Killing Carriers

[kato13]

So then it comes down to the question: were nuclear weapons used at sea before the hard date presented in canon?

If they were that brings up other issues like potentially greater civilian EMP/evacuation preparedness and longer time for continuance of government plans to implemented. I think as soon as any nuke is used anywhere those wheels would go in motion.

[stilleto69]

Originally Posted by kato13

So then it comes down to the question: were nuclear weapons used at sea before the hard date presented in canon?

If they were that brings up other issues like potentially greater civilian EMP/evacuation preparedness and longer time for continuance of government plans to implemented. I think as soon as any nuke is used anywhere those wheels would go in motion.

Kato -
You bring up a good point. If we try to use nuclear weapons before the hard date given in cannon, that raises all sorts of questions not to mention opening a whole new can of "cannon/non-cannon" worms.

[Webstral]

Perhaps before we try mental gymnastics to try to explain how a use of nuclear weapons in June, 1997 does not violate the stated first use in the v1 chronology, we should address whether or not nuclear weapons were actually necessary in the Barents Sea. While I think the use of nukes at sea would have been very helpful for the Soviets, and while I believe they might have believed the threat to the Kola Peninsula facilities warranted upping the ante, we may not have to go there. I remain firmly committed to the power of human factors and luck. Surely the Soviets will get a few lucky breaks. If Strike Fleet Atlantic goes into action with too little of some critical asset, and if the operability of the asset becomes markedly lesser by some happenstance, the whole house of cards may come tumbling down. Perhaps the Soviets were even prepped to use nukes, but they didn't end up hhaving to. Anyway, we should condier whether it's easier to maneuver our way around the given first use of nuclear weapons or figure out how Strike Fleet Atlantic could be defeated without nuclear weapons.

Webstral

[Legbreaker]

Personally I see nukes being used at sea from around the same time they began to see use in Europe - roughly July - August 1997.

As with Web, I see no need for the Soviets to resort to nukes at sea prior to the second half of 1997. Human error, bad tactics, bad weather, overconfidence and a number of other factors are all more than enough to explain how the Nato fleet in the Atlantic found itself on the bottom.

It only takes one or two well placed torpedos to sink even the largest of ships. The trick is in getting your sub into position without being detected.

[Matt Wiser]

One thing to keep in mind, gents, was that U.S. policy in the Cold War was that if nuclear warfare was initiated at sea, it would not remain limited to the sea. There would be retaliatory strikes against Soviet Naval bases within 24-48 hours. And things would escalate from there.

[Legbreaker]

Policy of course doesn't mean it was actually followed.

As we know, the nuclear war on land was conducted in a peicemeal manner - there's nothing to say the same didn't occur on the sea for the very same reasons.

[stilleto69]

I''ve always gone for the following:
For the Battle of GIUK Gap (Late Nov): NATO attacked with CV-59 USS Forrestal, CV-60 USS Saratoga, CV-66 USS America, CVN-69 USS Dwight D Eisenhower & HMS Illustrious. NATO sunk the CV Kusnetsov, CVGH Kiev & CVGH Baku.
The Soviets manage to counter using various tactics from massed attacks to just plain luck. The result is the Forrestal is damaged by AS-4s (Flight Deck, Port Elevator, 1 Starboard Elevator & Arrester Gear) & the HMS Illustrious is sunk. Forrestal sails to Newport News for repairs escorted by the Saratoga. Thus NATO only has 2 carriers in the North Atlantic.
Saratoga is ordered to report to the Med to replace the John F Kennedy after it was damaged by a Shkval torpedo (thanks Chico)
CVN-71 USS Theodore Roosevelt ordered to replace the Saratoga, and the RN orders the HMS Ark Royal to replace the Illustrious. Thus NATO Strike Fleet Atlantic is down to 4 carriers for the Battle of the Norwegian Sea.

Battle of the Norwegian Sea (12/3-12/24): NATO attacks w/CV-66 USS America, CVN-69 USS Dwight D Eisenhower, CVN-71 USS Theodore Roosevelt & HMS Ark Royal. The Soviets again counter this time by using a variety of new "superweapons", i.e. Kh-31 AAMs to down NATO AEW & AWACS aircraft & SS-N-27 missiles against Aegis cruisers & destroyers (thanks again Chico), but the result is the same, NATO wins, but at the cost of the America (Damaged by AS-4s off the coast of Norway) & HMS Ark Royal (Damaged by AS-4s just south of Norway) America docks in Tromoso, Norway.

Thus after 2 "successful" battles NATO Strike Force Atlantic commander recommends a "pause" to allow his forces to rest and a chance to reevaluate NATO's tactics.

Sorry for the rambling, but that pretty much how I manage to explain how NATO Strike Force Atlantic came to be without the Soviets using nuclear weapons.

[Marc]

Originally Posted by Matt Wiser

One thing to keep in mind, gents, was that U.S. policy in the Cold War was that if nuclear warfare was initiated at sea, it would not remain limited to the sea. There would be retaliatory strikes against Soviet Naval bases within 24-48 hours. And things would escalate from there.

I agree. In the Norwegian Sea, NATO and US forces have a clear opporunity to archieve a decisive victory. A victory with great strategic repercusions for the war development in Central Europe. The security of the supply lines between EEUU and Europe can be nearly granted after one decisive action. If soviets use the nuclear option so early in the war to counteract a conventional NATO action, it seems reasonable that NATO would consider that any temporal own advantage in any front could have the same response. Soviets would have broken the rules too early. A retaliatory strike seems a must.

[pmulcahy11b]

US carriers were high-value targets that, in the mind of the Soviet military, fully warranted the use of nuclear weapons. The most likely avenue of attack would be by overwhelming amounts of Soviet maritime bombers launching cruise missiles armed with conventional, antiradiation, and nuclear weapons. The Soviets knew their attack subs were, for the most part, too loud to simply slip under US carrier task force defenses, and they didn't have enough of them for overwhelming attacks. They were willing to lose large amounts of maritime bombers on the chance that one or two might get through to kill the carrier. To the Soviets, US carriers were some of the most frightening items in the NATO inventory.