OT Navies in WWII

[copeab]

Oh, for those interested:

The M-1941 Johnson rifle


The M-1941 Johnson LMG

[dragoon500ly]

The Battle of Savo Island, 9 Aug 42

On 8 Aug, the 1st Marine Division landed on the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo and smashed the Japanese garrisions or sent them fleeing into the jungle.

The Japanese responded by launching furious air attacks from Rabaul and gathering a naval landing force and sending it south. The USS S-38 spotted the convoy and sank the Meiyo Maru (carrying a large portion of the landing force). This led to the withdraw of the first Japanese attempt to land reinforcements.

Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi sorted from Rabaul with a surface-action group consisting of the heavy cruisers Chokai, Aoba, Kinugasa, Furutaka and Kao, the light cruiser Tenryu and the destroyer Yunagi. Enroute down the Slot (the body of water running down the center of the Solomon Islands), Mikawa's ships were spotted by a RAAF Hudson at 1101 hours, but communications problems prevented this spotting report from reaching the US Commander, Admiral Turner.

Shortly after being spotted by the Hudson, Mikawa launched a scout floatplane from each of his heavy cruisers. These plans proceeded south and operated freely over the American transport anchorage off Tulagi as well as the cruiser groups operating north and south of Savo Island. They were spotted by several ships, but no alarm was given, due in part, to the mistaken belief that they were friendly aircraft.

At 2100 hours, Mikawa received a report from Rabaul indicating that the air attacks had sunk three cruisers, two destroyers and nine transports and that a cruiser and two transports were left burning. With the odds now in favor of the Japanese, at midnight, speed was increased to 28 knots and Mikawa headed for the enemy.

The Allied forces were deployed in three units to cover the approaches to the transport anchorage.

The US destroyers Blue and Ralph Talbot (carrying SC search radar) were deployed as radar pickets north and south of Savo Island.

The Southern Group, under Rear Admiral V.A.C. Crutchley, RN; consisted of the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia, HMAS Canberra, USS Chicago and the destroyers USS Bagley and USS Patterson. Prior to the Japanese entering the area, the Australia was detached to carry Admiral Crutchley to a meeting with Admiral Turner, after the meeting, Australia off Lunga point, screening the transports anchored there.

The Northern Group, under Captain F.L. Riefkohi, USN; consisted of the hravy cruisers USS Vincennes, USS Quincy and USS Astoria and the destroyers USS Helm and USS Wilson.

The Eastern Group, under Rear Admiral Norman Scott, USN; consisted of the light cruisers USS San Juan, HMAS Hobart and the destroyers USS Monssen, USS Buchanan and USS Jarvis. Jarvis had been damaged in the air attacks and was floating in between Florida and Guadalcanal. The remainder of the Eastern Group were covering a passage south west of Florida Island.

Surprisingly enough, the Northern and Southern Groups were not at battle stations or, indeed, at any sort of hightened readiness status at all.

The Japanese spotted USS Blue just before midnight, using their superior night optics and specially chosen observers, the IJN often saw Allied ships at night well out of radar range. Blue never detected the incoming warships on radar due to the scattered returns from Guadalcanal and Salvo Islands (the early SC radar did not give reliable info when close to land masses).

Steaming at reduced speed to conceal their wakes the IJN cruisers spotted the Southern Group at 0125 hours. Upon spotting the enemy, speed was increased to 30 knots and the cruisers launched their deadly Long Lance torpedoes. It was not until 0143 hours that a lookout on USS Patterson shouted "Ships ahead!'

The warning "Strange ships entering harbor" was broadcast on the short-range TBS system just as Chokai opened fire on HMAS Canberra, destroying her bridge and damaging her engine rooms. Two torpedoes struck her bow, setting her on fire. Canberra would later be scuttled at 0800 hours. USS Chicago was struck by a torpedo that blew off part of her bow. Surprisingly, no contact report was made to alert the other ships of what had just happenened.

The Japanese force had seperated into two groups, seperated by about 4nm after making a turn to port: Chokai, Aoba, Kako and Kinugasa in the eastern group and Furutaka, Tenrtu and Yubari in the western group. Yunagi was dispatched to deal with USS Jarvis which had just appeared from a rain squall.

The two groups spotted the Northern Group at 0150 hours and launched spreads of torpedoes and then illuminated the sleeping cruisers of the Northern Group with searchlights. USS Astoria was quickly knocked out of action. USS Quincy was caught with her guns still trained in when she was illuminated by the searchlights. A hit in her well deck set her floatplanes on fire and marked her for the Japanese gunners. She was hit by a torpedo in her engine room as well. She sank at 0235 hours.

HIJMS Kako pinned USS Vincennes in her searchlights quickly raked the cruiser. Vincennes was able to return fire damaging Kako. Vincennes was then hit by 2-3 torpedoes from Chokai at about 0155 and then one more from Yubari at 0203 hours. When illuminated by search lights from the east, thinking that they were friendly ships, the Vincennes raised a large American flag. Spotting the large flag, and thinking that this was the flagship, the IJN cruisers from both groups pounded the Vincennes. Caught in this brutal crossfire, Vincennes received over 60 shell hits and 3-4 torpedoes before she capsized and sank at 0250 hours.

The USS Jarvis and HIJMS Yunagi had a brief gun duel before the Yunago broke off to follow the Furutaka group. Yunagi reported that she had engaged a light cruiser of the Achilles class, this later lead to a Japanese air strike the following morning that sank Jarvis.

Admiral Mikawa assassed the situation and determined that it would take 2-3 hours to reform and attack the transport area. Unsure of the location of any US carriers, he decided to withdraw in order to be out of range by morning. During the withdraw, the radar picket USS Ralph Talbot was severly damaged by the Furutaka group, but managed to duck into a rain squall.

For minor damage to three cruisers and a destroyer, the Allies paid with four cruisers sunk and a cruiser and two destroyers damaged.

Iron Bottom Sound had claimed its first victims.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by RN7

Overall it cost America over 7,000 deaths, 29 ships and 615 aircraft. Japanese casualties were 31,000 deaths, 38 ships and over 800 aircraft.

