The Great War, aka WWI

[dragoon500ly]

Doing some research for a paper I'm doing for college and came across the organization of a U.S. Infantry Regiment in 1918, its intresting...

The Rifle Platoon (one of four in the company) consisted of 59 men and was made up of a headquarters group of 6 men and four rifle squads:

First Squad consisted of 12 men who acted as grenadiers (close-assault), typically armed with pistols or shotguns and as many as 12-14 hand grenades per man.

Second Squad consisted of 9 men and was armed with rifles, each fitted with the French VB rifle grenade discharger.

Third Squad was the maneuver element and was made up of 17 riflemen armed with either the M-1903 Springfiled or the M1917 US Enfield rifle.

Fourth Squad was the fire support element and consisted of 15 men armed with rifles and four M1918 Chauchat automtic rifles (later replaced by BARs).

Four Rifle Companies, along with a small headquarters group (39-45 men) made up a battalion.

Three Battalions made up the Infantry Regiment, Regimental Headquarters consisted of 350 men and include a infantry gun section with three M1916 37mm guns and a trench mortar platoon armed with six 3-inch Stokes mortars. Supporting the Regiment was a Machine Gun Company of 178 men and sixteen French 1914 Hotchkiss HMGs.

The Brigade level organization consisted of two Infantry Regiments, with a Machine Gun Battalion (sixty-four French 1914 Hotchkiss HMGs).

A Field Artillery Brigade consisted of two French 75mm Field Gun Regiments and a French 155mm howitzer Regiment, each regiment with twenty-four tubes as well as a Trench Mortar Battery with twelve 6-inch Newton Trench Mortars.

All told, each Division of the American Expeditionary Forces contained some 28,000 men, this at a time when a French Infantry Divsion seldom fielded more than 10,000 men.

Also of intrest was that the AEF commander, General Pershing, made the decision to go with a strong division so that it would be able to maintain its combat effectiveness for a longer period of time. Its organization was created specifically for the assaults necessary to break the German frontlines. After the war, While the Army tried to maintain the "square" division, Pershing (during his period as Chief of Staff), fought to have the division organization converted into the "triangular" division organization.

Sources are the Doughboy Center.com and "Chateau Thierry & Belleau Wood, 1918"

[dragoon500ly]

WWI saw some odd tactics used, among them the Machine Gun Barrage.

The British would organize their Vickers machine guns into batteries of 4-8 weapons and then anything up to 24 guns into a group. These weapons would then be used in a series of long-range saturation tactics that was used to destroy enemy morale; preventing the movement of troops and supplies; preventing the operation of working parties; creating a protective screen of fire and the general harassing or suppressing of enemy fire.

Machine gun bararages would be used to supplement artillery barrages, being worked over areas or adding a sudden suprise element at intervals. The guns would be fired in bursts of 25 rounds and in one of three different barrages: the "slow" barrage of 60-75rpm per gun; the "medium" barriage of 125-150rpm, and the "rapid" barrage of 250-300rpm. A full-strength group of 24 guns was capable of dumping over 7,000rpm into a fairly confined space in the course of a rapid barriage.

The French came to the conclusion that LMGs would be useful for "walking fire", this consisted of a two-man team that would fire on the move, or take cover from time to time during the advance, providing close fire support to the troops. The French M1915 Chauchat could not be made in quantity and proved itself to be an unreliable weapons. But the concept of carrying LMGs into the front of the attack had been borne, and sooner or later, all the major armies included a sling with their LMGs.

The Germans were satisfied with their M1908 Maxim machine guns, but at 152lbs per weapon, it was not very mobile. In 1915, the MG 08/15 was developed, deleting the heavy tripod and fitting a buttstock to the standard MG08 resulted in a weapon that weighed in at 43lbs. The Germans accepted that their new "LMG" was not as accurate as the MG08, and stressed that the MG08/15 was to never take the place of the infantry, but was rather to be used as a means of increasing their firing capacity. The 08/15 was to be placed in front line positions, ideally, setup for flanking fire, and where possible at least two guns were to cover the same area of ground from different angles.

Source is "Trench, A History of Trench Warfare on the Western Front"

[dragoon500ly]

No discussion of WWI can take place without a mention of the bane of the soldier's existence (And No, I'm not talking about Supply Sergeants!), Gas.

