Conscript Armies

[copeab]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

To think of a infantry company, understrength by 30%....ouch!

Units in 2000 seem to be more like 80-90% understrength ...

[dragoon500ly]

But of course, Dunnigan and Dupoy are the starting points for any student of how wars are fought.

[helbent4]

Originally Posted by Canadian Army

Canada has had Conscription only once; during World War II, and then it limited to homeland defence; at first, but, then expanded it overseas service. I recently finished article about Canadian Conscription in Twilight 2000; I will post it after this weekend.

"Conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription."

I tend to downplay conscription in Canada prior to the direct involvement in the European war in mid-'97 and the later nuclear strikes (which were staggered over several months time).

Needless to say, while I greatly respect Legion McRae, (and am running a version of his campaign/adventure "The River" from Adventurer's Quarterly) I don't take everything he says as gospel, or at least put my own spin on it!

Tony

[HorseSoldier]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Yes, it makes most sense for replacements to be sent into existing units rather than form new ones.

Up to a point, yes. Beyond a certain level of rough handling and casualties, you'd get better results skimming experienced leaders from units that had been in the line and using them as the backbone for a new unit. Once a unit is bloodied enough, you're talking about a thin core of experienced troops and a mass of replacements. Being able to put that together far from the front under more controlled conditions may be a lot better than feeding raw meat into the grinder.

More generally, you want both, though -- a battle casaulty replacement stream and a new unit stream of incoming personnel.

In the initial 2-3 years of the war, I'm fairly certain draftees would be looked down upon by the volunteers. After late 1997 however, this view would be bound to change.

Honestly, I can definitely relate to Paul's earlier comments about being anti-draftee since I came up in the same era and all. On the other hand, though, draftees can't be any dumber and screwed up than some of the volunteer entry-level Joes I have to deal with. I think NCOs down at the platoon/company level wouldn't care so much about draft status as they would about whether the individual brought his A game and learned fast.

The potential for valuable civilians skills would be a definite plus, but let's remember that in a post-industrial service economy you're at least as likely to get guys whose resume is limited to fast food jobs or pursuing a philosophy degree as a guy who was a trained welder or who'd grown up helping his dad run the family farm. Especially if Selective Service or other conscript scheme was pulling from the 18-22 age cohorts rather than something like 26-30 (and to be fair, in a total war, your skilled workers are more valuable doing their job rather than toting a rifle -- one of my grandfathers was working in a ship yard in December '41 and he and his coworkers were banned from enlisting by the government since their work was wartime essential).

[HorseSoldier]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

I'd like to mount a small historical defense of the oft-maligned Army replacement system. In WW2, the individual replacements often were casualties within 24 hours of arriving, often after spending many boring days or weeks in a replacement depot with little or no training. The defense of the system is that the US Army was able to keep its divisions in the line constantly at an effective (not full) strength, hardly ever having to withdraw them for replenishment. [Which was good, since Ike almost never had any reserve divisions to replace shot-out ones on the line.]

The system used in Vietnam is usually critiqued even more vigorously -- the individual replacement system on 12 month rotations undermined unit cohesion, fostered an every man for himself angle, and so on and so forth.

I recently reread The 13th Valley by John DelVecchio which, though fiction, is based on his service with the 101st late in the war (70 or 71). One of the characters in the book talks or thinks about the strength of the Vietnam era system, since cherries coming into a unit are always guaranteed to be surrounded by experienced guys, and get the benefit of in country finishing school sort of training programs run by their divisions. Same character contrasts this with units that deployed in country as new units and collectively suffered higher casualties because so few knew the basics of survival on the battlefield in SVN.

Anyway, interesting different point of view to encounter compared to the conventional wisdom all of us got fed during the volunteer army era. Makes me wonder if a bigger issue weren't other aspects of military personnel policy back then that undermined small unit leadership (shake and bake NCO academies, rotating officers from the line to staff jobs halfway through their tours).

[HorseSoldier]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

In a WWIII setup, I feel that the US would activate Selective Service in the 1995-1997 time frame.

I can't see the US activating the Selective Service system at any point before the Bundeswehr crossed the Inter-German Border.

