New Chinese Carrier

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by Webstral

That particular shortcoming is widespread, though we're especially good at it. The analogy is especially applicable to what's happening now in Afghanistan and Iraq. Shock and awe, indeed. It takes more than a very strong single at the beginning to make a classic album.

Iraq in paticular made me cringe. The vast might of the US army, trained and equipped to fight WW3 agaist the Russians going straight into an insurgency.

The worst thing is that so many people told the high level planners what they where walking into and yet they still had the attitude that the Iraqis would just be grateful and give no trouble.

I remember an American friend telling me he thought it'd be like WW2 with Germany and Japan, America would liberate them and they would just do as they where told. He didn't like it when I voiced the opinion that a nation that is bombed into the stoneage tends to be more pliable than a nation you blitzkrieg to their capital and set up shop, I said it'd me more like France under German occupation than Japan under American.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

The worst thing is that so many people told the high level planners what they where walking into and yet they still had the attitude that the Iraqis would just be grateful and give no trouble... I said it'd me more like France under German occupation than Japan under American.

Like so many nations of great power, we endure leadership and a body politic that is fixated on false visions of what we can accomplish without making any adaptations to our existing strengths and modus operendi. We get some things right. Sadly, the well-directed efforts of many are derailed by poor strategy and a parochialism on the part of far too many that borders on the tragicomic. The Green Zone in 2004-2005 is a classic example. When 3rd ID set up shop, the brigade that took control of the area that would become our AO in OIF 3 promptly hired locals to do everything. This was wise, since the economy (what economy there was) was completely upended by the invasion, liberation, and occupation. When 1st CD came in, the new sheriff fired all of the locals and requested--requested--Americans and other "reliable" foreign nationals be brought in to do the work the local nationals had been doing. Surprise, surprise--a sharp uptick in violence.

Of course, the whole problem goes back to the very nature of the society. We have no patience. We have an attention span measured in minutes. We elect a leadership who gives voice and action to our neurotic inability to focus on anything for longer than a single season of the local sports franchise. This leadership creates a command climate in which the military is focused predominently on killing people and breaking things to the exclusion of all other activities. In fairness, killing people and breaking things well is a fine art and must be practiced rigorously--which is to say to the exclusion of everything else. Asking a tanker who has spent his career rising to battalion command by killing folks and breaking things to make good decisions regarding policing and counterinsurgency is probably asking too much. The same can be said of the infantry. The infantry maneuvers, closes with, engages, and destroys the enemy. Policing is not our forte, if we're adequately trained for high-tempo conventional combat. If we're adequately trained for policing, then we become something besides infantry in the traditional sense of the word. Multi-tasking is a better sound bite than a reality.

This gets back to who ought to be President. A military man understands that a force organized, trained, and equipped to fight conventional wars makes a poor nation-building/counterindurgency force. Certainly, the guys on the ground will do their very best. They may actually do their jobs well. So did the Germans on the ground on the Eastern Front. A strategy that fails to match the existing human and material resources with the situation on the ground negates most or all of the efforts of the folks fighting the war. A President with some time in combat has a halfway decent chance of understanding this. A President with no real military time, advised by other men with no military time, is susceptible to all manner of hubris and wishful thinking. Ah, if only we could get the likes of Colin Powell to run...!

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

The worst thing is that so many people told the high level planners what they where walking into and yet they still had the attitude that the Iraqis would just be grateful and give no trouble.

GEN Shinzeki, who IIRC was the JCS Chariman at the time, tried to warn the rest of the warplanners what was going to happen if they implemented the favored warplan for Iraq, and got forced into retirement by Bush for his trouble. I remember something about his figures indicating that we would need 600,000 ground troops alone plus twice the amount of aircraft we had committed to the operation, and even then it wouldn't be a simple takedown and lockdown. He was not in favor of invading Iraq, IIRC.

[95th Rifleman]

You can drive from one end of Northern Ireland to the other in one day, they spoke the same language as us and where the same race. Yet it took 30'000 soldiers to keep the peace (barely).

The original estimates for Iraq where 5000 soldiers 3 years after the invasion.

