OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I agree, but for the Russians, life is cheap. Literally. A SU-34, on the other hand...

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Currently any heavy gear, vehicle or airplane, is irreplaceable for the Russians. Men are just forced into service via the prison system - a knack the defense department has copied from Wagner now, apparently - or conscription. Material on the other hand cannot be repaired to pre-war standards, because Russia lacks western supplies or has sold of - often via corruption - parts. Also, planes are either old or extremely rare and sometimes external costumers have rights to being supplied. If Russia doesn't honor these contracts, they loose their last allies.

Als Gen. Miley put it the other day: "Russia has lost strategically, operationally and tactically."

Currently, Russia is thus loosing combatants in record tempo, but only a handful of tanks and armored vehicles per day. Alas, the Ukrainians seem to hunt down SAM vehicles and SPAAGs with priority now. Each day sees about two systems destroyed.

[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

It is somewhat surprising that the Russians haven't made greater use of their air force during this war. In the lead up to the war, much was made of Russia's superiority in air power vis-a-vis the Ukranians.

That said, I have seen references to an uptick in Russian tactical air sorties during the recent fighting for Bakhmut. In fact, in a PR stunt, the Wagner PMC head challenged President Zelensky to an air duel after allegedly flying a SU-24 over the embattled city. That same SU-24 was damaged a day or two later by a MANPAD in the AO, but the aircraft made it to base safely.

Re helicopters, I recently read that the Russians have changed their tactics after losing up to a third of their KA-52 fleet so far. They are now pairing KA-52s with Mi-28s because their respective defensive countermeasures complement each other. I can't remember which is which, but one is stronger against radar-guided SAMs and the other is better against heat-seeking missiles.

I think KC makes a good point re appearances. In the cost benefit analysis, the Russians have probably concluded that benefits of using their air power do not outweigh the combat losses plus the PR embarrassment of same.

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I get the impression that there are a few factors comingling to result in the west not seeing the Russian Air Force in action.

First, we know that they are definitely still flying sorties, as you mention, Rae. Not only near Bakhmut, but there's stories (albeit few) that sorties continue over many areas of the front with quite some regularity. This is somewhat evidenced by Ukraine's fairly frequent claims of shooting down additional aircraft. So part of the impression we have may be simply due to lack of reporting on the number of Russian sorties that are actually happening.

Second, by all accounts, the Russians have lost quite a few aircraft already. Not that I would expect this to mean that their stocks are depleted by any measure, but it does mean that they may be running low on competent pilots. Training new pilots is a long process.

Next, we know the Russian logistical chain is a nightmare at present. A comparatively large portion of their air force may be grounded due to lack of parts/ammunition.

Not only the above, but given the increasing numbers of western AA systems operating in Ukraine, Russia may have done the math and figured that they would lose too many planes. As mentioned, this could result in a PR/morale issue for them, but also, it might just mean that Russian pilots and officers are reluctant to want to fly too deep behind Ukrainian lines.

Finally, I'm not as up on differences with Russian air doctrine as others here, but perhaps that's playing a part as well?

I'll end on this note - the fact that Ukraine even still has an Air Force, let alone one actively flying sorties, a year after the invasion began, is a portent of doom for this entire "Military Operation".

[Raellus]

Those are all good points, Jeffe.

This article does a decent job of explaining why Russia was unable to seize Kiev in the first days of the war, highlighting several persistent, systematic failings that continue to plague Russian forces nearly one year later.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64664944

Although, one year into the war, Russia is still struggling to achieve any of its strategic and operational goals, we shouldn't count them out just yet. First off, it appears that Russia is prepared to fight a long war of attrition. Economic sanctions have not had the desired effect and, despite heavy losses of manpower and ground vehicles, the Russians are showing no signs of calling it quits anytime soon.

At the same time, numerous reports over the past two weeks have lamented Ukraine's rapidly dwindling ammunition supplies. Reports from various fronts all cite critical shortages of all types of ammunition, but especially artillery shells and mortar bombs. Ukrainian forces have had to sharply decrease artillery fires due to these shortages, in some cases ceding local fire superiority to the Russians.

