LAV-75; Stingray; M8 AGS

[Webstral]

Horse, I absolutely agree that there will be voices calling for the United States to limit aid to China. There is, however, a logic to sending top-notch vehicles and missiles to the PRC that has nothing to do with military planning. We know from the v1 chronology that the West sends state-of-the-art missiles to China prior to the start of the Soviet Spring offensive in 1996. Therefore, we know that the West is willing to risk having some of the best technology of the free world fall into Soviet hands.

The Chinese Communists are smart people. We can see today that they know how to use Western capitalism to their advantage. As I have argued in the past, the Chinese capacity to employ the dynamics of capitalism in service of their own purposes would find expression in Twilight: 2000. While many conservative Western voices (none more so than American voices) might tell the Chinese to go hang, the bankers, investors, and arms manufacturers of the West will sing a different tune. France will lead the way, since France has a well-developed arms industry and a penchant for doing her own thing. Once France arranges for loans at handsome rates and closes her first multi-billion dollar (franc) deal, the bankers, investors, and arms manufacturers of the western democracies will be howling for their elected officials to open the doors for British, American, German, etc. involvement. It's hard to imagine how the House of Representatives would be able to resist such an opportunity and such strident calls for profit-making. Once the US acquires a major stake in the future of the PRC, the various barriers will come crashing down.

Webstral

[Webstral]

I was thinking more about the Ridgway as I was reading about assault guns in the WW2 era. Grendal’s superb information about the 75mm Ares tells us that the LAV-75 as originally conceived would have provided good service as a tank destroyer. I’m thinking now that a version equipped with a 105mm gun might still have been desirable for assault gun purposes. Granted, the LAV-75 doesn’t have the frontal armor that characterized mature German and Soviet assault guns designs, but a Ridgway with a 105mm gun could do double duty in the anti-tank role and the fire support/assault gun role. This is not to say that the LAV-75 would have been replaced. Rather, it might be possible to see two variants—one optimized for tank killing, the other a more general purpose platform.

Webstral

[HorseSoldier]

Being able to provide effective fire support for infantry units and engage soft targets was the big criteria driving the 105mm gun for the Stryker MGS (well that and a desire to capitalize on existing stocks of 105mm ammo). Makes sense that a 105mm version would have been considered, possibly even fielded alongside the 75mm version in some quantity. A 105mm armed system, for instance, would be a better replacement for the Sheridans in the 82nd for contingency operations, etc.

[Legbreaker]

What sort of weight different could there be between the 75mm and 105mm?
With an airdroppable/transportable vehicle, every last kilogram could be important.

[James Langham]

I think I can see my next write up coming.

Rough outline:

1980s - RDF Light Tank proposed and trialed Not a huge success but workable. Not adopted
Late 1980s M8 proposed and prototypes built
1993 ish - M8 getting nowhere, Congress orders off the shelf package
1994 trials of Sherridan with 105 Stingray turret, RDF Light tank (slightly improved), Sherriden with ARES gun, Scorpion 90, maybe a couple of others (THM301?)
1995 Sino-Soviet War, rapid numbers needed, Sherridan with Stingray turret, LAV75 adopted as little impact on M2 production. Standard Sherridans also refurbished
1996 LAV75A1 with 105mm gun adopted, some LAV75 with Stingray turrets tried
1997 M8 trial vehicles pulled from storage and issued

Thoughts?

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by HorseSoldier

Being able to provide effective fire support for infantry units and engage soft targets was the big criteria driving the 105mm gun for the Stryker MGS (well that and a desire to capitalize on existing stocks of 105mm ammo). Makes sense that a 105mm version would have been considered, possibly even fielded alongside the 75mm version in some quantity. A 105mm armed system, for instance, would be a better replacement for the Sheridans in the 82nd for contingency operations, etc.

