OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[kcdusk]

The latest warzone articles discuss Ukraine being supplied with Stryker, Marder, Challenger and potentially Leopod tanks. And questions how the associated countries will be able to keep up this level of spending.

If Nato/USA is struggling to keep up supply and spending, how will Russia ever be able to? And, they are potentially loosing more equipment than Nato.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by kcdusk

The latest warzone articles discuss Ukraine being supplied with Stryker, Marder, Challenger and potentially Leopod tanks. And questions how the associated countries will be able to keep up this level of spending.

If Nato/USA is struggling to keep up supply and spending, how will Russia ever be able to? And, they are potentially loosing more equipment than Nato.

A lot of the systems you mentioned are at or nearing the end of their service lives and were scheduled to be phased out of service over the next couple of years anyways. In effect donating them to Ukraine just gets them off the books a few years sooner. It's kind of like a kid starting to outgrow some old clothes and, before that happens, handing them down to a younger sibling (or giving them to a needy neighbor). That says, the donating countries are getting nothing for them (whereas they could sell these systems on the secondary market to recoup a portion of the loss).

NATO defense spending has gone up since the Russian invasion of Ukraine (it was already trending that way before said). Giving Ukraine mountains of military aid in the form of weapons systems and ammo gives NATO militaries a nice excuse to ask for bigger budgets and shiny new toys.

Transactionally, I'm less concerned for NATO than I am for Ukraine. Maintaining such a motley assortment of older, but new-to-them, vehicles and weapons systems is going to be extremely challenging, especially under wartime conditions. And, despite major similarities between analogous systems (say, for example, a Chally and a Leo), each system requires an adequate training cycle in order to be employed effectively.

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[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

A lot of the systems you mentioned are at or nearing the end of their service lives and were scheduled to be phased out of service over the next couple of years anyways. In effect donating them to Ukraine just gets them off the books a few years sooner. It's kind of like a kid starting to outgrow some old clothes and, before that happens, handing them down to a younger sibling (or giving them to a needy neighbor). That says, the donating countries are getting nothing for them (whereas they could sell these systems on the secondary market to recoup a portion of the loss).

NATO defense spending has gone up since the Russian invasion of Ukraine (it was already trending that way before said). Giving Ukraine mountains of military aid in the form of weapons systems and ammo gives NATO militaries a nice excuse to ask for bigger budgets and shiny new toys.

Transactionally, I'm less concerned for NATO than I am for Ukraine. Maintaining such a motley assortment of older, but new-to-them, vehicles and weapons systems is going to be extremely challenging, especially under wartime conditions. And, despite major similarities between analogous systems (say, for example, a Chally and a Leo), each system requires an adequate training cycle in order to be employed effectively.

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Ukraine has proven remarkably adaptable when it comes to onboarding with new equipment, but you're undoubtedly correct in that it's got to be an enormous challenge managing the various logistical needs, especially in wartime. Regarding the crews, I recall hearing that Ukraine had, was it tens of thousands of soldiers training in the UK a few months ago? I feel reasonable sure at least some of those were some tank crews getting up to speed on the Chally 2.

[Raellus]

This is what I'm worried about. Ukraine may be able to pace, or even pull ahead, of the Russians in operational AFV and artillery numbers, but the manpower disparity is beginning to tell. 100k military casualties on both sides favors the Russians. Yeah, the replacements they're mustering are very poorly trained and equipped but, as Stalin once said, "quantity has a quality all its own". If Belarus joins the fight...

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...op-u-s-general

From the article,

"The foreign intelligence service informed security politicians in the Bundestag in a secret meeting this week that the Ukrainian Army is currently losing a three-digit number of soldiers every day in battles with the Russian invaders" in Bakhmut, according to Der Spiegel."

In all likelihood, the bulk of those casualties consist of Ukraine's more experienced troops.

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[castlebravo92]

Does anyone have any recent numbers for Ukraine's mobilization?

I've read reports that they've sent a fairly sizable number of troops to NATO countries for training on various platforms, and they are clearly operating on more of a total war / full mobilization footing than Russia is, which suggests they'll be able to absorb battle casualties better than Russia can without a similar mobilization on their part.

There was a joke about this last round of conscripts and convicts Russia was sending to the front were getting more training this time around and were going to be much more formidable than the last wave - 2 days of training instead of 1!

I'm guessing the weather is preventing Ukraine from launching counter attacks to relieve the pressure on Bakhmut.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by castlebravo92

Does anyone have any recent numbers for Ukraine's mobilization?

