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#31
12-20-2010, 07:38 AM
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The Terry Order
By mid-morning of July 22nd, 1876, the Seventh was ready for its 15 day planned march. Custer received Terry's written orders. The instructions wer implicit and fixed the location of the hostiles. This is the order:
Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory June 22, 1876 Lieutenant Colonel Custer 7th Cavalry Colonel, The Brigadier General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken leads. Should it be found, as it appears almost certain that it will be found,to turn towards the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn towards the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course, its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible. The Department commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should throughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's column, with information of that result of your examination. The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon's command. The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks if the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the mean time you receive further orders. Very respectfully, Your obedient servant E.W. Smith, Captain 18th Infantry Acting Assistant Adjutant General
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. 
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#32
12-20-2010, 08:04 AM
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"Condemned horses" to pull the gatlings?
Does this mean they were no longer suitable for riding?
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If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem
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#33
12-20-2010, 09:38 AM
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Quote:
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the best course of action when all is against you is to slow down and think critically about the situation. this way you are not blindly rushing into an ambush and your mind is doing something useful rather than getting you killed.
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#34
12-20-2010, 01:54 PM
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Yeah that is one things we don't realize when we look back in history. The modern Fire Team, Squad, Platoon, and Battalion organization that we take for granted today weren't used as they are today. Even in today standards Regiment and Battalion are used to mean the same thing.
Many of times when Battalions were mention it was just a collection of Companies being lead by either the senior Company Commander or one of the staff officers from Regiment with whatever resource the Regiment Commander would offer for support. Yes 1st Lt, 2nd Lt, and many of the NCOs were there to make sure that troops on the firing line followed orders. Also it wasn't uncommon for Officers in the various regiments to be seconded for other duties leaving most Regiments short of their TO&E for Officers. There was full Colonel listed as member of the Regiment, but it seems for most of the 7th Cavalry existence that Lt Colonel Custer was "acting" commander something that I hadn't known. That was even doing a report on the battle back in school. Then again there wasn't this thing called the internet to find all of this information either...
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#35
12-20-2010, 02:09 PM
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Quote:
__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#36
12-20-2010, 02:14 PM
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Quote:
The Upton manual stresses that the horses were to be pulled back behind cover, this distance was to be anywhere from 50-200 yards behind the skirmish line. There is a lot of reference to horses having been shot during the course of the battle, but Indian oral tradition has always held that the mounts were shot in the course of the battle or were stampeded by various warriors.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#37
12-20-2010, 02:18 PM
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Quote:
__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#38
12-20-2010, 02:51 PM
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I remember 20 years ago how computers were suppose to turn us into paperless society. In reality it has only made it where it uses more paper, because everyone has to have their own hard copy of things. Maybe eBooks trend will help some of that out, and you don't have to load box after box of often heavy books when you move too.
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#39
12-20-2010, 02:56 PM
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I guess in many ways the little things that added up to Custer defeat there as add to the legend and myths that persist to this day of what happen there.
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#40
12-21-2010, 12:24 AM
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Being at the battle site showed very plainly that there was NO cover for Custer's men. The trees that are within a mile of the place where Custer fell are all probably only 40-60 years old. So those trees weren't even there during the battle and they were only in a location where Benteen could have used them had they existed at the time. Where Custer was...no trees. Simple, exposed hillside.
