Where are the US airforce and Navy ground Units

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Olefin

"Some medium flatbed trucks carried the Soviet-made ZPU and ZU-23-2 towed anti-aircraft twin or quad barreled guns, as well as recoilless rifles and S-5 rocket helicopter rocket launcher pods. Some rebels have improvised with captured heavy weaponry, like BMP-1 turrets and helicopter rocket pods, as well as lower-tech methods such as using doorbells to ignite rocket-launched ammunition."

Good point. I've seen some great photos on this forum and dedicated Technicals threads on other forums showing some of the wild and crazy technicals the Libyan resistance were fielding during the recent "regime change". In particular I was pleased to see helicopter rocket pods being succesfully used in improvised vehicle mounts as in my last T2K campaign the PCs got their hands on an up-armoured dirt track speedway sedan with a rocket pod mounted on a roof ring mount.

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by Tegyrius

The first problem I see with ground support mounts for Vulcans is the ammo consumption.

My thoughts are (as you can see in the Marines thread) these ex aircraft weapons would be used as makeshift AA weapons and employed by the 2nd LAAD battalion. My thoughts are the M1097's had their original Avenger turrets removed (and stripped for parts to keep the others in action) and the aircraft guns mounted in their place.
Ready ammunition may be only what the donor aircraft carried unless the feed system is also modified, but additional rounds could be carried either on the vehicle or in a trailer.
Use in the ground support role would be avoided as much as possible due to the lack of protective armour and high visibility of the vehicle as a whole. One or two units would be located with Divisional, Regimental and perhaps Battalion HQs with the nearest to the front lines being perhaps a mile or two away (unless the shit had hit the fan).

The main problem I've found with fielding more of these makeshift weapon systems is available personnel to crew them. Roughly one third of the 2nd Marines have had to be dedicated to support positions (and that's nowhere near what I consider enough), about another 600 to armour, recon and combat engineers leaving just 2,200 to divide up between the three foot mobile infantry regiments. Even with only 8 tanks and a few dozen LAV-25s, it's hard to justify an increased fighting vehicle presence based on support requirements.

[rcaf_777]

I am think that the idea of having Navy and Airforce provide rear security and services is good

The high technical nature of the many trades they could assiting with salvage of high components or repair of vehicles, gun systems ect, this could free up other army personel to provide combat troops replacment.

IRL the USN Navy Provisional Detainee Battalion 2 was formed for duty in Iraq under the coomand of the US Army's 16th Military Police Brigade

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navy_Pr...ee_Battalion_2

Also the Canadian Navy has provide Clearance Divers to Army for Counter IED duty in Afghanstian, most notable was Petty Officer 2nd Class Craig Blake who killed in Afghanstian while attemting to disfuse an IED - one of the best divers I ever met

[Greylond]

The U.S. Navy has had a "Auxiliary Defense Force" for years. Back in the mid/late 80's it was decided by SecDef/SecNav that the Navy would provide it's own base defense and only use U.S. Marines for critical installations and/or Defense Reaction purposes. It was never said outright but Navy ASF was basically a "tripwire" that freed up the Marines from standing regular guard duty and if something happened ASF would provide first line defense and the closest Marine unit would provide a Reaction Force to come in and kill the bad guys. The Navy ASF was composed of various members of the base. These sailors would go through a one week(sometimes two weeks) training. It covered weapons familiarization(M14s, M60s, Shotgun, and Pistol(.45 and later 9mm), peacetime legal search/siezure, use of deadly force in a Law Enforcement situations, arrest and evidence handling, first aid, basic vehicle/IED searches, basic combat/base defense tactics and a short ground exercise lasting a few hours or full day. The weapons training was just enough to allow each member of ASF to be able to the weapon and basic marksmanship, in TW2K v1.0 terms I'd say a CRM: 10 and PST: 10) The training was given by local Navy Security Departments augmented with local Marine trainers from the closest Marine unit. Like any other unit that was made up by service people that had to be seconded from a parent unit ASF basically had two types of sailors; those that the local Departments/Shops wanted to get rid of because they were worst members of the department(lazy, incompetent and/or insubordinate) and those that really wanted to go through the training because it was a chance to learn something about weapons and tactics. Usually most of the ASF was made of the first group and a few of the second.

