On V.1 Background: Germany and the Bundeswehr in the Eighties

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Ursus Maior

Starting a shooting war is likely to set off a nuclear war and Germany would be the epicentre. If you have any love for your live, your family and/or your country, you keep the peace at (almost) all costs. Nuclear war will devestate most of Europe, large parts of North America and the USSR. No one wins in this game, unless you don't play. This not debatable, since it - by design - is a key concept of T2K as well as popular knowledge at the time.

I'm not questioning the validity of your arguments, but this thinking strikes me as somewhat inflexible. We're not talking about reality here, we're talking about realism, and that's not quite the same thing.

If the excerpt quoted above is an incontrovertible fact, then why wouldn't this principle apply equally to every other nation in Europe- or anywhere on the planet, for that matter (barring the occasional unhinged, tin pot dictator)? It wouldn't only be German politicians on both sides of the Iron Curtain that understand that a shooting war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe stands a good chance of going nuclear at some point. So, if this premise applies universally, then no one starts a war, and you don't end up with Twilight 2000- you end up with reality. Not very fun. Perhaps reality is the enemy of realism, in this case.

But back to the main topic of discussion here. During the course of its nearly fifty years as a polity, did the West German gov't always behave in wholly rational, totally lawful, and completely risk-averse ways? I don't know enough about its post-war history to answer that question accurately- I defer to your knowledge regarding the subject. However, to believe that constitutional democracies somehow can't or won't start wars of aggression is, IMHO, a bit naive. As a US citizen, I am painfully aware that constitutional democracies can and do start wars, sometimes purely to advance their own interests. The same holds true of constitutional democracies who are signatories to international treaties, and/or members of alliances. If the Germanies are incapable (and I'm obviouslystill having a hard time accepting that proposition) of kicking off a shooting in Europe, then some other country has to, as you put it, willfully commit the world to self-immolation, and start the war. That seems like passing the buck, or playing favorites. I suppose one could take the easy way out and throw a maniacal dictator- the deus ex machina of alternate history- into the mix to trigger WW3, but that's a bit of a copout, IMHO.

I think the key to creating a realistic start to WW3 in Europe is to create a stumble-into-it scenario. The participants don't necessarily intend to start a major shooting war, but things take a turn and spiral out of control. This requires tension, misunderstandings, miscalculations, mistakes, accidents even. Are German governments and military leaders somehow immune to these stumbling blocks? Is this approach realistic only if it's the Polish, American, or Soviet governments and/or military leaders displaying poor judgment and making bad decisions? Again, seems like playing favorites.

If a German trigger point doesn't work for you, it doesn't work, and I don't begrudge you going with something that does. Even though we see things a little differently, I appreciate you taking the time to share your thoughts and answer my questions. You've given me a lot of food for thought.

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[B.T.]

If one tries to understand, how Germany worked after WWII, one has to consider quite a lot of factors.
Both German states were newly formed with the assistance or even guidiance of one or more allied nations of WWII; the Soviet Union was the leading political force in the institution of the DDR/GDR, the Western Allies USA, Great Britain and France were the leading powers in the West, that was to be known as the BRD/FRG after 1949.

One can not underestimate the outcome of WWII on German society. The founders of the Grundgesetz were absolutely clear in the approach, that never again in any future, a war should be started by German forces. In the beginning of the FRG, Western Germany did not even have an army or armed forces at all.
In 1950/51 the Bundesgrenzschutz was formed. The tasks of that paramilitary force were:

"Border police protection of the federal territory: police surveillance of the borders on land, sea and from the air; police control of cross-border traffic including checking of the border crossing papers and the authorization to cross the border as well as the border search; the defense against dangers that impair the security of the borders in the border area up to a depth of 30 km and from the seaward boundary to a depth of 50 km" (From the German Wikipedia, translated with Google translater)

The desire of West-German authorities to field a paramilitary force was a reaction to the formation of the East-German Kasernierte Volkspolizei in 1948. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kasernierte_Volkspolizei)

Some kind of rearmament was something that the majority of Germans (at least in the West, I don't know, how this was viewed at in the East) rejected. The discussion about the rearmement from 1949 till 1956 can be labelled as one kind of political crisis in the early years of Western Germany.
We all know the outcome: The Bundeswehr was founded in 1955. The same year saw the entry of the FRG into NATO. The BGS lend a helping hand in the build-up of the Bundeswehr.

