OT Navies in WWII

[copeab]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Fubuki-class. Entered service in 1930 with 20 ships.. The first modern IJN destroyers, they displaced 2,090 tons and were armed with three twin 5-inch/50 rifles and three triple 24-inch torpedo tubes. During the war, they lost one 5-inch mount, replaced by additional AA guns. Nineteen were sunk during the war and one was scrapped in 1947.

The Fubukis were probably the most formidable destroyers in the world when they first entered service and by 1941 were still quite capable. Their big flaw, like most pre-WWII destroyers of all nations, was a poor AAA armament.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by copeab

The Fubukis were probably the most formidable destroyers in the world when they first entered service and by 1941 were still quite capable. Their big flaw, like most pre-WWII destroyers of all nations, was a poor AAA armament.

Yup! They certainly gave the USN nightmares during the Solomon Islands fighting. The Kageros were the ultimate in the design however and all of their follow-up designs were variations on the basic Kagero.

[dragoon500ly]

Talking about poor AAA armament during WWII...

The two worst systems had to be the USN 1.1-inch/75 quad mount and the Japanese 25mm/60 gun in any mounting.

The 1.1-inch or Chicago Piano as it was nicknamed in the fleet, well, the gun crew had a sailor whose job was to carry a sledge hammer and a chisel. His sole function was to pry loose jammed shell casings when they happened. This is one of the things that is very bad for a AAA gun when you are firing at attacking torpedo planes!

The 25mm/60 was a copy of a Hotchkiss design with a limited magazine capacity, typical twelve rounds, and an even more limited engagement zone. To add to the puzzle, the IJN had access to the British 2-pounder and the Bofors 40mm/60 designs, neither of which ever entered service with them. Instead, the IJN simply added more and more 25mm mounts.

Considering that as the war progressed, the Allies realized that the 20mm Oerklions were not effective weapons and that even the quad 40mm mounts didn't have the aircraft destruction capacity to stop Kamikazes.......one wonders just what the IJN was thinking.

[dragoon500ly]

In any discussion of the Pacific War, sooner or later it turns into a discussion of just what might have happened had the largest Japanese battleship, HIJMS Yamato had met the largest USN battleship, USS Iowa in a toe-to-toe fight.

First, the basic stats:

Yamato had a full load displacement of 69,888 tons (she was the largest warship ever launched until the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise in the 1960s). Her length at the waterline was 839'11" with an overall length of 862'9". Beam was 121'1" and she had a draft of 34'1".

Iowa's full load displacement was 57,540 tons. Her length at the waterline was 860" with an overall length of 887"3". She had a beam of 108'2" and a draft of 36'3".

The key features here are the beam and draft measurements, typically a wide-beamed ship with deep draft is a steadier gunnery platform. Yamato being wider and Iowa being deeper, both balance out in the long run. Iowa had a better layour of rudders vs Yamato and actually had a smaller tactical diameter (this is the minimum diameter necessary to make a full circle), thus making her more maneuverable.

Machinery wise, Yamato had twelve boilers and four sets of turbines giving her a max shaft horsepower of 150,000 and a maximum speed of 27 knots. The Iowa had eight boilers and four sets of turbines which turned out 212,000 shaft horsepower with a sustained speed of 32.5 knots (the Iowas were able to reach 35 knots during trials for short periods).

Iowa's higher sustained speed gave her the advantage in closing the range and her ability to kick up to 35 knots whould have given Yamato problems in tracking.

Yamato's armor protection was: Her main belt was 16.1"; her deck armor was 9"; her barbettes (turret bases) was 21.5"; the turret faces had 25.6"; and her conning tower had 19.7" of protection. Iowa had a belt 12.9" thick; deck armor 8.1"; barbette: 17.3"; turret faces of 19.7" and conning tower of 17.5".

On paper, at least Yamato had the advantage, but this is rather deceptive. Thickness of plate also has to make an allowance for quality. In the years prior to WWII, the USN had made considerable strides in armor technology, as a result, the protection offered by its new armor plate was equivalent to about 25% more thickness than the old type of armor used by Yamato. Iowa also appears to have been much better constructed than Yamato. On December 25, 1944, Yamato took a single torpedo hit that demonstrated that the jointing in between her armor belt and her hull was faulty. To correct the fault, the IJN concluded that it would have to add an additional 5,000 tons worth of bracing and armor to the ship's displacement. The IJN simply repaired the hole and pretended that there was no problem.

