OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[Heffe]

This seems to be the clear path forward. If Ukraine ends up attacking into Crimea, they'll have to do it through the Melitopol path. Unless Ukraine has some magical way of instantly transporting huge numbers of Ukrainian soldiers across the Dnipro, it seems like that part of the front is going to become static for now. I imagine this will open up a number of forces on both sides however as it will be easier for both sides to defend the Dnipro with fewer troops. I don't see Ukraine making much headway in the south anytime soon as it gets reinforced with all of these soldiers from Kherson, but there might be a path up in the north.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Heffe

This seems to be the clear path forward. If Ukraine ends up attacking into Crimea, they'll have to do it through the Melitopol path. Unless Ukraine has some magical way of instantly transporting huge numbers of Ukrainian soldiers across the Dnipro, it seems like that part of the front is going to become static for now. I imagine this will open up a number of forces on both sides however as it will be easier for both sides to defend the Dnipro with fewer troops. I don't see Ukraine making much headway in the south anytime soon as it gets reinforced with all of these soldiers from Kherson, but there might be a path up in the north.

The Russians have few good troops left and even less equipment to reequip these forces. Melitopol seems the way to go for the Ukrainians I think, unless they assess the situation of the Russians on the other side of the Dnipro as so dire that crossing the river seems viable. I lack information on that, obviously.

But taking Melitopol would cut of southern Kherson and Crimea from the rest of Russian GLOCs and put the UAF in a position to encircle Russian forces or hit them in the rear (again) as they flee into Crimea. By then, Crimea would be yet another dead end, however, since the Kerch bridge remains out of operation. Also, taking Melitopol would allow Ukrainian forces to strengthen it's forces in Donbas.

This winter will bring a lot of action and as far as I read it, the Russians don't have enough winter equipment for their forces. Oh, the irony.

[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Ursus Maior

The Russians have few good troops left and even less equipment to reequip these forces. Melitopol seems the way to go for the Ukrainians I think, unless they assess the situation of the Russians on the other side of the Dnipro as so dire that crossing the river seems viable. I lack information on that, obviously.

But taking Melitopol would cut of southern Kherson and Crimea from the rest of Russian GLOCs and put the UAF in a position to encircle Russian forces or hit them in the rear (again) as they flee into Crimea. By then, Crimea would be yet another dead end, however, since the Kerch bridge remains out of operation. Also, taking Melitopol would allow Ukrainian forces to strengthen it's forces in Donbas.

This winter will bring a lot of action and as far as I read it, the Russians don't have enough winter equipment for their forces. Oh, the irony.

I don't disagree at all, but targeting Melitopol is such an obvious move right now that I have to imagine Russia is reinforcing that direction as we speak, likely with troops from the Kherson Oblast (there and in the east near Bakhmut).

Some other observations -

• This is the first time in the war that the front has become just a static line without the Dnipro cutting it in half. and it's also reduced the length of the front line significantly. Any movement from either side at this point is going to be taxing that side's supply lines heavily while the other side will be free to respond largely without impediment.
• Ukraine is likely suffering more losses than any of us actually know. Paired with them having a far smaller military than Russia at the start of the invasion means that they have to play it much more conservatively with any attacks.
• Attacking Melitopol or pushing south will be a really hard campaign. Russia has had months to reinforce the direction, add mines and defensive fortifications, etc. Ukraine would need to have a resounding opportunity there to try for it since it would be such a big risk to their own units getting surrounded/cut off.
• Russia moving forces from Kherson east is going to increase pressure on their already taxed logistics hubs, and reduce the number of targets for HIMARs, which will only help Ukraine.
• Totally agreed that Russia is in big trouble with regard to winter approaching. If the rumors are true about their lack of cold weather gear, the first cold storm of the season is going to see Russians getting frostbite and taken out of action. This could definitely open some opportunities for Ukraine, especially once the ground freezes.

Overall, I see the war as being like a boxing match - an old heavyweight champ against a spry young fighter. The younger boxer took a couple of mean hits in the beginning of the fight, but has since been guarding, trying to wear the older fighter out. He's patient and smart - jabbing to the stomach, and then baiting the older fighter with feints and ducking in with heavy hits anytime the champ makes a mistake. This preserves his own energy while sapping the older boxer's energy. The young fighter's already won on points at this stage of the fight, but the older champ is still holding out hope for a stray knockout.

In this analogy, I don't see things changing a whole lot in the immediate future. Zelensky has done a really admirable job of restraining his own desires to push harder and risk his own forces on unnecessary assaults. I think Ukraine continues to hold for now and keeps hitting Russian logistics nodes while keeping its defenses tight, and then strikes hard when Russia makes mistakes. In short, anyone hoping for a big sudden push from Ukraine anytime in the near future is probably in for a disappointment. But once winter hits and parts of the Russian front begin to fall apart from lack of morale/winter clothing/supplies, we might see some great movement. Since Russia seems most intent in the east (that's where they claim they're making the most gains) they'll probably continue to reinforce the east to the detriment of the other directions -> future Ukrainian pushes will likely be up in the north near Svatove, or like you say, down near Melitopol. Personally I think we'll see a hard drive for Svatove first, but I'd be happy to be wrong if its in the south.

[Vespers War]

Between regular military units and the Territorial Defense Forces, Ukraine is pretty rapidly approaching a million uniformed personnel. That's at least in the ballpark of what Russia can mobilize without a formal declaration of war, and might well exceed what Russia can actually deploy to Ukraine, even if neither can completely ignore their other neighbors. The TDFs are light motorized infantry, which aren't really suited for offensive operations without significant regular army support, but they can hold territory to free up other units for offensives.

