Stupid GI Tricks

[Abbott Shaull]

Ever wondered on how a Black Jack Pershing, a George Patton, or a Erwin Rommel would have fit into today's military?

Would strategic mistakes like not finishing Desert Storm by seizing Basrah, not completing the fighting in Afghanistan before invading Iraq, or not blocking in Ossoma prior to cleaning out Bora-Bora have been allowed by any of these generals?

Or even better...would GSP have told Bush/Obama were to shove their stars and ripped them both new orifices after he had retired?

No they wouldn't, and yes GSP would have made what was said in the Time article seem tame. All three would of been more capable to tell Rumsfeld where to go...lol

[Panther Al]

Way way back in the day on AHWI newgroup, there was talk on various ways that the end of part two of the great european civil war could end with the "good" germans doing ok (and Rommel living) and the bad ones getting what they deserved. But the on topic bit if it was that it also posted that the Soviet Union viewed VE day as a operational stand down for maintenance and promptly decided to see if Paris was as nice as every one says. The real debate was who would be better: Patton or Rommel, since this time they both would be drawing from the same logistical tail and sharing the same air cover.

A later version of the thread joked that the two of them running in the same tank country would be called the "Great Tank Race." My money is on Rommel.

[Abbott Shaull]

Way way back in the day on AHWI newgroup, there was talk on various ways that the end of part two of the great european civil war could end with the "good" germans doing ok (and Rommel living) and the bad ones getting what they deserved. But the on topic bit if it was that it also posted that the Soviet Union viewed VE day as a operational stand down for maintenance and promptly decided to see if Paris was as nice as every one says. The real debate was who would be better: Patton or Rommel, since this time they both would be drawing from the same logistical tail and sharing the same air cover.

A later version of the thread joked that the two of them running in the same tank country would be called the "Great Tank Race." My money is on Rommel.

How rude Montgomery wasn't mention...j/k...lol

[Panther Al]

Due to my, admittedly rather odd, upbringing I always found myself in the middle on Monty. Americans think that he was horrid, yet the English thinks that he was outstanding. To be honest, with the exception of operation "what the hell was I thinking-garden" he, once he went on the offensive, did rather well. But that is the catch- once he went on the offensive. He had the tendency to be the ACW General (I know who it is but for the life of me I can't get the name right - sigh) that was asked by Abe "if you are not using the army, could I borrow it?" I feel that whilst he did not win the war for England, he did build the army that did so- under lower but much better -fighting- leadership.

[Abbott Shaull]

McClellan comes to mind. Yeah, I think that was part of the problem. Everything seemed to move at slower pace, as oppose to under some American Generals like Patton where you couldn't move fast enough...

[dragoon500ly]

No they wouldn't, and yes GSP would have made what was said in the Time article seem tame. All three would of been more capable to tell Rumsfeld where to go...lol

You can almost hear GSP daring Rumsfeld to stick his nose outside of the Pentagon...so GSP could have the pleasure of shooting it off!

[dragoon500ly]

Way way back in the day on AHWI newgroup, there was talk on various ways that the end of part two of the great european civil war could end with the "good" germans doing ok (and Rommel living) and the bad ones getting what they deserved. But the on topic bit if it was that it also posted that the Soviet Union viewed VE day as a operational stand down for maintenance and promptly decided to see if Paris was as nice as every one says. The real debate was who would be better: Patton or Rommel, since this time they both would be drawing from the same logistical tail and sharing the same air cover.

A later version of the thread joked that the two of them running in the same tank country would be called the "Great Tank Race." My money is on Rommel.

I'd have to bet on GSP, he had a cavalryman's instinct for the pursuit that was hard to beat.

Rommel was an infantry officer, while he pulled some wonderful moves, a lot of them were handed to him by the Brits. To throw three armored brigades along three different axis at threes different times simply allowed the Africa Corps to nail each brigade one at a time. Rommel was an excellent division commander, he just didn't have the feel for corps/army level.