Armament wise, the Yamato mounted three triple turrets mounting 18.11-inch/45 rifles (two forward and one aft), a secondary armament of two triple 6.1-inch/60 rifles (one each fore and aft), and a dual purpose armament of twelve twin 5-inch/40 rifles. Iowa mounted three triple turrets mounting 16-inch/50 rifles and a dual purpose armament of ten twin 5-inch/38 rifles.

So just how good were the main armament? The 18.11-inch naval rifle had a muzzle velocity of 2,550fps. It could fire one round per gun per minute. The 16-inch rifle had a muzzle velocity of 2,560fps and a rate of fire of two rounds per gun per minute.

At first glance, the 18-inch gun fires a shell weighing some 20% more than the 16-inch, and has a 7% greater range.

But the American advantage is a bit more subtle. The 16-inch had a longer barrel length than the 18-inch, this gives the shell more stability in flight, giving it greater range.

Its when the penetration capability of the two guns is compared that it becomes intresting: At a range of 0 yards, the 18-incher has a pen of 34", compared to 32.62" for the 16-inch. At a range of 20,000 yards, the 18-inch will penetrate about 20.4"; at the same range the 16-inch will penetrate 20.04". Open the range to 30,000 yards and the 18-inch will penetrate about 14.7" and the 16-inch will penetrate 14.97".

But it all boils down to the fact that extended range gunnery duels did not happen. The longest-range deliberate hit by any battleship in either the First World War or in the Second was made by HMS Warspite when it scored a hot at 26,000 yards.

There is also one other factor to consider. The USN's gunnery was supported by superior fire control radar as well as better ballistic computers.

There is no doubt that in a one for one engagement, the Iowa would have emerged bloody, but victorious.

[dragoon500ly]

The Battle of Midway is called the most decisive naval battle of WWII, the turning point of the naval war, and a host of other platitudes. Its the classis David-vs-Goliath battle. The heavily outnumber USN ambushes the superior IJN and nails four carriers and a heavy cruiser and losing only one carrier and a destroyer. The so-called incredible victory.

Or was it?

Certainly when you sit down and flip over the orders of battle, the IJN put committed almost its entire fleet against a handful of USN warships. But when it comes right down to it, just how badly outnumbered was the USN.

The primary strike force for the IJN was the "Kido Butai", the First Carrier Striking Force .

The Kido Butai consisted of the following:
Carrier Division One
CV Akagi: with an air group of 18 A6M2 Zero fighters, 18 D3A1 Val dive bombers and 19 B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers. Also carrying 6 Zero fighters for the Midway Garrision and available for CAP.
CV Kaga: with an air group of 18 A6M2 Zero fighters, 18 D3A1 Val dive bombers and 27 B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers as well as 9 Zero fighters intended for the Midway Garrison and available for CAP.
Carrier Division Two
CV Hiryu: her air group consisted of 18 A6M2 Zeros, 18 D3A1 Vals and 18
B5N2 Kates as well as 3 additional Zeros intended for Midway.
CV Soryu: her air group consisted of 18 A6M2 Zeros, 19 D3A1 Vals, 18 B5N2 Kates and 2 D4Y1 Judy recon bombers as well as an additional 3 Zeros intended for Midway.
Escorting the carriers were the battleships Haruna and Kirishima, the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, the light cruiser Nagara and 11 destroyers.

The combined air groups totaled 93 A6M2 Zero fighters; 73 D3A1 Val dive bombers; 2 D4Y1 Judy recon bombers; 82 B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers.

The US committed:
Task Force 17:
USS Yorktown: with an air group of 27 F4F-4 Wildcat fighters, 37 SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers and 15 TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bombers.
She was escorted by 2 heavy cruisers and 6 destroyers.

Task Force 16:
USS Enterprise: her air group comprised 27 F4F-4 Wildcats, 37 SBD-3 Dauntless and 14 TBD-1 Devastators.
USS Hornet: her air group comprised 27 F4F-4 Wildcats, 35 SBD-3 Dauntless and 15 TBD-1 Devastators.
Their escorts consisted of 5 heavy and 1 light cruisers and 9 destroyers.

The fleet deployed 81 F4F-4 Wildcat fighters; 109 SBD-3 dive bombers and 44 TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bombers.

