OT: Putin's War in Ukraine

[castlebravo92]

Originally Posted by Spartan-117

Like a 90's battle group...

We'd clean the Ruzzian's clock if NATO was unleashed on them with current equipment, professional troops, and unconstrained logistics.

I think a National Guard division like the 36th probably could have defeated the Russian invasion by itself. Much less an active duty division, much less a full corps with air supremacy.

Ironically, I really think the outcome of this conflict is going to be the emergence of Poland as the dominant military land power in Europe. Their buying spree is impressive, and they are going for pretty much top of the line gear. They'll have an armored force about 6-8x the size of Germany's.

[Heffe]

Originally Posted by castlebravo92

I think a National Guard division like the 36th probably could have defeated the Russian invasion by itself. Much less an active duty division, much less a full corps with air supremacy.

Ironically, I really think the outcome of this conflict is going to be the emergency of Poland as the dominant military land power in Europe. Their buying spree is impressive, and they are going for pretty much top of the line gear. They'll have an armored force about 6-8x the size of Germany's.

And given Poland's history, who could blame them?

Since we're all commanding from our armchairs, I'll go out on a limb here. The result of this war has already been decided, and Putin has lost. I just don't see a path forward for Russia where it becomes able to achieve it's operational/strategic goals, not with the losses they've already suffered.

Russia's best bet is to effectively force Ukraine to concede the land already occupied, but short of a major catastrophe, I don't see Ukraine agreeing to concessions anytime soon. As far as cards to play, Russia could and will resort to additional mobilizations, but without the supporting training, equipment, and leadership, those men are just being fed into a meat grinder. All accounts of Bakhmut are showing Russians using human wave attacks. That isn't a recipe for gaining operational momentum.

The west seems ready to keep supporting Ukraine with equipment for the long haul, and Russia's munitions are shrinking drastically. Reports are showing that they've already reached, and potentially surpassed, critical levels of long range missiles. Their armor forces seem to be gutted, with likely somewhere around 1800-2000 tank losses so far. Much the same with artillery systems. The aircraft situation seems nominally better, but Russia appears averse to flying sorties over Ukrainian airspace, probably doubly so now that Patriots are in theater. And Russia's ability to produce anything advanced has been cut off at the knees due to heavy sanctions and lack of microchips.

Anything can happen of course, but short of walking away with some of the already occupied territory (of god forbid, using nukes), I just can't see Putin achieving any kind of real victory in Ukraine.

[Raellus]

Broadly, I agree with your assessment, Heffe. I do, however, think it really depends on how long Putin is willing to fight this war. Russia has a significantly larger pool of fighting age men. Even if the Ukrainians produce 3 casualties for every 1 sustained, they'll run out of soldiers first. Can Russian gov't, econ., and society hold out long enough for that to happen? Probably not, but the possibility can't be discounted.

This piece does a pretty good job of analyzing demographic trends in relation to the war.

https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-demog...aine-vs-russia

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[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Broadly, I agree with your assessment, Heffe. I do, however, think it really depends on how long Putin is willing to fight this war. Russia has a significantly larger pool of fighting age men. Even if the Ukrainians produce 3 casualties for every 1 sustained, they'll run out of soldiers first. Can Russian gov't, econ., and society hold out long enough for that to happen? Probably not, but the possibility can't be discounted.

This piece does a pretty good job of analyzing demographic trends in relation to the war.

https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-demog...aine-vs-russia

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That's very fair, but at some point the lack of equipment will result in casualties far in excess of 3:1. You can't just have men with rifles running in against combined forces in well entrenched positions forever.

I kind of suspect the reason why Leopards and Challies are currently on offer is because Ukraine knows that in order for their own forces to go on the offense, they need better armor support, and have communicated that to friendly western nations. If Russia sustains another major defeat or two, Putin risks losing the support of the mil-bloggers, and then that of the people. We'll have to see how that all plays out.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Heffe

That's very fair, but at some point the lack of equipment will result in casualties far in excess of 3:1. You can't just have men with rifles running in against combined forces in well entrenched positions forever.