Surprisingly, the threat of poison gas being used in war was appreciated in the late 19th Century. The 1899 Hague Convention committed its signatories not "to deploy projecticles the sole use of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or harmful gases." While well-intentioned, the convention did not outlaw all gas, or its development. The result was that all of the major nations continued with the development of tear gases and after the outbreak of the war, research into other substances was intensified.

Gas warfare started on April 22nd of 1915 when the Germans employed the brutally practical expedient of opening large cylinders of chlorine gas at their front line and allowing the billowing yellowish green contents to drift towards the enemy. In spite of the capture of a German prisoner equipped with a respirator and who had mentioned gas cylinders during his interrogation, the French colonial and territorial troops were caught completely off guard with some 4,000 men killed or injured during this first attack.

The Germans quickly discovered that tthe use of cylinders was very unpredictable, Wind blowing in the wrong direction would blow the gas back into the faces of the assembled assault troops.

The first protective masks ranged from oxygen rebreather sets designed for U-Boat crews to such desperate techniques such as balling up a handerkerchief, placing it on your mouth and then breathing through it. Such crude uses were quickly overrun by such tricks as breathing through a cloth dipped in urine, and cotton bandoliers dipped in a water/alkaline solution.

Replacing cylinders were artilley shells loaded with gas, and while initial surprising, troops quickly learned to recognize the softer "plop" of a gas shell, far quieter than high explosive.

By mid 1915, the Germans developed K-Stoff, phosgene was in wide spread use by the end of the year. Such lung irritnats were used throughout the war, but the worst of them all as known simply as "H.S." or Hun Stuff, but owing to its distinctive smell was soon known as "Mustard Gas". The key effect of mustard gas was not only that it affected the respiratory system and the eyes, but any part of the body it came into contact with. Soon, it was causing more casualties than all of the other German gas munitions combined. Mustard would also linger of a week or more, depending on weather conditions.

Gas, for of its terrors, was surprisingly non-lethal. According to the British, in 1915, of 12,792 personnel treated for gas symptoms, only 307 died and almost all of the others were returned to duty. By mid-war, of 23,626 treated for gas poisoning, 93% were returned to duty and just over 3% died.

A French survey of 120 gas casualties in 1917 is of intrest. Of these men, 39 blamed their incapacitation at being surprised or through their own carelessness; 15 to the removal of their masks too soon; 62 to ill-fitting or displaced masks and 4 to having an obsolete mask.. In short, most gas casualtues were aviodable if up-to-date, masks were supplied to men who had received warning of the attack and put on their masks promptly and properly.

Source is "Trench, A History of Trench Warfare on the Western Front"

[Adm.Lee]

The light MG ideas led the Americans to develop the M1918 BAR, and walking fire appeared in WW2 for the Americans using the BAR and M1 rifle. At least in Third Army, it doesn't seem to have been taught outside of that formation.

I've read of Australian troops using the MG barrage in WW2 New Guinea as indirect fire support. If they couldn't get field artillery forward, it was the best thing they had to reach the reverse slope of a hill.

Re: the square division: The Army convened a board to discuss organization after WW2. A fourth regiment was rejected early, as too cumbersome for the division commander to deal with.

[TrailerParkJawa]

I thought the BAR never got issued in any quantity because someone felt it was too good and couldn't be allowed to fall into the hands of the Germans?

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by TrailerParkJawa

I thought the BAR never got issued in any quantity because someone felt it was too good and couldn't be allowed to fall into the hands of the Germans?

The BAR entered production in September of 1917. The initial production run of 25,000 was completed by Winchester in March of 1918. Full production started in June of 1918 with 4,000 being delivered with another 9,000 in July. By August, Colt and Marlin-Rockwell started production.

The BAR arrived in France in July of 1918 and its first combat uses was on September 13, 1918 by doughboys of the 79th Division. It was used extensively during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Authorized issues was 16 automatic rifles per company, 768 per division.

The BAR proved its superiority early and the British, Belgian and Frence governments were soon placing orders for the BAR. The decision was made by the Americans that it would be inadvisable to divert any of the BARs from American troops until the Spring of 1919, when production capacity would be able to meet the needs of the Allies as well.

The BAR gunner was issued with a magazine belt that held eight 20-rd magazines as well as a metal cup to hold the buttstock for marching fire and two clips for the gunner's pistol. His assistant would carry a bandoleer holding an additional 6 magazines.