Latest official numbers by the Ukrainian - minister of defense Reznikov - government were from July and stated that:

"There are up to 700,000 people mobilized for the Armed Forces, up to 60,000 border guards, up to 90,000 National Guards, and up to 100,000 National Police. Today, we have more than 1 million people in uniform ensuring the security and defense sector," said Reznikov.

https://babel.ua/en/news/81183-the-m...e-armed-forces

I'm guessing the weather is preventing Ukraine from launching counter attacks to relieve the pressure on Bakhmut.

Both sides seem to mass troops around Zaporizhzhia and Russia claims it started an offensive their: https://twitter.com/AFP/status/16167...on-supply-live

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by castlebravo92

I'm guessing the weather is preventing Ukraine from launching counter attacks to relieve the pressure on Bakhmut.

The winter weather is undoubtedly miserable, but sub-zero conditions means the ground is frozen, which allows heavy AFVs to move off-road/cross-country. In the spring, when the ground thaws, Ukraine's infamous Rasputitsa makes it difficult, if not impossible, for heavy AFVs to operate off-road.

If Ukraine isn't pressing to relieve pressure on Bakhmut now, there must be other reasons besides the weather.

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/...asputitsa.html

The almost clockwork arrival of the Rasputitsa in early spring makes Russia's decision to launch its invasion of Ukraine in February deliciously ironic.

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[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The winter weather is undoubtedly miserable, but sub-zero conditions means the ground is frozen, which allows heavy AFVs to move off-road/cross-country. In the spring, when the ground thaws, Ukraine's infamous Rasputitsa makes it difficult, if not impossible, for heavy AFVs to operate off-road.

If Ukraine isn't pressing to relieve pressure on Bakhmut now, there must be other reasons besides the weather.

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/...asputitsa.html

The almost clockwork arrival of the Rasputitsa in early spring makes Russia's decision to launch its invasion of Ukraine in February deliciously ironic.

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Depending on where in Ukraine one looks, they haven't necessarily had sustained sub-zero temperatures. Kharkiv, sure, they've stayed below zero all month. In Kherson, the only days in January where the high temperature was at or below zero Celsius were the 8th and the 19th. In Melitopol, only the 19th and 20th had a high of zero, every other day this month has been above freezing. Zaporizhzhia has had 9 days above freezing and 13 at or below freezing. I've seen speculation that Ukraine's not moving much along the southeastern front because the ground's not frozen hard and mobility is worse than if it was colder.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Raellus

If Ukraine isn't pressing to relieve pressure on Bakhmut now, there must be other reasons besides the weather.
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My take is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are getting to the point of being overstretched. Not necessarily is this the case in form of personnel, there are plenty of light forces in the Bakhmut area available (cf. https://militaryland.net/news/invasion-day-333-summary/ and here: https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/), but they begin to feel the lack of tanks, IFVs and ammunition. They have been pretty clear on that for months now: warning of coming Russian offensive operations and dire logistical situations, especially concerning Soviet type ammunition.

With the newfound attacks in the Zaporizhzhia oblast and front, there might not be enough of an armored relief force available as of now, in order to counterattack north of Bakhmut against Russian forces at Soledar.

I wouldn't be surprised, if Ukraine has to regroup to towns West of Bakhmut soon, maybe as far as Kostyantynivka. That's only 10 km to the Southwest and the city is pretty well fortified by now. But it'd still be a problem regarding the information warfare for some time.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Raellus

This is what I'm worried about. Ukraine may be able to pace, or even pull ahead, of the Russians in operational AFV and artillery numbers, but the manpower disparity is beginning to tell. 100k military casualties on both sides favors the Russians.

The casualities are vastly discrepant and by now means the same for both. It's 100k KIA for the Russians plus countless WIA, MIA and POW. The Russian chain of rescue for WIA is abysmal, their hospitals ill-equipped.

On the contrary, Ukraine has around or likely above 100,000 total casualities, including KIA, WIA, MIA and POWs with Western support in later stage medical treatments, logistical help in getting first aid material and first aid training to the front. Their ratio of KIA and WIA will be far superior to Russia's and their abilities to regenerate combat effectiveness from WIA will be far better. Also, Ukrainians are likely to reenlist and volunteer for service. Russians more or less have to force their citizens into service and have been scraping the barrel for months.

