OT; The Longest Day

[dragoon500ly]

Source material drawn from “Omaha Beach, A Flawed Victory” as well as “Operation Plan Neptune, Western Naval Task Force, Assault Force ‘O’, Annex E, Gunfire Support Plan”.

The Allies approached D-Day convinced that they would have both tactical surprise as well as the greatest possible firepower ever assembled for an amphibious assault. Overlord would be the largest amphibious assault in history, therefore the planners had no standard that they could measure the adequacy of their plans or of the firepower resources allotted to the task. The only information that the Allies could use was the American Pacific theater doctrine and the British Mediterranean theater doctrine. Yet, in spite of this knowledge, the Overlord planners approached their task by developing a new, untested, hybrid doctrine. This doctrine rested on the combination of naval gunfire support from both warships and converted landing craft and the use of heavy bombers in a tactical situation.

The Royal Navy and the U. S. Navy provided a mix of battleships, cruisers and destroyers to conduct the pre-invasion bombardments. The warships assigned to Omaha Beach included the battleships USS Texas and USS Arkansas, the cruisers HMS Bellona, HMS Glasgow, FFS Georges Leygues and FFS Montcalm, the destroyers USS Baldwin, Carmick, Doyle, Emmons, Frankford, Harding, McCook, Satterlee, Thompson, HMS Melbreak, HMS Talybont, and HMS Tanatside.

The battleships and cruisers were assigned the task of engaging the fourteen German artillery batteries that could threaten Omaha Beach. These batteries would be engaged in accordance with a priority list and the warships spotter planes would be used to correct fires. This would commence at first light and last until the batteries were silenced.

The next phase would be the neutralization of beach defenses commencing at H-20 minutes. The destroyers and armed landing craft would deliver the initial fires to be supported by the cruisers and battleships as they completed their counter-battery assignments. At H Hour, the naval fires would switch towards targets further inland or on the flanks of the beach.

The last phase of the naval bombardment program was the close support fire on call. This phase would commence as the naval shore fire control parties landed and set up, at approximately H+30 minutes. Each of the four initial assault battalions had a naval fire control party that would accompany it. Each battalion would have two destroyers in direct support.

All told, the naval gunfire program was slated to last a total of thirty minutes.

The air phase of the bombardment program is, perhaps, the most misunderstood. Many histories written after the war have the bombers being assigned to drop their ordnance directly onto the beach. Nothing could be further from the truth. The air support for Operation Overlord was intended to attack the battery positions, beach defense localities, bridges, road embankments, cable junctions, command posts and communications centers. This would be assigned to the heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force. Close air support would be conducted by the fighters of the Eighth Air Force and it is in this mission that the air forces failed.

Every regimental landing team was assigned an air support party. They were assigned VHF radios, but were not permitted to talk directly with the overhead aircraft unless they were specifically authorized to do so. Nor were they allowed to intervene in stopping attacks on friendly troops or on wrong targets. To request air support, each party would have to call a headquarters hip and the request was then relayed to a central control facility in Uxbridge, England. There the decisions was made whether to support the request. So cumbersome was this process that on June 6, 1944, Uxbridge received only thirteen requests. Targets of opportunity were attacked by aircraft on station above the battlefield, however, these aircraft could not communicate with ground units and could not assist in any meaningful tactical situation.

Additional fire support would be provided by tanks, machine guns, artillery, naval guns and rockets mounted or loaded on variety of landing craft. Their mission was to “furnish during the approach to the beaches and prior to touchdown, area fire on and in the rear of the beaches, fire on strong points, beach defenses and to take part in drenching fire on the beaches.” To support the Omaha Beach landings were
9 LCT(R)s, 5 LCG(L)s, 7 LCFs, 18 LCT(A)s and 32 LCP(L)s.

The LCT(R) or landing craft, tank, rocket were fitted with 1,064 5-inch rockets. They were intended to deliver a large volume of preparatory fire on the landing beaches at the last moment before the assault. The intent was to start launching the rockets while the assault troops were 300 yards out from the beaches, the rockets would clear lanes through the obstacles and minefields.

The LCG(L) or landing craft, gun, large were fitted with two 4.7-inch naval guns and two 20mm AA guns. Manned by Royal Marines, they were intended to provide direct fire against beach positions and surface attack for the initial assault waves. Each LCG(L) had specific targets to neutralize and an area of responsibility for targets of opportunity.

LCFs or landing craft, flak were fitted with either eight 2-pdr and 4 20mm AA guns or four 2-pdr and 8 20mm AA guns. Their mission was to provide air defense to the landing craft as well as to engage surface targets prior to and during the landings.

LCT(A)s, or landing craft, tank, armored each carried two M-4 Sherman medium tanks. As part of the leading assault waves, they were to land their cargo directly onto the beach. The tanks were tasked with opening fire as soon as range and visibility permitted, take part in the beach drenching fire and then join the assault.

