In Defense of the Red Army

[Raellus]

I'm currently finishing up Max Hastings' single-volume history of WWII, Inferno (it was published first in the UK under a different title) and, in his analysis of the war, he brings up a couple of points about the WWII Red Army that I would like to reiterate here.

WWII-era Soviet troops, many of them illiterate peasants, were able to withstand sustained hardships that most troops from the Western Allies (henceforth WA) did not experience often or for long periods of time. Whereas WA troops often had the "luxury" of stopping and calling in massive artillery barrages and airstrikes when they met strong enemy resistance, Soviet troops were often forced to attack again and again without the benefit of strong supporting fires. Wehrmacht troops who fought on both fronts often noted this contrast. They generally stood in awe of WA fire support while simultaneously being fairly contemptuous of WA reliance on said. On the other hand, Wehrmacht troops learned to cede a grudging respect for the Red Army soldier who they considered simple-minded but incredibly tough and determined. In other words, the Red Army often did more with less than the WA.

Soviet units, although well supplied with lend-lease trucks, were able to live off the land much better than WA or even Wermacht units, reducing their need for the long logistical chains that WA armies could not operate without. One of these days I'll track down the stats that back this up, but the Red Army in WWII was able to field and supply a larger combat force than the WA with fewer supporting units and trucks. Even so, the Red Army during Operation Bagration was able to advance over 450 miles along a broad front in a matter of a few weeks before logistical difficulties slowed them to a halt.

I know that the Red Army of the late Cold War was not the same force as that fielded in '43-45, and that the WA, later NATO, armies also changed (mostly for the better), but it's hard to contend that young men raised during consumer goods shortages in the authoritarian U.S.S.R. were not tougher, in many ways, than those young men raised in the West on Pac-Man, MTV, and Big Macs (insert your prefered equivalent Western cultural equivalents here).

Also, the Red Army's leadership and operational doctrine steadily improved over the course of the Great Patriotic War. I know that some detractors here have pointed out as proof of their inherent inferiority to the West how poorly led, and chained to outdated military dogma, the Soviet Army was in Afghanistan and, later, as the Russian Federation, in Chechnya. I contend that the Red Army of the Twilight War, much like that of WWII, would have identified and elevated talented generals and weeded out the incompetent ones as the war progressed. Some of this would have happened during the China campaign. More would occur as NATO pushed the Soviets east towards their own border. In the case of the latter, you can be sure the entire Soviet economy, monolithic as it may have been, would have been operating at full capacity in support of the war.

All of this suggests to me that, after the tech advantages of the West were rendered null by time and attrition, the Soviets would be in a better condition/position to continue the war on a stronger footing than NATO would.

There's one more point that I would like to make based on a recent viewing of Soviet War Scare 1983 (a History Channel documentary on Able Archer and the near nuclear war that occured as a result), and that is, as a result of their historical collective experience, the Cold War Soviets had an almost atavistic fear of invasion and war. If attacked, I have no doubt that they would have fought with a patriotic furor that would have surprised the West. In the v1.0 timeline, it is the German Army who strikes first (again!).

[95th Rifleman]

The problem is western attitudes tend to be a bit blind. The west consider themselves to be the "victors" of the cold war, citing the collapse of the soviet union and the defeat of soviet-equipped militaries in the 90's.

I must agree with Raellus that the realities are very different. One of my pet hates is how people consistently ignore Soviet air defence in their comparisons. Sure, soviet aircraft where inferior to western counterparts but the soviets whee far more advanced in the area of air defence, the Tunguska system is a prime example. The soviets knew that western helicopters and aircraft where superior so created systems to negate that superiority on the ground rather than in the air.

Another key factor is te more advanced anti-missle systems devised by the soviets in the mid 90's to deprive the west of their main anti-tank advantage, the ATGM.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

I remember playing plenty of flight sims in the 80s (F19/F117, Gunship, etc.) and being constantly frustrated by the clouds of SAMs so thick they'd blot the frigging sun out. :P

Always wondered why we never tried to maintain developmental parity - no offense but the M163 and Chaparral were jokes compared to some of the gear the Soviets fielded. Yeah some of it was pretty bad (the SA9, for example, had a very poor showing in S. Lebanon), but the Israelis were rightly afraid of the Shilka and SA11.

It seems like every time we got something comparable it would get shitcanned. Roland: Not Built Here (neither is a lot of gear we use and used so why was that singled out). ADATS: Same thing.