My thinking exactly. The fighting in the Far East would have shown the value of a modern assault gun for light forces. During the main Chinese counteroffensive in late 1995, Chinese light infantry would have gone up against at least some prepared fighting positions occupied by Soviet troops. While the Chinese would have employed large numbers of RPG firing HE against Soviet fighting positions, the fighting would have revealed the value of having self-propelled guns to help reduce the enemy's fortifications. A few perceptive folks in the Pentagon might have recognized that while SP guns are available to the heavy divisions, the light divisions would have no weapons acting in the assault gun role. (The Sheridans of the 82nd Airborne are a noteworthy exception, if they remained in service through 1995) Assuming that the LAV-75 had been approved for deployment in the light divisions prior to the start of the war, the same logic that applied to our earlier discussion about refitting all of the LAV-75s would apply to refitting, say, half of them for the assault gun role. The TO&E wouldn't even have to be reorganized. Each battalion of LAV might contain two companies of LAV-75 acting in the tank destroyer role and two companies of LAV-105 acting in the assault gun role. Against most of the enemy's AFV, the assault gun variant would have been reasonably effective with the added bonus of greater flexibility.

The Soviet offensive in 1996 might have served to reinforce the value of the assault gun, depending on how things worked on the battlefield. We know from the v1 chronology that the PLA made good use of the respite between the main Chinese counteroffensive in late 1995 (Operation Red Willow) and the Spring 1996 offensive launched by the Pact. Tying into previous discussions on the matter, the Chinese almost certainly made extensive use of mines and other obstacles, plus hardened fighting positions. Where Soviet assault guns were available, they would have been in high demand to knock out bypassed Chinese strong points (since the tanks, in accordance with Soviet doctrine, would have been pushed through gaps in the enemy's defenses to keep the offensive moving forward). Depending on how this worked out, Western observers in-country probably would have seen the value of a heavily mechanized force using specialty weapons instead of diverting SP guns for the job. There's a lot of room for interpretation here, though.

Nonetheless, the Chinese experience of using light infantry forces against mechanized forces would have caught the attention of the command and staff of the light US divisions, of not the higher-ups.

Webstral

[Grendel]

I could definately see the LAV-75 upgunned with the predecessor of the MGS' 105mm turret in the assault gun role under the designation LAV105. I would organize them as 3 plts of 75mm armed LAV75's with 1 plt of LAV105's per company to facilitate the destruction of bunkers and other fortifications. The LAV105 would travel in the middle of the formation and could swing forward to engage fortifications. They could even have flechete or "beehive" rounds to take care of infantry. This tactic was used in Vietnam when NVA sappers would swarm an M48 in an attemot to remove the hatches and drop grenades into the turret, another M48 would fire a behive round at the M48 which would quickly dispatch the sappers with no damage to the M48's armor integrity.

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by Grendel

I could definately see the LAV-75 upgunned with the predecessor of the MGS' 105mm turret in the assault gun role under the designation LAV105. I would organize them as 3 plts of 75mm armed LAV75's with 1 plt of LAV105's per company to facilitate the destruction of bunkers and other fortifications. The LAV105 would travel in the middle of the formation and could swing forward to engage fortifications. They could even have flechete or "beehive" rounds to take care of infantry. This tactic was used in Vietnam when NVA sappers would swarm an M48 in an attemot to remove the hatches and drop grenades into the turret, another M48 would fire a behive round at the M48 which would quickly dispatch the sappers with no damage to the M48's armor integrity.

I keep trying to avoid the term LAV105. How about LAV75(105)?

As for organisation, I suggest it is done as the Sherman 76s were used in WW2, each division can make it's own plan, some will have separate companies to ease logistics, others will have them integrated within troops for flexibility, others will compromise with separate companies. Most will just slot them in wherever they can get a vehicle as a replacement.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by James Langham

I keep trying to avoid the term LAV105. How about LAV75(105)?

I think Paul calls it the LAV-74A4 on his website.

[Grendel]

Originally Posted by James Langham

I keep trying to avoid the term LAV105. How about LAV75(105)?

As for organisation, I suggest it is done as the Sherman 76s were used in WW2, each division can make it's own plan, some will have separate companies to ease logistics, others will have them integrated within troops for flexibility, others will compromise with separate companies. Most will just slot them in wherever they can get a vehicle as a replacement.

