On V.1 Background: Germany and the Bundeswehr in the Eighties

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Raellus

What if a faction in the Bundeswehr launched a false-flag op to create the illusion of a DDR attack on West Germany?

It doesn't solve the basic problems of such a premise at all. Let me remind you of the premise again:

Originally Posted by Raellus

If that's still too far-fetched, what if the anti-communist DDR military faction decided to launch an attack on West Germany, to give the Bundeswehr a pretext to counter? This attack, of course, would be mostly for show, but it would provide a justification for a punitive Bundeswehr drive into East Germany which would then prompt a coup by the NVA. West Germany would have its fait accompli, and NATO would have a reason to intervene (Article 9 of the charter).

1. Starting a shooting war is likely to set off a nuclear war and Germany would be the epicentre. If you have any love for your live, your family and/or your country, you keep the peace at (almost) all costs. Nuclear war will devestate most of Europe, large parts of North America and the USSR. No one wins in this game, unless you don't play. This not debatable, since it - by design - is a key concept of T2K as well as popular knowledge at the time.
2. Both, West and East German military and political leadership is closely observed and guided by their respective hegemonial powers. Both German states and their militaries are so confined in their alliances that larger plans involving one's own military or talking to the other side will be impossible. Especially between members of both security aparatuses, i. e. high-ranking officers, members of the intelligence communities, relatives by blood or marriage etc. While low-ranking soldiers or officers could probably grab a few rifles and start shooting across the border, they couldn't pass it. Also, no-one would start a war over a lieutenant and a couple of guys going all murder hobo.
3. Anyone who tries that in the East, will fail and face the severest punishment. The GDR by then hadn't executed anyone since the early 80s, but torture and labor camp were still on the menu.
4. If you're politically unreliable, you don't get to be in the army, let alone in a position of power. That's a given for both German armies. However, being in the East German NVA puts you under direct and often intense scrutiny of the Stasi (the intelligence service of the GDR): 96 percent of all officers are members of the ruling Socialist party (the SED). The remaining 4 percent are members of one of the other allowed parties (so called bloc parties). None of these four percent of none SED-officers make it beyond the rank of major. While there was a nationalistic party that had been specifically founded (by Stalin) for East Germany to have a party that could harbor former NSDAP members and Wehrmacht officers, the party didn't play a huge roll for the armed forces. As mentioned, almost all officers were SED members and each and everyone was constantly vetted by the Stasi.

Originally Posted by Raellus

As a bit of an aside, how do you German T2k'ers handle the beginning of the Twilight War?

Not exactly sure yet. But it needs to be quick and ugly as I think premeditated plans are unlikely to work and very risky to be uncovered. Additionally, as mentioned above, I don't think anyone would plan an incident like that in the 80s or 90s for feat of annihilating most of humanity. China, for me, has to be a factor as explained elsewhere.

I'm going to use a modification of the new 4th edition. Probably, it'll revolve around the Third Taiwan Strait crisis and the USSR reclaiming its former member states in the Baltics, as well as Armenia, Moldavia etc. I still need to come with an idea, why proper war would break out in/over/against Poland or along a wider front. I could see the USSR attack Poland over people of Russian descent, in a similar spiel as in the Baltics. With Poland aspiring NATO-membership, a hardliner government in Moscow might try to pull a fast one on Poland, before it's to late.

Also, in our history, Polish government and civilian agencies helped Chechen separatists quite openly. That could go wrong quickly with a resurgent USSR in 1997. Maybe pro-Chechen-independence protests happen at the same time as a joint maneuver by forces of NATO and Poland. A combination of several of these factors might do the trick. The Czech Republic and Slovakia just get to be in the way, much like Belgium was in 1914. Romania and the USSR might clash over Transnistria in Moldavia, drawing the two in an unwanted war just prior to the Polish incident. The Bulgarian government was historically in the 90s constantly undermined by Russia, so similar things could happen in a timeline featuring the USSR, with the latter actively trying to destabilize the country and make it a satellite state through installing its own government choice. Hungary suffers a similar fate with both nations descending into civil war, Soviet occupation and hostilities with neighbours, until parts of NATO's Southern members (Italy, Turkey, Greece, maybe Spain and Portugal, too) try to stabilize the greater Balkan area, as the second wave of the Yugoslavian breakup (Kosovo) begins.