Patriot is kick-ass...but about as mobile as my house (which is to say: not). So Patriot is about like the SA-2.

Sigh.

(I still think the west won the Cold War :P )

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Soviet units, although well supplied with lend-lease trucks, were able to live off the land much better than WA or even Wermacht units, reducing their need for the long logistical chains that WA armies could not operate without. One of these days I'll track down the stats that back this up, but the Red Army in WWII was able to field and supply a larger combat force than the WA with fewer supporting units and trucks. Even so, the Red Army during Operation Bagration was able to advance over 450 miles along a broad front in a matter of a few weeks before logistical difficulties slowed them to a halt.

Fair points but where we use the term "living off the land" we really mean moving across the landscape like a plague of locusts. It's bad enough for rural civilians during times of war but it would be orders of magnitudes worse if the army moving through your area was relying on what they could "find" in the local area to supply themselves.

By late in the Twilight War NATO forces would be forced to operate in much the same way but I still suspect that Soviet soldiers would be more hated by European peasantry than their NATO equivalents for the above reasons.

[Webstral]

The West invested in airframes because the West had the money and the psychological framework to put into practice the philosophy that air superiority is achieved by aircraft, not ground-based systems. The Soviets put into practice a philosophy that point and area denial with dense and capable ground-based anti-aircraft systems was a cost-effective means of supporting the Army. The West expected that their huge investment in aircraft would enable them to take the initiative in the air and concentrate massive combat power on selected objectives. The Soviets expected that their robust point and area denial capability would enable their ground-based air defenses to keep the Western air forces from intervening decisively wherever the Soviets made their main effort on the ground. The West expected to use its air power to alleviate pressure on its ground forces. The Soviets expected to use their ground-based air defenses to keep the Western air forces from doing exactly that.

Obviously, this is an oversimplification. The Soviets would have entered a Red Storm Rising scenario with a major superiority in numbers of aircraft. The West would have had some effective point and area denial systems. However, where each side chose to make its major investment is telling.

I’ve seen some numbers for how much sustenance the Red Army could get from land the Germans considered scorched. If true, these numbers suggest that the Reds ought to have started with a SCR score of at least 50 (v1). However, I agree with Targan. It would have been hard for the locals that hadn’t been machine gunned to get by with the soft inner bark gnawed off all the trees in the forest, every tuber in a ten square mile area dug up and eaten, and every small mammal and bird in the same area put into “varmint surprise-ski”. Obviously, large numbers of civilians did survive. I can’t help but wonder, though, if survival didn’t mean come down to supplies rolling in behind the Red Army advance.

The degree to which US Army infantry is reliant upon close and consistent fire support is dismaying. It’s a major weakness. Once again, I feel the irresistible urge to advance my personal campaign for supplementing the traditional light/mechanized distinction in the US Army with a dragoon/grenadier distinction. Like typical mechanized infantry, the dragoons would be expected to move operationally and tactically in organic transport and to fight dismounted with close support from organic fighting vehicles as well as artillery and CAS. Dragoons could come in a variety of configurations while meeting the above conditions.

Grenadiers, on the other hand, would move tactically and operationally in vehicles belonging to a higher echelon. They would fight dismounted without close support from fighting vehicles. Support from corps-level artillery and CAS would be worked into the doctrine, but grenadiers would be expected to execute their missions without heavy fire support. I would add, though, that they should have some vehicles that could carry packs, ammunition, and other consumables over short distances so that the light fighters themselves could move and fight carrying the minimum additional mass. Every pound counts.

Dragoons probably would fight during the day, and they would never get very far from their fighting vehicles. Grenadiers probably would operate at night. Dragoons would go into the crucible of combat with the principle role of defending the tanks against the enemy’s infantry and dismounted anti-tank fires. Grenadiers would avoid combat as much as possible, preferring offensive or defensive ambushes. Dragoons could operate in any terrain, being all combined arms and junk. Grenadiers would operate in restricted terrain where the enemy’s dragoons would be forced to fight dismounted and with limited assistance from fighting vehicles. Dragoons could be produced relatively quickly. Grenadiers would take some training. Grenadiers would be junior Rangers, in effect, with a healthy dose of WW2 Japanese light fighter thrown in for good measure. Infiltration, camouflage, deception, superior leadership, superior training, superior marksmanship, superior conditioning, superior unit cohesion, superior leadership (‘cuz it needs to be mentioned twice), superior perks in the rear, and superior leadership (‘cuz it really does need to be mentioned three times) would distinguish grenadiers from dragoons. I’d have never been an NCO in a grenadier unit, though I might have done okay as a private.