On the other side, earlier reports that Russia was running out of artillery ammunition (indicated by intel that Russia was buying ammo from North Korea and Iran) may have been exaggerated. Local ammunition shortages were probably caused by the destruction of ammo caches by HIMARS strikes and SOF raids. More recent reports suggest that the Russians have learned their lesson and are now placing ammo dumps beyond HIMARS range. At the moment, the Russians have enough artillery ammunition to launch daily H&I strikes near the Ukrainian border with Belarus, as well as supporting offensive operations in the east. Ukrainian intel believes the purpose of this daily shelling is to keep Ukrainian forces tied down in the north, away from the actual fighting in the Donbas and elsewhere.

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[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Those are all good points, Jeffe.

This article does a decent job of explaining why Russia was unable to seize Kiev in the first days of the war, highlighting several persistent, systematic failings that continue to plague Russian forces nearly one year later.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64664944

Although, one year into the war, Russia is still struggling to achieve any of its strategic and operational goals, we shouldn't count them out just yet. First off, it appears that Russia is prepared to fight a long war of attrition. Economic sanctions have not had the desired effect and, despite heavy losses of manpower and ground vehicles, the Russians are showing no signs of calling it quits anytime soon.

At the same time, numerous reports over the past two weeks have lamented Ukraine's rapidly dwindling ammunition supplies. Reports from various fronts all cite critical shortages of all types of ammunition, but especially artillery shells and mortar bombs. Ukrainian forces have had to sharply decrease artillery fires due to these shortages, in some cases ceding local fire superiority to the Russians.

On the other side, earlier reports that Russia was running out of artillery ammunition (indicated by intel that Russia was buying ammo from North Korea and Iran) may have been exaggerated. Local ammunition shortages were probably caused by the destruction of ammo caches by HIMARS strikes and SOF raids. More recent reports suggest that the Russians have learned their lesson and are now placing ammo dumps beyond HIMARS range. At the moment, the Russians have enough artillery ammunition to launch daily H&I strikes near the Ukrainian border with Belarus, as well as supporting offensive operations in the east. Ukrainian intel believes the purpose of this daily shelling is to keep Ukrainian forces tied down in the north, away from the actual fighting in the Donbas and elsewhere.

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The ammunition situation for Ukraine is certainly a really major problem especially given that they seem to be raising additional brigades almost on a daily basis. That said, I don't get the impression that Russia is in a much better position. There's been quite a few reports that conventional Russian arty units are running very short on ammunition. And even more recently, some Wagner units have posted videos literally begging the Kremlin for artillery ammo - it's tough to say with this point though whether that's a result of scarce ammunition being prioritized toward army units, or if it's more related to the internal power struggles happening between Wagner and the MOD at the moment.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Heffe

And even more recently, some Wagner units have posted videos literally begging the Kremlin for artillery ammo - it's tough to say with this point though whether that's a result of scarce ammunition being prioritized toward army units, or if it's more related to the internal power struggles happening between Wagner and the MOD at the moment.

I get the sense that this is the case. Prigozhin seems to have gotten a big head and Putin's patience seems to have run out. Frankly, given some of Prigozhin's recent boasting re Wagners successes, whilst simulatenously loudly denigrating the regular army, it's a bit curious that it's taken this long for Putin to try bringing him to heel. I think that messing with Wagner's ammo is the way that Putin is doing that.

I really don't get Wagner any more. Their use by the Kremlin made sense in Syria and Africa, where plausible deniability was useful, but in Ukraine, it seems counter-productive. Prigozhin's private fiefdom reminds me a bit of Himler's early Waffen SS. I'm really surprised that Putin allows someone with such a big personality to amass that much hard power. I don't see any reason why the Russian army can't also empty the prisons for cannon fodder. I imagine it would be cheaper than paying Wagner to do it.

Given that most of Putin's vocal critics or troublesome allies have ended up dead or in prison, I'm kind of surprised Prigozhin is still alive.