Source is "US Infantry Weapons of the First World War"

By the time of the Armistice, some 43,368 BARs had arrived in France. Total production of the M1918 BAR came to 102,125 with Winchester building 47,123, Marlin-Rockwell building 39,002 and Colt building 16,000.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Adm.Lee

Re: the square division: The Army convened a board to discuss organization after WW2. A fourth regiment was rejected early, as too cumbersome for the division commander to deal with.

Pulled this from the Doughboy Center.com, its a RAND Corporation review of the AEF and the 1918 Division:

"Although it possessed tremendous firepower, this division could not fully capitalize on its assets and was also hindered by insufficient numbers of combat service support troops and equipment. Coordination between infantry and artillery was poor, hampered by unreliable communications equipment and the inability to keep track of the movement of infantry units in the offensive. Successful offensives were thereby slowed tremendously. A shortage of personnel and equipment specifically reserved for general logistical requirements, medical evacuation, and transporting rations and the dead further slowed the advance. In short, the square division lacked coordination and was unwieldy and difficult to support logistically."

"The interwar period would prove to be important for incorporating lessons learned from World War I into the division design. Chief among them was the fact that greater coordination among the combat arms and support was required to enhance combat effectiveness. Advances in weapons, communications, and transportation technology were needed to improve the division’s lethality, while properly integrating the advances into Army formations and operations was equally important."

"Immediately after the war, many veteran officers recommended that the Army retain the square divisional structure. General Pershing objected, believing that these evaluations came too soon after the conflict and were heavily influenced by the special circumstances of the Western Front. He favored a division that was much more mobile and flexible and proposed a design possessing a single infantry brigade of three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, a cavalry squadron, and combat support and combat service units. Time and distance factors were paramount: “The division should be small enough to permit its being deployed from . . . a single road in a few hours and, when moving by rail, to permit all of its elements to be assembled on a single railroad line within twenty-four hours; this means that the division must not exceed 20,000 as a maximum.”

"The debate over the divisional structure was framed by the assumption that North America would be the theater in which it would most likely be deployed. The static battlefield, characteristic of World War I in Western Europe, was viewed as a thing of the past as “technological advances in artillery, machine guns, and aviation made obsolete stabilized and highly organized defensive lines whose flanks rested on impassable obstacles, such as those encountered on the Western Front.”

"However, despite Pershing’s preference for a much smaller and flexible division of three regiments, two prominent redesign efforts, the Superior Board (1919) and Lassiter Committee (1920), recommended square designs. In answering the call to increase mobility, the division was cut in size by reducing from four to three both the number of platoons in infantry companies and the number of companies in battalions; 155-mm howitzers and some support troops were also eliminated. It is interesting to note that the Lassiter Committee wished to retain the brigade-based square division in part because a triangular design would have eliminated the brigade command billets filled by brigadier generals. The reduced square division was tentatively approved by Army Chief of Staff General Peyton March in August 1920 at 19,385 men and grew to 19,997 men a year later."

"Pershing, who was to become chief of staff soon after, may have ultimately acceded to a smaller square design because he wished to avoid embarrassment: many of his own officers had recommended the square design while serving on the Superior Board. At the same time, following much criticism for the bloated and unwieldy 1917 design, the postwar cavalry division was radically reduced from approximately 18,000 men to 7,463."

[dragoon500ly]

The beginning of the First World War can be traced all the way back to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the inter-war reaction by the French to their defeat and the responses of the Germans to meet France’s constantly shifting war plans.

France declared war on Prussia on 19 July, 1870, which in turn, caused the German states allied with Prussia to declare war on France. While France (with Bismarck’s skillful encouragement), declared war, it had no plan of action. As one reporter pointed out “it hardly made any sense to declare war without then launching an invasion.”

Three weeks after their declaration of war, the French were still gathering their forces on their frontier. The initial battles of August: Wissembourg (Aug 4), Worth (Aug 6) and Spicheren (Aug 6) were fought either on the frontier or inside France. Following its defeat in all three of these engagements, the French Army of of the Northeast fell back on Chalons, on the Marne River to the southeast of Reims. On August 15th, the French Army of the Center was defeated at Vionville and then again, on the 18th at Gravelotte, both small towns to the west of Metz.