Agreed. Your example cuts both ways, though, when it comes to offensive operations. The Russians have just captured Soledar after weeks of heavy fighting. Can the Ukrainians afford to sustain a 3:1 casualty ratio to retake it?

And Ukraine is running out of ammunition too, in particular for its artillery. Although local production has recently ramped up, it can't keep up with demand. Recent reports are that artillery fires have diminished from both sides. NATO is having a difficult time providing enough fresh shells and rockets to keep up with Ukrainian expenditures. They've been outsourcing resupply to "unaligned" countries (like Pakistan), but that supply is going to dry up soon as well.

Originally Posted by Heffe

I kind of suspect the reason why Leopards and Challies are currently on offer is because Ukraine knows that in order for their own forces to go on the offense, they need better armor support, and have communicated that to friendly western nations. If Russia sustains another major defeat or two, Putin risks losing the support of the mil-bloggers, and then that of the people. We'll have to see how that all plays out.

I hope that turns out to be the case. The UAF is probably going to have to repel a large-scale Russian offensive in the spring before it can go over to the offensive again. That's what Ukrainian intel is saying, at least. There's growing concern that said offensive will include another lunge at Kiev out of Belarus. There're also rumblings that the Belarussian military might be taking part in same. If that were to happen, the strategic calculus of Ukraine and NATO is going to have to change.

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[kato13]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The UAF is probably going to have to repel a large-scale Russian offensive in the spring before it can go over to the offensive again.
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Human wave attacks vs US designed cluster bomb artillery shells from Turkey. This is going to be bloody.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/10...bombs-ukraine/


I remember ICM-DP rounds being worth their weight in gold in T2k, weird how it seems to be that way again.

[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Agreed. Your example cuts both ways, though, when it comes to offensive operations. The Russians have just captured Soledar after weeks of heavy fighting. Can the Ukrainians afford to sustain a 3:1 casualty ratio to retake it?

And Ukraine is running out of ammunition too, in particular for its artillery. Although local production has recently ramped up, it can't keep up with demand. Recent reports are that artillery fires have diminished from both sides. NATO is having a difficult time providing enough fresh shells and rockets to keep up with Ukrainian expenditures. They've been outsourcing resupply to "unaligned" countries (like Pakistan), but that supply is going to dry up soon as well.
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All good points. Regarding Soledar, my understanding is that Wagner is essentially throwing bodies at the town in the interest of proving that Wagner is superior than the MOD. With vehicle kill counts on the Russian side being somewhat stagnant, that means Russian infantry losses have been absolutely atrocious. To your point though, maybe they really can absorb such tremendous losses. At least for now.

Originally Posted by Raellus

I hope that turns out to be the case. The UAF is probably going to have to repel a large-scale Russian offensive in the spring before it can go over to the offensive again. That's what Ukrainian intel is saying, at least. There's growing concern that said offensive will include another lunge at Kiev out of Belarus. There're also rumblings that the Belarussian military might be taking part in same. If that were to happen, the strategic calculus of Ukraine and NATO is going to have to change.
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Belarus is a really interesting scenario. You have to know Luka is looking at NATO's military build up on his border, and he doesn't have the nukes to scare NATO off, despite his closeness to Russia. NATO's calculus is going to be "Can we take out Belarus without triggering Russia's nukes?" It'll be a really dangerous game if Belarus ends up sending troops across the border. The Belarussian people as well, from what I understand, aren't quite as interested in the war as Russia's, and they're arguably more eager to see Luka be ousted.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Heffe

All good points. Regarding Soledar, my understanding is that Wagner is essentially throwing bodies at the town in the interest of proving that Wagner is superior than the MOD. With vehicle kill counts on the Russian side being somewhat stagnant, that means Russian infantry losses have been absolutely atrocious. To your point though, maybe they really can absorb such tremendous losses. At least for now.