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[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I get the sense that this is the case. Prigozhin seems to have gotten a big head and Putin's patience seems to have run out. Frankly, given some of Prigozhin's recent boasting re Wagners successes, whilst simulatenously loudly denigrating the regular army, it's a bit curious that it's taken this long for Putin to try bringing him to heel. I think that messing with Wagner's ammo is the way that Putin is doing that.

I really don't get Wagner any more. Their use by the Kremlin made sense in Syria and Africa, where plausible deniability was useful, but in Ukraine, it seems counter-productive. Prigozhin's private fiefdom reminds me a bit of Himler's early Waffen SS. I'm really surprised that Putin allows someone with such a big personality to amass that much hard power. I don't see any reason why the Russian army can't also empty the prisons for cannon fodder. I imagine it would be cheaper than paying Wagner to do it.

Given that most of Putin's vocal critics or troublesome allies have ended up dead or in prison, I'm kind of surprised Prigozhin is still alive.

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I've also been pretty surprised at Putin's delay in reining Prigozhin in. From him him openly courting Russian milbloggers to talking shit about Russian regular forces, it makes me think that Putin still needs him for some reason. Or perhaps he has something/knows something that Putin needs/needs to not get out - which, given his past with the Internet Research Agency, wouldn't be super surprising. This is all speculation, of course.

As far as Wagner is concerned, I do wonder if there's still some domestic benefit to them being separated from the MOD in an official capacity. I mean clearly everyone knows that they're a part of Russian forces, but perhaps there's a legal component there. My understanding is that it's illegal for the Russian military to actually conscript from prisons, so perhaps Wagner has just evolved as a constitutional loophole to allow for an extralegal arm of the military.

[Raellus]

If you enjoy long-form print journalism, I highly recommend the Atlantic.

From the article:

"One year ago, Russia launched a war that many never expected it to wage and assumed it would quickly win against a cowed Ukraine and its allies. How and when will the conflict end? For a war that has defied expectations, those questions might seem impossible to answer. Yet I recently posed them to several top historians, political scientists, geopolitical forecasters, and former officials—because only in imagining potential futures can we understand the rough bounds of the possible, and our own agency in influencing the outcome we want."

https://www.theatlantic.com/internat...-later/673159/

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[Targan]

Originally Posted by Heffe

Second, by all accounts, the Russians have lost quite a few aircraft already. Not that I would expect this to mean that their stocks are depleted by any measure, but it does mean that they may be running low on competent pilots. Training new pilots is a long process.

Next, we know the Russian logistical chain is a nightmare at present. A comparatively large portion of their air force may be grounded due to lack of parts/ammunition.

Not only the above, but given the increasing numbers of western AA systems operating in Ukraine, Russia may have done the math and figured that they would lose too many planes. As mentioned, this could result in a PR/morale issue for them, but also, it might just mean that Russian pilots and officers are reluctant to want to fly too deep behind Ukrainian lines.

Haha yeah forcing Ukraine into a war of attrition cuts both ways, doesn't it? Combat aircraft are expensive and difficult if not quite impossible for Russia to replace, and training combat pilots is expensive and time-consuming. Six months ago Russia's military command probably thought that grinding the Ukrainians down over a year or two was the best path forward. Now they're caught between a rock and a hard place. Can't pull together enough people, gear and skill to have big, successful advances; can't afford to slowly bleed away what half decent equipment they have left. As ye sow, so shall ye reap.

[Targan]

I thought this article was a pretty good summary:

The 8 Reasons Why Russia’s Much-Hyped Coming Offensive Will Fail Miserably

[bash]

With respect to Russia and Wagner, it really seems like Putin wants to use them as a no-lose scapegoat. If Wagner performs well it'll be played up and Putin will be hailed by his media apparatus as genius for using them. If they fail then they'll get written off and stiffed on the bill and probably turn out the whole war was their idea in the first place and they bamboozled poor Putin.

Also, as I understand it (I'm no Russiaologist) there's very much two Russias, the predominantly Slavic and wealthiest hubs of Moscow and St Petersburg and pretty much the rest of the country. When most of us think "Russia" we're thinking of the former. As long as the general zeitgeist of the war in those areas is positive then to the Russian government the population's view of the war is positive as nowhere else matters.