The remaining French troops fell back on Metz and regrouped, waiting for reinforcements. When the Germans defeated the reinforcements at Beaumont on August 30th, General MacMahon left a garrison at Metz (under General Bazaine) and fell back on Sedan. There, in September, at what both sides believed would be the decisive battle of the war. Unlike Metz, Sedan is a city located in a bowl and the French troops penned up there were helpless. France’s Emperor, Napoleon III, was forced the surrender along with most of what was left of France’s army.

Following its humiliating surrender, and the loss of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and with the formation of the German Empire, in the years following 1870, France had three aims:

1) To develop its capability to mount an effective defense of the frontier.
2) To strengthen France militarily through alliances.
3) To develop a loyal and effective military,

France’s efforts in developing its first goal were impressive. A belt of fortifications was built that would protect the 18070 borders from invasion and allow time for France to mobilize its army. Over the next thirty years, starting with the staggering sum of 88,000,000 francs in 1874, France poured money into its fortifications. By 1914, there were over one hundred independent forts on the northeast frontier alone and the Belgians mounted a parallel effort to insure their neutrality in the event of another war by encircling their three strategic cities of Namur, Liege and Antwerp by over forty forts.

These main forts were supplemented by dozens of small reinforced structures, called fortins or ouvarges, and carefully sited so as to dominate the terrain. The French encircled key cities at critical transportation junctures with more fortifications. From north to southeast, the cities of Lille, Maubeuge, Reims, Verdun, Toul, Epinal and Belfort were turned into places fortifiees (fortified positions). Verdun, for example, was the administrative center of a two-hundred square kilometer area protected by twenty forts and some forty ouvrages.

The most important path into France lay along the Meuse River, which begins in the Vosges Mountain near Switzerland and runs up through France and Belgium into Holland. Major rail and road links an alongside, and the river itself, and its connecting canals, was an important transportation artery. In Belgium, the fortified areas surrounding Liege and Namur sat astride the Meuse, as did Verdun. But from Verdun on down the river, there were no fewer than twelve forts sited on the heights of the Meuse, guarding the major crossings.

Below Verdun was another stretch of forts along the Meuse and the Moselle. This area, the plain of the Woevre, was considered by the French to be a swamp as unsuitable for maneuver as the Argonne. And from Epinal on down to Belfort, the forts formed a dense barrier. The Germans would have to advance out of heavily forested areas (the Ardennes and the Argonne), try to move through the passes of the Vosges Mountains, maneuver through major urban areas (such as Nancy) or mount a direct attack on one of the fortified areas.

All of these choices would force the Germans to move slowly, over ground covered by entrenched defenders, equipped with modern weapons and backed by one of the largest artillery parks in Europe. And while the Germans fought their way through the frontier, France would be able to mobilize its field army.

Source “The Myth of the Great War”

[dragoon500ly]

France’s efforts to build a military alliance against the Prussians started with the efforts of Napoleon III’s wife during the 1870 war. None of Prussia’s neighbors wanted to see Prussia beat France, but after the Prussian victories over Denmark and Austria, none of them wanted to enter the field of battle. After 1870, its was very clear that no European power, on its own, could defeat Germany.

Bimarck had made the maintenance of the Russo-German alliance the cornerstone of his foreign policy. When he was dismissed by the young Wilheim II in 1890, the new chancellor, Caprivi, was either incapable or unwilling to preserve this alliance. Wilhelm II, for all of his mental instability, clearly understood the catastrophic effect of this shift on Germany’s national security. When Czar Nicholas II assumed the throne of Russia in 1894, Wilhelm personally intervened in an attempt to maintain the alliance. But France was able to slip into the middle and signed a treaty with Russia.

Overnight, this new treaty changed France’s defense policy. If Germany attack France, Russia would come to France’s aid. France and Russia together, were considerably more powerful militarily than Germany. It did not take a military genius to see that while the Germans tried to fight their way through France’s new fortifications, Russian field armies would be busy, invading East Prussia.

The other side this treaty was, of course, that if Germany attacked Russia, France was bound to come to her aid. This meant the development of an army that would be able to mobilize promptly and take to the filed. France’s next logical priority would be the development of such an army.

But French foreign policy efforts were far from over. In 1902, France concluded a secret agreement with Italy that ruled out an Italian military action against France. As Germany was investing a good deal of effort in developing an alliance with Italy and Austria-Hungary, this treaty was another major setback for the Germans. This secret treaty was so highly classified, that the French Central Staff did not find out about it until 1909.