[Webstral]

The estimates I saw were more in the range of 350,000. However, I don't know if this figure includes the defeated Iraqi Army serving under a new regime. If Shinseki intended for the Iraqi Army to be kept, it's entirely conceivable that an estimate of 600,000 troops was presented. Of course, the entire Iraqi Army was kicked out the door and into arms of the insurgency. Good Lord, we Americans really can be hopeless yokels sometimes.

The precedence of politics over good sense--of civilian know-it-alls over military men--of bean counting over effectiveness--brings us back to some of the ironies built into Twilight: 2000. The chronology of v1 never actually says why NATO attacks across Poland or what the final plan was. It would be interesting to hear conversations between the Joint Chiefs and the White House regarding the feasibility of invading the Soviet Union with the forces in the field. Equally, it would be interesting to know what advise the State Department gives in early 1997. Surely someone must realize that the lives of the regime hang in the balance; therefore, the Kremlin would never consider allowing the West to occupy Soviet soil. Why was this message not included in the decision to cross the Soviet-Polish border? Did the Secretary of State tell the President this and find himself ignored or replaced? Was the keep-your-mouth-shut message delivered inside the State Department?

[natehale1971]

I always thought of it as the NATO forces crossing the border beause the Soviets were retreating so fast that the commanders engaged really didn't want to allow them a chance to recover and rebuild. and the battle was moving so fast that the higher ups didn't get a full understanding of what was happening, and when they did they gave the orders to pull back out of Soviet Territory (well, 90% of NATO didn't see the Baltic states as legally part of the Soviet Union so that's possible answer as well) it was too late.

[Webstral]

The timetables involved don’t suggest a very rapid advance across Poland. The drive across the Oder starts sometime in April. The first German troops cross the Soviet border on 9 July. Thus the drive across Poland takes 2-3 months, depending on when in April the offensive begins. Even at two months, the offensive isn’t especially rapid by mechanized standards. At any rate, Soviet withdrawal, though forced, doesn’t seem likely to involve an out-of-control retreat.

Crossing the Soviet border involves more than a few local commanders pushing a bit too hard. This would be a major decision. Even civilian politicians in the West would have known that crossing the Soviet border would run the risk of nuclear escalation like nothing that had happened in the war thus far. If the leaders weren’t prepared to run that risk, they would have established guidelines to prevent rogue crossings. For instance, a stop line parallel to the Soviet border and thirty miles inside Poland would have prevented chance crossings of the border by NATO troops. Such a line does not appear to have been established.

I do agree that the desire to prevent the Soviets from rebuilding their combat strength would have been a primary goal. In fact, it would have been a strategic goal since NATO clearly wanted to end the war as soon as possible. The evidence for this lies in the timetable. NATO and China together could have fielded at full mobilization literally hundreds of divisions by drawing on manpower reserves much, much greater than the manpower reserves of the Soviet Union. The Soviet system in the late 1980’s (which we project forward into the 1990’s) included some 200-250 divisions, depending on whose count one believes. The Soviet military included virtually every service-aged man in the country, since all men were drafted and kept on the books in Mobilization Only divisions long after their initial commitment was up. The system was created so that the Soviets could field an army capable of winning a short war while exploiting the gigantic manpower and industrial resources of the USSR. In part, the concept reflected sensibilities emerging from the Great Patriotic War. In part, the concept reflected the fact that the enemies of Soviets had much greater mobilization potential than the Soviets if another global war of attrition started. The Soviets had to win quickly or not at all.

However, full mobilization costs something. Western politicians may not have felt the public support would have been present for an extended build-up, which would mean an extended disruption of daily life. In a very real sense, the start of WW3 for Europe and North America was the fault of the Germans—just like the first two wars. Polling would reveal the degree to which the electorate felt that way. Therefore, the US Administration decided to go for broke without fully mobilizing and force the USSR out of the war in 1997.

[Raellus]

Read Cobra II. It was truly eye-opening. The architect of our early failure in securing post-Saddam Iraq was Donald Rumsfeld. The dude put all kinds of pressure on general Franks to do the job with the absolute minimum of manpower. This, and the decision to completely disband the Iraqi army, led to the bloody mess that followed.