An often under appricated member of the fight is the US Garrision on Midway. Their air group consisted of 25 PBY-5 Catalinas in a search role; 5 PBY-5A Catalinas in a strike role; 6 TBF-1 Avengers; 21 F2A-3 Buffalo fighters; 7 F4F-3 Wildcat fighters; 19 SBD-2 Dauntless dive bombers; 21
SB2U-3 Vindicator dive bombers; 1 B-17D photo recon; 15 B-17E heavy bombers; and 4 B-26 medium bombers (carrying torpedoes).

In the course of the battle, the Japanese Invasion Force was attacked by a single Catalina carrying torpedoes as well as B-17 bombers, that damaged one tanker, slightly (by a US torpedo that actually exploded!).

The Kido Butai launched a single air strike on Midway, that damaged many of the installations, but did not damage her AA or coastal defense guns. In the course of the air strike, almost all of the defending fighters were shot down (this would be the last combat action for the Buffalo in US service). The real impact of Midway was in the multiple air strikes that were launched against the Kido Butai that kept the Japanese occuiped with dodging ordnance and disrupted the Japanese CAP. The need to land, refuel and rearm their CAP fighters played a major part in delaying a follow-up strike on Midway.

Due to the relative rawness of the US air groups the three squadrons of torpedo bombers attacked individually and unsupported. This continued the disruption of the Japanese CAP and helped open a window in which the Yorktown and Enterprise dive bombers were able to hit three of the carriers and damage them so severely that they later sank. The final IJN carrier Hiryu was able to launch two separate attacks that first damaged Yorktown and then later so crippled her that she had to be abanded and later sunk by a IJN submarine. Hiryu later fell victim to Enterprise and Yorktown dive bombers.

With the loss of the fleet carriers of the Kido Butai, the Japanese were forced to withdraw. In the process of withdraw, two Japanese heavy cruisers collided and one was later sunk by US dive bombers.

The simple version, I know.

But Midway was not the Incredible Victory that many western authors paint it to be. It was a notable victory for the USN and certainly hurt the IJN, badly. But was it a decisive victory? Was it the turning point of the war?

The IJN still enjoyed numerical superiority over the USN. They were still protected by a ring of island bases that allowed them to control the seas around their islands and still were capable of offensive actions. While they had lost all of the carrier aircraft, a large number of their veteran pilots were rescued and were available for latter operations.

IMHO, the decisive battle of the Pacific War was the Battle for Guadalcanal. Here the cream of Japanese Naval Avation died fighting. Here the US took its first major offensive step forward on the long road that would end off an little known island called Okinawa.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

But Midway was not the Incredible Victory that many western authors paint it to be. It was a notable victory for the USN and certainly hurt the IJN, badly. But was it a decisive victory? Was it the turning point of the war?

In a paper for a high school history class, I argued the turning point was the Battle of Coral Sea. Until that point, the Japanese had been running free in the Pacific. While tactically the battle was a draw (or arguably a Japanese marginal victory), it was a strategic loss for them. For the first time in the Pacific war, Japan had failed to mount a successful invasion of significance.

(in that same class, I also wrote a paper where I asserted the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified)

[ShadoWarrior]

Originally Posted by copeab

I also wrote a paper where I asserted the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified

On what grounds?

[Panther Al]

In a nutshell:
Two things. The first and most obvious bit being that the Germans announced that they had reason to believe that it had in it's holds war cargo, and that they would attempt to sink it if it sailed.
Second, as it turns out it did indeed have such cargo, and there for a legit sinking- if tragic.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

But Midway was not the Incredible Victory that many western authors paint it to be. It was a notable victory for the USN and certainly hurt the IJN, badly. But was it a decisive victory? Was it the turning point of the war?

The IJN still enjoyed numerical superiority over the USN. They were still protected by a ring of island bases that allowed them to control the seas around their islands and still were capable of offensive actions. While they had lost all of the carrier aircraft, a large number of their veteran pilots were rescued and were available for latter operations.

IMHO, the decisive battle of the Pacific War was the Battle for Guadalcanal. Here the cream of Japanese Naval Avation died fighting. Here the US took its first major offensive step forward on the long road that would end off an little known island called Okinawa.

In a sense Midway was not the victory it has been made out to be because even if the Japanese hadn't lost four aircraft carriers they still would have been beaten, it just would have taken a while longer. However in another sense it was a sensational vistory as the IJN got a hammering, in fact it was the greatest naval defeat that Japan had ever suffered up to that date, and it totaly exploded the short lived myth that they were invincible.