The actual breakdown of losses for both sides were:

Allies lost 1,769 killed on the ground; 5,041 at sea and 420 in the air for a total of 7,230.

Japanese losses came to 25,600 killed in action, 3,543 lost at sea and 1,200 killed in the air for a total of 30,343.

Allies lost 2 fleet carriers, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 15 destroyers, 1 transport and 3 destroyer conversions (APDs) for a total of 29 ships.

The IJN lost 1 light carrier, 2 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 11 destroyers, 6 submarines, 13 transports and 1 destroyer conversion (APD) for a total of 38 ships.

American aircraft losses totaled:
Cactus Air Force: 115 F4F, 66 SBD, 16 TBF, 19 P-400/P-39, 18 B-17, 1 B-26 and 17 PBY or a total of 252 ac lost to all causes.

Carrier Air Losses: came to 81 F4F, 63 SBD and 40 TBF for a total of 184 ac lost to all causes.

Grand Total of 436ac.

The Japanese 11th Air Fleet (Rabaul) lost 107 Zeros, 15 Vals, 100 Bettys, 19 seaplanes and 1 float plane for a total of 242 lost to all causes.

The Japanese Carrier Air Groups lost 81 Zeros, 69 Vals, 47 Kates and 1 Judy for a total of 198.

Grand Total of 440 ac.

These cover the losses suffered during the primary combat period lasting from 1 Aug 1942 to 15 Nov 1942.

[dragoon500ly]

It always surprises me just how ignorant some of the military officers that I work with simply don't have any intrest in military history. Now, to be fair, the vast majority of officers do have a deep intrest in military history and are ready to agure at the drop of a hat the merits of line vs. column in the Napoleonic Wars. But I'm seeing a distrubing percentage of officers, that just don't take the time to understand how the mistakes of the past can teach you about today's actions.

One naval lieutenant, who shall remain nameless, got into an arguement with me over Guadalcanal, and how the Army needlessly prolonged the fighting....WTF, over? This officer also maintained that the Navy did everthing possible to insure that the Marines were well supplied. Hence this little article.

When the 1st Marine Division was first sent to New Zealand, the marines executed the move as an administrative move from one base to another. One result of this was that the cargo ships were commercially loaded, Basically all equipment was broken down as far as possible, crated and then loaded, cramming the most material possible into the hull. This also meant that the division was not in a position to make an amphibious landing. The division would have to unload its equipment, and reassemble and repack it and then combat load the transports. Colonel Hunt perhaps said it best, "the essence of combat loading is not to load the toilet paper on top of the ammunition." Hampering the marines was the limited port facilities of Wellington (at the time). The Aotea quay only had space for five freighters, for example.

The Division D-4, Colonel Pate calculated that there would not be enough cargo space available to transport all of the division's equipment and supplies. Each man would only be allowed to take what was needed to actually live and fight. All excess clothing, bedding rolls and company property would be stored in Wellington. Nonessential units or elements of units would also be left behind, as well as 75% of the division's heavy vehicles. Supply stocks were slimmed down from the prescribed 90 days to 60 days worth. And the division's ammunition reserves were pared down to only 10 units of fire.

Each cargo ship was assigned a detachment of 300 marines under a field officer to work around the clock, unloading, sorting and reloading. To the enternal disgust of the marines, the New Zealander dock unions insisted on regular tea breaks and refused to work their crews in the inclement weather that soon arrived. The police summarily ordered them off the docks, and with the exception of the operators of the loading machinery, all work was performed by the leathernecks.

The quay was pelted by the rain and as the marines worked, the rain melted the flimsy cardboard packaging of many supplies, washed the labels off of cans and caused the waterlogged cartons to split open and spill their contents. The quay soon became a marsh with dunes of cornflakes intermingled with paper pulp, clothing, candy bars, cigarettes and ration cans. It truely was a sight that would never be forgotten.

On 8 Aug, 1942, the marines landed on Guadalcanal and operations onBeach Red soon ran into trouble. The beach was littered with ground landing craft and was covered in boxes, crates and barrels. Off shore, more landing craft idled, waiting for a spot on the beach to open up and allow them to land. To unload the craft, there were only 300 men of the 1st Pioneer Battalion. So bad was the situation, that the transports were ordered to each detach 15 sailors to go ashore and assist, but even this was not enough to make sense of the bedlam ashore. The only respite to the beach congestion occuried when the Japanese air raid halted operations for three and a half hours.

[dragoon500ly]

When the marines captured Lunga Point on Guadalcanal, they also captured quite a bit of Japanese equipment. There were three antiaircraft batteries, ammunition dumps, a radio station, a refrigerating plant, an air compressor plant as well as vehicles and tons of supplies. Not the least of the captures was a copy of the current version of the main Japanese naval code---what Intelligence called the JN-25c. The marines also captured a Japanese shore-based air search radar; both of these were quickly loaded onto the transports.

With the disaster of the Battle of Savo Island and the decision to withdraw the carriers, Admiral Turner was left with no choice built to withdraw the vulnerable transports. Unfortunately, only a faction of the supplies and virtually none of the heavy equipment had been offloaded.

For the marines, their mission had changed. They now had to hold onto the uncompleted airfield at all costs. The 1st Marine Division was also splintered with 6,075 marines left on Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo islands and 10,819 marines on Guadalcanal (Turner's transports took another 1,800 marines with them). With only five combat battalions available General Vandegrift had to shorten his perimeter and secure new landing beaches on Lunga Point. This meant that Beach Red (and the available supplies) would now be over 3 miles outside of the perimeter. To add to the problem of digging in, there was a scarcity of picks, shovels and axes, no mines and only 18 rolls of barbed wire available. Some barbed wire was recovered from cattle fences, but there was only enough wire for limited use at the key points (usually a single or double strand fence!).

Fortunately, the Japanese made no further attacks for the next four days, giving the marines the precious time they need to move their supplies to within the perimeter and then dispersed into dumps. The marines also inventoried the captured Japanese supplies, all told, the marines had four units of fire and seventeen days of rations (two meals a day).