It's almost certain that Russia sustained heavier losses during the battle, possibly much heavier. Against dug-in positions, especially in MOUT, the defender usually has the advantage and the attacker usually sustains more casualties. I'm worried that Russia can sustain heavier casualty rates longer than Ukraine can. I just hope Russian willpower runs out before their manpower, armor, and ammo do.

Wagner had always been build as an elite PMC. Apparently, now they are employing large numbers of ex-Cons, many recently released specifically for the war.

Originally Posted by Heffe

Belarus is a really interesting scenario. You have to know Luka is looking at NATO's military build up on his border, and he doesn't have the nukes to scare NATO off, despite his closeness to Russia. NATO's calculus is going to be "Can we take out Belarus without triggering Russia's nukes?" It'll be a really dangerous game if Belarus ends up sending troops across the border. The Belarussian people as well, from what I understand, aren't quite as interested in the war as Russia's, and they're arguably more eager to see Luka be ousted.

Luka doesn't need nukes. Belarus is under the Russian nuclear umbrella. I may be overstating this a bit, but Luka is essentially a Russian puppet. If Putin orders him to jump, I don't see him saying no. In fact, I'm kind of surprised Belarus hasn't joined the invasion. Surely, Ukraine's "gay nazi demons" are a threat to Belarus as well.

Early in the war, Luka went on record as saying that Belarus would not participate, despite allowing Russian land and air forces basing and transit rights. Then there was the infamous "map slip", so maybe there was a plan to do so at some point.

In early summer, reports emerged indicating that Belarus was surreptitiously giving some of its T-72 tanks to Russia, to make up for heavy Russian losses.

Since at least autumn, Russia has been shifting forces to Belarus, despite simultaneously losing ground in Ukraine. Russia claimed it was just to conduct joint maneuvers with the Belarussians. AFAIK, those RF forces are still there, and reports indicating they're continuing to be reinforced. Some analysts believe this is to pressure Ukraine to maintain significant forces in the Kiev area, to defend the capital from potential second lunge at Kiev. I'm not so sure.

Do you think NATO will strike at Belarus if it joins the invasion of Ukraine? I don't.

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[Targan]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Do you think NATO will strike at Belarus if it joins the invasion of Ukraine? I don't.

I don't think it will either, but it's possible. NATO won't attack Russian forces on Ukraine's behalf, but technically Belarus isn't Russia . So if NATO did give Belarus a slap, it would send a powerful message without instantly starting WWIII.

[kato13]

RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RE TRACTED***

UK to send Apaches to Ukraine

https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/lat...e-war-28957065
RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RETRACTED***RE TRACTED***

EDIT *** https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/st...76434382528513

I have always thought NATO looked at the situation as the frog (Russia) in the stove pot (Ukraine), where they raised the temp slowly enough the frog never realized it was being boiled alive. Now they seem to be cranking the heat a bit (albeit with small numbers of tech).

EDIT *** I thought this was a RADICAL increase in quality of equipment. So back to the slow raising of the temperature in the pot.


This is going to be an incredible experiment in cross NATO platform C3I.

[LoneCollector1987]

I just found an article in the german newspaper WELT (unfortunately behind a paywall) where Wolfgang Ischinger says that Ukraine fires aso much ammunition in one day as Germany produces in 6 months.

Ischinger served as chairman of the Munich Security Conference from 2008 to 2022.

I think that following McKinsey (switching everything to just-in-time production), outsourcing nearly everything to the Far East and reducing stockpiles to nearly nothing was the wrong way to go.

Every country should have the production capability to produce at least 50% of its military needs (vehicles, ammunition, etc) on its own. And the stockpiles must be big.
I remember reading that in WWI the armies used up nearly all the ammo in a short time because nobody could imagine that artillery barrages would consume soo much ammo.

[Ewan]

Originally Posted by LoneCollector1987

I remember reading that in WWI the armies used up nearly all the ammo in a short time because nobody could imagine that artillery barrages would consume soo much ammo.