The use of Wagner helps insulate Russian urbanites from even seeing the war. The Russian government can ignore laws around conscription and deployment by using Wagner as a buffer. They can also assign contract soldiers from urban regions to ditch digging in Belarus or the rear in Donbas so when they go back home they tell everyone the war is not so bad and international news is exaggerating if not lying about what's happening in Ukraine.

[Bestbrian]

Russki's still fighting dumb and getting wrecked. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/w...sia-tanks.html

[Raellus]

My concern is that The Russians might be able to afford to continue to "fight dumb and get wrecked" and still win. It's not just me.

https://www.npr.org/2023/03/02/11596...rainian-troops

The author of the piece spoke to a Ukrainian sniper named Andriy. Here's what Andriy has to say about Russia's raw conscript soldiers:

"'The Russian mobilizational reserve is pretty much infinite', says Andriy, 'which means that they have the luxury to make mistakes. They can lose a brigade or they can lose a platoon, and some of those people are going to survive and they can share experience with the new conscripts.'"

He's got a point. Regarding his own [Ukrainian military], Andriy says,

"'Most of the people that were ready to take guns and fight, they came in the first two months and those people care coming to an end.' He means that they are mostly dead. He says the quality of the new soldiers is much lower. 'Some of them, they don't know how to hold a rifle.'"

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[Bestbrian]

Originally Posted by Raellus

My concern is that The Russians might be able to afford to continue to "fight dumb and get wrecked" and still win. It's not just me.

https://www.npr.org/2023/03/02/11596...rainian-troops

The author of the piece spoke to a Ukrainian sniper named Andriy. Here's what Andriy has to say about Russia's raw conscript soldiers:

"'The Russian mobilizational reserve is pretty much infinite', says Andriy, 'which means that they have the luxury to make mistakes. They can lose a brigade or they can lose a platoon, and some of those people are going to survive and they can share experience with the new conscripts.'"

He's got a point. Regarding his own [Ukrainian military], Andriy says,

"'Most of the people that were ready to take guns and fight, they came in the first two months and those people care coming to an end.' He means that they are mostly dead. He says the quality of the new soldiers is much lower. 'Some of them, they don't know how to hold a rifle.'"

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That's the popular view of Russia that's been burned into our head since the Napoleonic Wars and WWII through the Cold War, but current Russian demography is pitiful(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Russia).

Pair that with an authoritarian system that's trying to fight a war while hiding it from its urban population centers (which precludes drafting large numbers from Moscow, St. Petersburg, etc) and there aren't endless waves of Ivans to throw at the trenches anymore, especially of 18-49 year old males from rural backwaters. They might very well run out of men to crew their mothballed T-62s long before they run out of the vehicles themselves.

Keep in mind that Ukraine's demographics aren't much better, but the circumstances of this conflict allows them to mass mobilize a military backed by a highly motivated civilian population with a direct stake in the outcome, which gives them a higher percentage of a smaller pool. We'll have a better idea where this is all heading when the Ukrainian counteroffensives begin.

[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by Bestbrian

That's the popular view of Russia that's been burned into our head since the Napoleonic Wars and WWII through the Cold War, but current Russian demography is pitiful(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Russia).

Pair that with an authoritarian system that's trying to fight a war while hiding it from its urban population centers (which precludes drafting large numbers from Moscow, St. Petersburg, etc) and there aren't endless waves of Ivans to throw at the trenches anymore, especially of 18-49 year old males from rural backwaters. They might very well run out of men to crew their mothballed T-62s long before they run out of the vehicles themselves.

Keep in mind that Ukraine's demographics aren't much better, but the circumstances of this conflict allows them to mass mobilize a military backed by a highly motivated civilian population with a direct stake in the outcome, which gives them a higher percentage of a smaller pool. We'll have a better idea where this is all heading when the Ukrainian counteroffensives begin.

It's also worth noting that Russia's other recent(ish) wars have been against much smaller nations. Chechnya has a total population of 1.4 million. Georgia's population is 3.7 million. Ukraine has a population of 43.8 million. There's a literal order of magnitude of difference in the scale of what Russia's attempting to do here, and while the geography and type of war is much different, the size of the population Russia is trying to break the morale of is roughly the same as the population of Afghanistan.