Whenever the logistical situation demanded a down shifting of the tempo of mechanized operations, the grenadiers would go in to keep the front from stabilizing. They also would go in behind the lines, like the Chindits. Well-trained troops with effective light weapons can be extraordinarily effective under many conditions. Also, the grenadiers would be available to play the same game as enemy guerillas in the hinterlands, only with the advantage of aerial resupply and regular rotation out for rest and refit. Obviously, the US would need several brigades of these guys. The 82nd Airborne might qualify. I’m not up-to-speed on what the 10th Mountain has been doing since OEF started, so they may or may not count as grenadiers. I can say with certainty that 29th Infantry Brigade does not count. Not even close.

[avantman42]

Originally Posted by Raellus

There's one more point that I would like to make based on a recent viewing of Soviet War Scare 1983 (a History Channel documentary on Able Archer and the near nuclear war that occured as a result), and that is, as a result of their historical collective experience, the Cold War Soviets had an almost atavistic fear of invasion and war. If attacked, I have no doubt that they would have fought with a patriotic furor that would have surprised the West. In the v1.0 timeline, it is the German Army who strikes first (again!).

That's very true, and it's also worth bearing in mind that the Soviet government had total control over the news etc that the people got. Whoever actually struck first, chances are the Soviet people and soldiers would believe it was the Germans.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by raketenjagdpanzer

I remember playing plenty of flight sims in the 80s (F19/F117, Gunship, etc.) and being constantly frustrated by the clouds of SAMs so thick they'd blot the frigging sun out. :P

Always wondered why we never tried to maintain developmental parity - no offense but the M163 and Chaparral were jokes compared to some of the gear the Soviets fielded. Yeah some of it was pretty bad (the SA9, for example, had a very poor showing in S. Lebanon), but the Israelis were rightly afraid of the Shilka and SA11.

It seems like every time we got something comparable it would get shitcanned. Roland: Not Built Here (neither is a lot of gear we use and used so why was that singled out). ADATS: Same thing.

Patriot is kick-ass...but about as mobile as my house (which is to say: not). So Patriot is about like the SA-2.

Sigh.

(I still think the west won the Cold War :P )

It was a case of arrogance and over-reliance on air technology on the part of the US. Germany and Britain tried hard to keep up with the German Roland and Gepard and the British Rapier and Javelin (later we adopted the starstreak).

American thinking got a bit blinded by the success of the stinger in Afghanitan and their belief that their aircraft would be ble to avoid such air defence systems, they over relied on their stealth and SEAD aircraft.

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Grenadiers would be junior Rangers, in effect, with a healthy dose of WW2 Japanese light fighter thrown in for good measure. Infiltration, camouflage, deception, superior leadership, superior training, superior marksmanship, superior conditioning, superior unit cohesion...

So what you're really saying is Grenadiers would be just like Australian reserve infantry?

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

So what you're really saying is Grenadiers would be just like Australian reserve infantry?

[Panther Al]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

So what you're really saying is Grenadiers would be just like Australian reserve infantry?

Or better yet, only half as good as a US Cav trooper?

After all, as any would admit - We are not the greatest thing since sliced bread. We can't be - we invented it.

[95th Rifleman]

I've alwys worried about how much we rely on shiny toys and artillery, the west has a great pyschological hang up regarding casualties. Our tactics are based around the use of massed artillery and air power to eliminate the enemy on the ground so that the actualy ground combat becomes little more than a mopping up exercise.

In the first Gulf war this strategy was amazingly effective against poorly disciplined, mostly static Iraqi positions.

In a situation where the enemy has effective air defence and artillery reserves for counter-battery fire, I do wonder about the west's capability to engage effectively.

We must remember that the only reason the cold war stayed cold was because both sides did not feel they could win quickly enough or decisvely enough before nukes created th MAD scenario. If either side, for one minute, thought they could pull it off, they would of gone in hard and fast.

The proxy wars of the 80's and 90's gave the west an unreal sense of superiority as they made short work of poor quality soviet export designs. We conveniantly forget the times when more advanced soviet tech came into play (such as the Israeli merkava losses to advanced soviet ATGMs).

[Panther Al]

And here is something fun the think about:


The western doctrine was pretty much a mash of soviet/wehrmacht doctrines. So in a way, we was planning on fighting with ideas that was stolen from those two sources. Any way you look at it, the Soviets was no dummies when it came to military thinking. A lot of folks said that jeeps with a TOW missile could hold up all sorts of units. While true to a degree, the Soviets already had a plan for this: after all, they pushed the development of ATGM's before most other folks, and they put as much thought into countermeasures as much as uses of the technology. And there was a huge playbook that was to be used. Encounter situation A? Turn to page three of the plan. So on and so forth. A Soviet drive towards the Channel would be stopped: I don't think the Red Army was that good. But it wouldn't be fun, and it would be a *lot* harder than anyone seems to think.

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

I've always worried about how much we rely on shiny toys and artillery, the west has a great psychological hang up regarding casualties. Our tactics are based around the use of massed artillery and air power to eliminate the enemy on the ground so that the actually ground combat becomes little more than a mopping up exercise.

Unless you're Australian. We don't get the shiny toys the US and even British get to play with. Our usual fire support (if we're lucky) is the Section GMPG and if we're REALLY lucky, a few 40mm HEDP.
Once in a blue moon we might get a little 81mm HE from the battalion mortar platoon, and maybe once a lifetime we might see a couple of M113s giving fire support from their next hill with their .30 and .50 cals.

Try telling the youth of today that though. Think they'll believe you?

[James Langham]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Try telling the youth of today that though. Think they'll believe you?

Luxury! :-)

Try being in the cadet forces, 5.56 is regarded as a luxury item.

[Legbreaker]

REAL ROUNDS!?
I did a 2 week exercise once where we only had 11 blank rounds issued per person for the entire duration! Even the M60 only had a belt of a few dozen!
Try putting in ambushes and assaults with just that - and no bayonet!

And the food situation wasn't much better either! Somebody in the kitchens screwed up the meat order. There was only 20 pounds of meat between 400+ starving soldiers to last a week!

And then, if it couldn't get any worse, they sent us salad for lunch in the middle of winter while it was bucketing down with rain so hard there was water three inches deep on top of the hills!

You want more? Try the porridge they sent us one morning as an attempt to apologise for the meat snafu (we were supposed to be on rations during that phase of the exercise) - absolutely riddled with weevils! On a positive note, I suppose we did get our allotment of protein that day....

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

So what you're really saying is Grenadiers would be just like Australian reserve infantry?

Less beer—at least in the field. And also a greater variety of first names. It does no good for the platoon to yell in the heat of combat “Bruce, get down there and put some fire on their flank!” and have the whole platoon up and move. Or “Bruce, give us a tinny!” and get hit in the head with 30 cans of whatever Aussie infantry really drink instead of Fosters.

Originally Posted by Panther Al

Or better yet, only half as good as a US Cav trooper?

Less of an unwholesome fixation on horses.

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Try the porridge they sent us one morning as an attempt to apologise for the meat snafu - absolutely riddled with weevils!

Weevils? You were lucky!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xe1a1wHxTyo

[raketenjagdpanzer]

I think it's appropriate to this thread to bring up an old joke:

Right at the end of the second world war, three generals, a British General, an American General and a Soviet General are meeting in Berlin and discussing the hows and whys of their successes in the field, and the adage that "an army marches on its stomach" comes up. Soviet general proclaims that the Red Army did so well because its men were well fed - a thousand calories a day! The British general chuckles a bit and says sorry old man, we gave our lads fifteen hundred calories a day. The Soviet is flabbergasted but before he can speak, the American general chimes in and lets it be known that the US Combat soldier received three thousand calories per day, even under battle conditions. At this point the Soviet general cries foul and says "Impossible! No man can eat three sacks of potatoes in a single day!"

[Raellus]

As I see it, the West's main advantage over the ComBloc was technology. This advantage became more pronounced over time. I sometimes wonder how well NATO would have been able to deal with a conventional Soviet attack before the advent of the Western armored triumvarent- Leopard II, M1, & Challenger I.

In my view, that Western faith in, and reliance on, technology can also be considered a weakness. Superior technology allowed us to route Saddam's army not once but twice, and that only reinforced this belief that Western technology would have been the decisive war winner we hoped it would be during the Cold War. We tend to ingore historical examples that contradict that deeply-held belief. For example, it's easy to ignore the fact that the WWII-era German's belief that a complex, expensive, and technically superior Panther or Tiger was worth five or ten crude, relatively inexpensive T-34s still resulted in their eventual defeat (it should be noted that the T-34 was muchbetter than some Germans gave it credit for- some historians rate it the best overall tank of the war, in spite of some fairly glaring technical shortcomings).

We also seem to ignore or discount the fact that Western technological superiority failed to win the wars in Korea and Vietnam and, more recently, the war in Afghanistan. Yes, those are different types of wars, but GWI and II were not really comparable to a WWIII in Europe scenario either. It's not fair to say that the lessons of Korea and 'Nam don't apply to WWIII whereas the "lessons" of GWI somehow do.

Therefore, I think it's fair to say that the west clearly had a technological advantage over the ComBloc, but that this advantage was not a decisive one.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by Raellus

As I see it, the West's main advantage over the ComBloc was technology. This advantage became more pronounced over time. I sometimes wonder how well NATO would have been able to deal with a conventional Soviet attack before the advent of the Western armored triumvarent- Leopard II, M1, & Challenger I.

In my view, that Western faith in, and reliance on, technology can also be considered a weakness. Superior technology allowed us to route Saddam's army not once but twice, and that only reinforced this belief that Western technology would have been the decisive war winner we hoped it would be during the Cold War. We tend to ingore historical examples that contradict that deeply-held belief. For example, it's easy to ignore the fact that the WWII-era German's belief that a complex, expensive, and technically superior Panther or Tiger was worth five or ten crude, relatively inexpensive T-34s still resulted in their eventual defeat (it should be noted that the T-34 was muchbetter than some Germans gave it credit for- some historians rate it the best overall tank of the war, despite some fairly glaring technical shortcomings).

We also seem to ignore or discount the fact that Western technological superiority failed to win the wars in Korea and Vietnam and, more recently, the war in Afghanistan. Yes, those are different types of wars, but GWI and II were not really comparable to a WWIII in Europe scenario either. It's not fair to say that the lessons of Korea and 'Nam don't apply to WWIII whereas the "lessons" of GWI somehow do.

Therefore, I think it's fair to say that the west clearly had a technological advantage over the ComBloc, but that this advantage was not a decisive one.

WW2 is a good point.

Every allied nation was behind Germany in terms of tech and yet Germany still lost.

Compare the M4 Sherman to the later model Panzer IV's let alone the Panther and Tiger. The German Panzerfaust and Panzerschrek where superior to both the Bazooka and the joke (sorry, by joke I mean the british PIAT). The Germans had the jet aircraft which where superior in every way to the allied fighters.

The problem Germany had was numbers and fuel. In a WW3 scenario the Russians have a massive numerical advantage and this could prove as telling as it was in WW2.

If it takes ten T72's to kill an Abrams and the Russians have those tanks to spare, the Abrams will die. It;s how the American shermans killed Tigers.

[B.T.]

Once again, a very educated ans very inspiring thread, Thank you all for sharing your thoughts.
I would like, to add some of my own:

Originally Posted by Webstral

The degree to which US Army infantry is reliant upon close and consistent fire support is dismaying. It’s a major weakness. Once again, I feel the irresistible urge to advance my personal campaign for supplementing the traditional light/mechanized distinction in the US Army with a dragoon/grenadier distinction. Like typical mechanized infantry, the dragoons would be expected to move operationally and tactically in organic transport and to fight dismounted with close support from organic fighting vehicles as well as artillery and CAS. Dragoons could come in a variety of configurations while meeting the above conditions.

Grenadiers, on the other hand, would move tactically and operationally in vehicles belonging to a higher echelon. They would fight dismounted without close support from fighting vehicles. Support from corps-level artillery and CAS would be worked into the doctrine, but grenadiers would be expected to execute their missions without heavy fire support. I would add, though, that they should have some vehicles that could carry packs, ammunition, and other consumables over short distances so that the light fighters themselves could move and fight carrying the minimum additional mass. Every pound counts.

Dragoons probably would fight during the day, and they would never get very far from their fighting vehicles. Grenadiers probably would operate at night. Dragoons would go into the crucible of combat with the principle role of defending the tanks against the enemy’s infantry and dismounted anti-tank fires. Grenadiers would avoid combat as much as possible, preferring offensive or defensive ambushes. Dragoons could operate in any terrain, being all combined arms and junk. Grenadiers would operate in restricted terrain where the enemy’s dragoons would be forced to fight dismounted and with limited assistance from fighting vehicles. Dragoons could be produced relatively quickly. Grenadiers would take some training. Grenadiers would be junior Rangers, in effect, with a healthy dose of WW2 Japanese light fighter thrown in for good measure. Infiltration, camouflage, deception, superior leadership, superior training, superior marksmanship, superior conditioning, superior unit cohesion, superior leadership (‘cuz it needs to be mentioned twice), superior perks in the rear, and superior leadership (‘cuz it really does need to be mentioned three times) would distinguish grenadiers from dragoons. I’d have never been an NCO in a grenadier unit, though I might have done okay as a private.

I agree. As I see it, this was the reason behind the German (=West Germany in the Cold War) decision, to field the Panzergrenadier-units (mech. Inf with the Marder IFV) and the Jäger-units (Kind of "light Infantry", equipped with trucks or the M113.) Every PzGren-Btl in the Bundeswehr of the 80ies had one integrated Jäger company. Those would have been asked to support the Panzergrenadiers in FIBUA situations and in fighting in wooded areas. The Jägers were better trained. Every single soldier in my unit was trained with rifle, MP, Pistol, handgrenades, MGs, and the le. Panzerfaust. Everyone had seen the Milan and was instructed, to use it (although not everyone visited the 6 week training course).
We were trained in lying minefields and in improving booby traps with grenades.
The Panzergrenadiers, on the other hand, were not trained with the Uzi. At a time, when the Marder still had the firing ports for the Uzi!

Originally Posted by Raellus

We also seem to ignore or discount the fact that Western technological superiority failed to win the wars in Korea and Vietnam and, more recently, the war in Afghanistan. Yes, those are different types of wars, but GWI and II were not really comparable to a WWIII in Europe scenario either. It's not fair to say that the lessons of Korea and 'Nam don't apply to WWIII whereas the "lessons" of GWI somehow do.

Therefore, I think it's fair to say that the west clearly had a technological advantage over the ComBloc, but that this advantage was not a decisive one.

Very true. Technical superiority does not win wars. The more advanced technical weapons would help in warfare, but what counts, are the single soldiers. You know: "(More) Boots on the ground!"

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

Every allied nation was behind Germany in terms of tech and yet Germany still lost.

Compare the M4 Sherman to the later model Panzer IV's let alone the Panther and Tiger. The German Panzerfaust and Panzerschrek where superior to both the Bazooka and the joke (sorry, by joke I mean the british PIAT). The Germans had the jet aircraft which where superior in every way to the allied fighters.

The problem Germany had was numbers and fuel. In a WW3 scenario the Russians have a massive numerical advantage and this could prove as telling as it was in WW2.

One should not forget, that the German society was in a constant state of paranoia. Even in the developement of weapons, several agencies tried, to convince all others, that their approach would be the best. And that led to a situaton, where different groups worked on the development of certain items, but a central "power" was lacking. Look at the development of a modern infantry rifle, as an example: Fallschirmjägergewehr and Sturmgewehr both were interesting designs, both were really influential. But in the end, a lot of labour and intellectual manpower were wasted. Because everyone tried his thing, ignoring the work of others. (As an aside: This seems to be repeated in the current US: SOCOM, Marines and Army all search for a specific new rifle. But every force uses a different approach. Or look at the developement of helmets: Marines and Army both replaced the PASGT helmet, but both forces developed their own design!)
The majority of the German units in WWII were still equipped with an old rifle (Kar 98), even in the end of the war. And most soldiers did not ride in fancy halftracks, they moved on foot.

[Raellus]

I'm currently reading Ivan's War) (Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945) by Catherine Merridale. It's an excellent book and it has me thinking, once again, about the Red Army of the Twilight War/WWIII (v1.0).

It's truly an amazing story how the Soviet Union weathered Barbarrosa in the summer of '41 and not only just survived, but eventually stormed back to take a leading and underappreciated (at least, in the West) role in defeating Nazi Germany. Even before the German invasion in the summer of '41, the Red Army was already decimated and enervated by purges of its officer corps, a crisis of confidence precipitated by the failure of its Finnish adventure, widespread resentment in the ranks caused by Stalin's collectivization program, major military supply deficiencies, and doctrinal confusion (no viable plans for fighting any kind of defensive war since planning for defense was perceived to be "defeatist"). Yet, despite all of these self-imposed disadvantages, and truly staggering losses (nearly 5 million killed or captured by February of '42), the Soviets were able to rally and, eventually, strike back with overwhelming force.

The Soviet military of v1.0 would have been in a much better starting position than the Red Army of 1941. Yes, a few of its top units would have already been bled white fighting in China, and yes, many among its ranks would likely have been questioning the sanctity and efficacy of the Soviet system, and yes, it would be contending with shortages of certain items like military trucking. But, overall, it would be on a much firmer footing than its WWII predecessor, when the Bundeswehr launched its coup-de-main into the DDR. Another German attack on "Soviet" territory would be a huge "we told you so" moment and a massive propaganda victory for the Soviet government. Furthermore, the Red Army of 1997 would surely have learned from its experiences on the China front. Mobilization of the military and industry would have already been underway, if not quite complete, by the time of the German action. Yes, the Soviet military would be on the back foot in Europe, but it would be in a much better position to fight back than the Red Army of WWII. Considering how well the Red Army bounced back a year into the Great Patriotic War, I imagine that they would give NATO a rather hard time of it almost from the get-go (at least relatively speaking).

Anyway, I know that I'm badly beating a thoroughly dead horse now. It's just a topic that I'm rather passionate about. I really, strongly believe that in order for T2K to work on pretty much any level, you really need a good, strong Soviet military. Otherwise, there's not much there. Combine that belief with a fascination about the Red Army of WWII and I have become quite the late Cold War Soviet Military apologist.

[bobcat]

wait you guys had weapons? when i reported to my old cav unit we had a guidon and four guys wearing stetsons.

and i still insist that guidon was the theif.

[Tegyrius]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Anyway, I know that I'm badly beating a thoroughly dead horse now. It's just a topic that I'm rather passionate about. I really, strongly believe that in order for T2K to work on pretty much any level, you really need a good, strong Soviet military. Otherwise, there's not much there.

Agreed. However we get there, the setting at the time of play (mid-2000 through early 2001) needs to be pretty well blown up or you don't get "post-apocalyptic" so much as "lightly used." If you want that end result, your setting design needs to start there and work backward, which means creating a set of preconditions that logically yield your desired world.

(Getting there, then, is one of the biggest problems in designing T2013 or any other mid-2010s post-WWIII world. With what we know today through open sources, it's really hard to engineer a plausible drawn-out land war in Europe with a resurgent Warsaw Pact on one side and NATO or the EU on the other. My best bet these days involves a combination of an expansionist and nationalistic Eurasian Union under the demagoguery of a Putin protege, American preoccupation with an explosively destabilizing Mexico, Iranian aggression in the Middle East, and a Sino-Indian war triggered by the shenanigans of a Chinese-backed Pakistan.)

- C.

[Raellus]

If this stuff is even half as effective as the article claims (I can't find much to coroborate it, except for some Russian defense industry blurbs which probably shouldn't be considered objective), NATO would have had a harder time with Soviet MBTs than some folks seem to imagine they would.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kontakt-5

I'd always assumed that kinetic energy penetrators wouldn't have much (if any) trouble against ERV-equipped tanks. It appears that I was wrong.

[dragoon500ly]

Isby quotes a stat in "Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army" that is of intrest:

"There is an average of 3.285 logistics, service, communications and support personnel for every US fighting soldier. The comparable Soviet figure is surprising, they average 0.68 support personnel per every fighting soldier."

"The reason why is the different missions of the two armies. While the Soviets are prepared to fight a lengthy war, their main emphasis is on a short, intense conflict. They also lack the large training base and overseas commitments which dramatically increase the US Army's support requirements."

"The Soviets also enjoy a higher readiness in equipment. Soviet weapons are simple, rugged and have lower maintenance requirements than their Western counterparts. In WWII, in spite of their shortage of trained personnel, the Soviets were able to repair between 75-80% of their disabled vehicles, 80-90% of these within two days, a performance that is currently matched only by the Israeli Army."

I remember a demonstration that a Vietnam veteran Sergeant taught his platoon on a rifle range at Graf, he took an AK-47 and an M-16, blew four magazines through each on full auto, then threw the weapons into a mud puddle, submerging both weapons. He ran a cleaning rod through the barrel of each weapon, hand cycled the action twice and then proceed to load and fire another magazine on full auto, the M-16 fired some eight or nine rounds and then jammed. The AK-47 went through another three mags before the sarge ended his demo.

[HorseSoldier]

I know that the Red Army of the late Cold War was not the same force as that fielded in '43-45, and that the WA, later NATO, armies also changed (mostly for the better), but it's hard to contend that young men raised during consumer goods shortages in the authoritarian U.S.S.R. were not tougher, in many ways, than those young men raised in the West on Pac-Man, MTV, and Big Macs (insert your prefered equivalent Western cultural equivalents here).

An interesting footnote I read in Murray Feschback's pretty bleak Ecocide in the USSR: Health And Nature Under Siege is that polution and environmental contamination was so severe in the USSR that by the 1980s a huge percentage of potential conscripts to the Red Army were being turned away because they were medically unfit. This was mostly related to asthma and other respiratory problems caused by air pollution in industrialized cities, but there were various other problems all related to environmental mess the Soviets made of Mother Russia. It's been a long time since I read the book, but I think the reject rate was quoted as something like 45% -- but regardless, it was bad enough that there are various reports and documents reporting that this was considered a critical threat to national security by senior military leadership by the mid-late 1980s.

Now, obviously, one of the first things the Soviet government would do on the outbreak of a general conventional war would be to reassess their recruiting standards and criteria. However, I have to suspect that a lot of those guys who would have otherwise been rejected for service wouldn't have held up well on the battlefield.

I would guess that, with recruiting standards loosened for the Sino-Soviet War once the war starts in Europe at any given point in time, the Soviets would have much higher rates of duty-limiting illness and deaths from disease. (At some point after the nukes this probably flattens out more towards parity as everyone who is at increased risk of death from disease on both sides doesn't make it through short rations and cold winters, etc.)

Feschback's book deals almost exclusively with the USSR but environmental conditions were pretty much as bad, or maybe worse, in the other Warsaw Pact nations, so this was likely also a problem for the East Germans, Poles, and others.

How this interacts with growing up in a comparatively austere environment is an interesting question. I agree that Russian recruits in the 1980s/90s may have been better prepared mentally for privation, but it's likely that this was offset on the NATO side by better nutrition, medicine, and healthier environments personnel grew up in to maybe produce something of a wash at a big picture statistical level.

[Webstral]

I would argue that we’re not prepared to fight a lengthy war successfully. If we meant business, we would have flooded Afghanistan with troops from the beginning. We don’t have enough trained manpower to do that, nor do we have the political will to have the reserves called up long enough to make up the difference. We have fought for years under the assumption that it was all going to get better any day now, relieving us of the effort of making an appropriate commitment. We’re fighting the Rhodesian War in Central Asia and no closer to winning than the Rhodesians were. This makes me sad, because I know guys like Law have put real effort into getting victory over there.

[pmulcahy11b]

At the risk of becoming political on this board...

Afghanistan began right, but then Bush pulled away most of the troops to fight a war in Iraq that was designed for Cheney and Bush to make tons of money through Halliburton, the defense industry, and Blackwater, while simultaneously shoring up Bush's poll ratings.

Yep, I said it. Iraq was an opportunity for them and a few others to make money. We had no other reason to be there.

Afghanistan -- we're supposed to be there to scatter Al-Qaida to the winds. For the most part, we've done that. We're never going to build a viable, reliable allied country there, because the Afghanis aren't ready for it, let alone a democracy. It's time to leave.

And the usual cast of characters are making boatloads of money from Afghanistan. While our troops die for a cause that is unachievable.

[HorseSoldier]

Afghanistan -- we're supposed to be there to scatter Al-Qaida to the winds. For the most part, we've done that. We're never going to build a viable, reliable allied country there, because the Afghanis aren't ready for it, let alone a democracy. It's time to leave.

That's the problem with Afghanistan, regardless of take on other aspects of it. We went in and smashed up the bad guys, but ended up with a 90% solution, and the remaining 10% of the win is elusive because it just isn't going to happen unless Afghanistan becomes a much more functional country than it is. And I agree -- that's not likely to happen.

Where I was over there, the average Afghan on the street wants things to be better but they also have a culture where you take care of yourself and yours first, others very second. (Which makes sense if you live in an environment where all resources have to be triaged because of scarcity and precariousness.) It's an adaptive strategy for life in Afghanistan as it is now, and as it was under the Taliban, but it isn't a great strategy for Afghanistan to develop into a more stable nation. Unfortunately, it's an ingrained cultural thing -- getting people to step away from it is probably on par with convincing people in cultures coming out of western European sort of cultural backgrounds that democracy is a bad idea. Could be done, but there is a huge amount of inertia to overcome.