Guadacanal had a similar senationalism to Midway, but it was on land. It was the first time that the Japanese Army was stopped and thoroughly defeated, although the Soviet would argue that they did the same in the lesser known battles of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol in 1938 and 1939, and its impact was just a great to Allied soldiers and Marines fighting the Japanese in the Pacific and Asia as Midway was to the navy.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by copeab

In a paper for a high school history class, I argued the turning point was the Battle of Coral Sea. Until that point, the Japanese had been running free in the Pacific. While tactically the battle was a draw (or arguably a Japanese marginal victory), it was a strategic loss for them. For the first time in the Pacific war, Japan had failed to mount a successful invasion of significance.

(in that same class, I also wrote a paper where I asserted the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified)

Coral Sea was a turning point in the Pacific War for a number of reasons. Firstly it was the first time that the Japanese navy was effectively challenged in the Pacific. Secondly it demonstrated to Japan that Allied resistance or/and offensives would be better organised and more formidable than they previously had been. Thirdly it confirmed to Japan that New Guinea was the absolute outer limit of what it could hope to conquer, and that an invasion of Australia was beyond its capabilities. The fact that Japan actually invaded New Guinea has always puzzled me as it it had few exploitable resources at that time, and only limited logistical capabilities from which to attack Australia. It has always seemed to me to have been a waste of Japanese resources, and I can only think that they went there to disrupt and delay any build up of Allied forces in Australia which would threaten their forces in South East Asia and the Pacific.

I think the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified, but not morally.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

In any discussion of the Pacific War, sooner or later it turns into a discussion of just what might have happened had the largest Japanese battleship, HIJMS Yamato had met the largest USN battleship, USS Iowa in a toe-to-toe fight

I've always wondered what might have been built if it the war had started a year later, or if the emergence of the aircraft carrier as the most important warship had been delayed a few years. If it had the Yamato would not have been the largest battleships affoat. Consider the opponents.

1) The British Lion Class: The Lions were the most restrained of the planned super battleships, and would have looked very much like the King George V class and were designed for a new pattern 16in triple gun mount that was never produced. 4 ships were planned and 2 were laid down before building was halted in 1940, and was cancelled in 1942.

Displacement: 40,550t standard; 46,300t deep load
Dimensions: 740ft pp, 785ft oa x 104ft x 30ft
Machinery: 4-shaft Parsons geared turbines, 8 Admiralty 3-drum boilers, 130,000shp = 30kts. Oil 3720t
Armor: Belt 15in-5.5in, bulkheads 13in-4in, barbettes 15in-12in, turrets 15in-6in, CT 4.5in-2in, main deck 6in-5in
Armament: 9-16in/45 (3x3), 16-5.25in/50 DP (8x2), 48-2pdr AA (6x8), 2 aircraft

The protection scheme of these ships was similar to the King George V, but with larger guns. These ships would have been formidable, not too different from the American North Carolina class but better protected and faster, and in fact better protected than the American Iowas, but with less range than both. There was also plans to build two later Lion Class in 1946 with a 50,000t standard displacement (56,500 full load). This version would have carried 9-16in guns (3x3) of a newer type with a firing interval of only 20 seconds. The secondary battery would have been 24-4.5in DP (12x2), and the AA battery was to be 60-40mm Bofors (10x6). Speed was intended to be about 29kts. The increased beam would have allowed better underwater protection than and the armor protection included a 14in belt and 4in-6in deck.

An even larger Super Lion was also planned of 59,100t standard, and 69,140 full load, but still retained the same basic armament with more AA guns. The area of ship protected by armor would have been increased, and fuel oil capacity was increased for greatly increased range. The Lion Class would have contested their ground with a Yamato, although maybe not beaten it. But the later Lion Class versions would certainly have.

2) German H Class: The H class were a part of Germany's Z plan to build a balanced fleet and challenge British supremacy at sea. The first two ships were laid down in 1939, but were canceled shortly after. It was planned to build six of these ships.

