In Defense of the Red Army

[Raellus]

We've discussed NATO's willful choice to rely more on achieving air superiority than on investing in SHORAD systems for its ground troops during the late Cold War (and through the 2020s). It now appears that the Ukrainians are having to lie in the bed that NATO made. We're seeing strong evidence that a lack of SHORAD makes armor vulnerable to attacks by Russian attack helicopters.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...copter-problem

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[KozmasSchmierfink]

Yeah you can definitely argue that like Russian forces are reliant on their air defense umbrella, NATO/US forces need that assumed air superiority. Certainly makes breaching operations easier when everything in the air is yours...

of course every time I see a map with symbology on it I want to break out my doctrinal pins...

[bash]

While NATO/US prefers air superiority I'd say that even without it their use of AWACS makes up a bit for SHORAD. Anything bigger than a drone that leaves the ground is going to be seen and tracked by AWACS which can guide weapons to shoot it down.

Even with NATO AWACS planes over friendly countries or international airspace the lack of Ukrainian air and ground assets compatible with NATO systems mean they can't use the AWACS umbrella a NATO army could.

I think AWACS integration was a better investment for NATO. That's not to say SHORAD is not worthwhile. But the reality is AWACS integrated weapons have a much longer detection and engagement range than SHORAD.

For instance the Russian helicopter ATGMs have an 8km stand-off range. I don't know that you're going to be able to build a SHORAD system (without AWACS or aerial radar) with a 9+ km engagement range. The missiles might have the range but you need sensors to be able to see and shoot something that from the perspective of the system is right on the horizon.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by bash

For instance the Russian helicopter ATGMs have an 8km stand-off range. I don't know that you're going to be able to build a SHORAD system (without AWACS or aerial radar) with a 9+ km engagement range. The missiles might have the range but you need sensors to be able to see and shoot something that from the perspective of the system is right on the horizon.

Your points regarding AWACS and comparative weapons ranges are well taken.

As this thread is, by design, an apologetic for the Soviet military, I shall endeavor to provide a couple of counterpoints.

Not all Soviet helicopter-launched ATGMs outrange NATO SHORAD systems.

One of the most common Soviet helicopter-mounted ATGMs, the AT-9 Spiral, has a maximum range of 6km (product-improved versions introduced later have a range of 8-10km). The Stinger and Roland SAMS each have a range of 8km so, depending on the version of Spiral, either side has a slight range advantage.

The longer range AT-16 Scallion (10-12km) is only carried by KA-50 Hokum, of which the Soviets had relatively small numbers, compared to their older models of attack helicopters.

An IR-guided SHORAD system with a range of 10-15km would have given NATO ground forces a security blanket against Soviet attack aircraft.

Regarding NATO AWACs, there's no doubt it was/is a huge force multiplier for NATO. The Soviets were not unaware of this. I suspect that the Soviets had plans in place to neutralize NATO's advantage in that department, to some extent. I wouldn't be surprised if one of those plans involved attacking at least some of them on the ground at the outset of armed conflict with NATO.

Although NATO AWACS would be very well defended in the air, they can't hide (as long as their radar is turned on). The Soviets developed an AAM specifically to attack large aircraft like the AWACS and JSTAR at very long ranges- the hypersonic AA-13 Axehead (200+km range at Mach 5). Once they ran out of AA-13's, I can see the Soviets launching barrages of slightly shorter-ranged AA-9s (75-100km), and even AS-11s HARMS (120km) at any surviving NATO AWACS. The Soviets wouldn't even have to kill them (the AWACS) to reduce their impact on the battlespace- they could neutralize them by disrupting their operations or denying them certain sectors of airspace over the front).

And jammers might be able to screen Soviet attack helicopters operating at tree-top level.

I think NATO made a mistake putting all its eggs in once basket by choosing to skimp on SHORAD capabilities v. the Soviets.

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[bash]

Note I completely agree WRT NATO putting their air defense eggs in one basket. If their AWACS umbrella ever comes down or they have to operate without it they're incredibly vulnerable to things like attack helicopters. I'd include low-flying cruise missiles in that threat bucket too. Even non-nuclear cruise missiles could severely damage NATO rear lines lacking both good SHORAD and AWACS/air cover. A bunch of dudes with Stingers wouldn't quite suffice.

[ToughOmbres]

Originally Posted by Raellus

We've discussed NATO's willful choice to rely more on achieving air superiority than on investing in SHORAD systems for its ground troops during the late Cold War (and through the 2020s). It now appears that the Ukrainians are having to lie in the bed that NATO made. We're seeing strong evidence that a lack of SHORAD makes armor vulnerable to attacks by Russian attack helicopters.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...copter-problem

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The Stinger's have not completely driven the Russian Air Force from the sky but have clearly made a difference. I wonder if even older British blowpipe MANPADS would still be useful against Russian aircraft?

