T2K and the French & Indian War

[Raellus]

I have a habit of tying just about everything I read- especially nonfiction- back to Twilight 2000. I'm currently reading a book about Rogers' Rangers and the French & Indian War called War on the Run, by John Ross. It's a pretty good book that recounts/analyzes the role of provincial "ranger" companies during the FIW and the strained relationship between regular and irregular forces in one of the modern era's first "world wars" AND "low intensity" conflicts (counterintuitively, not mutually exclusive). It also has a lot of applications to a T2KU.

It seems to be that warfare/combat in many theaters c.2000 would resemble that which took place along the northeastern frontier between France and England's North American colonies during the French & Indian War, especially with the paucity of aerial and SIGINT later in the Twilight War.

On the frontier between New France and New England, you had scattered settlements, frequently raided by hostile groups of Native Americans, sometimes with rival European encouragement, other times acting of their own accord. You can bet that small settlements in most parts of the world c.2000 would have to worry about raiders, be they hostile military forces or outright marauders. Similar to the frontier around the time of the FIW, population density in most parts of the world would be a lot lower in T2K 2000 than they were just a few years before. Many mid-sized North American frontier settlements during colonial times had rudimentary fortifications (even if it was just one sturdy, palisaded house to which the settlement's inhabitants could retreat) and their own part time militias. Small, lightly fortified civilian settlements with lightly equipped civie miltias are an integral part of the T2K trope.

Forts guarded major trade routes and strategic choke points- in both cases, often rivers. Louisbourg also defended a city. I can see fixed fortifications- forts- making a comeback in the T2KU. In same cases, these forts would resemble Vietnam War-era Special Forces camps and/or today's Afghanistan FOBs. In others, they might resemble the larger, more permanent, "shot-proof" fortifications of the early-to-mid 17th century. You might even see some walled towns/small cities, similar to those of late Renaissance Europe- the Krakow of T2K being a prime example.

General officers during the FIW constantly needed fresh hard intel and, in order to obtain it, they often counted on the services of parties of frontiersmen and/or Indian scouts. In the T2KU, light infantry units proficient in long-range patrolling would become more and more important over time. Rogers Rangers were used to obtain intelligence on enemy numbers, movements, and dispositions via direct observation and/or prisoner snatches. To do so, they often had to traverse hundreds of miles of wilderness, on foot and/or by small boat. They also harassed the enemy by ambushing small parties of troops and/or supply convoys, killing livestock, and burning supply stockpiles. Burning crops and killing cattle at the onset of winter could have serious negative health and morale effects on the wintering enemy. When taking part in major military operations, ranger units would scout ahead of and screen the main [conventional] force. Occasionally, ranger-type units conducted raids on enemy settlements (Jesuit Indian missions). The French, who had a more symbiotic relationship with the region's Native Americans, were quick to adopt Indian-style units and tactics. The British Army, on the other hand, was a little slow to warm to the idea of locally-raised ranger units fighting like "red savages". Over time, however, as these units proved their worth, more and larger ranger units were authorized, including companies almost exclusively made up of friendly Indians. It was hard to argue with positive results, and there was always work for these ranger units to do. Despite their success, however, the tension between stuffy "old school" commanders and irregular units continued throughout the war.

In the T2KU, these sorts of missions, and the skills they required, would become commonplace as the fuel-starved, technology-deprived armies of the world settled into the cantonment system. A lot of these skills would be gleaned through OTJ (on-the-job) training. Over time, in a natural evolution, mech infantry units would look and operate more like light infantry units. There'd probably also be a lot of ad hoc "ranger" units set up on field commanders' own innitiative. You might also see some more formal, institutionalized training systems set up to help soldiers more quickly and fully adapt to the warfare of the late TW. In my Operation Pround Lion write up, I described a Recondo School set up by the 173rd RCT in Kenya to help create more purpose-built LRRP units for its widely-dispersed, battalion-sized line units. With some regional/institutional variation, I think these types of field training programs would pop up all over the world. I think most divisional commanders would want to raise more ranger-type units for LRRP'ing, screening, and raiding. I also think that these sorts of units would be a good place to put locally "recruited", high-quality personnel, since they would have knowledge of local geography and culture that could prove useful field operations.