Years ago reading a book about WW1 logistics the British had to decide a year in advance what kind of war they were going for the following year (offensive or defensive) to get enough shells manufactured and stockpiled in time for the campaigns.

[kcdusk]

The latest warzone articles discuss Ukraine being supplied with Stryker, Marder, Challenger and potentially Leopod tanks. And questions how the associated countries will be able to keep up this level of spending.

If Nato/USA is struggling to keep up supply and spending, how will Russia ever be able to? And, they are potentially loosing more equipment than Nato.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by kcdusk

The latest warzone articles discuss Ukraine being supplied with Stryker, Marder, Challenger and potentially Leopod tanks. And questions how the associated countries will be able to keep up this level of spending.

If Nato/USA is struggling to keep up supply and spending, how will Russia ever be able to? And, they are potentially loosing more equipment than Nato.

A lot of the systems you mentioned are at or nearing the end of their service lives and were scheduled to be phased out of service over the next couple of years anyways. In effect donating them to Ukraine just gets them off the books a few years sooner. It's kind of like a kid starting to outgrow some old clothes and, before that happens, handing them down to a younger sibling (or giving them to a needy neighbor). That says, the donating countries are getting nothing for them (whereas they could sell these systems on the secondary market to recoup a portion of the loss).

NATO defense spending has gone up since the Russian invasion of Ukraine (it was already trending that way before said). Giving Ukraine mountains of military aid in the form of weapons systems and ammo gives NATO militaries a nice excuse to ask for bigger budgets and shiny new toys.

Transactionally, I'm less concerned for NATO than I am for Ukraine. Maintaining such a motley assortment of older, but new-to-them, vehicles and weapons systems is going to be extremely challenging, especially under wartime conditions. And, despite major similarities between analogous systems (say, for example, a Chally and a Leo), each system requires an adequate training cycle in order to be employed effectively.

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[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by castlebravo92

Ironically, I really think the outcome of this conflict is going to be the emergence of Poland as the dominant military land power in Europe. Their buying spree is impressive, and they are going for pretty much top of the line gear. They'll have an armored force about 6-8x the size of Germany's.

Their problem is that they don't have the people for such a force. And while they said they'd be increasing defense spending to 3 % of their GDP, that money needs to be found within their total budget. That's not an easy feat. Plus, their army would need a hell of a lot more maintenance, supply and infantry units just to support all those new tanks and have battle line in front of all those HIMARS artillery units.

This is going to be an interesting time for Poland, indeed. If they don't find the money, their reform and resizing implodes. If they find the money, a lot of other stuff won't get funded and even more deficit will be built up.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by kato13

Human wave attacks vs US designed cluster bomb artillery shells from Turkey. This is going to be bloody.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/10...bombs-ukraine/


I remember ICM-DP rounds being worth their weight in gold in T2k, weird how it seems to be that way again.

In addition, Turkey cloned the M26 rounds for MLRS and HIMARS systems. Those are even more devastating.

[Heffe]

Originally Posted by Raellus

A lot of the systems you mentioned are at or nearing the end of their service lives and were scheduled to be phased out of service over the next couple of years anyways. In effect donating them to Ukraine just gets them off the books a few years sooner. It's kind of like a kid starting to outgrow some old clothes and, before that happens, handing them down to a younger sibling (or giving them to a needy neighbor). That says, the donating countries are getting nothing for them (whereas they could sell these systems on the secondary market to recoup a portion of the loss).

NATO defense spending has gone up since the Russian invasion of Ukraine (it was already trending that way before said). Giving Ukraine mountains of military aid in the form of weapons systems and ammo gives NATO militaries a nice excuse to ask for bigger budgets and shiny new toys.

Transactionally, I'm less concerned for NATO than I am for Ukraine. Maintaining such a motley assortment of older, but new-to-them, vehicles and weapons systems is going to be extremely challenging, especially under wartime conditions. And, despite major similarities between analogous systems (say, for example, a Chally and a Leo), each system requires an adequate training cycle in order to be employed effectively.