I've not yet written it down. We'll see.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Ursus Maior

Starting a shooting war is likely to set off a nuclear war and Germany would be the epicentre. If you have any love for your live, your family and/or your country, you keep the peace at (almost) all costs. Nuclear war will devestate most of Europe, large parts of North America and the USSR. No one wins in this game, unless you don't play. This not debatable, since it - by design - is a key concept of T2K as well as popular knowledge at the time.

I'm not questioning the validity of your arguments, but this thinking strikes me as somewhat inflexible. We're not talking about reality here, we're talking about realism, and that's not quite the same thing.

If the excerpt quoted above is an incontrovertible fact, then why wouldn't this principle apply equally to every other nation in Europe- or anywhere on the planet, for that matter (barring the occasional unhinged, tin pot dictator)? It wouldn't only be German politicians on both sides of the Iron Curtain that understand that a shooting war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe stands a good chance of going nuclear at some point. So, if this premise applies universally, then no one starts a war, and you don't end up with Twilight 2000- you end up with reality. Not very fun. Perhaps reality is the enemy of realism, in this case.

But back to the main topic of discussion here. During the course of its nearly fifty years as a polity, did the West German gov't always behave in wholly rational, totally lawful, and completely risk-averse ways? I don't know enough about its post-war history to answer that question accurately- I defer to your knowledge regarding the subject. However, to believe that constitutional democracies somehow can't or won't start wars of aggression is, IMHO, a bit naive. As a US citizen, I am painfully aware that constitutional democracies can and do start wars, sometimes purely to advance their own interests. The same holds true of constitutional democracies who are signatories to international treaties, and/or members of alliances. If the Germanies are incapable (and I'm obviouslystill having a hard time accepting that proposition) of kicking off a shooting in Europe, then some other country has to, as you put it, willfully commit the world to self-immolation, and start the war. That seems like passing the buck, or playing favorites. I suppose one could take the easy way out and throw a maniacal dictator- the deus ex machina of alternate history- into the mix to trigger WW3, but that's a bit of a copout, IMHO.

I think the key to creating a realistic start to WW3 in Europe is to create a stumble-into-it scenario. The participants don't necessarily intend to start a major shooting war, but things take a turn and spiral out of control. This requires tension, misunderstandings, miscalculations, mistakes, accidents even. Are German governments and military leaders somehow immune to these stumbling blocks? Is this approach realistic only if it's the Polish, American, or Soviet governments and/or military leaders displaying poor judgment and making bad decisions? Again, seems like playing favorites.

If a German trigger point doesn't work for you, it doesn't work, and I don't begrudge you going with something that does. Even though we see things a little differently, I appreciate you taking the time to share your thoughts and answer my questions. You've given me a lot of food for thought.

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[B.T.]

If one tries to understand, how Germany worked after WWII, one has to consider quite a lot of factors.
Both German states were newly formed with the assistance or even guidiance of one or more allied nations of WWII; the Soviet Union was the leading political force in the institution of the DDR/GDR, the Western Allies USA, Great Britain and France were the leading powers in the West, that was to be known as the BRD/FRG after 1949.