How do I know about this? I was a member of Navy ASF in Guam(1988-89) and San Diego(1990/1991), and I was a member of the second type(volunteered for it both times). I went through the entire training program twice, once at each base. When I was on Guam our base went through multiple day exercise with an "Aggressor Force" made up of a Reservist SEAL team. The ASF team that I was assigned to for that exercise had the job of protecting the Captain and XO living quarters. Our team was the only one that "Won." We were the only group to not only resist the Aggressors but we actually repelled an attack on the CO's house. Several of the factors in our favor were the fact that it was a daylight raid and the XO's living quarters were empty because the XO at the time was single and still lived in the BOQ, not having moved to the XO House yet so the raiders split, half the team hitting an empty house(bad info/intelligence) and the other half hitting the CO's house. And unlike the rest of the ASF we actually hid in the bushes and ambushed the raid team, which they didn't expect because of the general incompetence of the rest of the ASF. Our group just happened to be made up entirely of a group that had Volunteered to be on ASF and got a kick out of it. We repelled/"Killed" the team hitting the CO's house and by the time the other half of their team realized the XO house was empty the Marine Reaction team had gotten there because as soon as we saw the raid team our team leader had radioed in for assistance. In fact, I didn't even get to point my empty rifle at any of the raid team because I was the last one protecting the flank of the house/and front door and the "Raiders" all "Died" before they got to the front door. We were lucky in our engagement, other teams got hit at night and by raiders who had better info. There was a debrief in which they showed us a video taken by an aggressor team that sneaked up on a ASF team at night who never even realized that they had been there until the debrief!

Basically, here's my points;

1) yes, there is precedence for it.
2) Any Department Head/Shop Supervisor is going to send the worst of their command out first with a few members being really motivated but the overall unit quality is going to actually be pretty low, IMO.

A lot of the Navy is very technical oriented, in fact Navy Electronic Repair shops already have experience with Marine ground radios so using the Navy personnel for rear area maintenance/refit is not only possible but IMO very likely because the Navy already has those shops in operation. My last duty station(1991) was SIMA San Diego. SIMA stands for "Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity" and don't let "Intermediate" fool you, our mission was to restore equipment to "Like New" condition. We would tear down radio and RADAR systems completely down, refurbish the equipment cases(grind down to bare metal and repaint) and do a total component level rebuild. For example along with shipboard communications, our shop repaired PRC-77 and man portable satellite radios used by the Marine units in southern California.

So, I can really see a lot of the non-technical members of the Navy being used for Base Defense or other positional Defense points but all the technical repair/maintenance types(which is a very large part) being held back for maintenance and possibly even fabrication of some replacement parts. Each Navy ship has a machine shop of varying size and the larger ships/bases have pretty extensive machine/fabrication shops.

[dragoon500ly]

This link to the US Navy Naval Infantry...the USN actually trained naval infantry as late as the mid-1960s.

http://www.history.navy.mil/library/...l_infantry.htm

[Tegyrius]

Bringing this thread back from the grave, and back to some of its original discussions... the LSOZI blog recently ran an article on French WWII ground combat units composed of naval volunteers. In a sign of the times, or perhaps a sign of the tech base of the day:

In the case of both regiments, the conversion from manning battleships and cruisers to operating armored vehicles was surprisingly simple, as the men involved included high proportions of engineering, gunnery, and radio ratings.

While the skill sets might not map as well in the Twilight War, it's an interesting point to consider.

A US Navy ground unit formed post-'97 would be pretty unlikely to receive front-line US Army equipment. However, I can see a collection of machinist's mates, electrician's mates, and gunner's mates being handed the keys to a compound full of salvaged Warsaw Pact equipment and being told, "good luck, you're on your own." Depending on timing, an enterprising CO or SNCO of a newly-formed scratch unit might also have a way to arrange delivery of a batch of equipment off one of the last resupply convoys. I'm having visions of a naval mechanized task force mounted on Cadillac Gage products - Stingrays for light armor, V-series armored cars in lieu of APCs. All hastily repainted haze grey, naturally.

- C.

[ToughOmbres]

Originally Posted by Tegyrius

Bringing this thread back from the grave, and back to some of its original discussions... the LSOZI blog recently ran an article on French WWII ground combat units composed of naval volunteers. In a sign of the times, or perhaps a sign of the tech base of the day:



While the skill sets might not map as well in the Twilight War, it's an interesting point to consider.

A US Navy ground unit formed post-'97 would be pretty unlikely to receive front-line US Army equipment. However, I can see a collection of machinist's mates, electrician's mates, and gunner's mates being handed the keys to a compound full of salvaged Warsaw Pact equipment and being told, "good luck, you're on your own." Depending on timing, an enterprising CO or SNCO of a newly-formed scratch unit might also have a way to arrange delivery of a batch of equipment off one of the last resupply convoys. I'm having visions of a naval mechanized task force mounted on Cadillac Gage products - Stingrays for light armor, V-series armored cars in lieu of APCs. All hastily repainted haze grey, naturally.

