unknown submarine managed to make it well within a carrier battlegroup....they think the submarine was Chinese. It brought a big question about how our antisubmarine capability has degraded. And it must be asked, not just using Cold War era equipment, but troops who just don't have the skillset and experience.

And lastly, Russia is building up its submarine force again. I can not help but think they are well aware, the easiest way to fight is to keep them from landing. If you can keep your foe from even setting foot on land you've won! With that mindset, I could think they would put effort in keeping forces from crossing the Atlantic. Granted, that goes on the theory that there is not a lot of political bluff that allows for a troop buildup before anything actualy happens.

Another issue, bluff. Or good ol Cold War Brinkmanship. Push it to the limit and see how far you can go. Which in my view is what ol Vlad is doing. The gamble, is a small former block country that has limited ties or common history with Western Europe worth Nato going off? Come on, its only Estonia or Latvia...both are smaller than Los Angeles, they're not worth it. The test was Georgia, and then Ukraine neither Nato members true but a good test of the Wests resolve. Now, if both had completed their admission to Nato, would things have been different?

[Webstral]

The problem with writing off a member of NATO—any member of NATO—is that the credibility of the United States as an ally goes into the toilet as a consequence. One can debate whether bringing a country like Estonia into NATO was wise, given the difficulty of getting forces there and supporting them. Now the deal is done, though. Either we commit, regardless of the inconvenience of doing so, or our metaphorical stock tanks. If we fail to commit the resources of NATO, including the United States, to defending the territorial integrity of a member of NATO, then the whole arrangement comes into question. At that point, we might as well disband NATO for all it will be worth.

The political price to be paid by a POTUS who effectively negates NATO by failing to live up to the country’s obligations under treaty would be enormous beyond measure. His political opponents would call for an impeachment, and they might actually bring it off. It would be very, very difficult to see how he could expect his party to see much success in the 2016 elections unless his party joined hands with the other major party to force the POTUS to honor our treaty obligations. What a nightmare that would be. And then the government of every other country that has signed a treaty with the US (bilaterally or otherwise) would wonder whether the treaty was worth the paper it was printed on.

I’m not a gambling man, but I’d put the mortgage money down on an American commitment to Estonia. In my mind, the real questions revolve around efficacy and an ability to marshal the political will to embark upon the biggest war since WW2. The American public will be all up in arms at first. Once the initial excitement wears off and the National Guard and Reserves begin getting called up, the electorate will begin to realize that this is more than just good TV. And then when someone broaches the idea of increasing taxes to pay for the biggest war since WW2, the voters will suffer a distinct flagging of enthusiasm. So it will be up the POTUS to set expectations up to and including taxes, full mobilization, and even a draft as the USAF is fighting its first combat missions over the Baltics. I hope the appropriate staffs have been working on scenarios, because the first 12 hours after Russian troops cross the border are going to be an important time to say and do the right things.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

The American public will be all up in arms at first. Once the initial excitement wears off and the National Guard and Reserves begin getting called up, the electorate will begin to realize that this is more than just good TV. And then when someone broaches the idea of increasing taxes to pay for the biggest war since WW2, the voters will suffer a distinct flagging of enthusiasm. So it will be up the POTUS to set expectations up to and including taxes, full mobilization, and even a draft as the USAF is fighting its first combat missions over the Baltics. I hope the appropriate staffs have been working on scenarios, because the first 12 hours after Russian troops cross the border are going to be an important time to say and do the right things.

I think that the reaction will be mixed. I doubt that more than 10% of the population of the U.S.A. could point Estonia out on a map, even given the context clue that it borders Russia. And like you said, once the bills start to come in, or talk of reinstituting the draft begins, much of any enthusiasm does exist will probably fly out the window.

In terms of ground fighting in Estonia, NATO would immediately be at a several disadvantages. Even given the best-case scenario that NATO could get its ready reaction force (its exact current composition is unknown but it is believed to consist of one or two brigades of mostly light troops each from the U.S., U.K., Germany, and Poland) to Estonia before its own military is annihilated, it would immediately be outnumbered and outgunned by the Russians. NATO's supply lines would also be much longer. and NATO troops would be further from its air cover/support. It's unlikely that this relatively small, light military force, at the end of a long, vulnerable logistics chain, could do much more than slow the Russians down.