One can not underestimate the outcome of WWII on German society. The founders of the Grundgesetz were absolutely clear in the approach, that never again in any future, a war should be started by German forces. In the beginning of the FRG, Western Germany did not even have an army or armed forces at all.
In 1950/51 the Bundesgrenzschutz was formed. The tasks of that paramilitary force were:

"Border police protection of the federal territory: police surveillance of the borders on land, sea and from the air; police control of cross-border traffic including checking of the border crossing papers and the authorization to cross the border as well as the border search; the defense against dangers that impair the security of the borders in the border area up to a depth of 30 km and from the seaward boundary to a depth of 50 km" (From the German Wikipedia, translated with Google translater)

The desire of West-German authorities to field a paramilitary force was a reaction to the formation of the East-German Kasernierte Volkspolizei in 1948. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kasernierte_Volkspolizei)

Some kind of rearmament was something that the majority of Germans (at least in the West, I don't know, how this was viewed at in the East) rejected. The discussion about the rearmement from 1949 till 1956 can be labelled as one kind of political crisis in the early years of Western Germany.
We all know the outcome: The Bundeswehr was founded in 1955. The same year saw the entry of the FRG into NATO. The BGS lend a helping hand in the build-up of the Bundeswehr.

Originally Posted by Raellus

But back to the main topic of discussion here. During the course of its nearly fifty years as a polity, did the West German gov't always behave in wholly rational, totally lawful, and completely risk-averse ways? I don't know enough about its post-war history to answer that question accurately- I defer to your knowledge regarding the subject. However, to believe that constitutional democracies somehow can't or won't start wars of aggression is, IMHO, a bit naive. As a US citizen, I am painfully aware that constitutional democracies can and do start wars, sometimes purely to advance their own interests. The same holds true of constitutional democracies who are signatories to international treaties, and/or members of alliances. If the Germanies are incapable (and I'm obviouslystill having a hard time accepting that proposition) of kicking off a shooting in Europe, then some other country has to, as you put it, willfully commit the world to self-immolation, and start the war. That seems like passing the buck, or playing favorites. I suppose one could take the easy way out and throw a maniacal dictator- the deus ex machina of alternate history- into the mix to trigger WW3, but that's a bit of a copout, IMHO.

I think the key to creating a realistic start to WW3 in Europe is to create a stumble-into-it scenario. The participants don't necessarily intend to start a major shooting war, but things take a turn and spiral out of control. This requires tension, misunderstandings, miscalculations, mistakes, accidents even. Are German governments and military leaders somehow immune to these stumbling blocks? Is this approach realistic only if it's the Polish, American, or Soviet governments and/or military leaders displaying poor judgment and making bad decisions? Again, seems like playing favorites.
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Now, I don't want to turn this into a historical lecture, but I think, some aspects have to be clarified:

What follows is my own, personal opinion. Others may see it differently.
Germans are a strange kind of people. We are (Simplified and in general, thank God - there are exceptions!) so obsessed with "doing it the right way". In any given political debate we almost always have to save the whole world. So, it is either bright white or darkest black. Political talks do very seldom see the grays inbetween. From a philosophical viewpoint that seems to be ... erh ... correct, but sometimes philisophy and reality are different kettle of fish. German politicians are not better or worse than politicians in other parts of the world. But that "doing it the right way" sometimes prevents a more appropriate way of acting. Sometimes German politics seem to be the fiercest foe to German politics.
If some kind of military or paramilitary action should be conducted by West-German forces, that could not happen without the permission of at least one allied partner, who allows such action.


If we talk about a ver1 only backgroundstory, the role of the BGS is something, that could be used as a game changer. I personally - being a miniature builder and painter - miss the BGS in ver2.n.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by B.T.

If we talk about a ver1 only backgroundstory, the role of the BGS is something, that could be used as a game changer. I personally - being a miniature builder and painter - miss the BGS in ver2.n.

I think the absence of the BGS is historically correct, but GDW could not have known that at the time. Until 1994 BGS forces had the status of combatants. Even in a v.4 timeline that could still be the case, since a missing or reduced Peace Dividend might lead to the BGS remain in that role. However, since the lower ranks of the border guard had been disbanded by 1976 already, there would have been no rank-and-file units for around 20 years once the Twilight War starts.

Of course, if one wants to maliciously circumvent a treaty like CFE, you abolish combatant status for the BGS in the 90s but keep the heavier equipment and move ex-NVA East German soldiers into newly established BGS training units in East Germany. Declaring these units as "anti-riot police" only while crosstraining them for deployment in international ("UN only") missions (Somalia, Yugoslavia etc.), including EOD, COIN, force protection etc. could give you a third federal component next to field army and territorial army.

