OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[kato13]

For what rainy day is Russia saving its air force?

• Spring boarding an offensive
• Exploiting a breakthrough
• Stopping a UKR offensive (perhaps towards Mariupol?)
• Punishing civilian targets if the war starts to sour
• Last ditch effort to protect Crimea
• Some form of complicated logistical interdiction (intercepting new NATO Equipment?)

I was expecting a bit more action from the Russian air force for the probing attacks and small scale advances that have been made in the last few weeks. But I have not heard of any tick up. When do you think they will make a major appearance?

[kcdusk]

I don't think the airforce will make an appearance. Its felt to me like loosing a helicopter or aircraft always resulted in more promotional advantage for Ukraine, that its not worth the risk to Russia to fly them. Too embarrassing to loose a single unit.

Or, aircraft require so much more maintenance that they are not fit to fly.

So i don't think its a case of saving the air force for a rainy day. Its either embarrassment or not in a fit state.

[Raellus]

It is somewhat surprising that the Russians haven't made greater use of their air force during this war. In the lead up to the war, much was made of Russia's superiority in air power vis-a-vis the Ukranians.

That said, I have seen references to an uptick in Russian tactical air sorties during the recent fighting for Bakhmut. In fact, in a PR stunt, the Wagner PMC head challenged President Zelensky to an air duel after allegedly flying a SU-24 over the embattled city. That same SU-24 was damaged a day or two later by a MANPAD in the AO, but the aircraft made it to base safely.

Re helicopters, I recently read that the Russians have changed their tactics after losing up to a third of their KA-52 fleet so far. They are now pairing KA-52s with Mi-28s because their respective defensive countermeasures complement each other. I can't remember which is which, but one is stronger against radar-guided SAMs and the other is better against heat-seeking missiles.

I think KC makes a good point re appearances. In the cost benefit analysis, the Russians have probably concluded that benefits of using their air power do not outweigh the combat losses plus the PR embarrassment of same.

-

[kato13]

So strange they don't see losing 1000 men a day as not worth the PR.

I guess keeping that Ace always in the hole makes the UKR forces reticent to push when they have a slight advantage. Personally I am not sure Putin could survive the loss of Crimea, if that is threatened that is where I expect to see all cards go onto the table.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by kato13

So strange they don't see losing 1000 men a day as not worth the PR.

I agree, but for the Russians, life is cheap. Literally. A SU-34, on the other hand...

-

[Raellus]

In the early days of the war, I saw a lot of stories about how the Switchblade loitering munition was going to make a big impact in the hands of the Ukrainian army. Aside from a couple of videos showing Switchblades in action (including one where it attacked a civilian sedan), I've not seen/heard any references to their use or effectiveness (or lack thereof).

On the other hand, the Ukraine Weapons Tracker Twitter feed regularly shares video clips of Russian Lancet loitering munitions in action. Although they appear pretty accurate, they don't seem to do much damage to hard targets- in many cases the target can be repaired and returned to action relatively quickly. I get the impression that the Lancet's warhead is not very powerful.

Is this evidence of the rare example of a Russian system (Lancet) that is more effective than a comparable NATO one (Switchblade), or is there another explanation?

-

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I agree, but for the Russians, life is cheap. Literally. A SU-34, on the other hand...

-

Currently any heavy gear, vehicle or airplane, is irreplaceable for the Russians. Men are just forced into service via the prison system - a knack the defense department has copied from Wagner now, apparently - or conscription. Material on the other hand cannot be repaired to pre-war standards, because Russia lacks western supplies or has sold of - often via corruption - parts. Also, planes are either old or extremely rare and sometimes external costumers have rights to being supplied. If Russia doesn't honor these contracts, they loose their last allies.

Als Gen. Miley put it the other day: "Russia has lost strategically, operationally and tactically."

Currently, Russia is thus loosing combatants in record tempo, but only a handful of tanks and armored vehicles per day. Alas, the Ukrainians seem to hunt down SAM vehicles and SPAAGs with priority now. Each day sees about two systems destroyed.

[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

It is somewhat surprising that the Russians haven't made greater use of their air force during this war. In the lead up to the war, much was made of Russia's superiority in air power vis-a-vis the Ukranians.

That said, I have seen references to an uptick in Russian tactical air sorties during the recent fighting for Bakhmut. In fact, in a PR stunt, the Wagner PMC head challenged President Zelensky to an air duel after allegedly flying a SU-24 over the embattled city. That same SU-24 was damaged a day or two later by a MANPAD in the AO, but the aircraft made it to base safely.