To sum up, I see warfare c. 2000 resembling the warfare of the FIW:

A large wilderness (Poland = New France-England frontier), dotted by a few inkblots of civilization (organized/defended cities and/or cantonment areas) and sprinkled with forts astride MSRs and whatnot, plagued by some small but aggressive armed groups (marauders = Indians), and patrolled by smallish, flexible, "elite" ranger-type units (from both sides).

[Webstral]

I like the thinking. I'll comment more as time permits.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

I like the thinking. I'll comment more as time permits.

Your New England-based materials came to mind a few times while I've been reading the book.

[Webstral]

One of the phenomena I have briefly described in my sketches for a New England sourcebook/module is "consolidation". The population of New England coalesces into defensible cantonments that resemble medieval towns. Suburban sprawl becomes vast swaths of untenanted land patrolled by hunters, salvagers, militia, the insane, and those who prey on other humans. It's this process of consolidation that leads to the rise of hordes.

[Targan]

Raellus, I very much see the parallels you've drawn. I've seen many similar parallels in the way that British and New Zealand irregular units fought during the Anglo-Māori Wars in New Zealand from the 1840s to the 1870s. In particular, in the methods of the Forest Ranger Companies which were formed to use non-standard tactics and take the fight to the Māori in the bush, quite unlike the methods of the regular British Redcoats.

I'm no expert in the New Zealand Wars but I know a little bit about one colourful character, Major Gustavus von Tempsky. As a matter of fact, my most prized possession is a framed, limited edition print of a watercolour painting by von Tempsky of one of his unit's own military encampments in Taranaki in 1866. Von Tempsky was a Royal Prussian Army officer, adventurer, prospector and artist who had commanded a force of Mosquito Indians in Central America on behalf of the British before joining the Forest Rangers.

The Forest Rangers were renowned for wearing very different uniforms to the British Army of the time (dark browns, greens and blues instead of bright red), hard, practical wear for long periods in the forests of New Zealand. They were very proficient in ambush tactics and raiding and had much greater mobility than the Redcoats. And they were used to operating a long way from friendly forces and with minimal logistical support.

The Forest Rangers were disbanded 6 months after the scene in my print and von Tempsy joined the Armed Constabulary instead. He died in battle trying to save a wounded constable during an assault on a Māori gunfighter Pā (a Pā is basically a kind of rapidly constructed log palisade fort which was extreme effective and had some surprisingly modern features for the time), caught a bullet right in the middle of his forehead. This was during a less than successful campaign against the forces of the infamous Māori warchief and prophet Titokowaru whose forces, though outnumbered 12 to 1 by the British, never lost a battle during the Taranaki War. The gunfighter Pā (Māori) is similar in size and layout to what I think many forward operating bases and outlying cantonment forts would look like late in the Twilight War.

The Māori had great respect for von Tempsky's abilities as a warrior so (according to some sources) they did him the ultimate honour of eating bits of him.

[Medic]

A very good Post, Rae. The light infantry tactics are pretty much what the Finns used as well during the WW2 as well, especially during the Winter War. The use of terrain and snow for concealment allowed us to take out vastly greater enemy forces. This is still the doctrine of the Finnish Army (and will be even more as there has been some hefty budgetary cuts that have forced the Army to adapt - what used to be a task for the whole platoon will now become more a responsibility of a squad and some new technology).

[Raellus]

Targan, I know next to nothing about the Anglo-Maori wars but, from what you describe, there seem to be a couple of clear parallels with the FIW. I'm interested in learning more about this. Do you have any book recommendations on the subject (preferably something still in print)?