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Ukraine has proven remarkably adaptable when it comes to onboarding with new equipment, but you're undoubtedly correct in that it's got to be an enormous challenge managing the various logistical needs, especially in wartime. Regarding the crews, I recall hearing that Ukraine had, was it tens of thousands of soldiers training in the UK a few months ago? I feel reasonable sure at least some of those were some tank crews getting up to speed on the Chally 2.

[Raellus]

This is what I'm worried about. Ukraine may be able to pace, or even pull ahead, of the Russians in operational AFV and artillery numbers, but the manpower disparity is beginning to tell. 100k military casualties on both sides favors the Russians. Yeah, the replacements they're mustering are very poorly trained and equipped but, as Stalin once said, "quantity has a quality all its own". If Belarus joins the fight...

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...op-u-s-general

From the article,

"The foreign intelligence service informed security politicians in the Bundestag in a secret meeting this week that the Ukrainian Army is currently losing a three-digit number of soldiers every day in battles with the Russian invaders" in Bakhmut, according to Der Spiegel."

In all likelihood, the bulk of those casualties consist of Ukraine's more experienced troops.

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[castlebravo92]

Does anyone have any recent numbers for Ukraine's mobilization?

I've read reports that they've sent a fairly sizable number of troops to NATO countries for training on various platforms, and they are clearly operating on more of a total war / full mobilization footing than Russia is, which suggests they'll be able to absorb battle casualties better than Russia can without a similar mobilization on their part.

There was a joke about this last round of conscripts and convicts Russia was sending to the front were getting more training this time around and were going to be much more formidable than the last wave - 2 days of training instead of 1!

I'm guessing the weather is preventing Ukraine from launching counter attacks to relieve the pressure on Bakhmut.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Raellus

This is what I'm worried about. Ukraine may be able to pace, or even pull ahead, of the Russians in operational AFV and artillery numbers, but the manpower disparity is beginning to tell. 100k military casualties on both sides favors the Russians.

The casualities are vastly discrepant and by now means the same for both. It's 100k KIA for the Russians plus countless WIA, MIA and POW. The Russian chain of rescue for WIA is abysmal, their hospitals ill-equipped.

On the contrary, Ukraine has around or likely above 100,000 total casualities, including KIA, WIA, MIA and POWs with Western support in later stage medical treatments, logistical help in getting first aid material and first aid training to the front. Their ratio of KIA and WIA will be far superior to Russia's and their abilities to regenerate combat effectiveness from WIA will be far better. Also, Ukrainians are likely to reenlist and volunteer for service. Russians more or less have to force their citizens into service and have been scraping the barrel for months.

Also, Belarus isn't going to join them. Despite the fact that Lukashenka has allowed Belarus to become essentially Russia's biggest training grounds.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by castlebravo92

Does anyone have any recent numbers for Ukraine's mobilization?

Latest official numbers by the Ukrainian - minister of defense Reznikov - government were from July and stated that:

"There are up to 700,000 people mobilized for the Armed Forces, up to 60,000 border guards, up to 90,000 National Guards, and up to 100,000 National Police. Today, we have more than 1 million people in uniform ensuring the security and defense sector," said Reznikov.

https://babel.ua/en/news/81183-the-m...e-armed-forces

I'm guessing the weather is preventing Ukraine from launching counter attacks to relieve the pressure on Bakhmut.

Both sides seem to mass troops around Zaporizhzhia and Russia claims it started an offensive their: https://twitter.com/AFP/status/16167...on-supply-live

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by castlebravo92

I'm guessing the weather is preventing Ukraine from launching counter attacks to relieve the pressure on Bakhmut.

The winter weather is undoubtedly miserable, but sub-zero conditions means the ground is frozen, which allows heavy AFVs to move off-road/cross-country. In the spring, when the ground thaws, Ukraine's infamous Rasputitsa makes it difficult, if not impossible, for heavy AFVs to operate off-road.