[bash]

Originally Posted by Vespers War

It's also worth noting that Russia's other recent(ish) wars have been against much smaller nations.

It's additionally worth noting these countries were physically much smaller than Ukraine as well. A smaller front let Russia concentrate it's more capable units into a much smaller area. With Ukraine there's over a thousand kilometers of border plus the border with Belarus.

While it's a lot of border for Ukraine to defend it also means it's a lot of border for Russia to hold once the invasion starts.

[Raellus]

This guy knows more than all of us here so I wouldn't be too quick to dismiss his assessment.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-n...M0BhoDZFyvnOHI

Here's a taste:

Q: "Last year, you told me, at a very early stage of the war, that Ukraine was winning on Twitter but that Russia was winning on the battlefield. A lot has happened since then, but is that still the case?"

A: "Unfortunately. Let’s think of a house. Let’s say that you own a house and it has ten rooms. And let’s say that I barge in and take two of those rooms away, and I wreck those rooms. And, from those two rooms, I’m wrecking your other eight rooms and you’re trying to beat me back. You’re trying to evict me from the two rooms. You push out a little corner, you push out another corner, maybe. But I’m still there and I’m still wrecking. And the thing is, you need your house. That’s where you live. It’s your house and you don’t have another. Me, I’ve got another house, and my other house has a thousand rooms. And, so, if I wreck your house, are you winning or am I winning?"

It's not all doom and gloom, but the expert does throw cold water on the idea of Ukraine achieving its stated victory conditions. The whole article is definitely worth a read- it's definitely the best macro assessment of the war that I've seen to date.

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[Vespers War]

Good news for T2K lovers! There's a Giraffe!

The bad news - it's this thing:


It's an MT-LB with a 25mm 2M-3 naval turret welded on top.

[Raellus]

Bakhmut

Is the Ukrainian high command making a foolish mistake by continuing to defend Bakhmut, or is it laying a deadly trap for the Russians?

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...t-on-the-brink

I've been reading every reputable report on the battle that I can find and no one- outside of the Ukrainian high command, perhaps (and even that's not clear)- seems to know what's really going on there, strategically-speaking. Either the Ukrainians are being very clever, and luring the Russians into a trap, or they're being very foolish and wasting precious manpower and resources on a city with much greater symbolic than strategic significance.

It's a meat-grinder for both sides, but the Russians can better afford the heavy losses. In some ways, Bakhmut has become the Stalingrad of the 21st century. Is Ukraine going to make the same mistake that German high command made in 1942? Or are they setting the Russians up for a taste of their own Uranus?

What do you think is going on there?


Combat Aircraft

There's been speculation about if/when the West will provide combat aircraft to Ukraine since the beginning of the war. Recent reports have been all over the place, but the aggregate of reportage leans towards a qualified yes.

Yesterday, a local Tucson, AZ TV news station reported that two Ukrainian pilots are visiting Davis Monthan AFB (where USAF pilots train on both the A-10 and the F-16). Is this a sign or a red herring?

Do you think the west is going to provide combat aircraft to Ukraine any time soon?

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I think aircraft are a possibility...

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/0...f-16s-00085556

...but I think as long as they have airframes flying, NATO will seek to do the retrofit thing, like HARMs, JDAMs, etc.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/28/u...ns-russia.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/23/u...ns-russia.html

I mean how far can this go? Who knows. UIA 737s loaded with AIM-120 AMRAAMs? Hellfires on Mi-8 Hip pylons?

Also, they are a year into the war and have airframes flying against what at one point was the 2nd largest air force in the world. That's crazy and baller.

[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Bakhmut
What do you think is going on there?

I think Ukraine is buying time. Time to train units, time to receive Western equipment, and time for rasputitsa to end so that they can engage in maneuver warfare. A lot of the Ukrainian losses at Bakhmut are second-tier units, the TDFs and light infantry that are useful fighting on defense from prepared positions but can't attack a kitten successfully. It sucks to be them, but the longer they hold out, the more Ukraine's offensive units can refit and train for an attack once the mud dries up.