The only reason I suggested it is that it is obvious the guys at GDW renamed the HSTVL the LAV75 was the weapon it carried. But hey LAV75(105) works to. Of course I would have expected had it actually entered service it would have recieved a "M" designation.

[James Langham]

Well here we go...

[Grendel]

Originally Posted by James Langham

Well here we go...

Nice!!

[HorseSoldier]

As for organisation, I suggest it is done as the Sherman 76s were used in WW2, each division can make it's own plan, some will have separate companies to ease logistics, others will have them integrated within troops for flexibility, others will compromise with separate companies. Most will just slot them in wherever they can get a vehicle as a replacement.

While at the sharp end, task organization would be standard, I can't see the Big Army signing off on a "make it up as you go along" approach to the MTOE.

First, even if it's a common chassis, fire control, and everything else, ultimately a different gun system means variation in parts streams on the logistics side, as well as the more obvious ammo issue. Second there will be standards for gunnery, doctrinal employment, etc., that will be better supported by consolidation on the organizational side. Think mech infantry Echo Companies and the M901.

I'd suggest the light infantry Light Tank Battalion (Armored Gun Battalion, Direct Fire Support Battalion, whatever) would be three companies of LAV75s organized into 14 vehicle companies as per standard tank companies, with a fourth company of 20 LAVs with 105. Nominally this gives a mobile anti-armor company per brigade and a two vehicle section of 105mm armed vehicles per battalion for direct fire support (though obviously the usual METT-T realities will drive who gets at any given time). In a more real-world scenario, the 105 would probably be the format of choice -- able enough anti-armor and more anti-infantry bang -- but LAV75 heavy when part of the equation is fighting off the Soviet AFV hordes makes sense.

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by HorseSoldier

While at the sharp end, task organization would be standard, I can't see the Big Army signing off on a "make it up as you go along" approach to the MTOE.

First, even if it's a common chassis, fire control, and everything else, ultimately a different gun system means variation in parts streams on the logistics side, as well as the more obvious ammo issue. Second there will be standards for gunnery, doctrinal employment, etc., that will be better supported by consolidation on the organizational side. Think mech infantry Echo Companies and the M901.

I'd suggest the light infantry Light Tank Battalion (Armored Gun Battalion, Direct Fire Support Battalion, whatever) would be three companies of LAV75s organized into 14 vehicle companies as per standard tank companies, with a fourth company of 20 LAVs with 105. Nominally this gives a mobile anti-armor company per brigade and a two vehicle section of 105mm armed vehicles per battalion for direct fire support (though obviously the usual METT-T realities will drive who gets at any given time). In a more real-world scenario, the 105 would probably be the format of choice -- able enough anti-armor and more anti-infantry bang -- but LAV75 heavy when part of the equation is fighting off the Soviet AFV hordes makes sense.

The manual may well say one thing...

See the Osprey on the 76mm Sherman for a comparison of 2 similar tanks with different armaments. Cross attaching would also be common. I may even put a comment in that some tankers preferred the 75mm for the rate of fire and reliability of the autoloader as fighting tanks rare late war.

[Webstral]

James, excellent work finding photos to support the writing! I feel the images really strengthen the presentation. Inclusion of the M551 chassis as a basis for some of the light tank variants found in the US tank park during the Twilight War indeed is creative. I have concerns about the timeline. It’s one thing to have a 105mm variant of the LAV-75 on the drawing board and examples of the original vehicle in service in 1995. It’s quite another to try to introduce a new AFV for US light divisions after the fighting starts in the Far East but before the US gets involved in the world war. Still, it would be hypocritical of me to point fingers at someone going off-reservation in terms of timelines, allocation of resources, troops, materiel, etc.

Horse, I’m intrigued by your idea for task organization. I like the idea of a reinforced company to provide fire support. If such a thing were fairly standardized within the Army in 1997, it would be easier to explain how a company-sized body of Ridgways with 105mm guns was assigned to Huachuca.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by HorseSoldier

While at the sharp end, task organization would be standard, I can't see the Big Army signing off on a "make it up as you go along" approach to the MTOE.