Also, Belarus isn't going to join them. Despite the fact that Lukashenka has allowed Belarus to become essentially Russia's biggest training grounds.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Ursus Maior

The casualities are vastly discrepant and by now means the same for both. It's 100k KIA for the Russians plus countless WIA, MIA and POW. The Russian chain of rescue for WIA is abysmal, their hospitals ill-equipped.

On the contrary, Ukraine has around or likely above 100,000 total casualities, including KIA, WIA, MIA and POWs with Western support in later stage medical treatments, logistical help in getting first aid material and first aid training to the front. Their ratio of KIA and WIA will be far superior to Russia's and their abilities to regenerate combat effectiveness from WIA will be far better.

Recent reports put Russian KIA and WIA, combined, at between 100-180k. Ukrainian losses- again, both KIA and WIA combined- are believed to be upwards of 100k. That's not even a 2 to 1 ratio in Ukraine's favor.

I'd like to see some POW figures from both sides. My impression is that more Russian troops have been captured, but what's the actual difference? Is it statistically significant?

Again, Ukraine is at or near full mobilization. Russia, on the other hand is not. They still have untapped manpower reserves. Yes, qualitatively, Russia's replacement troops are inferior but, quantitatively, Russia still has a decided edge.

Originally Posted by Ursus Maior

Also, Ukrainians are likely to reenlist and volunteer for service. Russians more or less have to force their citizens into service and have been scraping the barrel for months.

True, but I worry about the psychological toll that almost a full year of near continuous combat operations is taking on the Ukrainian military. Combat exhaustion is real. Physical and psychological wounds tend to degrade combat effectiveness over time.

Originally Posted by Ursus Maior

Also, Belarus isn't going to join them. Despite the fact that Lukashenka has allowed Belarus to become essentially Russia's biggest training grounds.

Why are you so certain?

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[kato13]

I know the Russians have a history of coming back after unfathomable losses, but so many intangibles are working against them:

• Return rate of WIA (after recovery)
• Nearly 100k troops being trained outside of Ukraine up to NATO standards.
• Equipment is shifting to more current generations rather than the opposite
• New trucks daily, while Russia never really focused on them and is really scraping the barrel for anything to move equipment.
• Ukraine has greater sources of Artillery rounds, yes both sides are going to need to curtail their usage, but unless China starts to supply Russia they will be hit much harder.
• US/Nato Satellite Imagery and C3I.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Recent reports put Russian KIA and WIA, combined, at between 100-180k. Ukrainian losses- again, both KIA and WIA combined- are believed to be upwards of 100k. That's not even a 2 to 1 ratio in Ukraine's favor.

The big factor here would be the ratio between KIA and WIA and from what we know about the war - reliable sources are the biggest problem here - Ukrainian medical care is superior to Russian. That has several factors:

1. Russian (and Soviet) CASEVAC and care was always far worse than Western and Ukraine was trained close to Western standards,
2. supply issues regarding first aid and all other tiers of medical care are well documented for the Russian side in this war,
3. Ukraine is fighting on its own soil, so hospitals are closer at hand and
4. civilian volunteer forces are available, because defense of the nation is an accepted common goal,
5. Russia is fighting an invasion and occupying Ukraine after a very destructive conquest, so their own hospitals are further away from the frontlines, even those in territories of their proxies, and
6. critical infrastructure in occupied territories is often damaged, especially due to the destructive nature of Russian offensive warfare: where Russia goes, its forces can hardly use critical infrastructure or only in vastly diminished forms, also, local volunteers are hardly available.

None of these factors benefits Russian forces to regenerate its forces from MIA casualties. In fact, it all of these factors are detrimental to medical care, increasing the number of Russian casualties that decease after reaching rearward medical care as MIAs or become permanently invalid.

Next, permanently invalids of the Russian forces are lost for the war effort almost completely. They will receive a pension, at least nominally, but are unlikely to contribute meaningful to further force generations. Ukrainian invalids have started civilian efforts to further the war effort (humanitarian aid mostly) or can, in some cases, be of use to the armed forces in administrative positions. This allows the armed forces to free up certain personnel.

I'd like to see some POW figures from both sides. My impression is that more Russian troops have been captured, but what's the actual difference? Is it statistically significant?

That's a big blurry subject in open sources, yes. My impression from the few numbers released was that Ukraine is eager to get its people back, so they often made deals that released their own people in infavorable ratios: more Russians were released than Ukrainians. But that seems to have changed recently, this compilation at the end of the text tells me: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casual...isoners_of_war

Again, Ukraine is at or near full mobilization. Russia, on the other hand is not. They still have untapped manpower reserves. Yes, qualitatively, Russia's replacement troops are inferior but, quantitatively, Russia still has a decided edge.