The key to Guadalcanal was the airfield. The Japanese had completed both ends, but there was a 180 foot wide gap in the middle that would need over 6,700 cubic feet of earth to fill. The marines had landed only a single angle-bladed bulldozer, but the Japanese had provided six road rollers, four generators, six trucks, fifty handcarts about seventy-five shovels and two gas powered locomotives that pulled hopper cars for earth moving. By August 12, the runway gap had been filled in and it had been extended to 2,660 feet. By August 18, it was stretched to 3,778 feet. Henderson Field was now ready to receive aircraft.

[dragoon500ly]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in authorizing the Guadalcanal operation, made a serious error in appreciating the time required to move supplies to the South Pacific and compounded this error by simple ignorance of the general physical layout of the theater and its stark primitiveness.

The initial plan was for the Army to set up a supply line that ran directly from San Francisco, lacking resources at Pear Harbor, the Navy followed suit. There was no coordination of supply activities and both services were requisitioning separate shipping for the long haul to the same destinations.

The Commander of the South Pacific theater, Admiral Ghormley chose Auckland, New Zealand to become the advance base for the US. Auckland lay 5,680 miles from San Francisco and 1,825 miles from Guadalcanal (New York City, for example is only 3,500 miles form Liverpool or Casablanca, the advance bases for the European and Mediterranean theaters).

Ghormley came under fire for this decision, but he was well aware that distance alone would not be the sole element affecting shipping movement. Cargos loaded in San Francisco would have to be unloaded, sorted, stored and then reloaded before movement to the combat areas. This required deepwater harbors with berthing, lighterage, warehouses, cranes and stevedores. Only Auckland had all of these. The forward bases at Espiritu Santo and Efate (and, of course, Guadalcanal) had none of these refinements. Noumea possesed four berths but none of the other facilities needed.

The Joint Chiefs had foreseen the need for specially equipped units to build advance bases. Detachements has been organized, code-named "Lions" for large advanced fleet bases and "Cubs" for internediate fuel and supply bases. Ghormley requested one of each as well as essentials such as naval construction battalions. No Lions would arrive in the South Pacific in 1942 and the first Cub to arrive at Noumea, did so without its desperately needed lighterage and pontoons.

Noumea, the advanced base supporting Guadalcanal best displayed the failure to appreciate the logistical problems of the theater. The port had a maximum capacity of twenty-four ships a month, by September 23, 1942, the harbor held eighty-six cargo ships that had become substitutes for nonexistent warehouse space. Many of the ships lacked the cranes to offload the heavy cargo, cranes that would not be available until October. Cargo intended for Brisbane was loaded on top of carge intended for Noumea. Shipping manifests often identified their cargos as "machinery" or "dry goods". A shortage of labor and transportation left tons of unmarked and unsorted stores stacked helter-skelter, exposed to the weather and to pilferage. Both services separately unloaded its ships and sometimes only partly unloaded a ship and returned it to anchor.

The local Army commander, General Patch cooperated with Ghormley in trying to tame this diaster. He formed a provisional port company of his own at Noumea and recruited more laborers. He supplied Army clothing and food to Naval personnel and when Vandegrift requested machetes (essential for jungle movement), Patch had his engineers modified and ship some of the 20,000 cavalry sabers that had been sent to Noumea.

Moving supplies the 1,100 miles from Noumea to Guadalcanal (roughly the distance from New Orleans to New York City) was another difficulty. R4Ds (Navy DC-3/C-47s) carried critical items, such as fuel and evacuated most of the wounded. A single squadron was available initially (18 planes), a second squadron did not reach the theater until late October. The lack of port facilities at Guadalcanal required those cargo ships equipped with landing craft to haul supplies for the final leg. This practice had an important impact on the Navy's tactical capabilities. Because of the limited ability of the marines to litterally manhandle supplies, the transports had to be sent up in twos and threes, generating severe strains on the scarce destroyer resources available for escorts. This escort duty, fractured all division and squadron integrity, with deadly consequences in the night surface actions around Guadalcanal.

[dragoon500ly]

Life on Guadalcanal went on with minor air raids. The almost daily raids at about noon quickly became a fact of life for the marines. On August 12th, the marines started a supply run of two Higgins boats and a tank lighter between Guadalcanal and Tulagi. On the first run, a IJN submarine surfaced and started to engage the landing craft with its deck gun until marines of Battery E, 11th Marines bracketed the sub with their 75mm pack howitzers. "Oscar" as the subs were nicknamed would surface and fire a few rounds into the perimeter. On the 13th, one that approached Guadalcanal was taken under fire from 75mm half-track mounted guns and discouraged.

On August 10th, a marine patrol on the Matanikau River captured a Japanese sailor. While under going interrogation, he revealed that some his fellow sailors might surrender as well. The Division Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Goettge, added this info to a report of a white flag having been seen and decided to lead a patrol to capture a few prisoners, eventually numbering twenty-five men, the patrol included many key members of the Division Intelligence Section as well as the Regimental Surgeon of the 5th Marines, Lieutenat Commander Pratt.

Vandergrift gave reluctant permission and the Goettge patrol departed by boat after dark on August 12th. As Colonel Goettge stepped into the brush off the beach, he was killed by a burst of fire. The patrol was quickly pinned down on the beach and took heavy casualties. A runner was dispatched and he reached marine lines near dawn. Two other men who had escaped as the Japanese overran the patrol later reached safety. When the news reached the 5th Marines commander, Colonel Hunt dispatched a reinforced company, which landed west of Point Cruz and swept back without contact. Of the remaining members of the Gottege Patrol only a handful of tidal graves, a few helmets and Dr. Pratt's empty medical bag were ever found. Eighteen members are still Missing in Action, Presumed Dead.

As bad as the loss of key members of the Division Intelligence Section was, it was not until thirty six years later that declassified documents revealed the potential for an even greater disaster. The missing included the Japanese interpreter for the 5th Marines, Lieutenant Ralph Corry, who had performed consular work in Japan before the war. But Corry had recently labored at breaking Japanese codes in Washington D.C.. Unsatisfied with this contribution, he had volunteered for more active service and had somehow gained permission to join the 1st Marine Division. Had he been captured and compelled to talk, the knowledge that the Americans were reading Japanese codes would have inflicted great harm on the conduct of the war in the Pacific.