Medic, I hadn't thought to compare the FIW and the Winter War. Thanks for bringing this up. Now that I think of it, there are a quite a few similarities. Roger's Rangers and their French counterparts were much more mobile (using snowshoes, sleds, and primitive iceskates) and active during the harsh winters of NE North America than their respective shelter-bound conventional military brethren.

I guess that these two examples bring up a larger point and that is that unconventional forces and tactics, when properly used, can be successful against both other irregulars and larger, more conventional forces. They're not a panacea, per se, but they can be an important force multiplier, especially given difficult terrain which impedes the operation of conventional forces. I think that in the T2KU, with smaller population densities (and larger areas of "wilderness"), and far fewer vehicles (and much lessfuel to run them), you've got a recipe for unconventional forces to take on a much more pivotal role in military operations than they would have when the huge, mechanized armies of the first world contested the battlefields of the planet.

[Adm.Lee]

You can also read into the development of British light infantry after 1763, through 1815. The most famous, of course, would be Riflemen made famous by Bernard Cornwell's "Sharpe's" novels, made into movies with Sean Bean.

I'd still like to find a good book on Sir John Moore's creating his Light Brigade (Division?) before 1809.

But, yeah, 2000 in a lot of places is going to look like what George Washington called "a war of posts." Light infantry (horse) patrols made up of PCs, wandering between towns and firebases.

[WallShadow]

I lived within 10 miles of the line of forts and fortified houses set up to resist any attacks by the local tribes of Indians. Before I moved from the area, the walls and blockhouse of Fort Loudon had been recreated. Our local gun club and buckskinning group was called the Ft. McCord Militia. Also nearby were the sites in order heading north from the Mason-Dixon line, of Ft Marshall, Ft. Davis, Reverend Steele's Fort, Ft.McDonnell, Ft. Loudon ,Ft. Waddel, and the massacred Ft. McCord as mentioned below. These were designed to form rallying points for settlers to flee to in the event of an attack.

"By early 1756, the Pennsylvania General Assembly finally decided to take action and defend the settlers. Pennsylvania voted to build a chain of forts along the Blue Ridge Mountains from the Delaware River to the Mason-Dixon Line. These forts were to serve and protect communities from Indian attacks. William McCord and his brothers built Ft. McCord in 1756 as part of this line of Pennsylvania’s frontier forts. It is well known and memorialized in Pennsylvania history where 26 people lost their lives or were captured on April 1, 1756 in an attack by the Indians backed by the French."

[Webstral]

The drawback of light infantry is that they require qualities that line infantry don’t have to possess. I’m all in favor of light infantry; however, real light infantry (as opposed to line infantry who are lightly equipped) require something above and beyond men trained for conventional combat. Raising units like this from scratch is going to be a challenge for anyone who doesn’t have a few of these guys to teach new light infantry recruits. This is not to say it can’t be done. Just that the light infantry who conduct long range operations without substantial logistical support will represent an elite among the body of troops from which they are drawn. Also, as people accustomed to thinking for themselves, they won’t always be the favorites of the commanders over them.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

The drawback of light infantry is that they require qualities that line infantry don’t have to possess. I’m all in favor of light infantry; however, real light infantry (as opposed to line infantry who are lightly equipped) require something above and beyond men trained for conventional combat. Raising units like this from scratch is going to be a challenge for anyone who doesn’t have a few of these guys to teach new light infantry recruits. This is not to say it can’t be done. Just that the light infantry who conduct long range operations without substantial logistical support will represent an elite among the body of troops from which they are drawn. Also, as people accustomed to thinking for themselves, they won’t always be the favorites of the commanders over them.

I agree with most of your assessment, Web. A commander couldn't just wave his magic wand and declare that such and such a company is now "ranger". I mean he could call them whatever he wants but it wouldn't necessarily mean anything. In the FIW, a couple of jingoistic, parochial British line officers tried to replace provincial rangers with their own British-born light infantry units, with minimal operational success. LRRP'ing requires skills not necessarily learned in basic or other line infantry training programs.