Displacement: 55,453t standard; 62,497 deep load
Dimensions: 872ft wl, 911ft 5in oa x 122ft x 33ft 6in
Machinery: 3-shafts, 12 MAN double-acting 2-stroke 9cyl diesels, 165,000shp = 30kts
Armor: belt 11.75in-7in, deck3.25in-2in, armored deck 4.75in-4in,
torpedo bulkhead 1.75in,armored bulkheads 8.75in, main turrets 15.25-5in, secondary turrets 4in-1.5in, CT 15.25in
Armament: 8-16in/47 (4x2), 12-5.9in/55 (6x2), 16-4.1in/65 DP (8x2),
16-37mm/83 AA (8x2), 24-20mm AA (6x4), 6-21in TT (submerged), 4 aircraft

Considered to have been enlarged versions of the Bismarck Class. They had improved diesel machinery and 16in guns, but also some of Bismarcks faults with single purpose secondary guns, and poorly distributed armor, and the placement of the armored deck too low in the ship to protect her vital fire control and communications. They also had underwater torpedo tubes that compromises a ship's watertight integrity. However they also had internal subdivision which made them so difficult to sink, excellent fire control, a steady gun platform and excellent anti-torpedo protection. Hitler in one of his mad moments wanted to radically change later versions of this ship with 20in guns and a dispacement of over 100,000t. The H Class would have been formidable ships but not as good as the Lion Class.

3) Soviet Sovyetskiy Soyuz Class: Four ships was authorized in 1938, and three were actually laid down. Construction was halted in 1940 after two were 75% complete. All three hulls were broken up in later 1940's.

Displacement: 59,150t standard; 65,150t deep load
Dimensions: 889ft 1in oa x 127ft 7in x 33ft 6in
Machinery: 3-shaft turbo-electric drive, 231,000shp = 28kts
Armor: Belt 16.75in, deck 8.75in, turret faces 19.5in
Armament: 9-16in/50 (3x3), 12-6in/50 (6x2), 8-4in/56 DP (4x2),
32-37mm/67 AA (8x4), 8-.50in MG, 4 aircraft

The Sovyetskiy Soyuz class would have been formidable opponents, although they sacrificed some speed and retained only a 9 gun main battery. With their huge beams they would have been very steady gun platforms, and their armor protection approached the Yamato class. However their fire control systems and rangefinder would likely have been inferior to both German and Japanese opponents. The Sovyetskiy Soyuz Class was the nearest of the super battleships to have been actually built, and statisticaly would have been a match for the German H Class although maybe not a Yamato.

4) American Montana Class: Five Montana's were authorized in 1940 but construction was suspended in 1942, and canceled in 1943.

Displacement: 60,500t standard; 70,500t full load
Dimensions: 890ft wl, 925ft oa x 121ft x 36ft 8in full load
Machinery: 4-shaft turbines, 8 boilers, 172,000shp = 28kts full load. Oil 7300t, range 15,000nm at 15kts
Armor: Belt 16.1in-10.2in on 1in STS, internal belt 7.2in-1in, armor deck 6in-7.35in with 2.25 in weather deck and. 62-.75in splinter deck, bulkheads 15.3in, barbettes 18in-21.3in, turrets 22.5in face, 9.15in roof, 10in side, 12in rear, CT 18in with 7.25in roof
Armament: 12-16in/50 (4x3), 20-5in/54 DP (10x2), 32-40mm AA (8x4), 20-20mm AA (20x1), 3 aircraft

The Montana's were the best American battlehips ever designed, and their 16in/50 gun was probably the best battleship gun ever produced. It threw the super heavy 2700lb armor piercing shell 42,345 yards. For comparison, the Japanese 18.1in/45 gun threw a 3200lb armor piercing shell 45,960 yards. The American gun weighed less, allowing the Montana's to carry 12 of them, for a broadside weight of 32,400lbs. The Yamatos could only carry nine of the 18.1in guns on a similar size hull with similar armor and speed. Yamato's broadside weight was 28,800lbs. Montana's new 5in/54 DP secondary guns were superior in range and striking power to the older 5in/38. Her AA battery was well laid out with good arcs of fire for the guns. And the 40mm Bofors was better than anything the Japanese Navy had, and her light battery was superior to Yamato's. Montana and Yamato were protected to similar standards, but the quality of American armor was considered to be of a higher standard. Also Montana's were protected against their own 2700 lb shells between 18,000 and 31,000 yards. Montana's great beam and a reversion to a scheme similar to the North Carolinas gave it protection against torpedo attack. U.S. fire control with radar control, outclassed any German or Japanese battleship, although the 15 meter rangefinders of the Yamato class ws still the best optical design. The Montana was the best of all the super-battleships designed or built, and would have proven too great of an opponent for the Yamato. The only battleship that might have realy taken it on was one of the later British Lion Class.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by ShadoWarrior

On what grounds?

It's been over 25 years, but basically, it boiled down to the Germans sinking a ship flying a flag of an enemy country sailing in a declared war zone and carrying a suspected war cargo.