LCP(L)s or landing craft, personnel, large were equipped with smoke generators and had the mission of screening the assault waves in the last moments before the landing.

When I first read Flawed Victory I was certain that the author had erred in many ways...until I was able to see a copy of the Gunfire Support Plan. One is left with the impression that General Bradley who oversaw the planning, had dropped the ball, badly.

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by Sanjuro

Forgive me if this has been posted here before; when you watch the movie The Longest Day; have a look for Richard Todd's character, Major John Howard.
Uniquely among the cast, Todd actually fought on D-Day; while he did not play himself, he was a platoon commander in the airborne unit led by Howard. At one point IIRC he even speaks to a character called "Toddy."

I believe but am not certain that one of the actors playing a Ranger had climbed Pointe du Hoc on 6th June 1944.

[dragoon500ly]

Source material from "Omaha Beach, A Flawed Victory" and "Sherman".

The D-Day landings depended on naval gunfire and on a new device called a Duplex-Drive Tank. For Operation Overlord, this was a nine-foot high, waterproofed canvas skirt mounted onto a standard M-4A3 Sherman. THe shroud was held upright by thirty-six airfilled pillers and a set of collapsible metal struts.

The basic idea was sound. It is possible to float almost any size vehicle, no matter its weight, provide the shroud is high enough. But the higher the shroud, the more unstable and fragile the vehicle. At sea, the bulk of the DD tank hung some seven and a half feet below the surface of the water. Slightly more than a foot of the shroud protruded above the surface. The vehicle was propelled and steered by two 18-inch diameter propellers which were movable and acted as rudders. The best speed that a DD tank could maintain was about 4.5-5 knots. Each DD tank was fitted with a gyro compass for navigation, a platfrom on the rear of the turret that the TC could stand on and steer, a bilge pump with a fifteen-gallon-per-minute capacity and safety gear. The safety gear consisted of an inflatable life raft, a modified version of the submarine escape device (the Davis Lung) per man and an inflatable safety belt per man.

To launch the tanks, a modified LCT was used. Four tanks could be carried by each LCT and launched in less than eight minutes. DUring the rather limited testing phase, it was determined that a DD tank could traverse 4,000 yards of calm seas in 28 minutes. While tanks were deployed as far out as 6,000 yards, all training was conducted at 3-4,000 yards.

The tests also confirmed that the canvas shroud could be easily torn and that a hole larger than one foot could sink the tank. The DD tank could also be sunk by the wash of LCF, LCS and larger assault craft and that the concussion of nearby explosions could cause the metal frame to collapse.
Another issue was the limited exhaust venting of teh tanks engine, traversing more than 4,000 yards could lead to carbon monoxide poisoning of the crews.

These amphibious tanks were heavily counted on to support the Allied troops during the critical opening phase of the assault.

On June 6th, 1944, the DD tanks of B & C Companies of the 741st Tank Battalion were launched between 0530 and 0600 hours, some 6,000 yards off Omaha Beach. As the tanks rolled down the LCT ramps, some of them immediately sank, others managed to launch, but fell victims to the collapse of their canvas shrouds during the long run into the beach. Of the 32 DD Tanks launched off Omaha, only 5 reached the beach, three others were landed on the beach by the LCTs because of difficulties with the ramp.

One hunred and thrity-five men of B & C Companies of the 741st Tank Battalion went into action on D-Day. Remarkably, only 33 were lost, drowned at sea. Following D-Day, the bodies of 25 soldiers were recovered, by the end of June, 2 more bodies were recovered. These 27 bodies were the only ones recovered off the Normandy Coast.

In 1987, US Army Europe mounted a third search of the tank graveyard. A French SCUBA diver reported that he had seen skeletal remains in a tank off Normandy. A joint army/navy task force examined the remains of all 24 tanks, but no remains were found. The conclusion was that all possible remains had been recovered. No effort was made to recover the tanks and they remain at the bottom of the Channel, a mute testimony to courage of their crews.

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

When I first read Flawed Victory I was certain that the author had erred in many ways...until I was able to see a copy of the Gunfire Support Plan. One is left with the impression that General Bradley who oversaw the planning, had dropped the ball, badly.

I found it interesting, in a disappointing sort of way, that Gen. Marshall made a point of yanking Maj. Gen. Corlett out of the Pacific and sending him to Bradley to command a Corps. Corlett had commanded a corps-sized task force that invaded Attu and Kiska (August 1943), and then the 7th Division at Kwajalein (Jan-Feb 44). Bradley apparently reacted badly to having someone come in and give him advice how to run an amphibious landing, saying that the Pacific was "bush league."

This was despite Corlett's experience included studying the Tarawa battlefield with the Marines, and working out a deadly efficient fire-support plan with the Navy. Bradley did participate in the Sicily landings, including the smaller ones on the north coast, but he should have been aware that Normandy would be a different animal.