[natehale1971]

Web... couldn't the NATO forces been pushing into the Baltic States to liberate them? and that be what the writers of the game meant when talking about NATO forces crossing onto Soviet Soil? Many of NATO nations onsidered the Baltic states occupied territory while the Soviets & Warsaw pact considered them 'soviet soil'....

Looking at the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states were among the first to start protesting for indepedenece (even before some of the Warsaw Pact states).

This has made me think that could be what happened.. that NATO moved into the Baltic states, thinking it wouldn't have resulted in a nuclear exchange combined with what you've posted might work at explaining what happened.

[Legbreaker]

Looking at the unit histories, it's evident the push was not on a narrow front but rather spread out about as wide as it could be. Just look at how many Divisions were involved, then think about how much space each needs just sitting still and you start to get an idea of just how big 1996-97 really was.

This was no minor skirmish with limited aims, this was full on, all out, go for broke WAR!

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Read Cobra II. This, and the decision to completely disband the Iraqi army, led to the bloody mess that followed.

Don't get me started unless you want to issue more warnings about the f-bomb.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by natehale1971

Looking at the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states were among the first to start protesting for indepedenece (even before some of the Warsaw Pact states).

This observation is both factual and a creditable effort to incorporate real history into the Twilight timeline.

I can’t say that NATO forces did not cross into the Soviet Union in July, 1997 solely for the purpose of liberating the Baltic States. I’m reasonably certain that liberating some or all of the Baltics would be a selling point for the operation into the Soviet Union. However, loss of the Baltics would not force the USSR out of the war. The bottom line is that the Western Allies and China wanted to win the war—presumably without starting a nuclear war (which everyone would lose). The NATO offensive into the USSR has to be seen in the light of forcing the Soviets to the bargaining table, preferably on terms dictated by NATO and the PRC.

General Sir John Hackett suggests a shape to this scheme in The Third World War. He suggests that after NATO repulses the initial Soviet invasion of the FRG, some leaders want to go so far as to render the Soviet Union incapable of threatening Europe again. Obviously, the Soviet nuclear arsenal puts the outright destruction of the Soviet state out of the question. However, Hackett has his theoretical Western leaders posit that announced limited war aims which would guarantee the continued existence of the Soviet state, albeit in somewhat reduced form, would enable the Western Allies to forestall nuclear war. The suggested stop line would be along the Dvina and Dnepr Rivers. Loss of Soviet territory west of this line would sufficiently hobble the Soviet economy and manpower reserves to prevent the Soviets from renewing their invasion of Europe. A happy side effect would be the liberation of Eastern Europe.

Hackett’s idea seems well-suited to explaining the events of the v1 chronology. I’ll outline the events I believe are important:

• Dec 1997: Anglo-American (and Canadian) forces cross the border.
• Feb 1997: Soviet and Czechoslovak forces launch an offensive into southern Germany but lack the strength to make any significant gains.
• Apr 1997: NATO launches its offensive across Poland
• Jul 1997: German forces cross into the USSR
• Jul 1997: The USSR initiates tactical nuclear war

There is a lengthy hiatus between the Anglo-American entrance into the war in Germany and the start of offensive operations into Poland. There are several possible explanations for the long pause. My preferred explanation is that the fresh Anglo-American forces hit the exhausted Pact forces in Germany like a pile driver. Comparisons between the NATO attack across the North German Plain in the DDR and Operation Desert Storm are not entirely out of place, although neither the pace of the advance nor the very low casualty rate are replicated. Still, the fresh and intact heavy divisions of III, V, and VII US Corps, and I and II British Corps, supported by the full weight of the USAF in Europe, proves overwhelming against the Pact defenders. After some brutal fighting, NATO forces close up on the borders of the DDR and stop.

At this point, the Western Allies want to call a halt to the fighting. They’ve gotten what they wanted, and it’s cost them a pretty hefty bag of casualties. The Germans had been severely handled. The Anglo-Americans have gotten their noses bloodied, too. German reunification is a fact. To the Western way of thinking, the Soviets ought to respond to a peace initiative. The Soviets have gotten the worst of the fighting in Germany. The Soviets are still bogged down in China. Surely they will make peace if NATO guarantees that there won’t be further action against the Pact.