I also pointed out that earlier in the war, against merchant shipping U-boats would often surface, fire a bow shot to get the merchant ship to stop, allow the crew to get into lifeboats, then torpedo the merchant ship. The British then began arming merchants with concealed deck guns to fire on the submarines as soon as they surfaced. The Germans then started sinking merchants without warning, which of course led to incredulous British outrage. No one knows if the Lusitania actually had any hidden deck guns, but the U-boat captain had to assume so.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by RN7

I think the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified, but not morally.

From a moral point, I blame the British more than the Germans, since the British were using human shields to protect war materials.

Now, from a more practical political perspective, the whatever war cargo was on the Lusitania was not worth the risk to Germany (although, as it turned out, it still took nearly two years for the US to get upset enough to get involved int he war).

[copeab]

Originally Posted by RN7

Guadacanal had a similar senationalism to Midway, but it was on land.

Actually, Guadalcanal was very much a land, air and sea battle. Partly because it being fought in all three arenas, it was one of the longer battles of the war.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by copeab

Actually, Guadalcanal was very much a land, air and sea battle. Partly because it being fought in all three arenas, it was one of the longer battles of the war.

Actually, Guadalcanal was a campaign with many battles.

The Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo in August 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of Savo Island in August 1942 was a naval battle.
The Battle of Tenaru in August 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942 was a naval battle with air power.
The Battle over Henderson Field from August to December 1942 was an air battle.
The Battle involving the strenthening of the Luga defenses from August to September 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of Edson's Ridge in September 1942 was a land battle.
The Action along the Matinkau from Septembet to October 1942 was a land battle with air and naval support.
The Battle of Cape Esperance in October 1942 was a naval battle.
The bombardement and Battle for Henderson Field in October 1942 was a land battle with naval support.
The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in October 1942 was a naval battle with air power.
The Matanikau Offensive in November 1942 was a land battle.
The Koli Point Action in November 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of Carlson's Patrol in November to December 1942 was a land battle.
The First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November 1942 was a naval battle.
The Second Naval Battle of Guadalanal in November 1942 was a naval battle.
The Battle of Tassafaronga in November 1942 was a naval battle
The First Battle of Mount Austin in December 1942 was a land battle.
The Battle of the Galloping Horse in January 1943 was a land battle.
The Battle of the Sea Horse in January 1943 was a land battle.
The Second Battle of Mount Austin in January 1943 was a land battle.
Operation Ke in January to February 1943 was a naval battle with air support.
The Battle of Rennell Island in January 1943 was a naval battle with air support.

Overall it cost America over 7,000 deaths, 29 ships and 615 aircraft. Japanese casualties were 31,000 deaths, 38 ships and over 800 aircraft.

[RN7]

Originally Posted by copeab

From a moral point, I blame the British more than the Germans, since the British were using human shields to protect war materials.

Did the Royal Navy sink any German passenger liners?

[ShadoWarrior]

Originally Posted by RN7

Did the Royal Navy sink any German passenger liners?

No, but the Russians did in WW2.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by ShadoWarrior

No, but the Russians did in WW2.

I don't remember the name of the ship, but Russia sank one liner late in the war, packed with refugees and soldiers being evacuated, which is the greatest loss of life in a ship disaster.

[copeab]

Originally Posted by RN7

Did the Royal Navy sink any German passenger liners?

Not that I'm aware of, no, but that's largely the result of Germany's surface ships rarely going to sea after the war started and the British navy not taking subs seriously enough at the start of the war (I mean, dear God, they built nearly 20 steam powered subs).

[Sanjuro]

I have never seen any evidence that the Lusitania was carrying war materials; the onboard explosions which made her sinking so rapid can best be accounted for by the initial impact filling her largely empty coal bunkers with coal dust; when the coal dust in turn exploded the mixture was like a primitive Fuel-Air Explosive.
While not perhaps a war crime, the sinking of the Lusitania was an act of terrorism in that it was declared as a specific target, in an effort to deter passengers.
The unrestricted submarine warfare seemed to bring on a new level of unpleasantness; it is understandable to try and sink ships from ambush if they may be armed, but to capture and execute a ship's captain for attempting to sink the submarine which is shooting at him is not.
http://southernlife.org.uk/fryatt.htm

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by copeab

In a paper for a high school history class, I argued the turning point was the Battle of Coral Sea. Until that point, the Japanese had been running free in the Pacific. While tactically the battle was a draw (or arguably a Japanese marginal victory), it was a strategic loss for them. For the first time in the Pacific war, Japan had failed to mount a successful invasion of significance.