First, even if it's a common chassis, fire control, and everything else, ultimately a different gun system means variation in parts streams on the logistics side, as well as the more obvious ammo issue. Second there will be standards for gunnery, doctrinal employment, etc., that will be better supported by consolidation on the organizational side. Think mech infantry Echo Companies and the M901.

I'd suggest the light infantry Light Tank Battalion (Armored Gun Battalion, Direct Fire Support Battalion, whatever) would be three companies of LAV75s organized into 14 vehicle companies as per standard tank companies, with a fourth company of 20 LAVs with 105. Nominally this gives a mobile anti-armor company per brigade and a two vehicle section of 105mm armed vehicles per battalion for direct fire support (though obviously the usual METT-T realities will drive who gets at any given time). In a more real-world scenario, the 105 would probably be the format of choice -- able enough anti-armor and more anti-infantry bang -- but LAV75 heavy when part of the equation is fighting off the Soviet AFV hordes makes sense.

I'd have to disagree with the idea of a armored battalion trying to maintain ammunition loads of two major caliber weapons just from a logistical standpoint alone. It would be far more likely for the 75mm versions to be assigned to the airborne/light divisions with the 105mm versions beings assigned to the cavalry squadrons...

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

I'd have to disagree with the idea of a armored battalion trying to maintain ammunition loads of two major caliber weapons just from a logistical standpoint alone. It would be far more likely for the 75mm versions to be assigned to the airborne/light divisions with the 105mm versions beings assigned to the cavalry squadrons...

What seems logical to us here for some reason never seems to be to senior officers and politicians...

Remember the 105 version is only issued later on, it would be too hard to standardize then. Also it has been fairly common to have different ammo types in the same unit. Actually 75mm and 105mm is less ammo types than an M2 unit with 25mm, TOW and 7.62mm, even before we consider the M231s and dismounts.

Depending on your take of history, feel free to change, after all I'm not canon. an earlier issue would easily allow your change.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by James Langham

What seems logical to us here for some reason never seems to be to senior officers and politicians...

Remember the 105 version is only issued later on, it would be too hard to standardize then. Also it has been fairly common to have different ammo types in the same unit. Actually 75mm and 105mm is less ammo types than an M2 unit with 25mm, TOW and 7.62mm, even before we consider the M231s and dismounts.

Depending on your take of history, feel free to change, after all I'm not canon. an earlier issue would easily allow your change.

All too true and I did consider that argument; but I also remember an episode that happened in Germany during a Table VIII gunnery, we had just converted to M-1A1s and had ordered 120mm ammo....and the transportation company delivered 105mm...funny in peace time, but in war time...OUCH!

Hmmmm, on the other hand, what a horrible thing to do to a group of players!

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

All too true and I did consider that argument; but I also remember an episode that happened in Germany during a Table VIII gunnery, we had just converted to M-1A1s and had ordered 120mm ammo....and the transportation company delivered 105mm...funny in peace time, but in war time...OUCH!

Hmmmm, on the other hand, what a horrible thing to do to a group of players!

On the other hand having both types means SOME will have ammo :-)

"Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."

[Webstral]

There is a logic to both arguments regarding task organization. US mech units already are accustomed to maintaining large numbers of different vehicles. For example, in 1993 the 4th Combat Engineer Battalion (Mech) used M113, M577, HMMWV, 2.5 ton trucks, 5 ton trucks, at least two models of bulldozer, HMMIT fuelers and wreckers, and other vehicles. Granted, none of these vehicles used unique large caliber ammunition. Large caliber ammo is a supply consideration all its own. Still, the folks empowered to make such decisions will base their conclusions on the perceived need/usefulness of adding LAV fire support vehicles to existing LAV-75 battalions versus the additional logistical burden. Light divisions will need both the anti-armor capability and the fire support capability. This might be one of those moments when the maneuver commanders tell the support people to suck it up and do their [expletive deleted] jobs. Sometimes there will be ammunition mix-ups. If the LAV FSV is deemed sufficiently useful, some mix-ups might be judged a price to be paid.