- C.

By the closing year of World War 2 Great Britain was running surplus RN personnel through training and sending them as replacements; "marginal" U.S. Army units like AAA were being disbanded and sent as replacements to combat formations.
For the Twilight War, sailors for whom there were no more ships and excess USAF personnel could be run through a 4 - 8 week course with the "parent" unit they were being assigned to; a quick infantry basic course, some familiarization with heavy weapons and the like.
Forming them into combat units directly would probably work poorly like the Luftwaffe Field Divisions during World War 2.

[Tegyrius]

Originally Posted by ToughOmbres

Forming them into combat units directly would probably work poorly like the Luftwaffe Field Divisions during World War 2.

(Posting before caffeine takes hold, may not be fully coherent.)

And those are the hard questions for what's left of EUCOM, aren't they? Do you dilute your remaining veteran units' competence and cohesion with onesie-twosie replacements drawn from Navy and Air Force survivors? Do you build mostly-USN and mostly-USAF units with Marine and Army veteran cadre? Or do you stand up "dedicated" USN and USAF ground units knowing that they'll be little more than speed bumps? The latter may preserve a bit more capability in your Army and Marine Corps formations, but it'll be damned hard on the speed bumps... though they might find some use as rear-area security or cantonment defense (to the everlasting resentment of the guys who keep getting sent forward).

It also may come down to whether the surviving admirals and USAF generals have any remaining political power to keep personnel under their respective commands.

- C.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Tegyrius

Do you dilute your remaining veteran units' competence and cohesion with onesie-twosie replacements drawn from Navy and Air Force survivors? Do you build mostly-USN and mostly-USAF units with Marine and Army veteran cadre? Or do you stand up "dedicated" USN and USAF ground units knowing that they'll be little more than speed bumps? The latter may preserve a bit more capability in your Army and Marine Corps formations, but it'll be damned hard on the speed bumps... though they might find some use as rear-area security or cantonment defense (to the everlasting resentment of the guys who keep getting sent forward).

It also may come down to whether the surviving admirals and USAF generals have any remaining political power to keep personnel under their respective commands.

Those are really good questions. I think that the most likely destination for "homeless" USAF and USN personnel is established Army and Marine units as replacements.

The Army and Marines have established organizational and doctrinal systems in place to incorporate combat replacements. During a total war, it's very likely that basic training for the average draftee would be somewhat truncated, so, by the time that surviving USAF and USN personnel are surplus to requirements, Army and Marine units would already have hands-on experience with integrating lightly-trained replacements in veteran formations.

A few clues from canon support this hypothesis. The 1-2.2e US Vehicle Guide doesn't include any USAF or USN infantry units of regimental or greater strength. The USVG does, however, include a plate (E2) portraying an ex-USAF Peacekeeper armored car seconded to a US Army ACR in Germany. The plate description also mentions other Peacemakers reassigned to an ANG unit in Oklahoma. If there were standalone USAF infantry units, these vehicles would be a natural fit; instead, they're described as being assigned to existing Army formations. It's a small sample size, granted, but AFAIK, canon makes no mention of USAF or USN ground line units. That's not to say that an Army division couldn't include a company or battalion of USAF or USN personnel but, given what little evidence exists, I think full integration into existing Army/USMC formations is the more likely option.

For anyone interested, additional musings on this topic can be found here:

https://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.php?t=2126

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[Desert Mariner]

I might be overthinking this, but I don’t believe there’s a one-size-fits-all answer. Given their specialized skill sets, some USN and USAF personnel could prove too valuable to be used solely as rifle-carrying infantry replacements—at least, not right away.

Possible examples:

• A grounded F-16 pilot now serving as convoy commander for a mixed-service logistics detachment.
• A Navy machinist’s mate acting as lead mechanic in an USMC armored recovery team.
• A former USAF weather technician repurposed as the unofficial S2 (Intel) officer for a provisional infantry company, thanks to her expertise in map reading and terrain analysis.
• An Air Force Security Police detachment reassigned as the quick reaction force (QRF) for an Army-run supply depot.
• A Navy corpsman now fully integrated as a line medic within an Army infantry company.
• A Navy aviation ordnanceman, his carrier long scuttled, now serving as the armorer for a Marine-led fire support team.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Desert Mariner

I might be overthinking this, but I don’t believe there’s a one-size-fits-all answer. Given their specialized skill sets, some USN and USAF personnel could prove too valuable to be used solely as rifle-carrying infantry replacements—at least, not right away.