Tangentially, piecing together numbers from Oryx and making some estimates based on proportions of known losses and differences between Oryx's visually confirmed losses and UA's estimated losses, Russia has lost somewhere around half of its modern tanks, defining modern as the T-72B3, T-72B3M, T-80BVM, and T-90M (the four models with the enlarged autoloader that allows use of Svinets-2 rounds). Russia still has a lot of tanks, but their tank forces are weaker now than at the start of the war. Because of shortages of imported thermal imager components, tanks are receiving thermal sights that are roughly equivalent to what the US had in Desert Storm. Allegedly even elite units like 1st Guards Tank Army are including T-62 tanks in their formations, which is slightly eyebrow-raising.

[bash]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Bakhmut

What do you think is going on there?
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Ukraine has effectively fixed the front for the muddy season with Bakhmut. NATO's estimates are the Russians are suffering a 5:1 loss ratio of personnel, Ukraine claims 7:1. The Russians are also losing AFVs left and right as each of their attempts at encirclement have been huge failures.

Bakhmut isn't cheap to hold but it completely blunted Russia's big push they had planned. Ukraine has a solid GLOC protected by high ground they control. By all accounts they've been conducting an orderly withdrawal over the past week.

I don't think the point is to keep Bakhmut forever, just continue fixing the Russians and bleeding their forces in preparation for a Ukrainian counterattack elsewhere once the mud dries enough for move heavy AFVs freely over fields.

Keep in mind Bakhmut is now little more than rubble. Might as well make the rubble bounce there then fall back and have another city leveled.

[Heffe]

Bakhmut
You're right that no one beyond arguably Ukrainian high command and NATO/US military advisors have any idea what's really going on here. I did read recently (I forget where) that estimates are putting Russian losses in the area at 1:5-7 in favor of Ukraine, and that a going theory was that Ukraine is simply willing to trade favorably against Russian forces to bleed Russia down a bit until western assets arrive in theater. I have no idea whether that casualty estimate is accurate or not, and I certainly won't believe Ukrainian or Russian estimates on the matter, but if true it might help explain the thought processes involved.

The optimist in me hopes that Ukraine is planning to let Russia advance on the flanks and then cut them off/encircle their forward elements with Ukraine's reserves. The pessimist is convinced that Ukraine just doesn't have that many forces still available and will be forced to start pulling back due to overwhelming numbers of Russian forces despite their training and technological advantages.

The only things we know for sure are that Bakhmut is a meatgrinder for at least the Russian forces - we know that because Russia has been throwing attacks at the city since August at least, with shelling of it beginning back in May. The fact that the Russian army hasn't been able to take Bakhmut in nearly 7 months despite throwing huge numbers of men and equipment at the city indicates that Russia is having a very difficult time gaining any real ground in Ukraine. Especially when paired with what happened at Vuhledar. We know that Ukraine has now left the eastern part of the city, but it seems to have been an orderly withdrawal, and Ukrainian forces are keeping a corridor open to the west. Whether that indicates that Ukraine will continue hold the western part of the city, or counterattack, is anybody's guess. The fact that there's a risk of encirclement and Ukraine hasn't pulled out yet indicates that Ukrainian leadership is either making a mistake by holding the destroyed town at all costs, or that they're smart and know something we don't. So far in the war, Ukraine's been very effective in their decision making, while Russia has been flailing all over the place, so that gives me some hope that Bakhmut is no exception and that there's some kind of plan.

Aircraft
I will happily eat crow here, but I don't think the west is going to be sending F16s to Ukraine anytime soon. At least not the US. It would represent quite a heavy escalation of forces, and could lead to further escalation on Russia's side. Not only, but as others have mentioned, the prospect of getting planes, parts, maintenance crew, and pilots trained, is likely going to take a year or more. Even if the process starts now, we're looking at a 2024 rollout. While it's certainly possible the war could go on that long, the runway to implementation feels too long, so to speak.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Heffe

BakhmutYou're right that no one beyond arguably Ukrainian high command and NATO/US military advisors have any idea what's really going on here.