Prior to that you've got the PRC-Soviet fight going full tilt, and the US and other NATO nations pouring support into the PRC. Political leadership, in my opinion, is not going to risk a huge gesture like a return to the draft that might make the Soviets fear that they are about to be on the receiving end of a two front war. Too much aggression (or actions that a paranoid authoritarian regime might consider aggressive) could easily be taken the wrong way and possibly provoke a nuclear response from the Soviets. And not a tit-for-tat T2K nuclear attack, but possibly the nation-wiper first strike that both sides feared during the Cold War.

My guess/personal take is that once the Sino-Soviet War goes hot, the US government boosts spending on all sorts of military programs, with some of that going to the PRC and some of it going into bringing the reserve component more up to date. Additionally, more money would get pumped into recruiting and bonus programs, etc., to encourage voluntary enlistment in the active and reserve components. The reserve component would likely get additional money for training and (maybe/god willing) some of that would translate into identifying and trying to correct the problems that came to light IRL when the Nat'l Guard round out brigades fumbled their Desert Storm mobilization.

Much lower profile, Selective Service gets dusted off and looked at, ready to be put into play, but the government doesn't take that step until after the European war starts. Even then, they might not immediately put it into play, potentially waiting to see if the war will be a quick German reunification and then a peace settlement. Again, I don't think anyone would want to send the Soviets the message that it's war to the knife and the panzer columns are heading for the gates of Moscow again (even if that's exactly what it started turning into as the war developed).

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

To think of a infantry company, understrength by 30%....ouch!

Considering one exercise I was on our company was at only 25% strength - 10 man plattoons (x3), plt HQ of 2 men, plus Company HQ, 30% down isn't too bad (that was normal for us).
Naturally we got totally creamed when we assaulted an enemy position numbering barely a dozen men who'd had no more than 30mins to prepare their position. Besides CHQ, there was only one survivor - me, and that was more through sheer luck than anything.

[Dog 6]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Considering one exercise I was on our company was at only 25% strength - 10 man plattoons (x3), plt HQ of 2 men, plus Company HQ, 30% down isn't too bad (that was normal for us).
Naturally we got totally creamed when we assaulted an enemy position numbering barely a dozen men who'd had no more than 30mins to prepare their position. Besides CHQ, there was only one survivor - me, and that was more through sheer luck than anything.

lol crunchy.....

[Adm.Lee]

I forgot: I recommend The GI Offensive by Col. Peter Mansoor to look at how under-rated the US infantry may have been in the ETO.

Originally Posted by HorseSoldier

The system used in Vietnam is usually critiqued even more vigorously -- the individual replacement system on 12 month rotations undermined unit cohesion, fostered an every man for himself angle, and so on and so forth.
...

Anyway, interesting different point of view to encounter compared to the conventional wisdom all of us got fed during the volunteer army era. Makes me wonder if a bigger issue weren't other aspects of military personnel policy back then that undermined small unit leadership (shake and bake NCO academies, rotating officers from the line to staff jobs halfway through their tours).

Again, we're talking late-war vs. early-war situations. As I said earlier, in the WW2 ETO, most divisions and regiments learned that they had to acclimate their replacements themselves, and were doing so after the winter of 1944-45. In Vietnam, this was done regularly, but by late in the war, the leadership cadre was exhausted, and reduced to undertrained and underexperienced leaders. I recommend Death of an American Army by Shelby Stanton, to address this.

Both of which have led to the current system, which tries to keep whole units together for a rotation. That, of course, brings up its own criticisms, which I'm going to avoid.

While the Army Air Forces were able to rotate bomber crews home after 25 missions,

Which was raised to 35, and then 50 missions in 1944, BTW. And it wasn't whole crews, it was done on an individual basis, too. The crew of the "Memphis Belle" was celebrated because they were the first complete crew to finish a 25-mission tour. And those crewmen, once returned, often were given a training tour, followed by a second combat tour.

That the US Army used the replacement system in the manner that they did, was a utter disgrace. And nothing was learned. The same system was used again in Korea and again in Vietnam.

I contend that things were learned, and elements of the system that did not work were addressed for 1945, as well as during Korea and Vietnam. There were processes to integrate replacements into platoons and companies during time off the line, unless there was some emergency.