Originally Posted by Raellus

But back to the main topic of discussion here. During the course of its nearly fifty years as a polity, did the West German gov't always behave in wholly rational, totally lawful, and completely risk-averse ways? I don't know enough about its post-war history to answer that question accurately- I defer to your knowledge regarding the subject. However, to believe that constitutional democracies somehow can't or won't start wars of aggression is, IMHO, a bit naive. As a US citizen, I am painfully aware that constitutional democracies can and do start wars, sometimes purely to advance their own interests. The same holds true of constitutional democracies who are signatories to international treaties, and/or members of alliances. If the Germanies are incapable (and I'm obviouslystill having a hard time accepting that proposition) of kicking off a shooting in Europe, then some other country has to, as you put it, willfully commit the world to self-immolation, and start the war. That seems like passing the buck, or playing favorites. I suppose one could take the easy way out and throw a maniacal dictator- the deus ex machina of alternate history- into the mix to trigger WW3, but that's a bit of a copout, IMHO.

I think the key to creating a realistic start to WW3 in Europe is to create a stumble-into-it scenario. The participants don't necessarily intend to start a major shooting war, but things take a turn and spiral out of control. This requires tension, misunderstandings, miscalculations, mistakes, accidents even. Are German governments and military leaders somehow immune to these stumbling blocks? Is this approach realistic only if it's the Polish, American, or Soviet governments and/or military leaders displaying poor judgment and making bad decisions? Again, seems like playing favorites.
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Now, I don't want to turn this into a historical lecture, but I think, some aspects have to be clarified:

What follows is my own, personal opinion. Others may see it differently.
Germans are a strange kind of people. We are (Simplified and in general, thank God - there are exceptions!) so obsessed with "doing it the right way". In any given political debate we almost always have to save the whole world. So, it is either bright white or darkest black. Political talks do very seldom see the grays inbetween. From a philosophical viewpoint that seems to be ... erh ... correct, but sometimes philisophy and reality are different kettle of fish. German politicians are not better or worse than politicians in other parts of the world. But that "doing it the right way" sometimes prevents a more appropriate way of acting. Sometimes German politics seem to be the fiercest foe to German politics.
If some kind of military or paramilitary action should be conducted by West-German forces, that could not happen without the permission of at least one allied partner, who allows such action.


If we talk about a ver1 only backgroundstory, the role of the BGS is something, that could be used as a game changer. I personally - being a miniature builder and painter - miss the BGS in ver2.n.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by B.T.

If we talk about a ver1 only backgroundstory, the role of the BGS is something, that could be used as a game changer. I personally - being a miniature builder and painter - miss the BGS in ver2.n.

I think the absence of the BGS is historically correct, but GDW could not have known that at the time. Until 1994 BGS forces had the status of combatants. Even in a v.4 timeline that could still be the case, since a missing or reduced Peace Dividend might lead to the BGS remain in that role. However, since the lower ranks of the border guard had been disbanded by 1976 already, there would have been no rank-and-file units for around 20 years once the Twilight War starts.

Of course, if one wants to maliciously circumvent a treaty like CFE, you abolish combatant status for the BGS in the 90s but keep the heavier equipment and move ex-NVA East German soldiers into newly established BGS training units in East Germany. Declaring these units as "anti-riot police" only while crosstraining them for deployment in international ("UN only") missions (Somalia, Yugoslavia etc.), including EOD, COIN, force protection etc. could give you a third federal component next to field army and territorial army.

Then again, what's the motive here? What is the higher strategy in circumventing arms control treatise?

[Ursus Maior]

Indeed, realism is not always fun, and we're trying to walk a very fine line here between fun and not being able to suspend disbelief. I'm glad we're having a solid, argument based discussion here.

If the excerpt quoted above is an incontrovertible fact, then why wouldn't this principle apply equally to every other nation in Europe- or anywhere on the planet, for that matter (barring the occasional unhinged, tin pot dictator)?

Two points to keep in mind here: A) German contemporary history and B) the immediate geopolitical context.