Then again, what's the motive here? What is the higher strategy in circumventing arms control treatise?

[Ursus Maior]

Indeed, realism is not always fun, and we're trying to walk a very fine line here between fun and not being able to suspend disbelief. I'm glad we're having a solid, argument based discussion here.

If the excerpt quoted above is an incontrovertible fact, then why wouldn't this principle apply equally to every other nation in Europe- or anywhere on the planet, for that matter (barring the occasional unhinged, tin pot dictator)?

Two points to keep in mind here: A) German contemporary history and B) the immediate geopolitical context.

A) Germany had lost two world wars in the 70 years before the Wall came down. This was well within the lifetime of individual person and if you're beaten twice, you draw different lessions from war than if you won both rounds and your homeland wasn't even touched (or hardly, as was the case of the US). The USSR equally drew completely different lessions, having formed in the aftermath of the Great War and being almost physically eradicated during the Second World War.

West and East Germany concluded that, since they were no longer masters of their own land and indeed their land had actually been split between the victors, any third round would spell doom on the very idea of having a German state at all. Unless of course, they were not loosing it. However, since any war conceivable at that time would certainly have one of the German states on each side, Germany itself would always loose. The bigger question in the background was thus the so called German question, which had been the governing question in all European great power politics. It basically boils down to: can Europe (and that meant most of the world, too) be stable, if a large and powerful Central European power exists (i. e. Germany) or is it better to have larger powers at Europe's periphery (France, UK, Russia/USSR) and leave the center politically weaker.

Word War Two answered that question until 1990 and Europe was very stable during that time. If that's a consequence or a correlation is hard to decide, but everyone was happy with it.

B) The immediate context was that Germany could not decide any of this on its own. Both states had these things decided for them. This isn't a question of being a purely rational actor, its about not having any agency.

Case in point, constitutional democracies to not wage more or less wars on the basis of them being governed like they are. The type of government is not responsible for the likelihood of warfare. Otherwise Canada, Estonia and the US couldn't be all liberal democracies sporting constitutions. What makes a state go to war are very diverse reasons, but mostly it has to be a credible option. In NATO, that only works for France, UK and USA, the rest cannot do it, so they don't. However, from this inability also roots a different way of thinking. If you know you cannot, you think about other options. So, if you're used to solve problems without force and then an opportunity arises where you could use force, you have different and proven instruments at your disposal.

This got nothing to do with risk-aversion either. War isn't the only risky thing to do. Not being able to defend yourself is risky too. Germany needed NATO to survive. There would have been no stopping the USSR without NATO. So Germany had to believe NATO would step in for Germans, despite Germany having waged war twice during the 20th century against most NATO partners. That was risky, but it paid off.

I have given several examples of how I could think a third world war could go down in Europe. I don't see a planned war anywhere on the horizon, however. Nothing planned by a conspiracy and certainly nothing planned by state governments. Unless we radically change the political landscape and give a new government a reason to try to reverse history. That's what v.2 and v.4 do with the August Coup in 1991 succeeding and a resurgent USSR going to war.

That seems the better option over v.1 since it is far more credible. It's similar to why Germany started the Second World War in 1939.

[unipus]

Originally Posted by Raellus

But back to the main topic of discussion here. During the course of its nearly fifty years as a polity, did the West German gov't always behave in wholly rational, totally lawful, and completely risk-averse ways? I don't know enough about its post-war history to answer that question accurately- I defer to your knowledge regarding the subject. However, to believe that constitutional democracies somehow can't or won't start wars of aggression is, IMHO, a bit naive. As a US citizen, I am painfully aware that constitutional democracies can and do start wars, sometimes purely to advance their own interests.

I think the "US" angle taints that perspective substantially. US has for 80 years enjoyed a much more bigger appetite for military adventure. I think the reasons for this are clear: the isolation of the nation which secures it from any direct destruction as a result, which also ties into relative public opinion, and the huge gains made by US industry as a result of WW2.