[James Langham]

I do sometimes worry how hard we work to make things realistic when reality is far weirder...

The nice thing with this group is the way everyone is friendly and even if we can't reach a consensus we can agree to disagree and run our own campaigns the way we want.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Webstral

There is a logic to both arguments regarding task organization. US mech units already are accustomed to maintaining large numbers of different vehicles. For example, in 1993 the 4th Combat Engineer Battalion (Mech) used M113, M577, HMMWV, 2.5 ton trucks, 5 ton trucks, at least two models of bulldozer, HMMIT fuelers and wreckers, and other vehicles. Granted, none of these vehicles used unique large caliber ammunition. Large caliber ammo is a supply consideration all its own. Still, the folks empowered to make such decisions will base their conclusions on the perceived need/usefulness of adding LAV fire support vehicles to existing LAV-75 battalions versus the additional logistical burden. Light divisions will need both the anti-armor capability and the fire support capability. This might be one of those moments when the maneuver commanders tell the support people to suck it up and do their [expletive deleted] jobs. Sometimes there will be ammunition mix-ups. If the LAV FSV is deemed sufficiently useful, some mix-ups might be judged a price to be paid.

Good point!

As far as the mounting of a 105mm on a LAV75; it probably would be more likely that a mounting for a TOW Under Armor system of some kind would be the vehicle of choice. The time frame of T2K would be as the M-901 was leaving service (Echo companies of the mech bns be deactivated). Now the M901 was top heavy for the M113 chassis, but yanking a turret, and replacing it with a TUA stripped from a M901...

I went digging through some old Armor magazines trying to find any of the articles that talked about alternative designs for the LAV, unfortunately the only mention that I could find for were two mentions in passing about a mortar version and a TUA version, neither of which went into any great detail. Still, it is intresting that they were already considering that the 75mm would have problems with the anti-armor role. The article itself was a more of "what-if" the RDF light tank would be deployed sort of thing.

The whole chain of RDFLT-LAV75 is a great "what might have been", but the final judgement for the 75mm was that it packed too little umph, was too complex, and would be too much of a logistical problem.

Still....it would have been fun to take one down range!

[pmulcahy11b]

For what it's worth, my Janes Armor & Artillery 1983-1984 edition says that ARES was working on a 90mm version of the same autocannon on the LAV-75, but abandoned it after producing two working prototypes, to concentrate on the 75mm version. It doesn't say why they did, however.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by pmulcahy11b

For what it's worth, my Janes Armor & Artillery 1983-1984 edition says that ARES was working on a 90mm version of the same autocannon on the LAV-75, but abandoned it after producing two working prototypes, to concentrate on the 75mm version. It doesn't say why they did, however.

Wan't that about the same time that Cockerill displayed their lightweight 90mm?

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Good point!

As far as the mounting of a 105mm on a LAV75; it probably would be more likely that a mounting for a TOW Under Armor system of some kind would be the vehicle of choice. The time frame of T2K would be as the M-901 was leaving service (Echo companies of the mech bns be deactivated). Now the M901 was top heavy for the M113 chassis, but yanking a turret, and replacing it with a TUA stripped from a M901...

I went digging through some old Armor magazines trying to find any of the articles that talked about alternative designs for the LAV, unfortunately the only mention that I could find for were two mentions in passing about a mortar version and a TUA version, neither of which went into any great detail. Still, it is intresting that they were already considering that the 75mm would have problems with the anti-armor role. The article itself was a more of "what-if" the RDF light tank would be deployed sort of thing.

The whole chain of RDFLT-LAV75 is a great "what might have been", but the final judgement for the 75mm was that it packed too little umph, was too complex, and would be too much of a logistical problem.

Still....it would have been fun to take one down range!

I did consider it but my feeling is that the M901s will be remaining in service, many being pulled from storage. Maybe a change in employment methods? I'm fairly sure the M551TUA was trialled or at least a prototype built. With all of these TUA vehicles on light chassis, the biggest problem is a lack of storage space for reloads (maybe a reload vehicle?).

Again what I love is the way we all agree to disagree.

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

Wan't that about the same time that Cockerill displayed their lightweight 90mm?