Corlett's XIX Corps HQ did not land at D-Day, but much later. Even then, they were not favored by First Army, and Corlett was sacked during the slogging of November '44. On the other hand, Utah's corps commander was J. Lawton Collins, who had commanded a division on Guadalcanal and New Georgia (but it appears to me, no landings), and had also been sent by Marshall to Bradley.

Putting Corlett and not Gerow in charge at Omaha might have led to a different fire-support plan?

[Adm.Lee]

I've got a game of GMT's "Battle for Normandy" set up in my basement right now. It's partly a revision of the old "Longest Day" game from Avalon Hill.

I'm playing the Germans, and we're starting the 5th day. Omaha has been mostly contained, Utah almost as much, with heavy paratrooper casualties. The British haven't broken out, but my SS troops are starting to get thinned out. Bayeux is being contested, and they're only halfway to Caen. The 21st Panzer Division just took Pegasus Bridge in a night tank assault, so the British paratroopers are in trouble. If I can get some more infantry divisions into the fight fast enough, I might be able to squeeze Omaha some more.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

Putting Corlett and not Gerow in charge at Omaha might have led to a different fire-support plan?

When I started digging through the Gunfire Support Plan, what struck me the most was just how limited the naval bombardment really was, some of the defensive positions were to be hit with no more than 3-4 salvoes...WTF?!?

Samuel Eliot Morrison, the naval historian had this to say on the Omaha Beach defense, "altogether, the Germans had provided the best imitation of hell for an invading force that American troops had encountered anywhere. Even the Japanese defenses of Iwo Jima, Tarawa and Peleliu are not to be compared with these." Considering that the three Japanese islands were reknowned as some of the hardest actions that the Marines ever fought, this says a lot about Omaha Beach.

Toss into the pot that the Allies had massive information on the location and construction of the German defenses, via the French Resistance who would work on the defenses during the day and radio their reports in at night, then how could a thirty minute fire plan be considered as anything other than hopelessly inadequate.

One of the arguements in favor of the gunfire plan was that any extended bombardment would alert the Germans to the location of the invasion and there is a lot to be said for this. German reinforcements started arriving in the late afternoon of June 6th (mostly 21st Panzers movement to cover Caen), but siginificant reinforcements still were not able to arrive for at least 36-hours. So why wasn't a bombardment of, say 3-4 hours undertaken? Would you believe Bradley's reason was to "maintain tactical surprise"!!!!

Maybe its me, but sailing a fleet of a few thousand ships off a beach, kinda blows the surprise....

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

I've got a game of GMT's "Battle for Normandy" set up in my basement right now. It's partly a revision of the old "Longest Day" game from Avalon Hill.

I'm playing the Germans, and we're starting the 5th day. Omaha has been mostly contained, Utah almost as much, with heavy paratrooper casualties. The British haven't broken out, but my SS troops are starting to get thinned out. Bayeux is being contested, and they're only halfway to Caen. The 21st Panzer Division just took Pegasus Bridge in a night tank assault, so the British paratroopers are in trouble. If I can get some more infantry divisions into the fight fast enough, I might be able to squeeze Omaha some more.

Longest Day is an old favorite! Really must set it up again and have another go.

Right now I've got Terrible Swift Sword set up and my seven-year old son is having a blast with Buford's Cavalry Division holding the line!

[Sanjuro]

If anyone wants to trace a relative who died in British or Commonwealth service, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission has a good search facility at
www.cwgc.org
The more details you have, the easier the search will be, but if all you have is a surname it will show you all the records it has.
I used it to find details of my great uncle, a lieutenant in the Green Howards, who landed in Normandy two days after D-Day and was killed three weeks later. Now I know where to look I should go and visit his grave...

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

One of the arguements in favor of the gunfire plan was that any extended bombardment would alert the Germans to the location of the invasion and there is a lot to be said for this. German reinforcements started arriving in the late afternoon of June 6th (mostly 21st Panzers movement to cover Caen), but siginificant reinforcements still were not able to arrive for at least 36-hours. So why wasn't a bombardment of, say 3-4 hours undertaken? Would you believe Bradley's reason was to "maintain tactical surprise"!!!!

Maybe its me, but sailing a fleet of a few thousand ships off a beach, kinda blows the surprise....

There's also the point that bombarding by dark wouldn't accomplish much but wasting ammo, and that the landing time had to be influenced by the tide (I believe they wanted low tide to avoid the obstacles?) and daylight. That didn't leave much for bombardment. That said, there could have been a whole more more done, IMO, towards setting up channels for calling fire, and more DDs or small ships to suppress the beach defenses.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

There's also the point that bombarding by dark wouldn't accomplish much but wasting ammo, and that the landing time had to be influenced by the tide (I believe they wanted low tide to avoid the obstacles?) and daylight. That didn't leave much for bombardment. That said, there could have been a whole more more done, IMO, towards setting up channels for calling fire, and more DDs or small ships to suppress the beach defenses.