Unfortunately for the West, there has been a regime change. This was inevitable, really. The German invasion of the DDR in October [surely would have] prompted calls for full-scale war with the West before NATO could marshal its full strength. I have personified this idea with Premier Dmitri Danilov and Defense Minister Sergei Sauronski. Danilov wants to keep the war with Germany limited to war with Germany because he doesn’t believe the Soviet Union can win a conventional war against NATO or even afford to wage one. Sauronski believes the war has already started; therefore, the Soviets should use their advantage of in-place forces and shorter lines of communication to achieve the greatest possible advantage before the European allies can mobilize and before US forces can be brought to Europe. Danilov wins the argument. When the English speaking members of NATO join the fight, Danilov pays with his life.

Sauronski isn’t about to make peace with Germany still united. The USSR still has an advantage in the median term because true mobilization of Western manpower and resources will take a year or more. The Soviet Union can go to full mobilization, launch a counteroffensive in Europe, and then call for a peace that will reestablish the status quo ante bellum in Europe at the bare minimum. Once that is done, the USSR can finish business with China once and for all.

The Pact offensive in February is intended to peel away members of NATO. France, Belgium, Italy, and Greece already have quit. Although the Soviets don’t have the strength they need to go over to the offensive in Europe by February, they want to influence the nascent peace talks in Geneva. Although the Netherlands and Denmark have refused to help reunify Germany, they have remained part of the NATO alliance. Dutch and Danish forces have assumed control over the southern part of Germany where US forces have been based. Sauronski orders the February invasion of southern Germany to inflict such casualties on the Dutch that the Netherlands will drop out of the alliance or make a separate peace. Unfortunately, he overestimates the offensive capabilities of the Pact forces in western Czechoslovakia while underestimating the fighting abilities and resolve of the Dutch. The crisis passes as Canadian, Danish, and German forces, liberally supported by NATO air power, arrive in southern Germany.

At this point, the Western Allies realize that it will take additional measures to get the Sauronski regime to quit the war—at least the war in Europe. The two options for NATO are to attempt to use the forces in the field to force a solution in the near term or mobilize overwhelming power in the long term. The second option virtually assures victory, but it will be very costly. Additionally, there is the fighting in Korea, North China, and the Persian Gulf. The longer global fighting goes on, the more the war will cost. Also, Western public opinion might not support a general mobilization and all its attendant discomforts to finish a war the [damned] Germans started. For this reason, the remaining NATO allies decide to try to finish the thing in 1997.

The Western Allies announce that they will continue fighting until the Soviets get serious about peace. They announce that they will advance across Poland and Belarus to the Dvina-Dnepr Line, there to stop. The intent is not to destroy the USSR, they say. The intent is to impose peace by denying the Soviet Union the economic and material resources to wage war.

The build-up in eastern Germany takes until April. The infrastructure in the DDR has been badly damaged, and the tonnage of materiel to be moved is staggering. SACEUR really has paid attention to the supply issues that have plagued all of the mechanized operations to that point, and he is determined to get the needed supplies forward. Also, losses in manpower and vehicles take some time to make good.

The NATO offensive in Poland runs afoul of amazingly extensive defenses. The Soviets, determined to husband their armored reserves, have created a labyrinth of obstacles, fire bases, and strong points that can be manned by foot mobile Soviet and Polish reservists. Almost from the start, NATO suffers tremendous losses. Western forces adapt, but the offensive slows to a crawl. Operation Desert Storm this ain’t. The Soviets launch local mechanized counterattacks to keep NATO forces off-balance. This is a different modus operendi than the Allies fought in the DDR.

Still, by the end of June NATO forces are nearly at the Soviet border. Despite the best efforts of the Pact, they have been unable to recreate the kind of show-stopping defensive works of the Chinese in early 1996. Everywhere, the war has turned against the USSR. In the Far East, the Chinese are rolling forward. In the Middle East, Coalition forces have liberated Kuwait again and are moving north in Iran. While the involvement of Greece and Italy more-or-less on the Soviet side is welcome, there have been no drastic changes. If Sauronski doesn’t get things turned around soon, he’ll pay with his life.

He uncorks the nuclear genie.

So there is my rather long-winded short version of the hows and whys of the v1 chronology relative to the aborted invasion of the western Soviet Union.