[dragoon500ly]

Japanese Operations

During the early days of Guadalcanal, the Japanese were debating both the intent and the strength of the American Assault. The first tentative censensus was that it was little more than a reconnaissance in force. However, it was decided that no time would be wasted in arrangeing moves to expel the Americans.

As reports from Guadalcanal made their way to Area Army Headquarters at Rabaul, the situation become more and more clear; reports from air recon of 30 transports promted 8th Fleet to estimate that one division was involved. The 17th Army took the view that no more than one regiment was involved and that the large number of transports were present due "to the amenities" that the Americans required.

By August 10th, the IJN confirmed the presence of a Marine division on Guadalcanal. Accordingly, the IJA made plans for the brigade commanded by Major General Kawaguchi (35th Infantry Brigade) be transported to the island. A detachment (reinforced battalion), from the 4th Infantry Regiment (the Aoba Detachement) as well as another reinforced battalion from the 28th Infantry Regiment (the Ichiki Detachment) would reinforce the counter-attack. The Kawaguchi Brigade was currently in the Palaus, waiting for transport, the Aoba Detachment was in the Philippines and the Ichiki Detachement was at Guam, with its transport in place. Ichiki would be able to arrive on the scene first.

On August 12th, an aerial recon flight reported that the main body of the US forces had been withdrawn. With this bit of news, the Japanese accelerated the movement of the Ichiki Detachment.

Colonel Ichiki received orders to make a quick attack to recapture the uncompleted airfireld, for this purpose, a spearhead of 900 men would be landed at Taivu Point (22 miles east of Lunga Point), as a diversion,some 250 men of the Special Naval Landing Force would be placed at Kokumbona, on the western side of the American perimeter.

The Ichiki detachement would travel light (the troops would carry 250 rounds of ammunition and seven days of rations) reflecting the supreme self-confidence of their commander.

The Ischiki Detachment consisted of
Headquarters = 164 men
Headquarters, 2nd Bn, 28th Infantry = 23 men
1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th Companies (each of 105 men) = 420
Machine Gun Company (8 HMGs) = 110 men
one Platoon, Battalion Gun Unit (2 70mm guns) = 50
1st Company, 7th Engineer Construction Regiment = 150
total = 917 men

The detachment was landed at Taivu Point at 0100 hours on August 19 and they marched 9 miles to Tetere, where they remained to rest at 0630 hours.

[dragoon500ly]

American radio intelligence monitored the dispatch sending Ichiki into the area. While they were unable to determine the contents of the message, they were able to confirm the movement of IJA reinforcements. By August 17th, Intelligence was able to place a special shock unit in the Guadalcanal area. Their belief was that an attack on the airfield would accure sometime around August 20th.

On August 12th, a few engineers began a movement to thte Tetere area to survey a possible airfield site, leading to the Marines first contact with Ichiki. A rifle platoon was detached as escort and was informed on the 13th of rumors that a Japanese force had landed further east. The platoon leader decided to return to the Marine perimeter to report the intelligence and to take a larger force out to verify it.

On August 19th, a combat patrol of 60 men from Company A, 1st Bn, 1st Marines entered the jungle. At the same time, Ichiki sent a patrol of 38 men ahead to set up a radio station near Alligator Creek.

About noon, as the Marines halted for rest and food, native guides warned them of the approach of the Japanese. The Marines prepared a hasty ambush. In a firefight that lasted roughly an hour, the marines killed all but 5 of the Japanese, the survivors escaping back into the brush. The marines lost 3 killed and 3 wounded. Examining the ambush site, the marines noted that the dead Japanese wore the star of the Imperial Army instead of the chrysanthemum of the Imperial Navy. The new condition of their uniforms confirmed their recent arrival on the island and the large amount of communications equipment betrayed the presence of a larger unit. A map was also captured that revealed in stunning detail that the Japanese knew that the Marine defenses on Alligator Creek extended only a short distance inland.

Word reached Ichiki about 1630 of the clash between his commo party and an American company. He rushed forward with one company to help and confirmed the destruction of his party. Ichiki pressed on and did not halt until 0430 hours after he crossed the Nalimbu River.

The captured Japanese map and other documents told General Vandegrift that the unit was regimental sized and had recently left Guam. They did not tell him of the exact size, location and intentions of this force. The map not only illustrated the Marine positions along Alligator Creek, but also accurately depicted the Marine artillery positions near the airstrip.

Faced with a series of difficult choice, Vandegrift had to make a decision. His staff recommend that he unleash his only reserve battalion to attack the approaching the Japanese. But lacking clear information as to the enemy strength and intentions, and being left without a reserve, he made the decision to await the Japanese attack within his perimeter.

[dragoon500ly]

Alligator Creek was the watercourse anchoring the eastern perimeter of the Marines. In spite of its name, it was not a creek, but rather a tidal lagoon that emptied into the sea only during the monsoon season, or after a storm. It was no more than 100 feet wide at any point and was separated from the sea by a sandbar that varied from 25-50 feet and rose 10 feet above the "creek". The west bank was slightly higher than the east bank.

On August 20th, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines manned the west bank of Alligator Creek from a point about 1,000 yards inland north of the sandbar, From the corner formed by the sandbar, the 2nd Battalion's line turned sharply west and linked with the right flank of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. The work of clearing vegatation to extend the line 3,500 yards further inland had begun, but was not yet complete by this date. On the sand bar near the west bank, the marines strung a single-strand barbed-wire fence. Dug-in machineguns covered the sand bar and because Alligator Creek approached the sea at an oblique angle "upstream" guns could rake the bar and the portion of the east bank connected to it. A 37mm antitank gun was positioned to sweep the bar and an extra supply of cannister rounds lay ready. The angle itself was held by a platoon from Company G, 1st Marines and two platoons of the 1st Special Weapons Battalion (some 100 marines). A thin line of outposts and small patrols watched from the eastern bank.