What concerns me is that numerous reports seem to indicate that the US is advising Ukraine to pull out of the city but the Ukrainians continue to insist that they can and will hold it. Some reports indicate an orderly withdrawal is underway; others that reinforcements are still being sent into the city. What's really going on there?

The optimist in me wants to believe that the Ukrainians are setting the Russians up for something like you described (a-la 1942's Operation Uranus v the German 6th Army salient at Stalingrad). The pessimist in me worries that Ukrainian leadership is stubbornly wasting troops for primarily symbolic reasons.

Originally Posted by Heffe

I did read recently (I forget where) that estimates are putting Russian losses in the area at 1:5-7 in favor of Ukraine, and that a going theory was that Ukraine is simply willing to trade favorably against Russian forces to bleed Russia down a bit until western assets arrive in theater. I have no idea whether that casualty estimate is accurate or not, and I certainly won't believe Ukrainian or Russian estimates on the matter, but if true it might help explain the thought processes involved.

I saw a figure today of 1:3. At that rate, Ukraine will run out of troops before Russia does.

Originally Posted by Heffe

So far in the war, Ukraine's been very effective in their decision making, while Russia has been flailing all over the place, so that gives me some hope that Bakhmut is no exception and that there's some kind of plan.

You're right, and I'm trying to take reassurance from that fact, but I too worry that maybe Ukraine is finally making a really bad call in Bakhmut.

To anyone who hasn't read it yet, I highly recommend this piece from the New Yorker about the war to date and likely long-term outcomes.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/the-n...M0BhoDZFyvnOHI

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[Vespers War]

Just for funsies, I decided to compare The Military Balance 2022's estimates of Russia's active tank force to Oryx's visually confirmed losses of Russian tanks. This has the obvious gap of not accounting for reactivated tanks, but it gives at least an idea of how their losses compare to their original tank fleet. For the purposes of this count, I included derivatives (so a T-72B obr. 1989 is counted as a T-72B), but did not include other variants (so a T-72A loss is not counted at all because Russia had no active T-72A in February 2022), and also did not count the T-90S even though they're identical to T-90A because Russia stole them from India, they weren't part of the pre-war fleet.

Older (pre-Svinets) tanks
T-72B/BA - 650 in service - 354 lost - 54.5% fleet loss
T-80BV/U - 310 in service - 357 lost - 115.2% fleet loss
T-90/A - 350 in service - 35 lost - 10.0% fleet loss

Newer (Svinets-capable autoloader) tanks
T-72B3 - 850 in service - 294 lost - 34.6% fleet loss
T-72B3M - 530 in service - 209 lost - 39.4% fleet loss
T-80BVM - 170 in service - 71 lost - 41.8% fleet loss
T-90M - 67 in service - 14 lost - 20.9% fleet loss

What concerns me is that numerous reports seem to indicate that the US is advising Ukraine to pull out of the city but the Ukrainians continue to insist that they can and will hold it. Some reports indicate an orderly withdrawal is underway; others that reinforcements are still being sent into the city. What's really going on there?

Being mildly flippant, if we're not sure what's going on, imagine how confused the Russians must be!

[bash]

Originally Posted by Vespers War

Just for funsies, I decided to compare The Military Balance 2022's estimates of Russia's active tank force to Oryx's visually confirmed losses of Russian tanks. This has the obvious gap of not accounting for reactivated tanks, but it gives at least an idea of how their losses compare to their original tank fleet. For the purposes of this count, I included derivatives (so a T-72B obr. 1989 is counted as a T-72B), but did not include other variants (so a T-72A loss is not counted at all because Russia had no active T-72A in February 2022), and also did not count the T-90S even though they're identical to T-90A because Russia stole them from India, they weren't part of the pre-war fleet.