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#41
12-21-2010, 05:06 AM
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Quote:
It all comes back to the Upton manual, the cavalry were taught to fight as dismounted skirmishers, and while a trooper was allowed to take cover, this was only if it did not interfere with the skirmish line. There are a lot of references to the troopers actually being discouraged from seeking cover. Photos of the battlefield taken in 1878-79 confirm that there was very few trees, mostly in the ravines and along the LBHR. There was some sage and lots of tall grass. One of the intresting things about the battlefield is the somewhat gentle slopes of some of the key areas. For example, there is a low ridge facing Battle Ridge that is known as Henryville (the Fox dig found over 100 Henry/Winchester casings here). You can walk up the slope to a point where you can still stand erect and be in a position to see the cavalry positions along Battle Ridge. Take another couple of steps and you can whip up your rifle, fire a couple of rounds and then step back into safety. And this is one of four locations within easy rifle shot (150-300 yards) of the cavalry positions. Dr. Fox has a rather intresting theory of what is called bunching. The tactical manual required the file closers, i.e. the officers and ncos to remain standing in order to better direct fire of the kneeling skirmishers. As the Indian attacks became increasingly heavy, these key people were killed or wounded. The effect on the enlisted men would be to move closer to the remaining command structure. This would lead to gaps in the skirmish line that would be exploited by the Indians, who would take advantage to gett closer, kill more exposed troopers, force the remaining troopers to bunch closer and repeat the process over and over. The good doctor was trying to explain why several of the cavalry graves (the Custer bn was buried were they fell) are grouped together in rather small areas (Keogh and Custer areas). Its an intresting theory.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#42
12-21-2010, 07:09 AM
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To help visualize
I thought it might help to see where BLBH took place and the best know movements of the pricipals involved.
http://www.nps.gov/libi/planyourvisi...d/LIBImap1.pdf Hope this helps. Mike
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#43
12-21-2010, 08:02 AM
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The Nativity of the Seventh
Of the men of the Seventh, about 57% were born in the United States, remember those old classic John Ford cavalry movies with the old First Sergeant with a thick Irish accent?
Canada = 14 Denmark = 3 England = 40 France = 8 Germany =126 Ireland = 128 Italy = 6 Scotland = 12 Switzerland = 13 Other = 17 Connecticut = 8 Illinois = 17 Indiana = 23 Kentucky = 20 Maine = 13 Maryland = 15 Mass. = 45 Michigan = 8 Missouri = 8 New Hampshire = 7 New Jersey = 11 New York = 101 Ohio = 61 Penn. = 81 Other = 59 Immigrants were not confined to the lower ranks: Captain Myles Keogh: Ireland 1st Ly Henry Nowlan: Corfu 1st Lt Charles DeRudio: Italy 1st Lt W.W. Cooke: Canada 1st Lt Donald McIntosh: Canada 1st Lt Henry Jackson: England 1st Lt Edward Mathey: England Finally, a brief of mention of race. The Army of this period has a segregated one until the Korean War. The Seventh was a white regiment. Only two members were of other races. Civilian Interpreter Isaiah Dorman was African-American and married to a Santee Sioux woman, he was killed in the rout from the valley fight. First Lieutenant Donald McIntosh was of mixed ancestry, Scottish-Indian, he was a member of an old Canadian trading family.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#44
12-21-2010, 08:43 AM
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The Frontier Army
"There was Sergeant John McCaffery and Captain Donahue,They made us march and toe the mark, in gallant Company Q. Oh the drums would roll upon my soul, this is the style we'd go. Forty miles a day on beans and hay, in the Regular Army O."