(in that same class, I also wrote a paper where I asserted the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified)

Coral Sea was at best, a draw for both sides. To be sure, it did stop the immediate Japanese move on Port Morseby. But what halted the planned invasion was Yamamoto's commencement of the Midway/Aleutians operation.

With the launch of the Guadalcanal battle, the Japanese were forced into a attrition battle that they could not sustain. With the encirclement of Rabual, the cream of the Japanese pilots lay dead. This was a blow that they never recovered from.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by RN7

Coral Sea was a turning point in the Pacific War for a number of reasons. Firstly it was the first time that the Japanese navy was effectively challenged in the Pacific. Secondly it demonstrated to Japan that Allied resistance or/and offensives would be better organised and more formidable than they previously had been. Thirdly it confirmed to Japan that New Guinea was the absolute outer limit of what it could hope to conquer, and that an invasion of Australia was beyond its capabilities. The fact that Japan actually invaded New Guinea has always puzzled me as it it had few exploitable resources at that time, and only limited logistical capabilities from which to attack Australia. It has always seemed to me to have been a waste of Japanese resources, and I can only think that they went there to disrupt and delay any build up of Allied forces in Australia which would threaten their forces in South East Asia and the Pacific.

I think the sinking of the Lusitania was legally justified, but not morally.

Japan's goals in the New Guinea campaign have always had people scratching their heads in confusion. The only thing that I have ever heard that made any sense was that they wanted to capture Port Moresby for use as an air/naval base for a possible future attack on Australia.

The IJA/IJN were at loggerheads about the need to invade Australia. The IJA's veiwpoint was that it would require too much in terms of troop commitments and logistical support. Okay, makes sense, the IJA was hard pressed to provide more than a dozen divisions for the Pacific and certainly Australia would have required a lot more than dozen divisions to conquer/pacify. Logistical wise, the Japanese simply didn't have the merchant shipping to support operations. The IJN on the other hand, favored an invasion of Australia in order the deny the US any safe area to build up forces for a counter-offensive.

With the Port Moresby invasion force turned back, the IJA/IJN now needed to capture the airfield in order to deny its use to the Allies, as well as acquiring a defensive position on the southern shore of New Guinea.

[Targan]

Originally Posted by copeab

I don't remember the name of the ship, but Russia sank one liner late in the war, packed with refugees and soldiers being evacuated, which is the greatest loss of life in a ship disaster.

I believe that would be the Wilhelm Gustloff. A major tragedy of WWII.

[Fusilier]

Originally Posted by copeab

I don't remember the name of the ship, but Russia sank one liner late in the war, packed with refugees and soldiers being evacuated, which is the greatest loss of life in a ship disaster.

Unfortunately, there were a few actually.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by Fusilier

Unfortunately, there were a few actually.

To be fair when you consider what the Germans did to the Russians it's not hard to realise why the Russians ignored the rules of war.

If the Germans and raped and murdered their way through half of the UK, we'd be less inclined to be nice.

[Fusilier]

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

To be fair when you consider what the Germans did to the Russians it's not hard to realise why the Russians ignored the rules of war.

If the Germans and raped and murdered their way through half of the UK, we'd be less inclined to be nice.

I know why they did it, but don't think that is fair at all. The women and children on the boats didn't rape and murder anyone. I tend to disagree with punishment extending to all those who share ethnicity with the guilty. Fortunately, western society (at least) is in agreement with this and our legal system is based on blood justice.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by RN7

I've always wondered what might have been built if it the war had started a year later, or if the emergence of the aircraft carrier as the most important warship had been delayed a few years. If it had the Yamato would not have been the largest battleships affoat. Consider the opponents.

1) The British Lion Class: The Lions were the most restrained of the planned super battleships, and would have looked very much like the King George V class and were designed for a new pattern 16in triple gun mount that was never produced. 4 ships were planned and 2 were laid down before building was halted in 1940, and was cancelled in 1942.

2) German H Class: The H class were a part of Germany's Z plan to build a balanced fleet and challenge British supremacy at sea. The first two ships were laid down in 1939, but were canceled shortly after. It was planned to build six of these ships.

3) Soviet Sovyetskiy Soyuz Class: Four ships was authorized in 1938, and three were actually laid down. Construction was halted in 1940 after two were 75% complete. All three hulls were broken up in later 1940's.