Older (pre-Svinets) tanks
T-72B/BA - 650 in service - 354 lost - 54.5% fleet loss
T-80BV/U - 310 in service - 357 lost - 115.2% fleet loss
T-90/A - 350 in service - 35 lost - 10.0% fleet loss

Newer (Svinets-capable autoloader) tanks
T-72B3 - 850 in service - 294 lost - 34.6% fleet loss
T-72B3M - 530 in service - 209 lost - 39.4% fleet loss
T-80BVM - 170 in service - 71 lost - 41.8% fleet loss
T-90M - 67 in service - 14 lost - 20.9% fleet loss

Yeouch! I've been paying attention to the Russian losses but this is a great perspective. I'm just amazed the brightest military minds in Russia have settled on a Zapp Brannigan strategy. Unfortunately for them it seems the Ukrainians upgraded to 32-bit unsigned integers, their kill limits aren't going to hit a limit any time soon.

I'm also amused at the idea that somehow Russia is just playing dumb and their real offensive will start any day now. Like they've got some secret competent army waiting to be let loose.

[kato13]

Originally Posted by bash

Zapp Brannigan

Another line I expect Russian command has been uttering.

[Heffe]

Originally Posted by bash

Yeouch! I've been paying attention to the Russian losses but this is a great perspective. I'm just amazed the brightest military minds in Russia have settled on a Zapp Brannigan strategy. Unfortunately for them it seems the Ukrainians upgraded to 32-bit unsigned integers, their kill limits aren't going to hit a limit any time soon.

I'm also amused at the idea that somehow Russia is just playing dumb and their real offensive will start any day now. Like they've got some secret competent army waiting to be let loose.

And to think, that's only the losses which have been visually confirmed with photographic or video evidence!

It's difficult to know what Russia has left, but with T-62s already having entered the field, they can't be terribly happy with their armor losses thus far. I'd wager that they've probably lost somewhere between a third and a half of all of their available tank capacity, nationwide. Who knows how fast they're able to manufacture new machines, but it can't be enough to cope with that kind of widespread destruction of forces.

What concerns me is that numerous reports seem to indicate that the US is advising Ukraine to pull out of the city but the Ukrainians continue to insist that they can and will hold it. Some reports indicate an orderly withdrawal is underway; others that reinforcements are still being sent into the city. What's really going on there?

IMO, these kinds of reports too unreliable to take very seriously - even if it's true that the US advisors have been saying this, for all we know it could just be an intel operation to draw in more Russian/Wagner units for summary destruction. I have a feeling that we're not going to know for sure until we know, if you get my meaning.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Heffe

It's difficult to know what Russia has left, but with T-62s already having entered the field, they can't be terribly happy with their armor losses thus far. I'd wager that they've probably lost somewhere between a third and a half of all of their available tank capacity, nationwide. Who knows how fast they're able to manufacture new machines, but it can't be enough to cope with that kind of widespread destruction of forces.

I've seen the figure of 20 new builds per month from one particular plant. A couple of other plants are "refurbishing" older models (like the T-62), and/or repairing battle-damaged tanks.

This recent piece gives some insight into Russian MBT production.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidax...h=27a19f812061

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[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I've seen the figure of 20 new builds per month from one particular plant. A couple of other plants are "refurbishing" older models (like the T-62), and/or repairing battle-damaged tanks.

This recent piece gives some insight into Russian MBT production.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidax...h=27a19f812061

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Nice find. 20 new builds a month isn't going to be nearly enough, especially not with western sanctions and lack of quality optics. Russia's best shot, I imagine, is going to be pleading with China.

[bash]

Originally Posted by Heffe

Nice find. 20 new builds a month isn't going to be nearly enough, especially not with western sanctions and lack of quality optics. Russia's best shot, I imagine, is going to be pleading with China.

Yeah those production/refurbishment estimates are likely based on pre-war levels which means before sanctions came into play. While sanctions won't mean Russia can't build any tanks, they're just more likely to be more equivalent to export/older models than top of the line models.

As we've seen even their top of the line kit are vulnerable to ATGMs, drones, poor logistics, and shitty tactics. I haven't seen any evidence the Russian army has learned any lessons along those lines in the past year. Even if they can roll out 900 tanks a year it doesn't amount to much strategically if they're abandoned or destroyed a few miles past the Russian lines of control.