Re helicopters, I recently read that the Russians have changed their tactics after losing up to a third of their KA-52 fleet so far. They are now pairing KA-52s with Mi-28s because their respective defensive countermeasures complement each other. I can't remember which is which, but one is stronger against radar-guided SAMs and the other is better against heat-seeking missiles.

I think KC makes a good point re appearances. In the cost benefit analysis, the Russians have probably concluded that benefits of using their air power do not outweigh the combat losses plus the PR embarrassment of same.

-

I get the impression that there are a few factors comingling to result in the west not seeing the Russian Air Force in action.

First, we know that they are definitely still flying sorties, as you mention, Rae. Not only near Bakhmut, but there's stories (albeit few) that sorties continue over many areas of the front with quite some regularity. This is somewhat evidenced by Ukraine's fairly frequent claims of shooting down additional aircraft. So part of the impression we have may be simply due to lack of reporting on the number of Russian sorties that are actually happening.

Second, by all accounts, the Russians have lost quite a few aircraft already. Not that I would expect this to mean that their stocks are depleted by any measure, but it does mean that they may be running low on competent pilots. Training new pilots is a long process.

Next, we know the Russian logistical chain is a nightmare at present. A comparatively large portion of their air force may be grounded due to lack of parts/ammunition.

Not only the above, but given the increasing numbers of western AA systems operating in Ukraine, Russia may have done the math and figured that they would lose too many planes. As mentioned, this could result in a PR/morale issue for them, but also, it might just mean that Russian pilots and officers are reluctant to want to fly too deep behind Ukrainian lines.

Finally, I'm not as up on differences with Russian air doctrine as others here, but perhaps that's playing a part as well?

I'll end on this note - the fact that Ukraine even still has an Air Force, let alone one actively flying sorties, a year after the invasion began, is a portent of doom for this entire "Military Operation".

[Raellus]

Those are all good points, Jeffe.

This article does a decent job of explaining why Russia was unable to seize Kiev in the first days of the war, highlighting several persistent, systematic failings that continue to plague Russian forces nearly one year later.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64664944

Although, one year into the war, Russia is still struggling to achieve any of its strategic and operational goals, we shouldn't count them out just yet. First off, it appears that Russia is prepared to fight a long war of attrition. Economic sanctions have not had the desired effect and, despite heavy losses of manpower and ground vehicles, the Russians are showing no signs of calling it quits anytime soon.

At the same time, numerous reports over the past two weeks have lamented Ukraine's rapidly dwindling ammunition supplies. Reports from various fronts all cite critical shortages of all types of ammunition, but especially artillery shells and mortar bombs. Ukrainian forces have had to sharply decrease artillery fires due to these shortages, in some cases ceding local fire superiority to the Russians.

On the other side, earlier reports that Russia was running out of artillery ammunition (indicated by intel that Russia was buying ammo from North Korea and Iran) may have been exaggerated. Local ammunition shortages were probably caused by the destruction of ammo caches by HIMARS strikes and SOF raids. More recent reports suggest that the Russians have learned their lesson and are now placing ammo dumps beyond HIMARS range. At the moment, the Russians have enough artillery ammunition to launch daily H&I strikes near the Ukrainian border with Belarus, as well as supporting offensive operations in the east. Ukrainian intel believes the purpose of this daily shelling is to keep Ukrainian forces tied down in the north, away from the actual fighting in the Donbas and elsewhere.

-

[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Those are all good points, Jeffe.

This article does a decent job of explaining why Russia was unable to seize Kiev in the first days of the war, highlighting several persistent, systematic failings that continue to plague Russian forces nearly one year later.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64664944

Although, one year into the war, Russia is still struggling to achieve any of its strategic and operational goals, we shouldn't count them out just yet. First off, it appears that Russia is prepared to fight a long war of attrition. Economic sanctions have not had the desired effect and, despite heavy losses of manpower and ground vehicles, the Russians are showing no signs of calling it quits anytime soon.

At the same time, numerous reports over the past two weeks have lamented Ukraine's rapidly dwindling ammunition supplies. Reports from various fronts all cite critical shortages of all types of ammunition, but especially artillery shells and mortar bombs. Ukrainian forces have had to sharply decrease artillery fires due to these shortages, in some cases ceding local fire superiority to the Russians.