The hybrid doctrine used by Bradley at Normandy ignored all of the experience of the previous landings. North Africa, Sicily, Salerno and Anzio all featured hasty bombardments of the beach defenses and then the landings of the assault troops in the early morning hours. Dawn would arrive with the first 3-4 waves already on the beaches. Even the hasty bombardments lasted for anywere from 1-2 hours.

So what was Bradley thinking?

D-Day had the shortest bombardment period, followed by landing the troops during daylight. And to really puzzle everyone, Gerow (the corps commander) as well as the Hubner (the 1st ID commander) both objected to the gunnery program. Right up to the point that Bradley threatened to remove both officers from their commands.

One can almost pity Bradley, standing safely offshore on his command ship, hearing the sketchy reports of the failure of his grand scheme. In the end, it was the raw courage of the assault troops, coupled with the sucidial bravery of the supporting destroyers that enabled the Americans to win at Omaha.

But, dear God, at what a cost.

[pmulcahy11b]

Off the thread topic here, but we used to discuss the D-Day landing a lot in ROTC. We came up with this for a modern attack on the same area and type of positions:

1) A preparatory bombardment with Lance missiles (still in service at the time), cruise missiles (by Tomahawks and the then-new CALCMs), and attack aircraft armed with mostly iron bombs and laser and TV-guided missiles, and some smart bombs (smart bombs weren't as common in the early 1980s as they are now), and possibly heavier bombardment with B-52s and B-1s.

2) A combined amphibious assault by Marines and an air assault with helicopters.

3) Limited conventional airborne drops on key enemy positions. Airborne operations, even in the early 1980s, weren't necessarily the mess that they were in the 1940s.

4) Heavy use of special operations, as early as a week or possibly more before the actual D-Day assault. Possibly as much as six months before, some special ops units would be scoping out the opposition and aiding resistance forces.

5) Heavy use of air cover, especially by helicopters and aircraft such as the A-10, during the D-Day assault.

Of course, the German positions would be protected by a big SAM umbrella, mobile AAA, and they would be armed with a lot of shoulder-fired rockets and ATGM, as well as land-fired antiship missiles...we assumed for the scenario that there was still a stupid Hitler-type who refused to release most of his armored forces until it was too late. We also assumed for the scenario that as with the actual D-Day, only two German aircraft got off and attacked the beach, but they would be armed with a cannon pod each and cluster bombs. Allied casualties might have been so severe that this version of D-Day might have been repulsed.

[dragoon500ly]

Well, when you toss modern weapons into the mix, I really doubt that any invasion on the scale of Overlord would have ever been attempted, talk about a target that begs for three or four tac nukes!

[dragoon500ly]

In any discussion of Overlord, and the near disaster at Omaha, you seldom hear any mention of the gunfire support destroyers. According to Bradley's Gunfire Support Plan, each of the initial assault battalions would be supported by two destroyers to provide final fires on the beach defenses and to be on call for any additional fire support.

The destroyers were originally supposed to remain 2,000 yards offshore, but, as the extent of the disaster that befell on the assault troops, the destroyers closed to close range. At least two of the destroyers touched bottom (then as now, a court martial offense for the commander). All of them reported damage from machinegun and rifle fire as well as fragmentation damage from near misses.

Each of the Fletcher-class destroyers carried five 5-inch/38 rifles with 250 rounds per gun, the four destroyers that were closest to the beach; USS Carmick fired 1,127 rounds; USS McCook fired 975 rounds; USS Emmons fired 767 rounds and the USS Thompson fired 638 rounds of 5-inch as well as almost emptying their magazines of 40mm and 20mm ammunition.

Many of the Omaha Beach veterans relate in their oral histories of the action how deadly accurate the destroyers gunfire was, as well as how close the destroyers got to the beach. Truely, the destroyermen of the gunfire support ships performed above and beyond!

[natehale1971]

Thinking about an Operation like Overlord using today's technology is quite... frightening. Even without having to resort to using NUKES, we have modern conventional weapons that can massively bombard the hell out of the German entrenchment on the Normandy beaches.

I read somewhere that someone had actually wrote a computer program that modeled out the D-Day invasions, and that D-Day wasn't a sure thing... that the Allies could have lost the landings. Even with Eisenhower willing to take up to 80% or more causualties to take those beaches to establish the beachead into Europe.

I can't remember where i read it... but it had said that Churchill had wanted to go with a southern beachhead at the underbelly of Europe, but that it was Eisenhower who wanted to beachhead in northern Europe. And that the gamble of D-Day was such that Eisenhower had stated that if the mission failed, that FDR woudl have already gotten his resignation letter.