A) Germany had lost two world wars in the 70 years before the Wall came down. This was well within the lifetime of individual person and if you're beaten twice, you draw different lessions from war than if you won both rounds and your homeland wasn't even touched (or hardly, as was the case of the US). The USSR equally drew completely different lessions, having formed in the aftermath of the Great War and being almost physically eradicated during the Second World War.

West and East Germany concluded that, since they were no longer masters of their own land and indeed their land had actually been split between the victors, any third round would spell doom on the very idea of having a German state at all. Unless of course, they were not loosing it. However, since any war conceivable at that time would certainly have one of the German states on each side, Germany itself would always loose. The bigger question in the background was thus the so called German question, which had been the governing question in all European great power politics. It basically boils down to: can Europe (and that meant most of the world, too) be stable, if a large and powerful Central European power exists (i. e. Germany) or is it better to have larger powers at Europe's periphery (France, UK, Russia/USSR) and leave the center politically weaker.

Word War Two answered that question until 1990 and Europe was very stable during that time. If that's a consequence or a correlation is hard to decide, but everyone was happy with it.

B) The immediate context was that Germany could not decide any of this on its own. Both states had these things decided for them. This isn't a question of being a purely rational actor, its about not having any agency.

Case in point, constitutional democracies to not wage more or less wars on the basis of them being governed like they are. The type of government is not responsible for the likelihood of warfare. Otherwise Canada, Estonia and the US couldn't be all liberal democracies sporting constitutions. What makes a state go to war are very diverse reasons, but mostly it has to be a credible option. In NATO, that only works for France, UK and USA, the rest cannot do it, so they don't. However, from this inability also roots a different way of thinking. If you know you cannot, you think about other options. So, if you're used to solve problems without force and then an opportunity arises where you could use force, you have different and proven instruments at your disposal.

This got nothing to do with risk-aversion either. War isn't the only risky thing to do. Not being able to defend yourself is risky too. Germany needed NATO to survive. There would have been no stopping the USSR without NATO. So Germany had to believe NATO would step in for Germans, despite Germany having waged war twice during the 20th century against most NATO partners. That was risky, but it paid off.

I have given several examples of how I could think a third world war could go down in Europe. I don't see a planned war anywhere on the horizon, however. Nothing planned by a conspiracy and certainly nothing planned by state governments. Unless we radically change the political landscape and give a new government a reason to try to reverse history. That's what v.2 and v.4 do with the August Coup in 1991 succeeding and a resurgent USSR going to war.

That seems the better option over v.1 since it is far more credible. It's similar to why Germany started the Second World War in 1939.

[unipus]

Originally Posted by Raellus

But back to the main topic of discussion here. During the course of its nearly fifty years as a polity, did the West German gov't always behave in wholly rational, totally lawful, and completely risk-averse ways? I don't know enough about its post-war history to answer that question accurately- I defer to your knowledge regarding the subject. However, to believe that constitutional democracies somehow can't or won't start wars of aggression is, IMHO, a bit naive. As a US citizen, I am painfully aware that constitutional democracies can and do start wars, sometimes purely to advance their own interests.

I think the "US" angle taints that perspective substantially. US has for 80 years enjoyed a much more bigger appetite for military adventure. I think the reasons for this are clear: the isolation of the nation which secures it from any direct destruction as a result, which also ties into relative public opinion, and the huge gains made by US industry as a result of WW2.

Reagan was far more reckless and aggressive in his foreign policy than any German I can think of (although of course I don't know a lot), and the same can be said of most US presidents, really. And that's not even getting into people like LeMay who wanted a war at any cost whenever they could get one.

The threat of nuclear war brought "peace." But even so, the Germans knew that if a war started, they were the ones that would be first to feel it, even if it somehow against all odds avoided going nuclear. German policy had to be based around avoiding that outcome at all costs. Think of the pronounced, significant opposition to US nuclear weapons in Germany. The German people knew that made them targets. It's not a good position to be in. (of course, the Russians did the same thing, they just didn't bother to tell anyone. No one knew there were Soviet nukes in Poland until the '90s.)

I just think there's a lot of reasons realistic and otherwise why "Germans start WW3" is an inherently silly place to start from.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by unipus

I just think there's a lot of reasons realistic and otherwise why "Germans start WW3" is an inherently silly place to start from.