But as secret arrangements went, the best was yet to come. In January 1906, a series of talks between the French and British high commands discussed the possibility of landing a British force in France or possibly Belgium. Although these talks were supposed to be secret, unofficial, and non-binding, by June of 1906, the British had committed to providing an expeditionary force into the continent, in support of Franco-Belgian aims.

By the summer of 1906, France had a formal alliance with Russia, a secret neutrality agreement with Italy, and an even more secret understanding with Great Britain that committed the British to fight Germany on the Continent. France’s advantage was quite clear; Germany could hardly expect to emerge victorious against all three of the other major European powers. It would face a war on two fronts with no real allies to speak of.

France no had a formidable defensive network, which was now matched by a formidable network of alliances. What it needed now was an army capable of enforcing its will on the battlefield.

Source “The Myth of the Great War”

[Matt Wiser]

You might want to take a look at the War in Africa-with its implications for anyone trying a Lions of Twilight sourcebook based on Frank Frey's data for that unpublished module. The war in Togo was quick: only three weeks; Cameroon (or Kamerun) lasted until 1916, when the Germans slipped across the border into a Spanish colony (today's Equatorial Guinea). The South African invasion of German SW Africa (Namibia) went until 1915, and the campaign to subdue German East Africa lasted the longest-until after the Armistice, with the British and South Africans chasing Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck all over the place from 1916-18. (the first two years were marked by British failures at Tanga and Jassin, and Lettow-Vorbeck mounting a successful guerilla campaign against the British in their own territory (today's Kenya). And one British officer who fought there said it was like fighting in a zoo-with the local wildlife on occasion being more dangerous than the enemy!

[raketenjagdpanzer]

The older posts from this blog might be of some use:

http://wwar1.blogspot.com/

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

No discussion of WWI can take place without a mention of the bane of the soldier's existence (And No, I'm not talking about Supply Sergeants!), Gas.

Yes, poison gas. Largely the invention of the famed chemist Fritz Haber. Haber was once Einstein's mentor and the major reason that he came back to Berlin. Einstein was horrified about how many German scientists supported the war; however, Haber was probably the most deadly of those World War 1 scientists.

[dragoon500ly]

While its engineers built and its diplomats negotiated, the French Army had developed. When military experts discuss the French Army of the pre-Great War era, they mean the 172 infantry regiments of the regular army in metropolitan France, together with its supporting regiments of cavalry and artillery. But France also maintained a Colonial Army as well, and France had one of the largest colonial empires in the world. The Colonial Army, however, was not composed of native troops. Instead, it was made up of a bewildering array of exotically named units: aside from the nineteen battalions of native troops, there were twelve regiments of colonial infantry, two of the Foreign Legion, four of zouaves, nine of tirailleurs, six mixed zouaves and tirailleurs and five battalions legered d’Afrique.

In French military terminology, regiment or battalion should be taken rather loosely. A regiment was supposed to consist of three battalions and at full strength it would number roughly twenty-five hundred men. But the two regiments of the Foreign Legion had seventeen thousand men divided between its two regiments. This was also true of another enclave within the Army, the Chasseurs. Like many elite units of the time, there were organized by battalions, but the battalions were over strength. For example, each of the twelve alpine battalions, the chasseurs alpins (BCA) had the same firepower as an infantry regiment.

Given the mountainous nature of much of the French frontier, it was clear there was a need for alpine troops, but it was also clear that France had too many elite units, two many specialist units and not enough commanders. In fact, there was no real overall commander, there was, instead, a committee, the Conseil Superieure de la Guerre (CSG), composed of those generals who would be army commanders in the event of a war. The chairman of the CSG was the minister of war, and the vice-chairman was the general who would be the commander-in-chief during wartime. This arrangement was deliberate, if any one man controlled the military in peacetime, he might be tempted to use it.

By 1910, it had become obvious that this was not an efficient arrangement and reforms were enacted in which the future commander in chief would also be chief of staff and thus have real power. But only in theory, as the government was leery of letting a senior army officer actually have control over military matters. In 1911, only one general would take the job, with all of its strings--Joffre, whose new title would be Chief of the General Staff. In day-today operations, Joffre had no real authority. The technical bureaus that controlled the development of weapons still reported directly to the minister of war, who also had the final say on the budget.