On the other side, earlier reports that Russia was running out of artillery ammunition (indicated by intel that Russia was buying ammo from North Korea and Iran) may have been exaggerated. Local ammunition shortages were probably caused by the destruction of ammo caches by HIMARS strikes and SOF raids. More recent reports suggest that the Russians have learned their lesson and are now placing ammo dumps beyond HIMARS range. At the moment, the Russians have enough artillery ammunition to launch daily H&I strikes near the Ukrainian border with Belarus, as well as supporting offensive operations in the east. Ukrainian intel believes the purpose of this daily shelling is to keep Ukrainian forces tied down in the north, away from the actual fighting in the Donbas and elsewhere.

-

The ammunition situation for Ukraine is certainly a really major problem especially given that they seem to be raising additional brigades almost on a daily basis. That said, I don't get the impression that Russia is in a much better position. There's been quite a few reports that conventional Russian arty units are running very short on ammunition. And even more recently, some Wagner units have posted videos literally begging the Kremlin for artillery ammo - it's tough to say with this point though whether that's a result of scarce ammunition being prioritized toward army units, or if it's more related to the internal power struggles happening between Wagner and the MOD at the moment.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Heffe

And even more recently, some Wagner units have posted videos literally begging the Kremlin for artillery ammo - it's tough to say with this point though whether that's a result of scarce ammunition being prioritized toward army units, or if it's more related to the internal power struggles happening between Wagner and the MOD at the moment.

I get the sense that this is the case. Prigozhin seems to have gotten a big head and Putin's patience seems to have run out. Frankly, given some of Prigozhin's recent boasting re Wagners successes, whilst simulatenously loudly denigrating the regular army, it's a bit curious that it's taken this long for Putin to try bringing him to heel. I think that messing with Wagner's ammo is the way that Putin is doing that.

I really don't get Wagner any more. Their use by the Kremlin made sense in Syria and Africa, where plausible deniability was useful, but in Ukraine, it seems counter-productive. Prigozhin's private fiefdom reminds me a bit of Himler's early Waffen SS. I'm really surprised that Putin allows someone with such a big personality to amass that much hard power. I don't see any reason why the Russian army can't also empty the prisons for cannon fodder. I imagine it would be cheaper than paying Wagner to do it.

Given that most of Putin's vocal critics or troublesome allies have ended up dead or in prison, I'm kind of surprised Prigozhin is still alive.

-

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Heffe

Second, by all accounts, the Russians have lost quite a few aircraft already. Not that I would expect this to mean that their stocks are depleted by any measure, but it does mean that they may be running low on competent pilots. Training new pilots is a long process.

Next, we know the Russian logistical chain is a nightmare at present. A comparatively large portion of their air force may be grounded due to lack of parts/ammunition.

Not only the above, but given the increasing numbers of western AA systems operating in Ukraine, Russia may have done the math and figured that they would lose too many planes. As mentioned, this could result in a PR/morale issue for them, but also, it might just mean that Russian pilots and officers are reluctant to want to fly too deep behind Ukrainian lines.

Haha yeah forcing Ukraine into a war of attrition cuts both ways, doesn't it? Combat aircraft are expensive and difficult if not quite impossible for Russia to replace, and training combat pilots is expensive and time-consuming. Six months ago Russia's military command probably thought that grinding the Ukrainians down over a year or two was the best path forward. Now they're caught between a rock and a hard place. Can't pull together enough people, gear and skill to have big, successful advances; can't afford to slowly bleed away what half decent equipment they have left. As ye sow, so shall ye reap.

[Targan]

I thought this article was a pretty good summary:

The 8 Reasons Why Russia’s Much-Hyped Coming Offensive Will Fail Miserably

[bash]

With respect to Russia and Wagner, it really seems like Putin wants to use them as a no-lose scapegoat. If Wagner performs well it'll be played up and Putin will be hailed by his media apparatus as genius for using them. If they fail then they'll get written off and stiffed on the bill and probably turn out the whole war was their idea in the first place and they bamboozled poor Putin.

Also, as I understand it (I'm no Russiaologist) there's very much two Russias, the predominantly Slavic and wealthiest hubs of Moscow and St Petersburg and pretty much the rest of the country. When most of us think "Russia" we're thinking of the former. As long as the general zeitgeist of the war in those areas is positive then to the Russian government the population's view of the war is positive as nowhere else matters.

The use of Wagner helps insulate Russian urbanites from even seeing the war. The Russian government can ignore laws around conscription and deployment by using Wagner as a buffer. They can also assign contract soldiers from urban regions to ditch digging in Belarus or the rear in Donbas so when they go back home they tell everyone the war is not so bad and international news is exaggerating if not lying about what's happening in Ukraine.