Possible examples:

• A grounded F-16 pilot now serving as convoy commander for a mixed-service logistics detachment.
• A Navy machinist’s mate acting as lead mechanic in an USMC armored recovery team.
• A former USAF weather technician repurposed as the unofficial S2 (Intel) officer for a provisional infantry company, thanks to her expertise in map reading and terrain analysis.
• An Air Force Security Police detachment reassigned as the quick reaction force (QRF) for an Army-run supply depot.
• A Navy corpsman now fully integrated as a line medic within an Army infantry company.
• A Navy aviation ordnanceman, his carrier long scuttled, now serving as the armorer for a Marine-led fire support team.

I agree completely. If the folks in charge know what they're doing, USAF and USN servicemen (and women) with in-demand skills are most likely going to be placed in new jobs in the ground forces that make use of same.

I was generalizing on a macro level. After the fuel is gone and spare parts used up, there will likely tens of thousands of grounded USAF and beached USN personnel. The majority of them- those without skills that translate to ground forces needs c.1999- will end up as infantry replacements.

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[ToughOmbres]

Originally Posted by Tegyrius

(Posting before caffeine takes hold, may not be fully coherent.)

And those are the hard questions for what's left of EUCOM, aren't they? Do you dilute your remaining veteran units' competence and cohesion with onesie-twosie replacements drawn from Navy and Air Force survivors? Do you build mostly-USN and mostly-USAF units with Marine and Army veteran cadre? Or do you stand up "dedicated" USN and USAF ground units knowing that they'll be little more than speed bumps? The latter may preserve a bit more capability in your Army and Marine Corps formations, but it'll be damned hard on the speed bumps... though they might find some use as rear-area security or cantonment defense (to the everlasting resentment of the guys who keep getting sent forward).

It also may come down to whether the surviving admirals and USAF generals have any remaining political power to keep personnel under their respective commands.

- C.

I believe you are quite correct-which officers will or at least want to hold on to as many personnel as possible without "losing" them to the Army? How many Blue to Green would an Admiral or Air Force Commander tolerate or allow? That's the $64,000 question.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by ToughOmbres

I believe you are quite correct-which officers will or at least want to hold on to as many personnel as possible without "losing" them to the Army? How many Blue to Green would an Admiral or Air Force Commander tolerate or allow? That's the $64,000 question.

Therin lies the rub. If a USAF commander has 2,000 on-base personnel and only three operable aircraft, how do they justify holding on to the bulk of that force when a nearby Army division is losing combat troops at an unsustainable rate?

This kind of internecine politicking could make for really interesting campaign dynamics.

I suppose a USAF or USN CO could flat out refuse orders from higher HQ* to relinquish control over his/her personnel...

And thus, many a warlord is born.


*Does the JCS survive the TDM? I'm wondering what entity would have ultimate command authority over inter-service personnel transfers.

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[ToughOmbres]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Therin lies the rub. If a USAF commander has 2,000 on-base personnel and only three operable aircraft, how do they justify holding on to the bulk of that force when a nearby Army division is losing combat troops at an unsustainable rate?

This kind of internecine politicking could make for really interesting campaign dynamics.

I suppose a USAF or USN CO could flat out refuse orders from higher HQ* to relinquish control over his/her personnel...

And thus, many a warlord is born.


*Does the JCS survive the TDM? I'm wondering what entity would have ultimate command authority over inter-service personnel transfers.

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Darn good question. My take is that since MilGov exists the JCS or at least most of the JCS did indeed survive through luck or planning.
That being said, from 1999-2000 or at least prior to Operation Omega, their options to move against insubordination would be very limited in my view.

You are correct though, many a potential warlord could be born.

[Rainbow Six]

An extant Joint Chiefs is mentioned in Howling Wilderness several times. It's stated that on 02 June 1998 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Army units to respond to the Mexican invasion. It's subsequently stated that by 19 April 1999 General Cummings is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. After that point the Cummings becomes head of MilGov.

Whether it's the same people that were in post pre TDM or they are post TDM replacements isn't stated anywhere as far as I know but there is definitely an intact JCS structure from June 1998 onwards (and by inference I would say all the way through, i.e. the individuals may not have all personally survived the TDM but I think the institution did).

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Rainbow Six

An extant Joint Chiefs is mentioned in Howling Wilderness several times. It's stated that on 02 June 1998 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Army units to respond to the Mexican invasion. It's subsequently stated that by 19 April 1999 General Cummings is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. After that point the Cummings becomes head of MilGov.

Thanks. IIRC, Cummings was Army. It doesn't necessarily follow that he would prioritize the transfer of USAF and USN personnel to the US Army but, when taken with the circumstantial evidence mentioned upthread, I think it adds support to the existence of such a policy.

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