Well, when you put it that way, yeah, it is.

I don't think that's really what GDW was going for in v1. That's certainly not what I've been arguing for. Technically, the USSR had already started WW3 over in Asia. In v1 the West German military saw an opportunity to reunify the two Germanies and they took it. They're not portrayed as warmongers, I don't think. They're portrayed as patriotic opportunists who were egged on by counterparts in the NVA. It's more that they made two fatal miscalculations. One, they underestimated the USSR's resolve to maintain its grip on the DDR and two, they underestimated the USSR's ability to fight a two front war (they probably assume that the Soviets were overcommitted in China).

So, perhaps v1's Germany scenario doesn't work as written.

How about Berlin as a flashpoint? It's got NATO and PACT forces in close proximity. We know from RL that many people in East Berlin wanted out. There've been major Cold War crises there before.

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[Raellus]

Two more questions for my German friends:

Given the points you've made about West German mindset, politics, and the mission of the Bundeswehr, do you see German forces operating on foreign soil (say, during a counteroffensive into Poland for example)?

I don't think it's too OT to ask how you view Germany's treatment in the v2 timeline? Is it any better? Worse? Looking at it again today- given what I've learned from this thread over the past few days- it seems problematic as well.

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[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Two more questions for my German friends:

Given the points you've made about West German mindset, politics, and the mission of the Bundeswehr, do you see German forces operating on foreign soil (say, during a counteroffensive into Poland for example)?

I don't think it's too OT to ask how you view Germany's treatment in the v2 timeline? Is it any better? Worse? Looking at it again today- given what I've learned from this thread over the past few days- it seems problematic as well.

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I have to read v.2 again and will share my thoughts later. I think Germany would follow its obligations to NATO in the event of a war. We were on board with Afghanistan from day 1 and we'll leave close to last this year. It won't be easy for the government to sell a full war, but once the Soviets bomb Germany, it's a very different game. There would probably still be large pacifist demonstrations, though. Even today many defend Russia's invasion of Crimea and otehr policies, plus I would expect the USSR to go full hybrid and propaganda warfare on Germany. Taking Germany of the war would be the end for all NATO logistics, so it's worth almost every investment.

But as I said, attacking German soil will set the machinery into motion and once the federal government takes full control, calls up reservists and starts handing out checks like candy to keep the war going, there will be enormous pressure to follow along, condemn the Soviets and take up arms. I could even see peace protestors getting lynched or rightwing terrorists start hunting Soviet sympathizers (i. e. the notorious Red Army Faction). From what we learned during the last years and various political scandals, rightwing terrorists and German internal intelligence services had a few cozy relationships for decades, so I could see some of these rightwing terrorists getting tipped off about leftwing terrorists, leading to hunting parties and something akin to gang warfare, even before the state's monopoly on violence visibly softens up after the nukes hit and the army conscripts police officers etc.

[unipus]

I mean that's all basically Operation Gladio.

As you said, the Soviets are well aware of the logistical importance of Germany in all things. So is the CIA.

[Ursus Maior]

It goes far beyond Operation Gladio or its national equivalents. The West German security apparatus was rebuild from the part of Nazi Germany's intelligence community that specialized on the USSR (Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost, transl. Department Foreign Armies East), for obvious reasons. It turned out that looking at counter-intelligence within your own population from the perspective of fascist extermination warfare does something to your ability to foster a liberal democracy, even 50-70 years later. Let's just say, no other extremist group has been paid in cash by these agencies or committed murder against civilians with intelligence agents sitting in the next room.

[Nowhere Man 1966]

Interesting points there. I'm a whole mess of things including German but I have German ancestors who came from all over the place, My maternal grandmother's side was from the Munich area and my maternal grandfather, the Rhineland from the Landau area along with Alsacian side as well. Many of those actually originated in Zurich Switzerland. Of those ancestors, my 5th great grandfather came over with his mother from Landau to settle in Lancaster County, PA and join the American Revolution, the commander was General George Washington. Later on, he was the second White settler in Mercer County, PA. His father and baby brother died on the way over to America. I downloaded a book from 1906 about their story in America up to that time. A lot of the smaller German states have changed hands in time. If I go back further like the 1200's, I also have a long line of Jewish Rabbis in my background who suffered persecution back then.