Going back to the original issue, I suspect the US (as well as the Germanies and many others) started conscription to generate replacements in the winter of '96-97, and continued into '98. After that, replacements for the NATO front line would have to come from comb-outs of the rear. IMC, I think there should be a major "Blue to Green" initiative, drafting or asking for volunteers from the Navy and AF to support the Army.

[Canadian Army]

Here is what I came up with:

Canadian Zombies during the Twilight War

ZOM·BIE; A derogatory nickname used by Canadian volunteers during the Twilight War to describe Conscripts.

When Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced on October 10, 1996, that Canada had declared war on USSR, he also took care to say, “The government did not believe conscription (a draft of men and woman) for the Canadian Armed Forces would not be necessary. No such conscription or draft will be enacted by this government.”

There was an initial surge of volunteers; within six months, over 20,000 men and women had joined the Canadian Armed Forces, and the 1st Canadian Division [Mechanized] embarked for West Germany to aid its defence. One month later, in November, 1996, the Warsaw Pact forces counterattack against Germany, and there was a real possibility Netherlands would also be overwhelmed. NATO demanded that Ottawa should demonstrate a fuller wartime commitment. But imposing military conscription would create serious domestic problems for the Liberal Party. It had been elected in 1993 and election time was fast approaching. Any conscription laws could hamper the re-election of the Liberal Party. After NATO’s General mobilization was declared, Canada was the only country in NATO that did not enact conscript laws, and relied solely on volunteers. The same policy had built an army during World War I, World War II, and the Korea War; while violent opposition to conscription had created a huge political problem during World War I and World War II for the Liberal Party. Chrétien knew something had to be devised that would both address the concerns of NATO and mollify Canadians reluctance to be conscription into Military Service.

As an experience parliamentarian, Chrétien help drafted the National Mobilization Act which gave the government “special emergency powers to mobilize all human resources for the defence of Canada”. He made a dramatic speech to the Commons when introducing the bill on 18 December, 1996 during a special session, saying, "The National Mobilization Act will relate solely and exclusively to the defence of Canada on our own soil and in our own territorial waters” Chrétien added that national service registration would be held and that this registration will have nothing to do with recruiting citizens for overseas service.” About 100,000 draftees were summoned for training in camps all across the country.

In 1997, after North Korea invaded South Korea, PM Chrétien called a special House of Commons vote on whether to amend the NMA in order to send NMA men overseas. The House of Commons voted 235 in favour, with 65 against. Though this majority vote gave Chrétien clear permission to order “Zombies” off to join the fighting, Chrétien like his predecessors was still reluctant to alienate Quebec voters, and simply shelved issue until the next session.

In 1997, United States forces began engaging Soviet forces in the Bering Straits of Alaska. As the territory was part of North America, within the designated "home defence area," a two divisions of NMA soldiers were directed to support ‘Operation Artic Thunder’ – US X Corps in Alaska. Though there were scores of temporary desertions, most NMA troops embarked to CFB Chilliwhack without incident in August, 1997, bound for a combat zone after all. The Canadians suffered over 15,000 dead during the fight for Alaska, and later British Columbia, before Soviet forces were contained.

By 1997, during final stages of the war, Canadians fighting in Europe felt a severe lack of trained replacements for their heavy casualties. Complaints by NATO mounted, increasing demands that “Zombies” be sent into combat. Jean Chrétien at long last reluctantly decided to order 5,000 NMA conscripts overseas. The first conscript infantrymen sent overseas arrived in Europe on February 23, 2000. About 2,500 of them took part in 3rd German Army’s; with the XI US Corps assisting, offensive into northern Poland, to clear the Baltic coast as far as the mouth of the Wisla River. Ninety-nine NMA were killed in action before the all Canadian soldiers were order evacuated form the European continent on September 28, 2000.

Upon returning to Canada and until 2008; at which point the National Mobilization Act was repealed; “Zombies” performed more mundane duties, such as Internal Security, Border Patrol, and Aid to Civil Power and left the all of fighting in Quebec and West to regular and volunteer forces, and never again saw an active combat role.

[HorseSoldier]

Looks pretty good to me.

[helbent4]

CA,

That's an awesome write-up. I'd like to borrow from that to flesh out the background of my ongoing campaign (based loosely on "The River") and set in the Lower Mainland.

Tony