NATO collectively made a budget decision regarding short range air defense to some extent during and certainly after the end of the Cold War. Why would you need much air defense when you will have air superiority if not outright air supremacy? ADA systems are in many ways like the old railway operating companies. We would never need them-until you can't get contractors to do the work.

There was a USAF open estimate that Russia retains perhaps 1,500 aircraft on inventory. My guess is that only 30% or so would be operational-in a pinch somewhat larger numbers could be pushed in the air. The Russians probably aren't going to risk any more aircraft against even short range air defense unless absolutely necessary. Now helicopters-the Russians seem to be cautiously using those with more success. For now.

[Raellus]

A lot of reporting on the Coalition air forces' performance against the Iraqi's Soviet-style (and equipped) air defenses tends to portray it as more or less of a cakewalk for the former, allowing Coalition air power to strike Iraqi ground forces almost at will, thereby dramatically impacting the course of the ground war. Some use these portrayals to argue that NATO would perform similarly against Soviet air defenses, allowing NATO aircraft to quickly focus more on tactical battlefield support. While it is true that the Coalition was able to establish air superiority over most of the battle space relatively quickly, it wasn't easy. The Coalition forces experienced some unanticipated challenges, and were forced to make some major adjustments on the fly; otherwise, the air campaign would have been significantly more costly (for the Coalition) than it turned out to be. This brief article does a good job of describing some of the challenges faced by Coalition air forces, and explains how they led to the adoption of different tactics.

https://theaviationgeekclub.com/the-...ision-strikes/

From this analysis, I would argue that the Soviet's denser, more complex air defense networks and more capable systems would have presented a much bigger challenge to NATO air forces than the Iraqis ever did, and that NATO losses would be much higher than they were in the Gulf. A deadlier threat environment would have necessitated similar, if not more dramatic, tactical adjustments (namely, smaller, stealthier strike packages), which would have reduced the impact of NATO air power on Soviet ground force operations.

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[Homer]

I’d offer that 1999s Allied Force is a better look at what may have happened in a peer fight. Even with the lessons learned from ODS and a massive overmatch in firepower, Serbia was able to maintain a credible GBAD threat and deflect a proportion of NATOs efforts throughout the conflict by using anti-SEAD tactics, deception, and dispersal. Despite fielding a smaller force than the Iraqis, the Serbs were able to retain an effective air defense force.

[Raellus]

Good call, Homer. In terms of air-defenses, the Serbs arguably did more with less than the Iraqis- that shouldn't be overlooked.

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[bash]

Something to keep in mind between Iraq, Serbia, and a T2K war would be the context of the air defenses and the ROE of the attacking force. In Iraq their air defense had to defend huge areas and the ROE for Coalition forces was "shoot anything dangerous looking". In Serbia the air defenses had much smaller coverage areas covering parent formations. The Coalition ROE were more restrictive as well.

In a T2K WWIII there would likely be good defenses on the Soviet side but a fairly lax ROE for NATO forces. NATO would also have the benefit of B-2s and F-117s for taking out air defense HQs and/or batteries themselves. So definitely not a cakewalk for NATO but the Soviets also wouldn't have an impenetrable wall of air defenses.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by bash

Something to keep in mind between Iraq, Serbia, and a T2K war would be the context of the air defenses and the ROE of the attacking force. In Iraq their air defense had to defend huge areas and the ROE for Coalition forces was "shoot anything dangerous looking". In Serbia the air defenses had much smaller coverage areas covering parent formations. The Coalition ROE were more restrictive as well.

In a T2K WWIII there would likely be good defenses on the Soviet side but a fairly lax ROE for NATO forces. NATO would also have the benefit of B-2s and F-117s for taking out air defense HQs and/or batteries themselves. So definitely not a cakewalk for NATO but the Soviets also wouldn't have an impenetrable wall of air defenses.

Good points. Would the US have risked B-2s for anything but nuclear strikes, though? I'm not well versed on late-Cold War SAC doctrine, but I would hazard a guess that B-2s would not be released to deliver conventional strikes anywhere near the FEB. F-117s might have good success against Soviet air defenses initially, but the Soviets probably would have "cracked the code" pretty quickly. IIRC, the Serbians allegedly figured out a way to detect and track them using ground-based radars (shooting down at least one F-117 with a SAM), and the IRST capabilities of the MiG-29 and SU-27 would mitigate, to some degree, the F-117's stealth capabilities v. radar.

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