But back to the modern forces carrying out D-Day... they computer programer said something about the use of a combination of bunker busters and MOABS to soften things up for the landings. But they also spoke about the use of MOABS by the defenders would definately turn the area into a meat grinder if they were to get used by either side.

Hell, the cluster bombs being used by the defenders COULD have opened up the minefields on the beaches for the assault... because the clusterbombs wouild not only take out larger numbers of attackers, but they'd also detonate many landminds... my granddad was a combat engineer, and he said that the M1 Bangalore (i spelled that right didn't i?) was used to take out fortifcations and landmines.

For every weapon we have now, there are counters for them. And while we wouldn't need the same numbers they had during WW2...

but i really wish i could find that damn site again were they used the computer program that detailed how a modern mliitary force would fight both aspects of D-day (as defender and attacker)... using the same tactics, but with modern weapons, equipment and the like. When it was done UAVs and guided ordances were 'new' tech... i think they did the simulation back it in the late-1990s and early double-aughts.

Anyone else remember anything about this?

[dragoon500ly]

I'm not sure if the program was written for one of the Beltway Bandits or if its was a home brewed version, I've heard rumors of both for several years.

Churchill's take on a southern landing was his notion that the "soft underbelly" of Europe would be easier to invade than the Atlantic Wall. The problem with attacking through the Balkans (Greece and Yugoslavia) was that the Allies would have been fighting through mountainious terrain with little or no critical infrastructure. And after fighting in Italy, the Chiefs-of-Staff were not ready for another mountain campaign.

The issue with an initial landing in southern France was that it too would not hurt the Germans quickly, better terrain, but still a long way to the critical points.

The Dieppe raid proved that attacking the harbors (and their defenses) would be a bloody affair. While Churchill favored the concept of the Mulberry artificial harbors, the USN view was that they could deliver more tonnage over the beaches by using large numbers of LSTs (and they were right!).

Overlord's planners were left with two basic choices, Pas de Calis was a short hop across the Channel, had favorable terrain and had the attraction of being the shortest route into Germany's industrial heartland, the Ruhr. The Germans realized this and to describe the 15th Army's defenses in PdC as "formidable" is classic understatement.

Normandy was chosen because it was a less likely target, the defenses were not as built up as PdC, there was a large port nearby (Cherbourg), the ground was well suited for building airstrips and the bocage (hedgerows) offered excellent defensive terrain against German counterattacks (and boy did that one come back to haunt the planners!).

[natehale1971]

I remember all the cons that showed how bad that a southern assault through the Balkans would have been, but I swear that I had read smowhere that the soft underbelly of Europe that Churchill was talking about was suppose to be an attack through Vichy France, using Sardina and Corsica as bases for forces to land in Southern France.

That they'd be able to push in and cut Germany off from Northern Italy and get to the Rhine, cutting German Occupation forces along the Atlantic Seaboard off from supplylines with the Fatherland. This would have been followed by the Normandy Landings when the Germans were focused on the Southern Offensive that was pushing towards the Rhine.

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by natehale1971

I remember all the cons that showed how bad that a southern assault through the Balkans would have been, but I swear that I had read smowhere that the soft underbelly of Europe that Churchill was talking about was suppose to be an attack through Vichy France, using Sardina and Corsica as bases for forces to land in Southern France.

That they'd be able to push in and cut Germany off from Northern Italy and get to the Rhine, cutting German Occupation forces along the Atlantic Seaboard off from supplylines with the Fatherland. This would have been followed by the Normandy Landings when the Germans were focused on the Southern Offensive that was pushing towards the Rhine.

Churchill was mostly opposed to the southern France landings in August 44, as that took forces away from the Italian campaign. What he wanted was more operations in Italy and the Balkans, for two reasons. One was to block future Soviet penetration of the Balkans, the other was to try to break into Germany from the south. He spoke of the Ljubljana Gap, and sending the Eighth Army's mechanized forces (pretty formidable, actually) through there. This was his "soft underbelly."

Churchill (and several of his military chiefs) was also opposed to the Normandy landings, because they knew it was something of a gamble, and that the British Empire had only one shot at it-- their armies had been bled out, and would be losing strength over time. If it failed, they'd be unable to meaningfully affect the war. Attacking the enemy where he has strength is usually a bad idea if you have waning strength yourself.

IMO, attacking the Balkans is bad idea.This is based on some map study, and a bit of wargaming. You know those supply shortages the W.Allies had in the autumn of 1944, when Patton famously outran his supply lines? One key culprit there was the damage inflicted on the French rail net by the Allied air forces. Compare the state of the French rail net, with the air campaign, to the far less developed Balkan railnet, with bombing and Yugoslav partisans. Then add in in all of the effects of dealing with those partisans, other ethnic militias, and so on. Then add in the fact that the Allies would be pushing through mostly rough terrain, against the Germans who had proved themselves to be no slouches at defense. Result? The Soviets still get to Berlin, and France is un-liberated.