If Ukraine isn't pressing to relieve pressure on Bakhmut now, there must be other reasons besides the weather.

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/...asputitsa.html

The almost clockwork arrival of the Rasputitsa in early spring makes Russia's decision to launch its invasion of Ukraine in February deliciously ironic.

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[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The winter weather is undoubtedly miserable, but sub-zero conditions means the ground is frozen, which allows heavy AFVs to move off-road/cross-country. In the spring, when the ground thaws, Ukraine's infamous Rasputitsa makes it difficult, if not impossible, for heavy AFVs to operate off-road.

If Ukraine isn't pressing to relieve pressure on Bakhmut now, there must be other reasons besides the weather.

https://slate.com/news-and-politics/...asputitsa.html

The almost clockwork arrival of the Rasputitsa in early spring makes Russia's decision to launch its invasion of Ukraine in February deliciously ironic.

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Depending on where in Ukraine one looks, they haven't necessarily had sustained sub-zero temperatures. Kharkiv, sure, they've stayed below zero all month. In Kherson, the only days in January where the high temperature was at or below zero Celsius were the 8th and the 19th. In Melitopol, only the 19th and 20th had a high of zero, every other day this month has been above freezing. Zaporizhzhia has had 9 days above freezing and 13 at or below freezing. I've seen speculation that Ukraine's not moving much along the southeastern front because the ground's not frozen hard and mobility is worse than if it was colder.

[Ursus Maior]

Originally Posted by Raellus

If Ukraine isn't pressing to relieve pressure on Bakhmut now, there must be other reasons besides the weather.
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My take is that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are getting to the point of being overstretched. Not necessarily is this the case in form of personnel, there are plenty of light forces in the Bakhmut area available (cf. https://militaryland.net/news/invasion-day-333-summary/ and here: https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/), but they begin to feel the lack of tanks, IFVs and ammunition. They have been pretty clear on that for months now: warning of coming Russian offensive operations and dire logistical situations, especially concerning Soviet type ammunition.

With the newfound attacks in the Zaporizhzhia oblast and front, there might not be enough of an armored relief force available as of now, in order to counterattack north of Bakhmut against Russian forces at Soledar.

I wouldn't be surprised, if Ukraine has to regroup to towns West of Bakhmut soon, maybe as far as Kostyantynivka. That's only 10 km to the Southwest and the city is pretty well fortified by now. But it'd still be a problem regarding the information warfare for some time.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Ursus Maior

The casualities are vastly discrepant and by now means the same for both. It's 100k KIA for the Russians plus countless WIA, MIA and POW. The Russian chain of rescue for WIA is abysmal, their hospitals ill-equipped.

On the contrary, Ukraine has around or likely above 100,000 total casualities, including KIA, WIA, MIA and POWs with Western support in later stage medical treatments, logistical help in getting first aid material and first aid training to the front. Their ratio of KIA and WIA will be far superior to Russia's and their abilities to regenerate combat effectiveness from WIA will be far better.

Recent reports put Russian KIA and WIA, combined, at between 100-180k. Ukrainian losses- again, both KIA and WIA combined- are believed to be upwards of 100k. That's not even a 2 to 1 ratio in Ukraine's favor.

I'd like to see some POW figures from both sides. My impression is that more Russian troops have been captured, but what's the actual difference? Is it statistically significant?

Again, Ukraine is at or near full mobilization. Russia, on the other hand is not. They still have untapped manpower reserves. Yes, qualitatively, Russia's replacement troops are inferior but, quantitatively, Russia still has a decided edge.

Originally Posted by Ursus Maior

Also, Ukrainians are likely to reenlist and volunteer for service. Russians more or less have to force their citizens into service and have been scraping the barrel for months.

True, but I worry about the psychological toll that almost a full year of near continuous combat operations is taking on the Ukrainian military. Combat exhaustion is real. Physical and psychological wounds tend to degrade combat effectiveness over time.