At 1200 hours on August 20th, Colonel Ichiki held an orders group and issued his attack plan. With little regard for the Marine dispositions, he ordered a march down the beach, ending in an assault on the old Japanese camp near Lunga Point and then fanning out to capture the airfield. A small party of engineers would scout out crossing sites and the first company would head out after 2000 hours. The order of march would be three rifle companies, with the battalion headquarters leading the detachment headquarters, the machine gun company and the battalion gun platoon, then the remaining rifle company with the engineer company bringing up the rear.

It was pitch-dark as Ichiki's men approached Alligator Creek. The Marine outposts had reported hearing voices and metallis sounds and were withdrawn. About 2400 hours, a sentry at the point fired at a shape that didn't answer his challenge. Rifle fire began to rattle across the tidal lagoon, engaging the engineer patrol and the lead company of Ichiki's detachment. Colonel Ichiki arrived at about 0030 hours and conferred with his battalion commander and the leading company commander. He ordered an assault across the sand bar by a strong detachment, under covering fire. At 0200 hours, a green flare was launched, signaling the start of the attack.

[dragoon500ly]

The initial Japanese attack was launched by the 2nd Company (roughly 100 men) over the sand bar. Screaming battle crys they poured onto the sand bar and straight into Marine firepower. Leaving a trail of dead and dying the Japanese drove down the sandbar, only to halt when they reached the single-strand of barbed wire, some 30 yards in front of the Marine positions. The leaders examined the wire, fearing that it had been electrified. Taking full advantage of the pause, the Marines poured fire into the group of Japanese soldiers. But the Ichiki Detachment was not considered to be a shock unit without cause. Snipping or flattening the barrier, the last few survivors swirled about the marine fighting holes and engaged in hand-to-hand combat.

For nine months, Allied units had often ran to the rear, abandoning duty when confronted by shrieking Japanese infantry. But the Marines were grass-green, but resolute, for all they knew, this was what combat was supposed to be like. And they held their ground and killed Japanese. One story perhaps best shows the determination of the marines. One machine gun, posted near the focal point of the breakthrough entered Marine folklore. The gunner, Private Rivers poured hundreds of rounds into the attacking Japanese until a bullet struck him in the face, killing him. Even as he died, he held the trigger down and emptied a last 200 round box into the attackers. Corporal Diamond then manned the gun until he was wounded in the arm. His place was taken by Private Schmid then fired the gun into an exploding grenade sent fragments into his eyes, blinding him, but he fought on with his pistol.

Ichiki sent the 2nd and 3rd Companies into the attack, but no progress was made. They were able to finally knock out the 37mm gun that had created such havoc on the sand bar. Seeing the penetration, the battalion commander ordered a platoon from his reserve into the line. Within the hour, the line was restored and all of the Japanese who had crossed the wire were dead.

With his main assault blunted, Ichiki used his machine gun company and his battalion guns in an attempt to gain fire superiority, but his attempt failed as the Marines called in the 75mm howitzers of the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines. The marine artillery fire created disorder among Ichiki's men as they rallied for another assault.

In another effort to break the marine lines, a company was sent through the surf and around the open beach flank of the marines but this assault was raked by machine gun fire and then deluged under artillery. Leaving a few men and machine guns to harrass the marines, Ichiki withdrew his mand into a coconut grove some 200 yards from the marine lines.

In this latter phase of the fighting, Martin Clemens, the coastwatcher now attached to Division Intelligence received word that his chief scout, Sergeant Major Vouza was desperately wounded but insistent on telling Clemens his story. Vouza had arrived at a small village when he was captured by a party of Japanese, discovering a small American flag on his person, he was interrogated. When Vouza refused to talk, he captors tied him to a tree and then pounded him with rifle butts and finally jabbed bayonets into his chest and arms. He remained silent, so, with one final slash of a bayonet across his throat, the Japanese left him to die. Regaining consciousness hours later, Vouza managed to chew his way through the ropes and then made his way back to the marine perimeter. Weakened by blood loss, Vouza crawled the last three miles on his hands and knees. Completing his story, he then gasped out a description of the size and equipment of the Japanese unit that he had seen. As Clemens held his hand, Vouze finished by dictating a last message to his wife before finally collapsing. Whisked to a hospital, Vouza staged an amazing recovery. Within two weeks he was back on his feet and was soon once again on patrol. General Vandegrift adwarded Vouza the Silver Star and then conferred a much rarer honor by appointing Vouze a Sergeant Major of the United States Marine Corps.

[dragoon500ly]

At daybreak on August 21st, Ichiki showed no signs of withdrawl, but in no condition to make another attack. With daylight was also resolved that there was no other Japanese unit available to make an assault. The decision to release the division reserve, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines was made. Reinforced by a platoon of light tanks, the battalion would cross Alligator Creek well inland and then sweep forward, outflanking the Japanese. Due to the terrain, the tanks would have to cross over the sandbar.

At about 0950 hours, first contact was made with Ichiki's detachment and, as the Marine report stated, made their "customary bayonet charge", following another newly-made Marine custom, the marines broke the attack and then closed in to kill the survivors. Steadily pushing forward and overcoming pockets of resistance, Ichiki's men were soon pushed into a little triangle by the mouth of the lagoon.

All morning long, the 2nd Battalion had been exchaning fire and picking off unwary Japanese. With the sounds of gradually increasing firing, the marines on the west bank soon saw parties of Japanese darting among the coconut trees, some dashed out onto the beach where they fell victim to the marines, or were strafed by aircraft. Others attempted to break out to the east, only to run headlong into Company C deployed in a blocking position.

The platoon of light tanks was soon sent over the sandbar at about 1500 hours and they cleared the beach and then swung into the coconut grove. Lacking antitank guns, the Japanese were reduced to confronting the tanks with grenades or magnetic antitank mines. One tank was disabled when a tread was blown off, but its crew was evacuated to the other tanks, who then resumed ravaging the grove. When the tanks returned back over the sandbar, Vandegrift later wrote, "the rear of the tanks looked like meat grinders".

In spite of the tank action, Japanese were still fighting in the grove. According to the Japanese Defense Agency official history, Colonel Ichiki burned the regimental colors and committed suicide. One Japanese survivor reports that he last saw Colonel Ichiki walking towards the front line, a trip from which he did not return, to the survivor's knowledge. This is entirely plausible and perhaps explains the paralysis that seems to have gripped the detachment after the failure of the night attack.