As for shooting up the Italian peninsula and making a right turn at Trieste, it could work, IMO, only if the Allies had made better northward progress before the winter of '43-44 set in, and continued to make such progress in the spring of '44. If Anzio hadn't been a stalemate for several months, maybe that could have done the trick, but it's hard to make that happen. Either way, you're again trying to shove a big armored corps through the southern foothills of the Alps to try to get to Vienna, leaving a long flank exposed to those same mountains. If you get there before the winter of '44-45, and If you can get through the "Gap," and IF you have the Americans and French to cover that flank, Maybe you get to Vienna by Christmas. And Maybe you invite the Germans to throw the forces that went to the Ardennes in December to descend on Austria instead.

What I haven't seen done, and might work in a game someday, is the part about cutting off the Germans in Italy by cutting across the top of the peninsula from the southern France landings. If those Germans are removed from the OB, then maybe a shove east could work out.

All of the above is again, my opinion as a wargamer.

[simonmark6]

Beevor holds the opinion that Churchill was wrong in his wish to attack through the Balkans and Italy and I have to say that looking at the maps I have to agree with him. He also makes the case, however, that if he hadn't persuaded the Americans to pursue the North Africa/Italy strategy in 1943, then an early D-Day might have failed when the amphibious landings would have seen the Germans in a much stronger position.

I need to look into this further, but it sounds possible to me. On the other hand, Churchill could usually be trusted to screw up tactics and strategy from his Gallipolli Adventure onward so it may well have been the case that even a stopped clock is right twice a day rather than any true strategic acumen.

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by natehale1971

I can't remember where i read it... but it had said that Churchill had wanted to go with a southern beachhead at the underbelly of Europe, but that it was Eisenhower who wanted to beachhead in northern Europe. And that the gamble of D-Day was such that Eisenhower had stated that if the mission failed, that FDR would have already gotten his resignation letter.

That letter would have been such a comfort to the family of the tens of thousands of men who died for nothing.....

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by simonmark6

Beevor holds the opinion that Churchill was wrong in his wish to attack through the Balkans and Italy and I have to say that looking at the maps I have to agree with him. He also makes the case, however, that if he hadn't persuaded the Americans to pursue the North Africa/Italy strategy in 1943, then an early D-Day might have failed when the amphibious landings would have seen the Germans in a much stronger position.

I need to look into this further, but it sounds possible to me. On the other hand, Churchill could usually be trusted to screw up tactics and strategy from his Gallipolli Adventure onward so it may well have been the case that even a stopped clock is right twice a day rather than any true strategic acumen.

I'm sort of an admirer of Churchill. I like the quote by Portal or Brooke (I can't remember which) to the effect, "Winston has ten ideas before breakfast each day. My job is to sort out the 1 really bad one, and the 2 bad ones from the seven good ones before he implements them all."

IMO, his strategic instincts outstripped the capabilities of the British Empire (and the Allies), and he was reluctant to let go of things in the "nice to have, but we don't have the time or the forces to do that" categories.

To wit, Gallipoli nearly succeeded, and would have been fantastic if it had succeeded, but it didn't. It was, at least, worth trying.

Re: North Africa and the Mediterranean campaign, no less than General Marshall admitted that it was a necessity for the Allies, and that he was wrong to have opposed it. Primary evidence: suppose the US II Corps that was shattered at Kasserine Pass had been in Normandy, instead of the divisions that were there in June 1944?

[Legbreaker]

Gallipoli in principle was a brilliant idea. It's the execution that let everyone down.
It was the first time in history an amphibious operation took place on a "modern" battlefield with "repeating" (ie mag fed) rifles and machineguns. If the navigation had been on the money, if the commanders on the ground had been a bit more agressive (particularly in the area of Suvla Bay), and if there'd been a little more initiative taken at critical moments the whole thing would have been an outstanding success. Unfortunately the initial landings were in the wrong location and delays in moving inland allowed the Turks to bring in reinforcements trapping the Anzacs on the beaches and cliffs of the landing areas.

The real crime was not acknowledging it was a lost cause early on and continuing to waste men in a hopeless attempt to force the way inland against prepared positions and heavy fire.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

The real crime was not acknowledging it was a lost cause early on and continuing to waste men in a hopeless attempt to force the way inland against prepared positions and heavy fire.

That sin was a trademark of British operations throughout WW2. There was a view that if we could throw enough men at a problem we would make it go away.

[dragoon500ly]

source material from "D-Day" and "Cross-Channel Attack"...

Churchill pushed for an invasion of Southern France as an alternative to striking the Atlantic Wall directly. The Americans agreed to this in order to secure the key ports of Toulon and Marsielle. Further operations into France and towards Germany would have run into the Volges Mountains (the region along the French-Swiss-German border). It was recognized early on that any major efforts into the Volges would have quickly bogged down, the ground was simply excellent for conduct of a defense (it litterly would have been up one ridge after another).