Joffre was faced with dozens of problems; the condition of the army, the deficiencies of its equipment and the need for a new strategic plan. After 1870, France’s plan and been primarily defensive with an emphasis on rapid mobilization. But given the length of the frontier, it was important to know where the Germans would strike.

During the inter-war years, the French has believed that the Germans would attack from around Metz, trying to break the French lines from Verdun to Toul. As a result, the fortifications in that area were the most modern and the French plan of mobilization, Plan 16, had the greater part of the army mobilized there for operations.

But as the 20th Century started, the French began to become more concerned about an attack from a different quarter and wanted to reorganize defense plans to deal with the possibility of an attack through Belgium. The Belgian fortifications at Namur and Liege, although blocking efforts to move eastward, would be unable to prevent a southwesterly move by the Germans across the French frontier west of Verdun.

The CSG decided that the best way to block a German invasion was to move into Belgium. With the threat of an upcoming war, Belgium would certainly be invaded, the only question was who would get there first. The French government made every attempt to keep the CSG plans secret, fearing that if France’s plans to invade Belgium came to light, then England would leave the alliance.

Faced with political necessities, the CSG dropped Plan 16 and started the development of Plan 17. Like its predecessor, 17 was not a plan of attack, but simply a plan for the mobilization of the French Army. France’s frontier area was large and the Germans had several options. For example, the German Army could simply remain on the defensive in the West and conduct offensive operations in the East, where they had an ally (Austria-Hungary). Or they could hold the line in the East and commence an offensive in the West, this in turn, allowed the Germans three options: An advance through Belgium; an attack out of Metz; or an advance out of southern Alsace.

The French responses were much simpler. The Germans had built forts around Metz and to the west of Strasbourg which made any French offensive there impossible. Nothing could be done to violate Belgian neutrality. Plan 17 was simply to cluster forces so that they would be in position to counterattack a German invasion out of Metz (the old Plan 16) or Belgium. Here geography favored the French, troops located in front of the Verdun positions could move to block either offensive. In any of the possible scenarios, the French Army would have less distance to move than the Germans. They could be in position to strike first or be in position to attack the flanks of any German advance into France. Another variant of Plan 17 called for an advance into Alsace from Belfort and along the Vosges Mountains. The German fortifications faced to the west and were vulnerable to a movement from the south.

France could plan big. In the event of a general mobilization, its peacetime army of 884,000 men would expand to a field army of 1,689,000 with another 1,098,000 men en route from the interior and the colonies. If the Germans attacked through Belgian, the Belgians could place another 250,000 men into the field. There was no way that Germany could place that many troops into the Western Front.


Source “The Myth of the Great War”

[dragoon500ly]

In spite of its numbers, the French Army had serious problems. With over thirty years of no major war, the army had forgotten the basics. In the 1911 maneuvers, Joffre observed the following:

“The infantry hardly maneuvering, demonstrated the gaps in their instruction, the fronts of attack were disproportionate to the means at hand, the ground badly used. The artillery and the infantry did not look for a way to coordinate their efforts… In sum, the mass of the army, for a long time maintained in the defensive mold, and neither the doctrine nor instruction.”

While the French maintained a large artillery park, the vast majority of its weapons were older models, better suited for deployment in fortifications; one example the 1878 270mm mortar weighed twenty metric tons and had to be shipped to its position in pieces and then hand assembled, a process that took days.

The pride of the French artillery was the 75mm field gun of 1898. This piece, coupled with the newly developed hydraulic recoil mechanism was much lighter (thus easier to deploy) and enjoyed a high rate of fire (15-20rpm). Unlike the older guns, the 75mm did not have to be resited after each shot, allowing it to be more accurate. This meant that a battery of 75mms could saturate a one hundred meter target with over a hundred shells in a minute. Older guns would be lucky to have two shots in the same target area. As excellent a weapon as the 75mm turned out to be, it still fired a fairly light shell (some 3kg), it is in the realm of medium and heavy artillery that the French lacked numbers.

Joffre did his best to develop howitzers for the army, but the technical bureaus reported to the Minister of War, not the Chief of Staff, and they refused to develop the 105mm howitzer to complement the 75mm gun. There was also the issue of ammunition supply, the Balkan wars had soon the military observers that shells would be fired at a rate far beyond what had been previously calculated. But the budget was controlled by the Minister, who was advised that ammunition stocks were adequate.