If the Russians were able to defeat the NATO RRF, would NATO member nations approve of a larger, stronger campaign to liberate Estonia? It's hard to say. One could argue that an early defeat could galvanize NATO members/supporters and stiffen their backbones. It could also go the other way, with an early defeat causing NATO members to lose their stomach for further combat, especially if the Russians offer to negotiate a settlement. Said settlement would undoubtedly lead to at least part of Estonia changing hands and ending up under the Russian flag.

This is why I think that the NATO RRF is a bad idea, in practice. It's not strong enough to stop a determined, large-scale Russian combined-arms offensive, and its loss could jeopardize further military measures to liberate the afflicted Baltic member state(s). ATM, it's not much more than a token gesture- a sop to those crying out in the Baltic wilderness.

The only real guarantee of Baltic security is basing NATO heavy brigades there. I'd be willing to wager a large sum that even just serious talk of doing such a thing will provoke a serious escalation in the region, likely leading to some sort of preemptive military action by the Russians.

As a side note, I've heard that, like in 1914 and 1941, the rail gauges between Poland and Lithuania change, complicating any ground trans-shipment of NATO heavy brigades from Germany/Poland to the upper Baltic States.

[Webstral]

The chicken hawks will be all over it. We can count on certain media outlets to pump as much oxygen as possible into whatever feeble flames exist among their viewership. One party, which shall go nameless, will very happily spend tax dollars in whatever quantity can be financed by sales of bonds to those of means on the consumption of machines and supplies for war with Russia. A certain segment of the population will be delighted that the Russians are the bad guys again.

I agree that reactions will be mixed, overall. A handful of setbacks during the buildup to the main ground offensive will test national commitment. While I agree that few Americans know where Estonia is right now, after they see it on the screen 30+ times daily for a month or so, the general populace may be able to distinguish Estonia from Rhode Island. In any event, I think even people who would not be inclined to go to war can understand the value of honoring a treaty, a contract. After all, if the federal government can back out of honoring the most fundamental NATO obligation, then they back out of honoring any obligation under whatever pretext comes to hand.

[Raellus]

All good points. I guess I probably couldn't have pointed out Kuwait on a map back in '91 (I was 16 or so) before the Iraqis invaded.

My second point still stands, though. If the NATO RRF is deployed and gets its butt kicked, will the public stand for round two, especially if it means full mobilization (including the draft) is put into effect, tax hikes to pay for a large-scale conventional war, etc.? Instead of a shooting war, we might be looking at a new Berlin crisis situation, with a new wall and highly militarized border zone going up to separate Russia's new conquest and its nearest free neighbor.

[Webstral]

If NATO were to insert a rapid reaction force, it would get its butt kicked. In some ways, that would be part of the point. The 82nd Airborne could have accomplished nothing more than being turned into road kill by the Republican Guard if Hussein had invaded Saudi in 1990. The American command knew this and chanced it anyway. It was a supreme act of chicken. If Hussein had annihilated the 82nd Airborne, the leadership was gambling that the American public would demand payback.

Obviously, not everybody would be on board for a crusade to liberate Estonia. What would be interesting is how the forces that be would manage getting people on board and keeping them on board through tax hikes, bond drives, and a draft of some sort. The Military-Industrial Complex would go all in, obviously. How other interest groups would respond would be very interesting to watch. People who normally have a knee jerk reaction to tax increases would have to be convinced, co-opted, or distracted. People who would be opposed to a major war, which is what this probably would become, would have to be silenced or discredited. The military manpower reserve and their parents would have to be motivated.

I think the manner in which the air war was waged and represented (not necessarily in that order) would be important factors. Intrepid reporters operating in occupied Estonia would have to send out word of Russian atrocities. The willingness of the noble Poles to go to the mat with the evil Russian aggressors would have to be played up. Putin's likeness to Hitler would have to be ridden for all the mileage it was worth. If these things could be done--if the people doing the fighting and paying for the fighting could be convinced that this was a chance to do what Britain and France and the rest of the world failed to do when Hitler could have been managed--then it might be possible to get a majority on board and keep them on board for the necessary effort.