Maybe ARES got a wind of it, but it's not in that issue of Janes.

[Webstral]

I'm reluctant to throw my support behind eliminating the LAV-75 from the lineup because the established body of material includes the LAV-75 rather prominently. Grendal posted some excellent material effectively debunking the idea that the 75mm ARES gun had problems with killing power vis-à-vis a 105mm low-recoil gun. If cost was a primary reason for not pursuing the LAV-75, then the fact that the Cold War didn’t end in 1989 may give us all the reason we need to imagine the LAV-75 being placed into service.

We can imagine, though, that in the climate of 1996 and certainly 1997 every AFV that can be cobbled together of available parts will be assembled and given to somebody. The US Army Vehicle Guide features a number of interesting items. I’m sure we can devise many, many more. I would expect to see units in CONUS supported by a veritable flying circus above and beyond the heavier AFV listed in the Guide in formations like the 40th Infantry Division. I’d include some in the TO&E for 111th Brigade but for the inconvenient fact that SAMAD is physically isolated from the rest of the US after mid-1998. However, formations in Fifth and Sixth US Armies might make use of all sorts of non-standardized light AFV.

I’m fond of armored TOW launchers, but they don’t do the job of an assault gun, light tank, or tank destroyer. The whole purpose of creating a vehicle like the LAV-75, M-8, or other such system was to create a mobile gun system. If the 82nd Airborne and other divisions like it had wanted armored TOW launchers in the 1980’s, no one would have bothered trying to create a replacement for the Sheridan. Sometimes a gun is the best tool for the job.

[HorseSoldier]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

I'd have to disagree with the idea of a armored battalion trying to maintain ammunition loads of two major caliber weapons just from a logistical standpoint alone. It would be far more likely for the 75mm versions to be assigned to the airborne/light divisions with the 105mm versions beings assigned to the cavalry squadrons...

It's less complicated than what US tank battalions made work in WW2, and not much more complex than supporting a standard tank battalion with an organic mortar platoon.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by HorseSoldier

It's less complicated than what US tank battalions made work in WW2, and not much more complex than supporting a standard tank battalion with an organic mortar platoon.

I guess my problem with this is that, in my office, I get to see a lot of the more intresting screwups with the supply system, so I view the supply system with a bloodshot eye! Even with the amount of computer support that the military has now, it is amazing the number of problems that occur! I've seen everything from medical units being issued out of date medication (slated for disposal but some SP4 screwed up) to tank battalions being issued TOW missiles (and we are not talking basic loads for the scout platoon, try 1,200 missiles!) to units in Iraq having artic clothing sent to them....in the middle of summer!

Now toss into the problem that of issuing two main caliber ammo types to the same battalion. And to make it even more fun, your assault gun battalion is attached to a light division with three battalions of 105mm howitzer ammunition. What are the odds that howitzer ammo will be issued?

And just to give a bit of historical background, Just Cause, the invasion of Panama, had a little logistical incident. A platoon of M-60A1s were assigned to Panama to provide support, and sure enough, they were initially issued 105mm howitzer ammo because of a computer screwup! An emergency supply of 105mm tank ammo had to be airlifted into the area and arrived just before the shooting started.

To be sure, the system works most of the time, but its almost the nature of the system that supply screwups will, not might, happen.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

To be sure, the system works most of the time, but its almost the nature of the system that supply screwups will, not might, happen.

So true! I'm certain that the supply types would be making almost exactly your argument against a 105mm variant of the LAV-75. The maneuver generals will reply in two ways: a) the fighting in the Far East has shown that light forces need stiffening with airmobile armor and b) the supply people are never going to get behind anything that makes their job more difficult, regardless of what that means for the troops actually doing the fighting. The former probably would be true. The latter is cheap shot, although there's a grain of truth in there. The logistics specialists have been a driving force behind commonality of supply since WW2 for good reason. Nonetheless, the "fighting" generals will attempt to discredit the arguments of the supply types if the maneuver commanders become convinced that an FSV variant of the LAV-75 is needed. The real question will be whose voice gets heard.