During the period of 1911-1014, Joffre was turned down for every request he made, from mobile field kitchens to new uniforms. The French Army went into the war wearing the red pants and blue jackets of the 1870s, because the Chamber of Ministers would not spend any money for new uniforms. The French solder went into battle with no hot meal, because the Chamber had decide that field kitchens were a waste of money.

Not only did the French Army lack an offensive doctrine and decent equipment, it went into battle with a shortage of officers. In 1914, General Weygand estimated that the army was short eight hundred lieutenants, but any examination of the documents suggest that the actual number was much, much higher. One division had only sixteen of its sixty lieutenants, and half of its sub and reserve lieutenants.

Admissions to military schools were down, the pay of officers and enlisted was miserable and promotions were held up indefinitely or blocked owing to politics. Emil Driant, who would be the first senior officer to fall at Verdun in 1916, had graduated fifth in his class at Saint Cyr in 1875, had served in three Tunisian campaigns and had commanded the elite first battalion of Chasseurs a Pied in 1899---and was then summarily retired, as had the misfortune of having married General Boulanger’s daughter.

The government persecuted Roman Catholics in the officer class with the same fanaticism that members of that class had persecuted Dreyfuss. Senior officers were ordered to report those officers serving who went to Mass. Then Colonel Petain, alleged, responded by saying that as he sat in the front row, he had no idea of who sat behind him. A response that infuriated both the left and right alike.

As anarchy descended on the army, to further the army’s woes, its professional officers fragmented into small groups, to such an extent that there was even a name for them, chapelles. On 22 January, 1919, General Fayolle had dinner with Colonel Rimailho (a noted gunnery expert) and General Saint-Clair-Deville. Rimailho and Saint-Clair-Deville showed Fayolle photos of some of the innovations that they had come up with during the war. When asked why these weapons were not adopted, Rimailho responded, “Rivalries among the chapelles.”

Each chapelle, had its own ideas, carefully nurtured and protected from outside influence. One chapelle favored the cult of the offense; another the power of field artillery. Would the war be long or short, decided by cavalry or the bayonet, by magazine rifles or shrapnel? And who would be the most qualified to lead? For each viewpoint, there was a chapelle, each one ready to fight to the death to preserve its viewpoint.


Source “The Myth of the Great War”

[dragoon500ly]

Military rifles have always fascinated me, I love to collect and shoot them. Happiness is truly three hours at the range with a new rifle and two hundred rounds….

The French Army entered World War One with two primary service rifles. The first was the Lebel, which entered service in 1886 and was the primary rifle. It is noteworthy as it was chambered for the first small caliber (8mm) smokeless powder cartridge adopted for military serve. It was a bolt action rifle with a five-round tubular magazine located under the barrel. It weighed in at 9.75 pounds and was 51.4 inched in overall length with a 31.5 inch barrel. The 8mm cartridge fired a 232 grain bullet at about 2,380fps. The Lebel was manufactured by several government arsenals and there were numerous modifications and conversions made to the original design, most were essentially cosmetic in nature. The Lebel was fitted with the Model 1886 spike-bayonet. This was a 25.5 inch long, quatrefoil-blade with a brass or aluminum hilt, usually with a hooked quill on. This bayonet was often referred to by the poilu as a “knitting needle” and was even nicknamed “Rosalie”.

One of the problems of the Lebel was that it could not be reloaded by a clip, each round had to be loaded into its magazine one at a time. Many users never bothered with this slow process, simply loading a fresh round, directly into the chamber.

In 1890, the Lebel design was refined by a designer named Berthier. The Berthier utilized the basic Lebel action, but incorporated a one-piece stock and a Mannlicher-inspired internal box magazine. The locking lugs of the bolt were arranged vertically rather than the horizontal lugs of the Lebel bolt. The bolt handle was turned down rather than being straight, as was the case with the Lebel. Since the Berthier used the same 8mm rimmed cartridge of the Lebel, it was not well suited for clip loading. The Berthier overcame this by utilizing a three-round Mannicler-type clip. While vastly superior to the Lebel system, the three round clip left the Berthier at a disadvantage to other military rifles. By 1916, the French had modified the rifle to accept a 5-round clip, but the 3-round Berthiers remained in service well into the 1930s.