Reagan was far more reckless and aggressive in his foreign policy than any German I can think of (although of course I don't know a lot), and the same can be said of most US presidents, really. And that's not even getting into people like LeMay who wanted a war at any cost whenever they could get one.

The threat of nuclear war brought "peace." But even so, the Germans knew that if a war started, they were the ones that would be first to feel it, even if it somehow against all odds avoided going nuclear. German policy had to be based around avoiding that outcome at all costs. Think of the pronounced, significant opposition to US nuclear weapons in Germany. The German people knew that made them targets. It's not a good position to be in. (of course, the Russians did the same thing, they just didn't bother to tell anyone. No one knew there were Soviet nukes in Poland until the '90s.)

I just think there's a lot of reasons realistic and otherwise why "Germans start WW3" is an inherently silly place to start from.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by unipus

I just think there's a lot of reasons realistic and otherwise why "Germans start WW3" is an inherently silly place to start from.

Well, when you put it that way, yeah, it is.

I don't think that's really what GDW was going for in v1. That's certainly not what I've been arguing for. Technically, the USSR had already started WW3 over in Asia. In v1 the West German military saw an opportunity to reunify the two Germanies and they took it. They're not portrayed as warmongers, I don't think. They're portrayed as patriotic opportunists who were egged on by counterparts in the NVA. It's more that they made two fatal miscalculations. One, they underestimated the USSR's resolve to maintain its grip on the DDR and two, they underestimated the USSR's ability to fight a two front war (they probably assume that the Soviets were overcommitted in China).

So, perhaps v1's Germany scenario doesn't work as written.

How about Berlin as a flashpoint? It's got NATO and PACT forces in close proximity. We know from RL that many people in East Berlin wanted out. There've been major Cold War crises there before.

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[Raellus]

Two more questions for my German friends:

Given the points you've made about West German mindset, politics, and the mission of the Bundeswehr, do you see German forces operating on foreign soil (say, during a counteroffensive into Poland for example)?

I don't think it's too OT to ask how you view Germany's treatment in the v2 timeline? Is it any better? Worse? Looking at it again today- given what I've learned from this thread over the past few days- it seems problematic as well.

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[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Two more questions for my German friends:

Given the points you've made about West German mindset, politics, and the mission of the Bundeswehr, do you see German forces operating on foreign soil (say, during a counteroffensive into Poland for example)?

I don't think it's too OT to ask how you view Germany's treatment in the v2 timeline? Is it any better? Worse? Looking at it again today- given what I've learned from this thread over the past few days- it seems problematic as well.

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I have to read v.2 again and will share my thoughts later. I think Germany would follow its obligations to NATO in the event of a war. We were on board with Afghanistan from day 1 and we'll leave close to last this year. It won't be easy for the government to sell a full war, but once the Soviets bomb Germany, it's a very different game. There would probably still be large pacifist demonstrations, though. Even today many defend Russia's invasion of Crimea and otehr policies, plus I would expect the USSR to go full hybrid and propaganda warfare on Germany. Taking Germany of the war would be the end for all NATO logistics, so it's worth almost every investment.

But as I said, attacking German soil will set the machinery into motion and once the federal government takes full control, calls up reservists and starts handing out checks like candy to keep the war going, there will be enormous pressure to follow along, condemn the Soviets and take up arms. I could even see peace protestors getting lynched or rightwing terrorists start hunting Soviet sympathizers (i. e. the notorious Red Army Faction). From what we learned during the last years and various political scandals, rightwing terrorists and German internal intelligence services had a few cozy relationships for decades, so I could see some of these rightwing terrorists getting tipped off about leftwing terrorists, leading to hunting parties and something akin to gang warfare, even before the state's monopoly on violence visibly softens up after the nukes hit and the army conscripts police officers etc.

[unipus]

I mean that's all basically Operation Gladio.

As you said, the Soviets are well aware of the logistical importance of Germany in all things. So is the CIA.