By 1700 hours, cautious patrols started across the sandbar and linked up with the 1st Battalion. Marines began to move onto the sandbar and the grove to gawk at what they had wrough and to collect survenirs while corpsmen moved among the bodies. But a number of Ichiki's men chose to use their last breaths in an attempt to kill one more American. They shot a few marines and one Japanese sergeant started a brief meeting of the commander of the 1st Marines and the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Battalions by discharging a pistol into their faces---without effect---before committing suicide. Seeing this as final evidence of Japanese treachery, the marines answer was brutally simple. Lining up on the banks of Alligator Creek, riflemen sent corpses twitching with round after round while other marines moved into the grove and along the beach, ensuring that all of Ichiki's men joined their commander in death.

During the battle, one Japanese soldier surrendered and twelve wounded soldiers, including one officer were taken prisoner. Marine losses totaled 44 killed and 71 wounded. Scattered along the beach, sandbar and the grove were the bodies of 777 Japanese. The marines also captured 10 heavy and 20 light machine guns, 700 rifles, 20 pistols, 2 70mm guns, 12 flamethrowers and a considerable quantity of demolitions equipment. They were particularly happer to relieve Ichiki's men of a large number of much needed shovels.

Between August 22nd and 29th, some 128 survivors of the Ichiki Detachment made their way back to Taivu Point. On the 22nd a radio message was sent, informing the 17th Area Army of the Ichiki's Deatchment "almost annihilated at a point short of the airfield". At first, this message was greeted with disbelief, not until the 25th, when a dispatch by the senior surviving officer, Lieutenant Sakakibara, was the extent of the disaster recognized.

[dragoon500ly]

August 20, 1942 was considered to be a red letter day for the 1st Marine Division. It saw the arrival of the first US aviation unit, Marine Air Group 23. MAG-23 consisted of two fighter (VMF-223 and VMF-224) and two dive bomber (VMSB-231 and VMSB-232) squadrons.

MAG-23 was a newly organized group and to state that its air crews were "grass green" was being polite. The first element of MAG-23 (VMF-223 and VMSB-232) received a mix of the latest graduates from flight school with an assortment of pilots that had survived the Battle of Midway. The two squadrons headed for the South Pacific on August 2nd onboard the escort carrier Long Island with a total of 19 F4F-4 Wildcats and 12 SBD-3 Dauntless.

The Long Island reached its launching point some 190 miles off the southern tip of Guadalcanal and launched its load of Marine aircraft.

For the last eleven days, the 1st Marine Division had endured almost daily air attacks. And as the skies filled with the rumble of piston engines, the Marines braced for another air raid. This time, the aircraft were quickly identified as Dauntless and Wildcats. When the lead dive-bomber, piloted by VMSB-232's Major Richard Mangrum, came to a stop, he was personally greeted with a handshake from Vandegrift. The aircrews were taken aback by the wild joy of the Marines, who tossed helmets in the air and cheered. Veterans noted that a good many of the youngsters shed tears and where not ashamed to admit that their own eyes were moist as well. No episode of the campaign gave such a boost to Marine morale as the arrival of the first American planes.

[dragoon500ly]

On August 16th, the soldiers of the Ichiki Detachement's Second Echelon and the the 5th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force were on board three transports and escorted by a light cruiser and eight destroyers. What followed would turn into an intricate dance of alternating lunges toward and away from Guadalcanal. The convoy's movements were tied to the operations of the Combined Fleet.

The Japanese had assembled two large task forces comprising four battleships, four carriers, one escort carrier, sixteen cruisers, one seaplane carrier and thirty destroyers for operations around Guadalcanal.

Since the disaster at Midway, the IJN had been busy rebuilding its air groups and refining its tactical doctrine. The newly conceived doctrine would place the cruisers in a line some 150-200 miles in advance of the carriers, where they would be in position to finish off enemy ships crippled by carrier attacks as well as serve as a magnet for attacking American aircraft.

The carriers would operate in divisions of two fleet and one light carrier. The light carrier would be responsible for local protection and would operate an air group of twenty-seven fighters and nine torpedo bombers (for ASW protection). The fleet carriers would now operate an air group of twenty-seven fighters, twenty-seven dive bombers and eighteen torpedo bombers. The fleet carriers would be responsible for all offensive action. In order to supplement the air search capability of the fleet, the battleships and cruisers would carry the maximum number of floatplanes.

The fleet needed time to implement these changes and to conduct training, but the American offensive denied the IJN a respite. The staff of the 3rd Fleet (which had the carriers) were able to consult only briefly with the staff of the 2nd Fleet (battleships and cruisers) before the sailed. The only clear point to come out of the staff discussion was the need to defeat the American carriers took first priority; defending the reinforcement convoy was a distant second.

The USN's Task Force 61 (under Admiral Fletcher), with three carriers, one battleship, seven cruisers and eighteen destroyers, loitered in the waters to the southeast of the Solomon Islands, just out of range of the Japanese search planes based at Rabaul. Twice daily, Fletcher launched 200-mile air searches, but as at Coral Sea and Midway, he anticipated warning of the approach of the IJN from radio intelligence. But recent changes in the Japanese code prevented intelligence from reading the contents of messages and traffic analysis (RDFing and reading of call signs) would only be able to hint at Japanese intentions and maneuvers.

On August 16th, some intelligence officers interpreted the radio silence of 3rd Fleet to mean that it had sailed. But the Pacific Fleet summary for August 17th placed the IJNs fleet carriers in home waters, although it did acknowledge the possibility that they would soon set sail. At midnight on the 18th, the IJN threw a monkey wrench into the US radio intelligence efforts by changing all major calls signs, temporarily halting the most important source of insight from traffic analysis. Two days later, Pacific Fleet placed the IJN carriers in home waters and rated a sorte as a "slight possibility".

