OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by ToughOmbres

NATO's navies have suffered tremendously from Post-Cold War penury-our old Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates would have been ideal for this role. They are long gone. NATO, I suspect, would be loathe to strip STANAVFORATLANT to send them into the Black Sea on escort missions even if the political will existed.

I doubt Turkey would close the Straits-although I do see Erdogan notifying NATO that in the event of an attack on NATO forces as a result of their actions in the Black Sea-Turkey would sit it out.

I don't disagree with you but it's interesting to note that Turkey is still a user of the OHP class frigate. Their modernized version is known as the G-Class frigate and there are 8 of them in service with the Turkish navy.

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[ToughOmbres]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I don't disagree with you but it's interesting to note that Turkey is still a user of the OHP class frigate. Their modernized version is known as the G-Class frigate and there are 8 of them in service with the Turkish navy.

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That's true-Poland/ORP has a couple as well now I think? Australia built several as well if my memory serves me correctly.

[Raellus]

Russian minefields have contributed greatly to slowing Ukraine's offensive operations this summer. From the articles I've read, it sounds like the UAF's main tactics to overcome the obstacle presented by AT mines is to rely on mine roller-equipped tanks or ARVs, or MICLICs, to clear lanes through minefields during an assault. According to a Ukrainian tanker interviewed by the BBC, a mine roller can usually handle, one at a time, up to four mines before it needs replacement, However, knowing this, the Russians have adapted by stacking multiple AT mines, thereby destroying rollers with one massive explosion. The Ukrainians are losing AFVs to mines at a pretty high rate- even their more advanced, better protected Western models- and have seemingly given up on attempts at a major mechanized breakthrough. They've largely reverted to smaller, more incremental (and slower) attacks led by relatively small formations of infantry. The Russians have even started to mine their own trench lines and remotely detonate them once they've been taken and occupied by UAF forces.

What I haven't read a single mention of in this current conflict is the UAF using combat engineers to prep attack lanes through mine belts by moving across minefields on foot, probing for AT mines, and removing them manually prior to a planned assault. I'm both surprised and not surprised by this. I'm not surprised because this procedure is slow and very dangerous to the mine clearing teams. Minefields, to be truly effective, need to be observed by the defending force and covered by fires (direct and indirect) to prevent what I just described. It sounds like, most of the time, the Russians are employing tactics that increase the effectiveness of their minefields.

On the other hand, I am surprised because pretty much every book I've read about major WW2 ground offensives describe the attacker- both Axis and Allied- using the tactic of manual mine detection/removal (almost always at night) in the lead up to a big assault. This is especially true of the Eastern Front. In quite a few cases, this tactic was very successful in getting the attacking force through the first line of defense with much fewer tank losses to AT mines.

I'm not advocating that UAF troops risk their lives by adopting this dangerous but potentially successful tactic. It's easy for me to sit here and suggest they give it a try. I'm just wondering why, AFAIK, they haven't. I suppose that improvements in and the proliferation of NODs and battlefield surveillance tech in the current era make manual demining in a combat area a lot more dangerous than it already was in earlier wars.

Anyway, that was a bit rambling. I just wanted to share my thoughts and wonder if any of you have wondered the same thing or read/seen anything illuminating on the topic.

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[Ursus Maior]

The difference between infantry clearing mines at night in 1943 and 2023 ist night optics and drones, I'd say. Also, clearing mines by hand in darkness is extremely dangerous and costly in terms of personnel.

[Raellus]

Here's the BBC piece that I referenced in the OP.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66306150

And another piece, in which a UAF sapper is interviewed. This one focuses a bit more on the threat of anti-personnel mines and the challenges faced by shorthanded Ukrainian sappers. The last line of the article offers a tantalizing, if vague, hint of new, more effective tactics to defeat Russian minefields.

"We are learning to improvise and to invent ways to make quick, safe paths through the minefields. But we are fighting a very vicious enemy," [the Ukrainian sapper] said.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66080652

I'm curious to learn what those innovative tactics are.

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[Bestbrian]

Didn't we send these guys any mine clearing line charges?

[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by Bestbrian

Didn't we send these guys any mine clearing line charges?

Sure, Ukraine's been using them at least since November. But each launcher is limited to 200 meters of charge per hour (half an hour required between launches, each MICLIC clears an area 100 meters long and 8 meters wide). With the depth of some of the minefields, that's a minimum of 80 hours of continuous MICLIC use (and 160 charges) to clear 16 kilometers of mines. Meanwhile, the enemy has made targeting the launchers a priority because hitting one while it's carrying just under a ton of explosives causes a good bit of damage to anything in the general vicinity of the launcher. That makes using multiple launchers to speed things up a bit hairy, because hitting one is likely to take out multiple vehicles.

TL;DR version - MICLICs are great against shallow minefields or ones hastily put together. Against minefields that have been laid in depth over the course of months, they're still useful, but not able to cause total breaches quickly.