The Berthier weighed 8.38 pounds and was 51.4 inches in length with a 31.4 inch barrel.

Both the Lebel and Berthier rifles saw service with the American Expeditionary Force, being mainly used by the colored troops attached to French divisions. Those Americans who used both rifles stated that “its accuracy was abysmal, awful or worse. They also hated the clumsy handling and length of these weapons. Their rifles seemed more or less something to put a bayonet on”

Source “US Infantry Weapons of the First World War”

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Chief of the Prussian General Staff from 1857 to 1871, and then Chief of the Great General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL) from 1871 to 1888, Helmuth Karl Bernhard, Graf von Moltke (Von Moltke the Elder), was of the opinion that in the event of a two-front war, Germany was to remain on the defensive in the West and then attack East. He was also opposed to the acquisition of Metz and the Alsace. But during his tenure, Russia was, nominally, Germany’s ally, and France’s military power, and its aggressive tendencies, were projected into Africa and Asia.

Von Moltke the Elder retired at the age of eight-eight and died three years later. His successor, Alfred, Graf von Schlieffen, was left to face the results of the first of Germany’s foreign policy disasters; after 1894, in the event of a war with either France or Russia, Germany would have to fight on two fronts. Militarily, this was a catastrophe. Germany’s only reliable ally, Austria-Hungary, spent hardly any money on its military and there was considerable doubt that the Austrians would actually fight.

Germany was left with the bitter prospect of a two front war, in which its army would be vastly outnumbered. In 1900, there were nearly two million Frenchmen and Russians in uniform, opposed by a shade over half a million Germans. Over the next twelve years, the German numbers crept slowly upwards, but so die the numbers for France and Russia.

In the event of war, Germany would have to destroy one enemy before it was itself destroyed by the other. Or the Germans, the only sensible plan was to attack France first, move an overwhelming force into France as quickly as possible, drive on Paris and knock France out of the war in a great battle of annihilation.

The fastest way into France was by way of Belgium and Holland. Von Schlieffen believed that Germany would be able to secure a passage through Belgium, or the Belgians would simply surrender. But the only practicable route into northern France for a large army was through Belgium and Holland. Like the French and British General Staffs, the German General Staff assumed that Belgium would fight on one side or the other, and planned accordingly.

Examination of his initial plan soon showed von Schlieffen that it was unfeasible. Germany simply lacked the manpower to make it work. Over the years, he tinkered with the plan and his pre-war dispositions give a good idea of his desperation. Von Schlieffen planned on defending the two-hundred some kilometers of the Alsace frontier with six battalions of Jager, an infantry division of the reserves, supported by a division of the Landwehr (units made up of old men or untrained draftees). The entire right bank of the Moselle River would be defend by four divisions, two of them from the reserves.

There would be in no troops held in reserve. Von Schlieffen didn’t have enough men to sweep through Belgium, outflank Paris, defeat the French armies in the field and do anything else. The German Army simply lacked the manpower to have any chance of success.

Von Schlieffen kept adjusting his plan, trying to create a scenario in which it would work. He ignored the French and Belgian fortifications, assuming that German troops would simply march around them. If the French went onto the offensive in Alsace, he assumed that the Germans would be able to move faster than the French and fight and win the decisive battle before the French could get into Germany proper.

The political implications of writing off Alsace, northern Lorraine and East Prussia were staggering, but even then von Schlieffen did not have enough infantry to execute his plan. If one makes the assumption that an operational plan, to be approved and made the basis for operations, has to have some chance of success. By this benchmark, Germany had no plan. At least Admiral Yamamoto could say that if the American aircraft carriers were present at Pearl harbor on December 7 1941, than a successful air attack would leave the United States without any naval capabilities in the Pacific to speak of. In addition, in the vastness of the Pacific, it was possible to mount a surprise attack, once the Japanese fleet left home waters, it could be headed for anywhere. It was impossible for Germany to conceal a million men in the Rhineland.

Once German soldiers started moving through Belgium, the French could reasonably be expected to notice their movement and deploy their troops accordingly. While von Schlieffen could claim that his infantry would simply sweep all before them, this was clearly clutching at straws. In order to mae his plan work, Germany needed two things to happen; France would remain on the defensive and Russia would take forever to mobilize.



Source “The Myth of the Great War”