Ukraine is very far from total mobilization and I don't know where you get an otherwise impression. Ukraine has somewhere around 11 million men at an available age for service and around 6,5 to 7 million fit for military service. About 400,000-450,000 men reach mobilization age each year. Mobilization so far has brought the strength of the armed forces to around 700,000 soldiers.

Quantities don't matter unless they're exploitable. And Russia's junta has clearly refrained from exploiting the full quantities available. This partially thanks to dismembering the necessary infra structure and blatant corruption in the remaining structures of mobilization during the years of "reforming the army", i. e. building a professional, expeditionary force and largely abandoning conscription service. However, another big factor is that mobilization en masse would mean mobilizing in the metropolitan centers of Moscow and Saint Petersburg as well as other large cities. This would be hugely unpopular and would mean bringing large swathes of unhappy people from all across the country into these cities - because that's how large scale transport works in Russia - and arm them. That trick didn't work well in 1917 for the government in power at the time.

As long as Russia mobilizes by scraping barrels in the provinces and sending inmates to the front as mercenaries, their quantitative factor remains unexploited. And since they lost most of their experienced long term cadre, including a good chunk of school staff early in the war, their training is now hampered.

Ukraine on the other hand trains new troops by the thousands, including the core of two new armored/mechanized divisions in the UK, Poland and Germany (by German and American instructors). Their instructors are among the best in the world, training them in mechanized warfare to the standards that so far kept Ukraine free and were proven successful at least twice in Iraq.

True, but I worry about the psychological toll that almost a full year of near continuous combat operations is taking on the Ukrainian military. Combat exhaustion is real. Physical and psychological wounds tend to degrade combat effectiveness over time.

Combat exhaustion is a true problem and its effects remain to be studied in this war. However, it's not true that Ukrainian soldiers or Western volunteers don't get time off. Force regeneration is definitely important and Ukraine knows this.

However, what Ukraine's forces can do that Russia's cannot is transfer of experiences. Human wave tactics - as seen in Bakhmut recently - and the horrific losses during the early weeks around Kyiv and the Northeast of Ukraine, have destroyed previously prestigious Russian divisions, including the vaunted VDV, and prohibit learning lessons on an operational level.

Why are you so certain?

Lukashenka is good at one thing: Staying alive and in power. He gains nothing from joining the war. He can loose everything. First of all, it makes his nation a target. Second, he couldn't count on Putin defending Belarus, if NATO would take punitive actions against Belarus. The Belarusian armed forces are a joke. Their size was reduced to minimal forces, equipment is decrepit and their best tanks were given to Russia. Lukashenka did this on purpose. The armed forces are pro-Russian and were for a long time his most likely internal opposition with the means to oust him.

He built his own internal security troops to counter that inner threat to his power. Fortunately, this also made Belarus a military dwarf. The installations and barracks are still around, though. So he could offer Russia his help training Russian soldiers, similar to what Western armies do for Ukraine. The difference though is that Belarus has no high standards to train Russians too. They have no experience. So, most likely Belarussian soldiers guard the barracks and donate equipment, letting Russia do all the rest: bring trainers, curricula and recruits.

Next, Russia is clearly playing the long game in Belarus. ISW stated that for the foreseeable future, the northern attack vector through Belarus seems unlikely for a new Russian offensive. They neither have the troops nor the equipment ready there. Would Belarus join in an offensive in the next winter? Unlikely. Again, Lukashenka would have to expand his military for that and reequip it, too. That only gets him to have a well armed internal opposition. Should Putin win, they would be on his side and better experienced than Lukashenka's internal security force. Should Russia loose, they'd likely drag Belarusian troops with them, probably sacrificing them first. This would generate unrest in the forces, making a mutiny more likely. Who'd be guilty of getting Belarusians killed in Ukraine? Lukashenka! That's a good way to end up like Ceaușescu.

Lukashenka needs to fear the war on all layers and probably does so. But the new sanctions hit him hard too, so he needs Russia for his survival, too. Also, if Russia becomes chaotic, that's not good for him either. Should the war end with a Ukrainian victory, Belarusian fighters who volunteered for Ukraine, will return home and probably start to dismember his power, maybe even using direct action and guerilla warfare. So, a frozen conflict would be Lukashenka's best option. For that, he needs Russia to keep going, but not win.