4) American Montana Class: Five Montana's were authorized in 1940 but construction was suspended in 1942, and canceled in 1943.

All were impressive designs and, speaking from a wargamer viewpoint, its fun to add one or two into the fleet mix just to see what might have happened. But the growth of the aircraft carrier and its air group is what sounded the death of the battleship.

Still....Montana vs Yamato....Lion vs Tripitz.....

[dragoon500ly]

Logistics, the boring stuff....

By 1945, the U.S. had committed 21 infantry divisions and 6 Marine divisions. To give an idea how how much shipping was entailed in moving these 27 divisions around....a infantry division had 14,000 men and 2,000 vehicles, which would require roughly 100,000 tons of shipping space to move.

Shipping requirements could be cut by over 40% if the division's equipment was broken down as much as possible and boxed. This method required a fully equipped port (with piers and cranes) at the other end to get all of the stuff off the ships. This explains the critical importance of Hawaii and Australia/New Zealand to the Pacific War effort.

Amphibious landings required four times as much shipping as the boxed method because the hear had to be stored in the order it would be needed and ready to be operated as soon as it left the ship. This is called combat loading. The preferred method was to ship the units to ports boxed, unload them, acclimate the troops and then reload the ships in the combat loading manner.

The rule of thumb used was that for every soldier, airman or Marine sent overseas, they required 12 tons of shipping each to get them over there with their equipment. Thereafter, they each required 1 ton a month of shipping to maintain them in action.

Explaining this another way; to send an infantry division overseas boxed required six Liberty ships. To move the same division into a combat zone required the use of 20 ships of various sizes. A dozen of these would be assault transports, the rest would be LSTs and other specialized amphibious ships.

The 27 divisions sent into the Pacific also required nearly 2,000,000 support troops (and replacements for losses). This meant that over 20 million tons of shipping was needed to get them there and then as much as 1.5 million tons of shipping each month to keep them supplied. The lack of decent ports in the Pacific meany that many of the ships had to make a 12,000 mile round trip in order to reach the fighting fronts.

Another factor that impacted Allied strategic planning was the various speeds of these ships. Consider this...

The Landing Force could maintain a speed of 12 knots.

The Bombardment Group (the old battleships) could sustain 15 knots.

The Escort Group (the CVEs providind CAS) could sustain 12 knots.

The Support Group (the tankers, cargo and hospital ships) could sustain 12 knots.

The Carrier Task Force (the fast battleships and fleet carriers) could sustain 15-25 knots and maintain 30 knots for extended periods of time.

Now then, making allowances for maneuvering, replenishment etc, the Carrier Task Force could cover between 300-500 miles per day. The Bombardment and Escort Groups might manage 300 miles a day. And the Landing Force and Support Group would be lucky to manage 250-miles a day. In addition, submarines often supported operations such as maintaining a scouting screen and picking up downed fliers, they could cover between 200-250 miles a day.

So the admirals commanding had to juggle their various task groups. While the slower groups could basically maintain straight-line steady courses, teh Carrier Task Force often found it self making hugh circles around the ocean, moving back and forth in irregular patterns, in order to provide cover for the slower ships. And in order to confuse the enemy while this dance was ongoing, the Carrier Task Force would often make air strikes on anything within range.

[dragoon500ly]

Came across this list....

The food supplies for a typical US Battleship for one week....

Beef, Frozen = 10,000lbs
Veal, Frozen = 2,000lbs
Ham, Smoked = 750lbs
Fish, Frozen = 500lbs
Spam = 250lbs
Potatoes, White = 9,000lbs
Potatoes, Sweet = 900lbs
Carrots = 1,500lbs
Lettuce, Iceberg = 1,200lbs
Tomatoes = 900lbs
Asparagus = 900lbs
Cucumbers = 850lbs
Celery = 600lbs
Rhubarb = 500lbs
Oranges = 1,900lbs
Lemons = 1,200lbs
Eggs = 1,500 dozen
Flour = 14,000lbs
Milk (fresh, condensed and powdered) = 2,200lbs
Seasonings and condiments = 700lbs
Ice Cream = 2,000lbs
Coffee = 4,000lbs

Something else!

[dragoon500ly]

Came across this little known factoid...

Most naval battles are fought within a hundred or so miles of land. The record for the distance from the battle site to shor belongs to the Royal Navy.

Its known as the Glorious First of June and was fought on June 1, 1794. The battle sight is a shade over 400 miles from land.