Originally Posted by Ursus Maior

Also, Belarus isn't going to join them. Despite the fact that Lukashenka has allowed Belarus to become essentially Russia's biggest training grounds.

Why are you so certain?

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[kato13]

I know the Russians have a history of coming back after unfathomable losses, but so many intangibles are working against them:

• Return rate of WIA (after recovery)
• Nearly 100k troops being trained outside of Ukraine up to NATO standards.
• Equipment is shifting to more current generations rather than the opposite
• New trucks daily, while Russia never really focused on them and is really scraping the barrel for anything to move equipment.
• Ukraine has greater sources of Artillery rounds, yes both sides are going to need to curtail their usage, but unless China starts to supply Russia they will be hit much harder.
• US/Nato Satellite Imagery and C3I.

[Raellus]

The floodgates have opened, it seems. Not only is Germany authorizing the transfer of several nations' Leopard II tanks to Ukraine, but the US is sending 30+ of its own Abrams MBTs as well.

https://apnews.com/article/russia-uk...e9d2e58d23acae

I'm a bit concerned about the Abrams' logistical requirements (especially re their gas turbine engines). Apparently, that was one reason that the US initially balked at the transfer. It might end up being more helpful symbolically than militarily. The acquiescence may have been required to end Germany's reticence to authorize the transfer of the more numerous, less thirsty Leopards. Reports indicate that Ukrainian tank crews have been training on the Leopard in Poland for weeks now.

My biggest worry is what Putin's response will be. There's been saber-rattling before the transfers were even confirmed. He may try something desperate before the modern Western MBTs arrive on the battlefield. This could lead to the escalation the German government was worried about. We shall see.

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[kato13]

Current MBT commitments and possibilities.

UK - 14 Challenger 2 battle tanks,

Germany - 14 Leopard 2 tanks (Arriving within 3 months),

Poland - 14 Leopard 2 tanks,

USA - 31 Advanced M1 Abrams tanks,

Portugal - 4 Leopard 2 tanks

Spain, Norway and Finland also said that they are going to send their own Leopard tanks but they are currently weighing the numbers.

Also, Netherlands is considering to buy 18 Leopard 2 tanks from Germany and providing them to Ukraine as they don't own any.

Funny after always looking at a minimum of battalion numbers(40-58), these counts do look like T2k Division MBT numbers.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by kato13

Also, Netherlands is considering to buy 18 Leopard 2 tanks from Germany and providing them to Ukraine as they don't own any.

This is particularly ironic being that, during the Cold War, the Dutch did own/field the Leopard II. They got rid of them in around 2010, essentially because Russia was no longer perceived to pose a threat to Europe (resulting in budget cuts and force restructuring).

Originally Posted by kato13

Funny after always looking at a minimum of battalion numbers(40-58), these counts do look like T2k Division MBT numbers.

So true!

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[Vespers War]

Originally Posted by kato13

Current MBT commitments and possibilities.

UK - 14 Challenger 2 battle tanks,

Germany - 14 Leopard 2 tanks (Arriving within 3 months),

Poland - 14 Leopard 2 tanks,

USA - 31 Advanced M1 Abrams tanks,

Portugal - 4 Leopard 2 tanks

Spain, Norway and Finland also said that they are going to send their own Leopard tanks but they are currently weighing the numbers.

Also, Netherlands is considering to buy 18 Leopard 2 tanks from Germany and providing them to Ukraine as they don't own any.

Funny after always looking at a minimum of battalion numbers(40-58), these counts do look like T2k Division MBT numbers.

The 18 from the Netherlands are tanks they're currently leasing with an option to buy.

Spain's Leopard 2 apparently will be whatever can be repaired within 2 months from the 53 Leopard 2A4 currently in storage at Zaragoza. They have 108 total of that model, but the other 55 are in Spain's North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. They also have a bunch of Leopard 2E/2A6, but those are in active service and (AFAIK) not being discussed as potential transfers.