By August 21st, the Melbourne radio intel station suggested that the IJN carriers were at Turk, based on a single interepted message directed to the cruiser Chikuma (a known carrier escort). But doubts about the accuracy of Melbourne's call sign recoveries and the routing of dozens of messages for the carriers through Tokyo contradicated that surmise.

While the USN was baffled about the location of the Japanese carrier task force, the Japanese were equally perplexed about the location of the American carrier task force. On August 20th, flying boats spotted two American carriers 250 miles southeast of Guadalcanal. And on the 21st they interperted the last message of a Mavis reporting itself under fighter attack as confirming the location of the Americans. Orders went promptly to the reinforcement convoy to turn around in order to keep out of range of American aircraft. The Japanese 11th Air Fleet dispatched a strike of twenty-six Bettys and thirteen Zeros in a failed effort to attack the carriers; on their return trip, they decided to drop their bombs on Henderson Field. The Zero escort ran into a section of four Wildcats from VMF-223 at about 1207 hours. In the ensuing fight the Zeros claimed to have engaged thirteen Wildcats and shot down four , plus two probables. All of the American fighters were damaged, two would never fly again. The Americans claimed one Zero shot down (actually no Zeros were lost). Such was the reputation of the Zero at this time, that the mere survival of all four pilots caused squadron morale to zoom!

[Matt Wiser]

Colonel Ichiki sums up the Japanese attitude: "Spirit" can overcome everything. Even being outnumbered and outgunned, and lacking tanks and heavy artillery, "Japanese spirit" can overcome all obstacles.

According to John Toland's The Rising Sun, Ichiki burned his colors just as one of the tanks found him and a small group of soliders. Before he could be mown down with the others, he killed himself.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Matt Wiser

Colonel Ichiki sums up the Japanese attitude: "Spirit" can overcome everything. Even being outnumbered and outgunned, and lacking tanks and heavy artillery, "Japanese spirit" can overcome all obstacles.

According to John Toland's The Rising Sun, Ichiki burned his colors just as one of the tanks found him and a small group of soliders. Before he could be mown down with the others, he killed himself.

The exact cause of Ichiki's death is unknown. The Japanese Self Defense Agencies' official history states that he burned his regimental colors (but his detachment was a reinforced battalion group, so why would he have the regiment's colors?) and then committed suicide; so Toland is simply repeating part of the line. There is a Marine Corps monograph that states that a high ranking officer killed himself as a tank was approaching him, again possible.

But there is also a story from one of the Japanese survivors that states that Ichiki went forward to rally his men and never returned. Of all the stories, I find this the most plausible because it jives with Ichiki's character, AND it explains why his remaining troops fell back to the coconut grove and underwent their odd paralysis. The next morning as 1st Bn, 1st Marines were making their attack, the Japanese defense was disjointed and had little, if any, central direction, exactly the situation a unit that had lost its higher officers would have reacted.

All respect to John Toland, he's a great author, but I believe that Ichiki met his death in the early morning hours before the Marine counterattack.

[Matt Wiser]

The battalion he led was 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment: Ichiki was the Regimental commander. His regimental command group was with the advance echelon, and thus had the regimental colors. The rest of the 28th Infantry were to follow up a week later, but Ichiki's "spirit" got the better of him and this battalion was wiped out as a result.

[Raellus]

I highly recommend James D. Hornfischer's Neptune's Inferno, about the naval side of the Guadalcanal campaign. Just the prologue is beautiful. As he rightly points out, it was really the only part of the Pacific War during which both sides were operating from positions of parity. The naval casualty figures from the year-long campaign are nearly identical.

Actually, all of Hornfischer's work is very good- his Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors about the Battle off Samar (part of the larger Leyte Gulf battles) is excellent.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Matt Wiser

The battalion he led was 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment: Ichiki was the Regimental commander. His regimental command group was with the advance echelon, and thus had the regimental colors. The rest of the 28th Infantry were to follow up a week later, but Ichiki's "spirit" got the better of him and this battalion was wiped out as a result.

Hmm, while the 28th Infantry Regiment did fight on Guadalcanal, Ichiki's 2nd Echleon was simply the support troops of the 2nd Battalion and a detachment from the regimental gun company. An intresting footnote is that there is a report of the 28th burning its regimental colors some time later. If that report is true, and if the JSDF official history is true and the regimental colors were burned, then either the regiment had two sets of colors or somebody is mistaken somewhere. And lots of luck trying to nail down which!

Myself, I believe that some sort of color was burned, the real question is was this the color presented by the Emperor himself or some kind of "field" color?

[Matt Wiser]

Found this at j-aircraft.org's forum: it's in their section about the ships of the Imperial Navy, and mentions the Ichiki Detachment.

Re: Ichiki Detachment
« Reply #1 on: March 10, 2011, 09:59:28 pm »

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Probably off topic, but to follow up from Bloody Ridge The Battle that Saved Guadalcanal, by Michael S. Smith

Ichiki's First Echelon - taken from Senshi Sosho, 14:292

Detachment Headquarters (with one 70mm gun) - 164
2d Battalion, 28th Infantry (-) - 603
2/28 Headquarters (23)
1st Company (105)
2nd Company (105)
3rd Company (105)
[each company with two platoons only]
2/28 Machine Gun Company
2/28 Gun Platoon (50) (two 70mm guns)
1st Company, 7th Engineer Regiment (150)

Total: 917

Transported to Guadalcanal aboard destroyers Kagero, Hagikaze, Arashi, Tanikaze, Hamakaze, Urakaze (commanded by RAdm Tanaka Raizo), to depart 16 August 1942 and proceed directly to Guadalcanal, landing troops on Taviu Point on evening of 18 August 1942

Each destroyer carrying approximately 150 troops and equipped with two motorboats, two cutters and seven collapsible boats (Hamakaze and Urakaze only had six of the later). Ichiki sailed aboard Arashi.

AND


Ichiki's Second Echelon (commanded by Major Mizuno Takeshi) (1,411 troops) also to depart Truk 16 August 1942 aboard transports Daifuku Maru and Boston Mau, to land Taivu point evening of 23 August 1942. Escorted by CL Jintsu and Patrol Boats 34 and 35.