[Adm.Lee]

As it happened, the Seventh US Army went through the Vosges fairly easily in November, even though the German defenses had solidified in September. Eisenhower had to push very hard to get Churchill to agree to the southern France landings, he wanted them very much to draw pressure off the Normandy front. The landing was originally code-named "Anvil," later changed to "Dragoon." Churchill quipped that it was because he had to be dragooned into it!

The capture of Marseilles was fortuitous, since its port was nearly intact, and it was able to supply both the Seventh US and French First Armies, and even some of Patton's Third.

[dragoon500ly]

According to the Green Book, the Vogles fighting was some of the hardest that the Seventh Army had to endure. The 442nd RCT earned most of its decorations in the Vosges (just to one example). I've walked the ground there once and its damned good defensive terrain, almost impassable to vehicle traffic off road and with lots of nasty little ridges and draws to disrupt any advance.

But if I've learned anything from researching military history, its that you will always find conflicting reports on every battle! One battalion can report foot-by-foot defense by well-led defenders and another battalion on the other side of the ridge, gets greeted by swarms of defenders all to ready to surrender. Go figure!

As for dear Winston, I've seen books and articles stating that he argued for or against every decision made in the war. So I have no doubt that we are looking at different views from one of the 20th Centuries premier politicans!

[dragoon500ly]

There was an article in the #27 issue of World at War that caught my eye. Its an indepth examination of the Atlantic Wall, one of the tables sheds a little light on something that is all too often ignored.

Logistics

Each Allied division required about 644 tons of supplies daily, this was not only to support the division, but an equal "slice" of the corps/army troops supporting each divisions.

By August 5, 1944 this is what the Allies were shipping into Normandy:

Utah Beach: 4,506 tons per day; enough to support 7 divisions.

Omaha Beach: 7,582 tons per day; enough to support 12 divisions.

Four Small Ports: 3,390 tons per day (total); enough to support 5 divisions.

Mulberry B: 7,000 tons per day; enough to support 11 divisions.

British Beaches (Gold, Juno and Sword): 4,000 tons per day; enough to support 6 divisions.

Cherbourg: 13,500 tons per day; enough to support 21 divisions.

[dragoon500ly]

So just how well defended were the Normandy Beaches?

The Atlantic Wall defenses were made up of two types of fortifications; the Stuetzpunkten (StP or strongpoints) were roughly company-sized positions that included a mix of heavy and light fortifications set up for 360-defense. Obstacles (mainly barbed wire and AT ditches) and minefields surrounded their perimenter, as well as formed internal barricades within the position. Heavy fortifications included combat and supporting bunkers while light fortifications were mostly open positions, such as weapon pits and trenches. Many of the StP also included artillery batteries and flak postions.

The most common positions were the Widerstandsnest (Wn or resistance nests). For the most part, these were rouyghly platoon-sized postions that contained a "shell-proof" postions. These mostly consisted of machine gun and mortar positions as well as postions with artillery ranging from 37mm up to 88mm in caliber.

StP and Wn were sited in areas most suited to amphibious landings and were usually placed in one or two defensive lines. The so-called Fortress Areas simply conisted of seveal StP and Wn which were placed to cover not only the beaches, but the landward approaches as well.

The StP and Wn also suffered from two critical weaknesses. First, so short of weapons was the Third Reich that the Atlantic Wall had to rely on a large number of foreign or older weapons, this created major logistical problems in the supply of ammunition and spare parts.

The second critical weakness lay in the troops assigned to defend the wall. A large number of the troops came from the Ost Battalions, units formed up non-German troops, mainly Eastern European "volunteers", whose reliability was questionable. Those German units present in the west often had their ranks filled out with soldiers recuperating from wounds suffered on the eastern front. Many of these units also included large numbers of young and elderly soldiers, often only partially trained. Many of the beach defense units were from Bodenstaendug (Static) Divisions that lacked almost any organic transport.

The number of divisions assigned to the Atlantic Wall was in a constant state of flux, as the best formations were sent to the east to heelp stabilize the deteriorating situatuion. Shattered and depleted divisions from the east took their place.

Hampering the troops was Rommel's decision to focus on the setting up of obstacles and the laying of mines, at the expense of the training of the troops.

Source material is World at War #27 "Atlantic Wall Analysis" and the "German Army Handbook"

[dragoon500ly]

The defenses of lower Normandy (defined as west of the Seine River and including the Cotentin Peninsula) were at their strongest near Cherbourg and included numerous coastal artillery emplacements. The area that would be known as Utah Beach did not include even a small fishing harbor, so it wasn't fortified as heavily. The primary defense was the flooding of the area behind the beach, this left four causeway exits from the beach itself.

The original planned invasion beaches were defended by a Wn and a StP with two 88mm guns placed that flanked the beaches. Fortunately, the loss of several command and control craft and a heavy current pushed the initial waves further south by several hundred yards, an area that was defended by only a single Wn.

Behind the flooded areas, the Germans built two (and third under construction) battery positions, the two active positions were at Azeville (105mm guns) and further north at Crisbeq (210mm guns).

Omaha Beach was defended by a dozen Wn, some of which had 75mm guns, while the one at Vierville had an 88mm gun that flanked the beach. A flooded area also existed beind the beach, but the topography placed this further inland. Many of the Wns were positioned on the bluffs, but some were also placed to flake the beach. Further west was a casemated battery position at Pointe de Hoc, its 155mm guns could fire into Omaha and Utah. Inland was another battery poisition at Maisy (also 155mm and able to fire into Omaha and Utah). Just east of Omaha is the small fishing harbor of Port-en-Bessin, defended by a battery of 155mm guns in a casemated battery at Longues.

The British/Canadian beaches included some small fishing harbors. Shoals covered large portions of Juno and Sword beaches. Sword was defended by a StP (with two 155mm guns), two Wn flanking the beaches and several more Wn inland, guarding the exits from Sword.

Juno Beach was defended by three Wn (one at Courseulles-sur-Mer, with two flanking it) As well as two additional Wn (Bernieres-sur-Mer and St. Aubin)

The British forces landing on Gold Beach would have to deal with four Wn on the beach, with two additional ones inland near Mont Fleury. These positions had a mix of 88mm, 75mm and 50mm guns. East of the Orne River was Battery Merville which had four 100mm guns covering the beach. Further east was Battery Mont Caisny (155mm guns), designed to provide flanking fire for Le Havre.

Too recap, the invasion beaches were protected by elements of three divisions, support by some 7 StP and over 60 Wn, the largest coastal batteries were 210mm and most were 155mm.


Source material is World at War #27 "Atlantic Wall Analysis" and the "German Army Handbook"

[dragoon500ly]

The German Army believed that any fortified position should consist of small works, organized in great depth. The idea was not to present an unyielding front to the attacker, but rather to act as a shocj absorber and gradually slow doen the advance. Then, when the attacker has lost his momentum, a series of counterattacks would destroy the penetration before the attacker had reorganized and consolidated his gains. The Germans would typically man their defense postions with inferior soldiers in concrete positions and group their best soldiers and equipment in reserve, ready for the counterattack. The soldiers defending these positions were carefully trained to continue fighting, even when their positions were being overrun.

The Germans would typically organize their defenses into three zones, these were:
1) The Forward Zone (Vorfeldzone) consisting mostly of field fortifications, trenches, barbed wire entanglements, machine gun emplacements and observation posts.
2) The Main Defense Zone (Groskampfzone) comprised of fortified structures such as pillboxes, casemates and shelters and antitank obstacles covered by antitank guns. In addition, this zone would have intermediate areas to its front and rear, in which isolated works were placed at critical points along the avenues of approach, with the mission od disrupting and delaying the advnace as well as channeling the attackers into pre-planned killing zones.
3) The Rear Defense Zone (Ruckwartige Zone), organized mush as the Groskampfzone, but not as strong, as the attacker continued his attack, this would often be built up and converted into a Groskampfzone and a new Ruckwartige Zone would be built to the rear.

The Germans would emplace their pillboxes, casemated and field fortifications in order to provide interlocking fields of fire, but not so close together that enemy artillery would be able to mass its fire on a particular sector. The Germans build their fortifications along the principle of "Effect before cover", in this, a wide field of fire is considered to be more important in the siting of a position than any cover or concealment. Whenever possible fortifications are sited to permit both frontal and flanking fire. Defensive fire plans are carefully coordinated so that artillery concentrations can be laid on the areas where fire coverage from the positions is relatively weak.

In accordance with this doctrine, the Germans carefully reinforce their pillboxes and casemates with extensive field fortifications that lend flexibility and mobility to the defending troops as well as allowing the defenders to engage the enemy before he gets close enough to engage the main works. A typical pillbox position would included barbed-ware and minefields, fire trenches for infantry and open emplacements for mortars and field artillery, typically placed to cover the dead zones around the fortification.

The German practice is to provide all troops with adequate shelter against weather and hostile fire. pillboxes and casemates often have accommodations for their crews, field works would have underground shelters adjacent to the combat positions. The reserves would also enjoy underground shelters, these would protect them from enemy bombardment until they are committed to the counterattack.

German fortified positions are commonly linked together by communications trenches, to allow the relief of personnel, ammunition resupply and the evacuation of the wounded. In many cases, a group of defenses would be connected by a system of tunnels. SIgnal communication is provided by buried telephone wire, with telephones often being used to communicate between the inside/outside of a positions. In some pillboes, speaking tubes are installed in case of the failure of the telephone system.


Source material is World at War #27 "Atlantic Wall Analysis" and the "German Army Handbook"