The Recondo school idea is basically an in-theater training facility/program where legitimate, tabbed Rangers and SF guys (perhaps guys that have been wounded and can't operate in the field anymore and/or guys who are convalescing), and probably local experts, would train selected line infantry in the finer arts of long range patrolling, ambush, etc. The 5th SFG ran a Recondo school in Vietnam during the war. Most early Recondo graduates were just volunteers from line units. They became the first LRRPs. If it worked then, for that war, it would probably work for the late Twilight War. If you're interested in how the program worked, you might want to pick up a copy of Recondo- LRRPs in the 101st Airborne, a decent firsthand account by Vietnam LRRP/Ranger vet Larry Chambers.

There would be more and longer periods of down-time later in the war, like when armies slow things down for the winter. There would be opportunities for classes to cycle through the Recondo programs. They could then form the cadre for "ranger" (little R) units for their parent divisions or whatever.

As for operating on their own without substantial logistical support, I think that by 2000, with large conventional units growing their own food and brewing their own fuel, travelling light and living off the land would come a lot more naturally to most troops than it would have in '96. Yes, rangers would take it to the next level, but it wouldn't be too much of a stretch. If anything, late-war ranger units would probably require less logistical support than line units.

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Targan, I know next to nothing about the Anglo-Maori wars but, from what you describe, there seem to be a couple of clear parallels with the FIW. I'm interested in learning more about this. Do you have any book recommendations on the subject (preferably something still in print)?

Unfortunately it's such a niche subject that few books have been written on it and of those they are mostly New Zealand publications. None of the books I've read on the subject are still in print. The best book I've read on the subject was James Belich's The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Penguin Books, 1986). I'm looking at trying to find a copy on the internet of Edmund Bohan's Climates of War, New Zealand in Conflict 1859-69 (Hazard Press, 2005) as I've read good things about it.

[Webstral]

Rae, I agree that the nature of the conflict will provide a more uniformly satisfactory pool of candidates for rangers (lower case r) than the largely mechanized force that enters the Twilight War. The need for scrounging and improvising will produce a force that is more self-reliant than the force that entered the war, too. I wonder, though, whether the troops will be involved in distilling fuel and growing food. The transfer of administrative functions to civilians so that able-bodied troops can be freed for combat duties seems likely to extend itself throughout the CSS specialties and perhaps some CS specialties.

As always, my attention is more fixed on CONUS than Europe or other locations in the world. (Of course, I’m always eager to read what others are creating elsewhere in the world.) After a certain point in time, virtually every surviving body of armed men will have someone dedicated to light infantry operations. This function would entail recce at the minimum. More capable light forces would be able to ambush and raid. They might also serve to secure lines of communication for larger, less capable conventional forces that would be needed to tackle marauders in their dens.

I have tried to address this idea to some degree with the organization of forces in New England and SAMAD. The State of Vermont is served by the Green Jackets Regiment, which is a light infantry formation used extensively for patrolling inside and outside the area nominally under the control of the rump Vermont government. The Green Jackets operate in enhanced platoon-sized formations that can move by foot, truck, or skis. During the winter months, ski patrols aggressively move into other parts of Vermont, upstate New York, and New Hampshire to locate marauders for suitable attention when they are snowbound and most vulnerable to having their shelter burned down. Replacements come from the militia units also under the control of the state government. The existence of a body of much less capable troops as the foundation of the light fighters is an important component, I believe.

The Maritime Rifles of First District are light-ish infantry in that they conduct patrols well outside the boundaries of the District. However, they often fight in close coordination with truck-mounted mortars and with motorized resupply. Thus, the Maritime Rifles as a whole don’t really meet the definition of light infantry. The recon elements within the MR could be counted as rangers, though.

I don’t see the UBF Marines as being light infantry, though again they would have some recon elements that would count. Based on the very scanty evidence of The Last Submarine, I have the impression that the UBF Marines operate close to the water and close to whatever heavy weapons they have available. They probably would move by water very close to any target of a raid; and thus they would not be out of supply for an extended period. Without a doubt, the Marines are tough customers. I don’t see the majority of them being rangers in the sense we have been discussing.

The Granite Brigade of the State of New Hampshire definitely are not light infantry, though they too have a recon element that would count as light infantry. The graniteers are more like dismounted motorized infantry in that they fight with close support from one or more of their gun trucks. The Granite Brigade reflects a confidence in firepower over skill. Through early 2001, they have had the luxury of keeping a handful of gun trucks operable. What will happen when and if they can’t field their gun trucks anymore is an interesting question.

The 43rd MP Brigade seems to have some troops who can be classified as light infantry. In The Last Submarine, players may encounter a hunter-killer group of MPs in Boston. Boston and Springfield are not exactly adjacent—especially if you are taking the heel-and-toe express to move between them. While the majority of MPs may be line infantry, for all intents and purposes, the soldiers of the hunter-killer groups clearly are capable of doing all of the things a squad of rangers would do. (This begs an interesting question. Do the MPs move to Boston as a platoon, then send smaller groups out from the patrol base?)

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

The need for scrounging and improvising will produce a force that is more self-reliant than the force that entered the war, too. I wonder, though, whether the troops will be involved in distilling fuel and growing food. The transfer of administrative functions to civilians so that able-bodied troops can be freed for combat duties seems likely to extend itself throughout the CSS specialties and perhaps some CS specialties.

I think local civies will take care of most food and fuel production, but I do believe that troops taking a break from combat ops would also be asked to shoulder some of the load whenever possible. The Red Army of WWII was routinely tasked with helping with the harvest and other agricultural jobs in areas liberated from the Germans. In many areas, due to German depredations, there just weren't enough civilians left to do all of the work that needed to be done. I think this would be the case in many parts of the world, Poland especially. Armies would have to pitch in out of sheer necessity.

Ranger companies would probably be exempted from this sort of duty since they would be conducting field operations pretty much year round.

Your Green Jackets sound very much like a modern iteration of Robert's Rangers (and perhaps Ethan Allen's Green Mountain Boys during the Revolutionary period, before Vermont got really uppity)- incidentally, Roger's Rangers' official uniform consisted of green jacket and breeches.

[mikeo80]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I think local civies will take care of most food and fuel production, but I do believe that troops taking a break from combat ops would also be asked to shoulder some of the load whenever possible. The Red Army of WWII was routinely tasked with helping with the harvest and other agricultural jobs in areas liberated from the Germans. In many areas, due to German depredations, there just weren't enough civilians left to do all of the work that needed to be done. I think this would be the case in many parts of the world, Poland especially. Armies would have to pitch in out of sheer necessity.

Ranger companies would probably be exempted from this sort of duty since they would be conducting field operations pretty much year round.

Your Green Jackets sound very much like a modern iteration of Robert's Rangers (and perhaps Ethan Allen's Green Mountain Boys during the Revolutionary period, before Vermont got really uppity)- incidentally, Roger's Rangers' official uniform consisted of green jacket and breeches.

I also think that the "regular's" will be tasked with the day to day of foraging, preparing defenses, cleaning weapons, maintenance on whatever equipment happens to be with the unit. It even says in both V1 and V2.2 that foraging and farming were the order of the day once the unit had set up its' fortified base of operations.

I think that the summer offensive of 2000 with the German III corp and the US V ID took the Russians, Poles, etc. by supprise. The Russian IV Army with it's gasoline was probably slated for a late fall/early winter offensive. Once the crops were in. I would imagine that the Spetnaz attached to IVth Army were conducting scouting/recon/road inspection for the tanks, that sort of task. They were probably looking at a drive to the west directed at the junction of the American and British Armies. This is the area the Spetnaz was concentrating on, vs the German III Corp.

The "Ranger" type of unit is probably the last of their kind. The best of the best after all these years of warfare. Any compitant commander would keep his "Rangers" as a strategic reserve, to be used in dire times or for dire missions.

My $0.02

Mike

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by Webstral

I wonder, though, whether the troops will be involved in distilling fuel and growing food. The transfer of administrative functions to civilians so that able-bodied troops can be freed for combat duties seems likely to extend itself throughout the CSS specialities and perhaps some CS specialities.

It does seem the logical thing to do, but it doesn't appear to have occurred in T2K, at least not on a wide scale. The 2000 offensive was after all delayed because the troops hadn't been able to sow their crops for the year because of the later than expected rains.
A unit on the move also needs it's administrative support networks to do exactly as they're told, when they're told - civilians aren't exactly reliable enough, especially when there's a chance of combat. What commander wants their support network to flee the area right when they're needed most?

Originally Posted by Webstral

(This begs an interesting question. Do the MPs move to Boston as a platoon, then send smaller groups out from the patrol base?)

My guess? Absolutely. There's strength in numbers, and it's beneficial to have a base, even just a temporary one, to return to between forays.

Originally Posted by mikeo80

I think that the summer offensive of 2000 with the German III corp and the US V ID took the Russians, Poles, etc. by surprise. The Russian IV Army with it's gasoline was probably slated for a late fall/early winter offensive. Once the crops were in. I would imagine that the Spetnaz attached to IVth Army were conducting scouting/recon/road inspection for the tanks, that sort of task. They were probably looking at a drive to the west directed at the junction of the American and British Armies. This is the area the Spetnaz was concentrating on, vs the German III Corp.

The evidence does seem to back up a planned Pact offensive, but I'm not so sure it would have waited until autumn/winter - harvesting has to be done before the crops simply rot in the fields.
What the evidence doesn't show us is whether or not the Pact was taken by surprise. It's certainly possible, but even without aerial and satellite surveillance they'd have to know something was on the cards. Nato hadn't carried out any significant action in the north of Germany for approximately two years and those units there had for the most part done nothing but train, reorganise and build up supplies during that period (down south it was a bit different).
It's possible the Pact 2000 offensive was delayed, either because of weather conditions preventing reinforcements being brought up in time, or because the commanders "smelt a rat" and decided to hold their units for the probable need for a counter attack.

[mikeo80]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

The evidence does seem to back up a planned Pact offensive, but I'm not so sure it would have waited until autumn/winter - harvesting has to be done before the crops simply rot in the fields.
What the evidence doesn't show us is whether or not the Pact was taken by surprise. It's certainly possible, but even without aerial and satellite surveillance they'd have to know something was on the cards. Nato hadn't carried out any significant action in the north of Germany for approximately two years and those units there had for the most part done nothing but train, reorganise and build up supplies during that period (down south it was a bit different).
It's possible the Pact 2000 offensive was delayed, either because of weather conditions preventing reinforcements being brought up in time, or because the commanders "smelt a rat" and decided to hold their units for the probable need for a counter attack.

There is also the possibility the the Soviet Military leaders were looking at history. The great winter offensives of 1942,1942, and 1943 during the Great Patriotic War all worked to one degree or another. The Russian Bear was always most dangerous during the winter. (Ask the Swedes, French and Germans!) What better way to drive that offensive then with the Russian IVth Army with it's gasoline (diesel?) powered tanks. The delay could have been pre-programmed to allow the Romanian Oil Fields more time to produce and refine gasoline/diesel!!

Obviously from the ORBAT of the Russian Army as presented by Allied Intellegence to Vth ID, the planners of the Allied offensive did NOT expect to run into IVth Russian.

I can see the commander of IVth Russian turning his entire "Ranger"/Spetnaz units loose on the Allied offensive as soon as the drive was anylized and plotted on the gaming table!

My $0.02

Mike

[Webstral]

In the interests of keeping the thread on-topic, I want to point out that the presence of Fourth Guards Tank Army in Belarus with its gasoline has been discussed at length in other threads.