Ichiki Detachment had two antitank companies: the 28th Regimental Antitank Company (4 37mm guns) and the attached 8th Independent Antitank Company (6 37mm guns)



Here is an interesting look at the Ichiki Detachment of Guadalcanal fame. This is a Babel Fish translation. My notes are in brackets. I have moderately rewritten the translation. It is interesting to note that his detachment included an antitank company, but I guess they were left in the second echelon and not included in the disastrous first echelon. Maybe they never landed, for I can’t find them in Frank’s Guadalcanal OB. I found them later with an OB for the 16th Division on Leyte.

"formation of Ichiki Detachment, the 7th Division’s 28th Infantry Regiment, consisted of 1st Company, 7th Engineers and the 8th Independent Rapid Fire Artillery Company [antitank], staff approximately 2000 names.

As for the 17th Army and the 8th Fleet divided Ichiki Detachment into 2 echelons, riding separately 1st echelon approximately 900 names in six destroyers.

163 men in the task force headquarters, 23 men in battalion headquarters, 420 infantrymen in 4 companies (submachine gun 36, grenade discharge 24), machine gun party 110 name (with 8 heavy machine guns), 50 men with one platoon of battalion guns (2 infantry guns), 150 engineers in 1 company embarks and is dispatched. Remainder of the task force with the Yokosuka 5th special naval landing would be sent in a 2nd echelon by transports. Or more in a manner of speaking was infantry 1 battalions and as for the portable ammunition of the infantry unit each 250 [rounds per man?], food was limited to 7 day's amount.

History

Ichiki Detachment history (1942 May ~ August)
May With the infantry 28th regiment mainstay in Hokkaido Asahikawa city for the Midway capture especially is formed. Task force leader the 28th Regimental Commander is Colonel Ichiki.

May 14th early morning, they boarded a train and starting the Asahikawa city station which is made quiet. Embarking to the wafter Yoshihiro Maru and the Nankai Maru counterespionage system May 18th two, the Hiroshima Ujina departured the port.

Starting, 2 days later, fact of the Midway island capture maneuvers is told to the officers and men for the first time. May 25th entered Saipan port. With the anchorage which is surrounded in the coral reef, the collapsible boat (the folding palpus). Intensive training of the opposed landing which you use was executed.
May 28th Saipan combat mission. From Saipan, guard of the warships is received.

We receive sad news of defeat of the June 6th. Furthermore as for large portion of the guard warships it came to the point of continuing advance, but the transports which carry Ichiki Detachment reverses.

16 day Guam landing. Nearly 2 months from now on, stationing life which utilizes the old US military barracks mark is led. An order to return to Japan arrives on August 6. August 7th early morning, embark to two transports and departs, but, the person of most is surprised the following 8th morning awaking. The transport which place by your, in the Guam of the expectation which yesterday morning departs port. Because it anchored. By August 8th that way wafter departure Guam.

In August 12th Truk Island approaches. As for Ichiki Detachment, the 1st echelon and it means to be divided into the 2nd echelon. As for the August 16th 1st echelon as an advance element, in six destroyers the amount riding. Guadalcanal destination is announced to everyone midway.

It lands to the August 18th nighttime Guadalcanal island [taibo] promontory.

Source is //www.ssystem.net/42.html

[RN7]

Best Fighter Planes of WW2

EUROPE
EARLY WAR PERIOD
Messerschmitt Bf 109: The Bf 109 fighter was flown by many Luftwaffe aces during WW2, including Erich Hartmann the leading fighter ace of all time, Gerhard Barkhorn the second highest scoring ace of all time, and the top scoring German ace over Western pilots Hans-Joachim Marseille. The Bf 109 first saw combat in the Spanish Civil War were German Condor Legion pilots quickly gained superiority over Russian I-15 and I-16 fighters used by the Communists. By 1939 the D model with a top speed of 304 mph equipped all German fighter squadrons, and in 1939-40 proved more than a match for the frontline fighters of Poland, Belgium, Holland and France. By the Battle of Britain the Bf 109E was coming into service with a top speed of 354 mph, and compared well against early British Spitfires. By 1942 the Bf 109G Gustav was reaching over 400 mph and was being used on all fronts, including ground attack, bomber interception and photo recon missions. Although the Bf 109 was a fine fighter it has some flaws such as a cramped cockpit, restricted rear visibility and a narrow track undercariage that made ground handling tricky. Its control also became progressively heavier as speed increased, and although manuverability was very good at low and medium speed, it deteriorated greatly at high speed. It was also short ranged which limited its tactical use.

Supermarine Spitfire: Most British WW2 aces flew the Spitfire, which proved to be a very adaptable fighter and in various versions served throughout the war period in all theatres. The Spitfire's all metal stressed-skin was a new technology at this time and delayed its production. When the war started the RAF insisted in holding most of its modern fighters in Britain and no Spitfires were sent to France. The Spitfire Mk. IA was powered by the famous Rolls Royce V-12 Merlin II engine, giving the early Spitfire a top level speed of about 360 mph and a climb rate of 2,530 ft./min. By the the Battle of Britain, markedly improved climb and acceleration rates had been achieved and fitted. Performance was similar to the Bf 109E, with the Spitfire being slightly faster and more maneuverable and the Bf 109 being faster in the dive and with a superior roll rate and having a performance edge above 20,000 ft. Early Spitfires were not fitted with fuel injection, and the engines would quit for lack of fuel if the aircraft pulled negative g's during a maneuver or was flown upside down. This problem was not fully solved until improved pressure carburetors were adopted in 1943. Later Spitfires models kept pace with upgraded Bf 109s and Fw 190s, incorporating many detail improvements and better streamlining, and top speeds of 450 mph. Overall the Spitfire was an exceptional fighter which excelled in the interceptor role it took on during the Battle of Britain. However like most other European fighters its primary shortcoming was its short range which became a serious fault when the RAF went over to the offensive.

[Targan]

Gentlemen, just a quick reminder that if information posted is partly or wholly sourced from works not originally authored by the poster, it needs to have some sort of attribution attached.

[Matt Wiser]

Fellas, has anyone been to this site? Plenty of info about the ships, aircraft, subs, and ordnance of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm