In Defense of MG Thomason, CG of Fort Huachuca

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Part One

Although Charles Thomason’s critics are legion, few of them seem to demonstrate more than a rudimentary understanding of the context in his he made his command decisions. Of those who claim that Thomason abrogated his duty in July, 1998 or at any point thereafter, few seem to be able to offer a well-reasoned explanation for how Thomason might have accomplished other ends, other than to claim that he had a duty. Although Thomason was by no means a brilliant wartime leader, he was capable of setting priorities and matching his planning and execution to those priorities.

Thomason’s top priority throughout his command was the defense of his cantonment. He saw the relationship between Fort Huachuca and the 111th Brigade as symbiotic: neither could exist without the other. Fort Huachuca—later the whole of SAMAD—was the basis of sustenance and support for 111th Brigade. In turn, SAMAD could not be defended without the brigade. While this symbiosis came to exist wherever military formations established cantonments, in southeastern Arizona after the start of the Second Mexican-American War the relationship took on a special closeness. The families and communities the MI troops had labored to preserve after the main nuclear exchange, the stores and food and ammunition, the new gardens and wells, the machine shops for making new weapons and ammunition—very little of it could be moved with the transport available in July, 1998. Worse, with the Mexican Army directly south of the border, any movement away from Huachuca would be made under the guns of the enemy and with the knowledge that everything left behind would fall into the enemy’s hands in short order. Thomason simply couldn’t bear to leave behind nearly a half-million American survivors, plus the food that had been intended to feed Tucson and Phoenix, the ammunition stores, and more.

Perhaps equally as important, by July the 111th Brigade was in no condition to march anywhere. Seven months of hard duty had cost the brigade more than half of its strength. Thomason’s troops were weary and demoralized. He knew that his people had given virtually their last measure of effort to hold Huachuca and Tucson against two determined attacks; asking them to pack up and move would have finished them.

The trial for the 111th Brigade began at Thanksgiving, 1997. Like many other training brigades throughout CONUS, the 111th had been practicing reorganizing itself into standard rifle companies for the purpose of providing disaster relief and security in the event the nuclear exchange caught up with the US homeland. After the bombs fell, the MI students and cadre helped organize, shelter, and care for the refugees fleeing Tucson and Phoenix. Their mission expanded into military police duties throughout southern Arizona. Refugees from Phoenix had taken control of towns throughout the area; violence was epidemic. Thomason deployed his troops in an effort to control the situation. Faced with tens of thousands of armed and desperate refugees, soldiers of the 111th died by the dozen. Dozens more committed suicide or deserted every month.

The situation began to come under control by late March. The 111th had dealt with a gang uprising in Tucson by cordoning off the area and burning it. Everywhere, municipal water supplies were brought under central control. Since the governments controlled the food and the water, the survivors began to see the wisdom of compliance. Still, the number of deaths was staggering. Worse, deaths to disease were rapidly increasing.

In April, Thomason became aware that Mexican Army activity in northern Mexico was increasing quickly. 304th MI Battalion had been monitoring radio traffic in northern Mexico since the first attacks on Mexican refugees in February. Military radio traffic indicated that units were moving north, along with supplies. In a precursor to the national movement of troops to the hot spots in the Southwest and Alaska, Thomason withdrew most of his personnel from police duties and began constructing defenses opposite the main crossing points along the border. Throughout May, as Mexican preparations picked up steam, troops from Huachuca rendered secondary roads across the border unusable insofar as this was possible.

The Mexican invasion opened on June 2, 1998. Arizona was a secondary effort. Initially, only Nogales Brigade was assigned to assault and destroy American forces at Fort Huachuca. The main effort would be made further west, passing through Yuma and into California.

By this time, the Thomason’s troops had constructed battalion strong points astride the main road north of Nogales and at Naco, near Bisbee. Further defenses had been constructed east of Bisbee to keep the Naco position from being overrun. Nogales Brigade attacked at Naco, sending its motorized elements up the main road while pushing dismounts across the border west of Naco to cut Highway 92 and delay the movement of reinforcements to Naco. The main effort at Naco foundered in the face of determined opposition. The blocking effort managed to stop American reinforcements, which were moving along Highway 92. However, the reinforcing troops launched a spirited, if clumsy, counterattack that pushed the Mexicans back across the border. By nightfall, the Mexicans pulled back from Naco.

During the night, Nogales Brigade shifted westward and renewed its attack through Nogales. Here again, Mexican forces were held up by dug-in defenders. Dismounts were capable of bypassing the American defensive position, but the Americans controlled the high ground and the roads north and northeast along which Mexican traffic would have to move. Again, Mexican infantry ambushed American reinforcements moving towards Nogales. Again, the Americans fought their way through the ambush and pushed the enemy back across the border in heavy fighting.

Virtually everywhere else along the border, the Mexicans appeared to have taken the Americans by surprise. In San Diego, advancing Mexican forces were only stopped at the outskirts of US Navy facilities. Further inland, Mexican forces crushed American militia in the Imperial Valley within hours of crossing the border. At Yuma, the remaining Marines at Yuma MCAS offered spirited resistance but were overwhelmed by superior numbers and firepower within three days. In Texas, only Fort Bliss held out against the initial assault. Further east, Mexican forces crossed the border virtually at will and drove north.

In southeastern Arizona, Nogales Brigade pulled back to recoup. In order to keep up the pressure on the Americans at Fort Huachuca, the commander of Nogales Brigade sent company-sized elements of dismounts across the border to harass the Americans, set mines and booby traps, and conduct ambushes. Moving at night, the Mexican infantry conducted a number of successful infiltrations despite the presence of American listening posts along the border between Nogales and Naco. One Mexican platoon actually managed to cross the Huachuca Mountains and, with a medium mortar, shell the headquarters of Fort Huachuca from a nearby north-facing slope.

For the next week, American infantry patrols combed the US side of the border, occasionally flushing Mexican troops out of their patrol bases in daylight. The Americans also ran afoul of booby traps and mines laid by the Mexicans. Several more Americans died, and more than a dozen were wounded.


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