Two New York vaudevillians sang this song in 1876, popularizing a song to which the Regulars themselves would add verses. But often public irreverence was a less pleasant affair. With the end of the Civil War, the beloved Boys in Blue had, once again, became hated mercenaries---an army that was dismissed by the New York Sun as "composed of bummers, loafers, and foreign paupers." The Regular of 1876 was paid $13.00 a month in federal greenbacks that was often not accepted in the various frontier towns, to add insult to injury, the soldier would often have to "redeem" his paper money with coinage, and often had to pay a fee to do this. From his pay, the soldier would have deductions for such things as drawing too much clothing (especially if the issue boots wore out before they were due to be replaced) as well as the requirement to pay the company tailor at least once every three months, Charges for this service could range from $6.00 for altering a dress coat, $1.00 for alterations to the service blouse and $3.00 for letting out or taking in the seams of his pants. Ten dollars every three months was a high price when the soldier only earned $39.00 and many soldiers bitterly complained about why they had to pay the company tailor for work that the government had already paid the contractor for. Typically, the soldier would receive very rudimentary training (little more than close-order drill) and his first issue of clothing at one of the recruit barracks and then was transferred to his post. Where he often shared a straw-filled mattress with his "bunkie". If he had enlisted in the infantry, he would serve three years, five years as a cavalryman, unless, of course, he deserted (about one third of those enlisted inbetween 1867 and 1891 deserted). If the trooper stayed, he faced isolation, wretched food, shoddy clothing and sometimes ferocious discipline. Enterainment might include bad whiskey and fornication with laundresses, Indian women or prostitutes. The Regular's best hope of overcoming the Indian's superiority as a fighter lay in his steadiness and discipline. But his training in marksmanship, horsemanship and the other skills needed by a soldier was often neglected, mostly due to soldiers being kept busy as manual labor to build or sustain their posts. The soldier might never see a hostile Indian, but when he did, he was always outnumbered. Congress limited the strength of the Army at 25,000 in 1874 and the Army usually numbered under 19,000. Much of this force was still serving on Resonstruction duty in the South. A German immigrant, a former Prussian military officer, had this to say about his fellow soldiers: "The handsome, finely organized cavalries of Europe know nothing of real hard cavalry work. For the work I have seen a squadron of United States Cavalry perform on the plains, German would send two regiment, and deem it hard service." In spite of the fighting of the Indian Wars, Congress provided no moral support, in 1877, barely a year after the Little Big Horn, a appropriations dispute left the Army payless from June until November, even as soldiers died fighting in the Nez Perce War. If the solder proved himself brave, he might receive the nation's only military decoration, the Medal of Honor (Thomas Custer, brother of George, was one of only a handful of men to win the Medal of Honor, twice). The only other acknowledgement of valor was the seldom adwarded Certificate of Merit. The Certificate was rarely adwarded because money was often tight and its recipients were paid an extra two dollars a month. Hollywood often characterizes the soldier as little more than a brute, murdering and raping helpless Indians as part of the country's brutal drive westward. The reality was that the soldier often sympathized with the plight of the Indains and often married Indian women. If the trooper stayed in service after 1905, he could wear the Indian Campaigns Medal, forever marking him as a soldier on a vanished frontier.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#45
12-21-2010, 08:59 AM
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A Day in the Life of a Cavalryman, in Garrision
Each and every day of a trooper's day was carried out in a rigidly organized routine. Here is a typical "training roster".
5:45am Assembly for trumpeters 6:00am Reveille and roll call 6:30am Mess Call (breakfast) 7:30am Fatigue Call (work details) 8:00am Sick Call 8:55am Assembly of trumpeters 9:00am Assembly of Guard Detail 9:45am Recall from Fatigue Duties 10:00am Drill 11:30am Recall from Drill 11:45am First Sergeant's Call (for morning reports) 12:00pm Mess Call (lunch) 1:00pm Drill for target practise (Mon/Weds/Fri); drill for saber practise (Tue/Thur) 2:00pm Fatigue Call 4:15pm Recall from Fatigue duties 4:30pm Stable Call (care for horses) 5:30pm Recall from stable 6:00pm Mess Call (dinner) 7:00pm Retreat and Roll Call 8:55pm Assembly for trumpeters 9:00pm Last Call 9:30pm Lights Out You will note that there was daily weapons practise. This did not necessarily mean with ammunition since the Army only issued 90 rounds per man, per year. This would be firing drill, cleaning weapons or close-order drill with weapons.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#46
12-21-2010, 09:17 AM
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Cavalry Rations
For the enlisted men there was a prescribed daily ration of 12oz of pork or bacon(20oz of salt or fresh beef could be substituted); 22oz of bread (if the post had a bread oven) or 16 ounces of hard bread (often called hard crackers; this was a simple flour and water biscuit measuring 3 1/8" by 2 7/8" by 1/2") substituted when the trooper was on field rations. In addition, the commissary would issue, each day, the following rations for 100 men: 8lbs of ground coffee; 15lbs of beans or peas; 10lbs of rice or hominy; 30lbs of potatoes; 1qt of molasses; 15lbs of sugar; 3lbs 12oz of salt; 4oz of pepper; 1 gallon of vinegar. In addition, each company was required to raise a garden in order to provide fresh vegetables for its men, but in the harsh Plains climate, these gardens often failed.
In garrison, the troopers endured countless rounds of hash, stews and salt meat, with very little variation. In the field, their ration was salt pork or bacon, hard crackers and coffee, sometimes with wild game added to the mix. Officers, received the same basic ration of salt meat and bread as the troopers, they also received a monthly allowance of foodstuffs: 2 cans of peaches; 1 can of oysters; 1/2 can of jam; 1/2 can of jelly; 4 cans of tomatoes; 2 cans of corn; 1 can of peas; 2 cans of milk; 3lbs of soda crackers; 2 1/2lbs of mackerel; 1 1/2 lbs of dried beef; 2lbs Coffee; 2 1/2lbs of sperm candles; 1/4lb of officer's soap; 1/4 gallon maple syrup; 1 1/2lbs of dried peaches and 2lbs of lard. Both officers and enlisted could supplement thier rations by purchasing supplies from the post sutler. The sutler enjoyed the sole monopoly for selling goods to the soldiers and often charged exorbitant prices, for example, a sutler could purchase a can of oysters for 29 cents and then retail it for $1.00, fruits in cans were higher priced. Troopers could purchase items at the sutler on a credit system, to be redeemed on the next pay day. If a trooper was approaching his discharge date and owed the sutler money, the sutler could prevent the discharge from being completed, until the trooper had paid his bill, in full.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#47
12-21-2010, 09:51 AM
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The Allowance of Clothing for a Cavalryman
Since the cavalryman was enlisted for a term of 5 years, he was entitled to be issued a basic issue of clothing and then yearly issues of clothing until the end of his service. Here is what the Quartermaster pawned of on its helpless victims!
The issue is given in the following format: 1st/2nd/3rd/4th/5th/total Cap, Complete: 2/1/2/1/1/7 Hat with trimmings: 1/1/1/1/1/5 Fatigue forage caps: 1/1/1/1/1/5 Plume: 1/0/1/0/0/2 Eagle and Ring: 1/0/1/0/0/2 Cover: 1/1/1/1/1/5 Coat: 2/1/2/1/2/8 Trousers: 3/2/3/2/3/13 Flannel Shirt: 3/3/3/3/3/15 Flannel Drawers: 3/2/2/2/2/11 Bootees, pair: 2/2/2/2/2/10 Boots: 1/1/1/1/1/5 Stockings, pair: 4/4/4/4/4/20 Greatcoat: 1/0/0/0/0/1 Stable Frock: 1/0/1/0/0/2 Blanket: 1/0/1/0/0/2 Bootees were made of heavy leather, rough-side out, contained no grommets in the lace holes and had heavy rawhide laces. It was a ankle-high, square toe shoe that was issued to all enlisted men, regardless of branch. Both hand-sewn and pegged bootees were in service and they were disliked due to the clumsy shape of the heel. The heel was both flat and awakened and not very high. When a soldier was issued a pair of booteees he would usually go to a shoemaker, spend 75 cents of his pay and have the heels replaced with a smaller, higher heel. An infantryman could make a pair of bootees last about two weeks on a march. A soldier who were a pair for more than six weeks was exceptional. A infantryman was issued 4 pairs of bootees a year but usually wore out eight. It was not uncommon for men to wear out their issue, draw another two pairs of bootees and then find themselves charged $6.00 for overdrawing clothing. A boot ended just under the bend of the knee and behind the leg, arching higher up in front so that the leather protected the knee cap. A boot would typically measure 15 1/2 inches in back and 19 1/2 inches in front. The boot had a 1 1/2-inch cuban-style heel with a heavy arched insole as well as square toes. The tops were made of calf skin while the lowers were made of heavier leather.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#48
12-21-2010, 06:26 PM
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Gee not much has change...lol...
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#49
12-22-2010, 06:57 AM
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Quote:
Of intrest is comparing the qualification rounds fired between then and now (okay 1987!!) 90 rounds a year back then...and 125 rounds in 1987.
__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#50
12-22-2010, 07:36 AM
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The Army Marches on its Stomach, Right?
Compared to the Indians, a column of Regulars was a cumbersome and slow-moving thing. A typical Indian war party would consider a move of 40 miles to be, well, taking their time. The Indians would ride at a fast trot, switching from horse to horse so that their mounts didn't become fatigued.
While the cavalry was considered to the arm most likely to finally close with the Indians, having infantry included in the column was not considered to be a serious handicap; men could survive hardships better than horses and over long periods of time, the foot soldiers could outmarch the mounted solders at a respectable rate of 20 miles a day. The largest handicap in bring large forces against the Indians was the sheer difficulty of keeping them adequately supplied. Traveling light and fast, was a strictly short-term measure, an officer once compared the usual expedition to a chained dog, "within the length of the chain irresistible, beyond it powerless. The chain was its wagon train and supplies." Troop and supplies could be moved by railroads, where they existed. Steamers could move supplies up rivers to where the troops were, but only if the rivers and creeks were navigable. Normally, wagon trains or steamers, usually owned by civilians, stockpiled supplies. Wagons then shuttled between these depots and the field forces. The supplies consumed were impressive. The daily ration for the soldier, weighed about 5lbs per man with its normal packing. Horses required 12lbs of grain daily. Reserve carbine ammunition weighed 105lbs per 1,000 round box. Terry's column alone required some eight tons of supplies each day. And although the Terry column only carried enough supplies to last until resupply by steamer, the supply train consisted of 1,604 horses and mules; even with the wagons rolling four abreast, it stretched out over a half mile. While an infantry company needed one six-mule wagon to haul its supplies, each cavalry troop required three such wagons due to the forage needs since the cavalry mounts could not exist on grass, even when grass existed. Wagons were more fuel efficient than pack mules; a 6-mule wagon could carry a practical load of roughly a ton, the same 6 mules could carry only 1,200lbs when used as pack mules. Since a pack mule required 10lbs of grain for its own needs, it could eat all of its load in 20 days. But Indians could go were the wagons could not and only be using pack mules could the Army have any hope of following them. Mule trains did not use the "Hollywood" mode of attaching the mule to the one in front, with a cursing trooper leading the whole string. A pack mule train consisted of 14 men assigned to every 50 mules, this included a pack master, his assistants, a blacksmith, and a cook. The mules were trained to graze within earshot of their bell horse, they simply followed the sound of the bell as they moved at a speed of about 5 miles an hour. But this was a professional organized and experienced train. Terry later complained that since no such train had ever been organized in his department, the he was "necessarily dependent upon wagons." though he did take some 250 pack saddles along along with 95 pack mules, to be reinforced with mules from his wagons. Once separated from the Terry Column, Custer's supply train number some 175 mules; including 12 per company; 12 carrying the reserve ammunition, 4 for the regimental headquarters staff, 2 for medical supplies, 2 to carry tools and camp gear and 11 for the use of the Indian Scouts, packers and civilians. So bad was the straggling of the mules, due to the speed of the march, that Custer finally detailed 1 NCO and 6 enlisted from every company to expedite their progress.
__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#51
12-22-2010, 07:59 AM
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I posted earlier a copy of General Terry's famous written order to Colonel Custer on the day that the Seventh broke off from the column and started its march to the Little Big Horn. I was hoping for some debate on the order and if Custer had really disobeyed orders when he launched his attack.
In the years since 1876, the Terry order has been argued, since the Officer's Call on June 21, Custer was already well awareof how the campaign was to progress, this order was simply written to confirm this. right? Colonel William Pond (ret) conducted an analysis which is intresting on many points: "No matter what Custer does, Terry is protected. If Custer does everything that Terry thinks, and wins, Terry told him to, and the credit is his. If Custer does and is defeated, Terry told him to use his discretion and the blame is Custer's. On the other hand if Custer disregards what Terry thinks and wins, Terry gave him the discretion to do it, and credit is due Terry. If he loses, he disobeyed orders and again the blame is his alone." Other historians regard the Terry order as so vague that Custer could not have disobeyed them, unless he disobeyed his own opinion as to his best course of action. Others argue that Custer's determination to strike the Indians on his own simply made him indifferent to his orders, especially since he had supposedly told a friend of his determination to "cut loose" from Terry and operate independently. Another factor is the question of whether Terry verbally modify these orders prior on the morning of the 22nd. In 1896, General Nelson Miles cited an affidavit which had Terry, tell Custer: "Use your own judgement, and do what you think best if you strike the trail; and whatever you do, hold on to your wounded." Miles thought this "a most reasonable conversation." Others questioned the likelihood of such a conversation, citing Terry's caution against Custer abandoning the wounded as most unlikely. Miles later identified his eyewitness only as "Custer's servant." Libby Custer possessed a copy of the affidavit but never defended its authenticity. The affidavit was not published until 1953 were it was revealed that the affiant was Mary Adams, Custer's negro servant. Statements made by three surviving Seventh Cavalry officers, taken in 1924 stated that no servant had accompanied the Dakota Column and another witness had "Maria", Libby Custer's housemaid at Ft Lincoln. At this point, the affidavit was regardless as useless. However, in 1983, historian John Manion produced evidence which establised the presence of Mary Adams with the column, but also explain "Maria" as Mary's sister, both women being employed as house servants by the Custers. But even this evidence does not confirm the affidavit's contents as to the real nature of Terry's verbal orders to Custer.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#52
12-22-2010, 08:22 AM
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The Reno Court of Inquiry
Marcus A. Reno.
A lot of debate surrounds Custer's second-in-command and his (mis)conduct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. His conduct after the battle also leads to questions about Reno's capability as an officer. Reno graduated West Point in 1857, after taking six years to complete the five year program. He served as a brevet 2nd Lieutenant with the 1st Dragoons on the Washington and Oregon frontiers. He was promoted to 2nd Lieutenant in 1858, to 1st Lieutenant in April of 1861 and to Captain in November of 1862. He commanded a troop in the renamed 1st Cavalry in the 1862 Maryland campaign. He was injured in 1863 and served for a time on recruiting and staff duty and on the Army's Cavalry Bureau. He rejoined the Army of the Potomac in May 1864 and served as chief of staff of Sheridan's Cavalry Division, and later as colonel of the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry and then as commander of a cavalry brigade. By the end of the Civil War, his brevets included colonel of Regulars and brigadier general of volunteers. He was promoted to major in the Seventh in December of 1868. Following the Battle of the Little Big Horn, His behavior as the acting commander of the Seventh became so bizarrely officious and obnoxious that on July 24, 1876, he was placed under arrest after a dispute with Colonel Gibbon. General Terry apparently considered relieving Reno as well, noting in his journey that "Reno's self important rudeness makes him unbearable." Considering Reno's performance and the outcome of the battle, it seems like this would be an odd time for self-important airs. Reno was courts-martialed in 1877 for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen," including taking "improper and insulting liberties with a fellow officer's wife." Reno was found guilty and President Hayes commuted his sentence of dismissal from the service to two years suspension without pay. During this period of suspension, Reno came under increasing attack by Libby Custer and several newspapers for his conduct at LBH. This led to him requesting a Court of Inquiry to clear his name just two days before the statutes of limitations on any possible charges expired. Five months later, a relucant War Department finally ordered the court convened. The CoI was held at Chicago's Palmer House Hotel and was unable to subpoena the man who might have provided the most damaging testimony. Captain Thomas Weir had died less than six months after the battle "terribly used up with liquor". But the court did hear most of the surviving officers as well as a few enlisted men and civilians. The three man panel, chaired by Colonel Wesley Merritt, concluded after four weeks of testimony that "While subordinates in some circumstances did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires animadversion from this Court." While it was not quite a verdict of "Not Proven", it was a decidely halfhearted "clearing" of Reno's name. Merritt was quoted as privately remarking; "Well, the officers wouldn't tell us anything, and we could do no more than damn Reno with faint praise." Even Colonel Graham, relictant to believe that officers would deliberately perjure themselves, believed some had been "evasive" and all had been "more or less reluctant," answering only when specifally asked and volunteering no information. Yet the impression that the court was merely a white-wash was based not merely on the suspicions that the officers had closed ranks, but also on the reluctance of the Court to probe for the truth with questions. Furthermore, even the evidence actually heard could have justified a harsher verdict, given Reno's rout-like "charge" to the bluffs and his loss of command control during the Weir Point episode. Certainly the Army, which never sought to try Reno on any charges related to the battle, had nothing to gain by reopening the wounds of LBH, especially since Reno, even if a court confirmed the worst suspicions of incompentence and cowardice, was due to rise to a colonelcy through seniority. There was also the honr of the Seventh to consider, as well as the reputations of its surviving officers. Captain Benteen, in spite of his lack of respect for Reno, later confessed that the court; "knew there was something kept back by me, but they didn't know how to dig it out by questioning, as I gave them no chance to do so." One civilian witness, Fred Gerard, later claimed that the officers knew that anyone making himself obnoxious to the defense would incur the wraith of superiors. Later in 1879, Reno was again courts-martialed for "conduct unbecoming," on charges including peeping through the window of his commanding officer's daughter and attempting to brain a lieutenant with a billiard cue. THis time President Hayes failed to interced and Reno was dismissed from the service. Still striving for reinstatement, he died of complications due to tongue cancer in 1889. Reno won a posthumous victory of sorts in 1967 when the Army Board for Correction of Military Records met in response to an appeal from Reno's great-grand nephew. For no apparent reason, the board simply jettisioned the considered opinions of Reno's colleagues and President Hayes, termed his dismissial "unjust" and ordered his records "corrected" to indicate an honorable discharge. One historian would later term it "a very silly procedure." But it did entitle Reno to be reburied in a military cemetery and he was duly interred with the pomp and honors due a military officer....at Little Big Horn National Military Cemetery.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. Last edited by dragoon500ly; 12-22-2010 at 08:39 AM.
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#53
12-22-2010, 09:08 AM
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#54
12-22-2010, 10:19 AM
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As you have state, you have drawn same conclusion from the orders and I think many of us drew from the same conclusion. I am concern that General Terry would go through the express effort to write out the last part for Custer to use his best Judgement. That part is usually the unspoken part of one written orders. We have to remember back in time period they didn't have the ability to call back to HQs and ask for permission. It where it was better to do something first and then ask for forgiveness, than do nothing and fail attitude came from. The only time I know of orders being written in such way, were back in the Civil War. Where many of the top players during this time had fought. The purpose was to give the subordinate freedom to act as they felt they should since they were Johny on the spot. With the clear intention of any failures would rest with the subordinate and keep the commander clear of the matter coming through the fan of fallout. Of course hearing the conversation where General Terry may have verbally modify the orders does on one hand surprise me. First off during the Civil War, the only time verbals orders were issued at this level were in time of distress. In many cases, when said orders were later disputed due to the fact they were rarely recorded, and infrequently were passed along by some aid. While at others the Chief of Staff were known to issue verbal orders in the name of their Commander too. Again when disputed there was general no record. In almost every case where things went badly, especially for the Union side the commanding officer would find themselves relief of duty. Especially in the East during the Civil War there were times when due to verbal orders a senior Commander had been removed from command to be replace by the same people who units had failed, but due to lack of documentation that they failed in executing their supposed orders were allow to raise to Corps and Army Commanders. In fact even Major General Meade, Major General Sherman, and Lt. General Grant all been accused of various forms of misconduct before and during their various command stints. Now back to George A. Custer, one of the things that many Regular Army Officers would keep noting during his military career was that Custer was only Regular Army Captain and was Brevet to Major General during the Civil War. Most of the jumps of rank from Captain to that Major General was due to fact that he served as aid to Major General McCleallan and then after he removed from command of the army he came to the attention of Major General Pheasonton who happen to command a Division of Cavalry. It was Pheasonton who promoted Custer from Captain of Regular Army to Brigadier General of Volunteers and assigned him to command a Brigade before the Battle of Gettysburg. From this point on Custer star would raise. Then fast forward to the end of the war. Custer was still listed as Captain in the Regular Army, but again jumped to Lt. Colonel due to his successes he had during the Civil War and 2nd in command of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. A unit for most part until his death he held, most of the time as 'acting' Commander, but due the actual commander of the Regiment being sent of to fill some other duty. The facts are that many Officers in the US Army didn't care for one Lt. Colonel George A. Custer. Many felt he hadn't proven himself, and felt he was under qualified for his position in his command. General Terry was one of those officers who felt this way, hence is why he issued the orders in this way. It was common practice for senior Officers who felt they had limit control over subordinates or wanted to find a reason to relieve someone. Then again if IIRC, some of the orders from even the War Department and directly from President Lincoln were similarly worded. Again this is due to the direct fact of life at the time. The Officer who was conducting the operation was to Johny on the spot and was to act as they felt was required, and yes they would be second guess later if they failed. This was general unwritten rule for any written orders, the only times it seems to be include when the Commander who issued the order felt it important enough to express, said unwritten part to remind the subordinate that they could use their better judgement because they were trusted when the subordinate had shown they wouldn't always use the initiative. Or as the case seem here invite the subordinate to use their initiative in hopes they second guess themselves long enough to give the commander to catch up and claim any victory to their credit, while leaving failures to be the subordinate fault solely.
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#55
12-22-2010, 12:11 PM
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And that is the problem with the orders. Have to agree that Custer was possibly one of the most hated regimental commanders in the army....and then you have how Benteen felt about Custer!
As long as Custer came up with the vistories, he was the darling, but when he was defeated.......
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#56
12-22-2010, 05:50 PM
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Yes that is how it always is. If Commander can win he is well liked, when they lose they are out in the dog house. Officers in the Civil War were made by having lucky days, and the days they were so lucky, well they were soon out of job. It was mentality that stayed with the regular Army for a long time...
It was Custer was liked by Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and others who were still in high places that help keep Custer in command of the 7th Cavalry and reason why the Colonel who was the actual Commander in postings in Washington to keep him out of Custer hair. I am guessing that he wasn't a Custer fan either. *shrug*
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#57
12-22-2010, 06:02 PM
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Like I said he was court martial for being AWOL and suspended but somehow retained the rank of Lt Col and 'acting' Commander/field commander depending on what accounts you read. General Sheridan seems to be the driving force behind this and the fact that the actual Colonel of the Regiment was detailed elsewhere.
General Grant was known to wear a uniform that were the same issued to Private. While Custer fell in the group that highly modify their uniform to their taste. All other Colonels and General of all ranks fell somewhere between the two.
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#58
12-22-2010, 06:09 PM
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If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem
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#59
12-22-2010, 06:28 PM
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Call it what him what you want, Custer may have been a vain, glory-hungry, undiscplined jackass...but when the time came to fight, he did better than most of his peers.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#60
12-22-2010, 06:42 PM
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Yes and it is reason why Cavalry Colonels and Generals would have the most outlandish uniforms. So when they were in the mist of the fight, their troopers who happen to be watching would notice and fight harder or so the theory goes...
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