They did have a far smaller military at the start of the war, but they also had a lot of veterans with recent experience because of their policy of rotating units in and out of the Donbas. There were reports that recruiters were being bribed to take people into units that had already met their recruiting quotas, the opposite of Russia where large numbers of conscription-aged men are fleeing the country to avoid service.

Russia does have a vast number of untapped reservists, but given how they've been scraping the bottom of the barrel to re-equip from recent losses and how they've re-formed training units into front-line forces to replace manpower losses, how they would train and equip those reservists would be a mystery even if they had the political will to declare war to make them eligible for call-up. Last week Ukraine captured a T-62 Obr.1967, which is pretty much as old as the name suggests (the Obr.1972 was the next model). No fittings for ERA (1983), no active protection system (1983), too old to have a laser rangefinder (1975) or even a pintle-mounted gun for air defense (1972). By this point I half-expect the next set of replacements to show up with Berdan rifles and tachankas with Maxims because they've already issued everything newer that wasn't looted for parts to sell on the black market.

Russia's still dangerous, to be sure, but their infantry and armor are showing severe shortfalls in capability, with the dangers coming from artillery (both tube and rocket/missile) and air support (both drone and crewed). If those can be suppressed through anti-air and counterbattery provisioning, I think it will largely mitigate Russia's advantages and allow Ukraine to exploit their advantages in having forces with better training and better morale.

[Targan]

One, maybe two stray missiles landing in Poland... not good. If it turns out they were fired by Russia, it'll be largely irrelevant that they were off-target. If they were Ukrainian ADA munitions, much of the world will still make the point that Ukraine wouldn't need to fire anti-missile missiles if they weren't being attacked by Russia.

Hello, Article 4. With Article 5 waiting quietly nearby.

[Heffe]

Even beside the recent news that the missiles were likely Ukrainian in origin (which I'm only half convinced is true in any case), I don't think NATO has any interest in escalation over what was, in all likelihood, an accident.

I saw an interesting analysis last night that the GPS coordinates of the explosion in Poland, when reversed, would target a train junction near Lviv, which could also be a potential explanation for what took place. If it happens again on the other hand, well let's just hope it doesn't happen again.

[Raellus]

I wonder what this [errant?] strike on Polish soil- regardless of who launched the offending missiles- will do to Poland's resolve to continue its support of Ukraine. It could go either way. This incident could either strengthen Poland's resolve (now we're really in this together!) or it could weaken it (why continue to support a combatant next door if it's leading to collateral damage here at home?). The Polish government is putting on a brave face, ATM. In a democracy, however, popular sentiment usually prevails in the end.

Does anyone have a sense of popular opinion in Poland re the war?

-

[ToughOmbres]

Originally Posted by Vespers War

Between regular military units and the Territorial Defense Forces, Ukraine is pretty rapidly approaching a million uniformed personnel. That's at least in the ballpark of what Russia can mobilize without a formal declaration of war, and might well exceed what Russia can actually deploy to Ukraine, even if neither can completely ignore their other neighbors. The TDFs are light motorized infantry, which aren't really suited for offensive operations without significant regular army support, but they can hold territory to free up other units for offensives.

They did have a far smaller military at the start of the war, but they also had a lot of veterans with recent experience because of their policy of rotating units in and out of the Donbas. There were reports that recruiters were being bribed to take people into units that had already met their recruiting quotas, the opposite of Russia where large numbers of conscription-aged men are fleeing the country to avoid service.

Russia does have a vast number of untapped reservists, but given how they've been scraping the bottom of the barrel to re-equip from recent losses and how they've re-formed training units into front-line forces to replace manpower losses, how they would train and equip those reservists would be a mystery even if they had the political will to declare war to make them eligible for call-up. Last week Ukraine captured a T-62 Obr.1967, which is pretty much as old as the name suggests (the Obr.1972 was the next model). No fittings for ERA (1983), no active protection system (1983), too old to have a laser rangefinder (1975) or even a pintle-mounted gun for air defense (1972). By this point I half-expect the next set of replacements to show up with Berdan rifles and tachankas with Maxims because they've already issued everything newer that wasn't looted for parts to sell on the black market.

Russia's still dangerous, to be sure, but their infantry and armor are showing severe shortfalls in capability, with the dangers coming from artillery (both tube and rocket/missile) and air support (both drone and crewed). If those can be suppressed through anti-air and counterbattery provisioning, I think it will largely mitigate Russia's advantages and allow Ukraine to exploit their advantages in having forces with better training and better morale.

It looks like the UK is sending more air defense aid to Ukraine in addition to another US military aid package. While neither side can control the air the additional assets make it more risky for Ivan to fly anything other than cruise missiles over Ukraine.

[bash]

Originally Posted by ToughOmbres

It looks like the UK is sending more air defense aid to Ukraine in addition to another US military aid package. While neither side can control the air the additional assets make it more risky for Ivan to fly anything other than cruise missiles over Ukraine.

And hopefully neuter Russia's cruise missiles at the same time. Ukraine will be much better off if Russia can't keep terrorizing civilians with cruise missiles.

[Vespers War]

I'm curious what the 100+ anti-aircraft guns will end up being, since I think the last new piece of AAA adopted by the British Army was the QF 5.25-inch Mark II in 1942. There were a few prototypes of systems after that, but they introduced missiles for land-based air defense in the late 1950s and never looked back.