[dragoon500ly]

Due to my, admittedly rather odd, upbringing I always found myself in the middle on Monty. Americans think that he was horrid, yet the English thinks that he was outstanding. To be honest, with the exception of operation "what the hell was I thinking-garden" he, once he went on the offensive, did rather well. But that is the catch- once he went on the offensive. He had the tendency to be the ACW General (I know who it is but for the life of me I can't get the name right - sigh) that was asked by Abe "if you are not using the army, could I borrow it?" I feel that whilst he did not win the war for England, he did build the army that did so- under lower but much better -fighting- leadership.

Monty always leaves one with mixed feelings.

To give him credit, he did propose to increase the D-day force from 3 to 5 divisions. But where he gets caught was in an early briefing in which he told the assembled allied generals of his intention of have British armored in Caen on D-day. When it turned out that the Germans held Caen, he then writes of it always having been his intention that the Americans being the breakout force. When you read his book, the entire war progressed, just like he had predicted it would and if only Eisenhower had pulles his head out of his ass and made Monty ground forces commander, the war would have been...tra la tra la tra la........

The main problem with Monty is that he believed his own press. He should have been relieved after Market-Garden for his insubordination to Eisenhower. God knows Brooks would have supported the ouster. Even Churchill admitted that a relief was the correct decision to make. But Eisenhower gave Monty another chance. And the old poison pen came out after the war!

[bobcat]

Way way back in the day on AHWI newgroup, there was talk on various ways that the end of part two of the great european civil war could end with the "good" germans doing ok (and Rommel living) and the bad ones getting what they deserved. But the on topic bit if it was that it also posted that the Soviet Union viewed VE day as a operational stand down for maintenance and promptly decided to see if Paris was as nice as every one says. The real debate was who would be better: Patton or Rommel, since this time they both would be drawing from the same logistical tail and sharing the same air cover.

A later version of the thread joked that the two of them running in the same tank country would be called the "Great Tank Race." My money is on Rommel.

my money is on Patton too. after all the only time he lost was against a bunch of kids in West Virginia. Rommel was too old to best Patton.

[Abbott Shaull]

I'd have to bet on GSP, he had a cavalryman's instinct for the pursuit that was hard to beat.

Rommel was an infantry officer, while he pulled some wonderful moves, a lot of them were handed to him by the Brits. To throw three armored brigades along three different axis at threes different times simply allowed the Africa Corps to nail each brigade one at a time. Rommel was an excellent division commander, he just didn't have the feel for corps/army level.

I would tend to agree with you he was a great Division Officer, then again looking at the Afrika Corps OOB, and later the Afrikaarrmee was an oversize German Division with several allied Italian troops going along for the ride. One thing to remember he did the more with lot less, than many other German Generals were asked to do.

He proved himself both in Poland and France at the beginning of the war. Given that he never went to the Eastern Front you can't really judge how he would compared to Corps commanders out there. One thing was that him and Montgomery probably owe their Field Marshal rank to each other. Otherwise I don't see either going beyond Corps commanders much less leaders of rival Armies and later Army Groups. Every war has General or two who make in command of units that they should never have been allowed to command, but since they were Great Regiment/Brigade commanders they would naturally be Excellent Division commanders and so forth on up...

[Legbreaker]

Firstly, Rommel was a good Divisional commander. He was not great at commanding anything much larger.
Secondly, Market Garden, in theory, was a brilliant plan. Unfortunately the necessary intelligence was not passed back to those who needed to know about it, and that little which did get back was basically dismissed as there was little supporting evidence. Montgomery cannot be blamed for not knowing about the presence of two understrength SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem if he hadn't been personally told about them (amongst other intel deficiencies).
Another problem with the operation was the radios used by the British Paras - they simply didn't work due to (I think) moisture getting to the crystals or something... If they had, then the dire situation could have been relayed back to HQ and the Poles dropped earlier (and on the right side of the river), supplies dropped in amongst the British soldiers instead of in fields covered by the Germans, and about a dozen other things too.

There were a number of other issues such as the bridge being blown in the face of the US 101st which held up the advance by about a day, the stubborn defence of the bridge at Nimegen, and the single narrow road up which nearly every man, tank, artillery piece, and especially supplies was to move. Yes, it was a complex plan, but if it had worked, if the British Paras had been able to hold out another day or two and armour reinforcements arrived....

And now on to the reason the British were so hesitant - they'd been fighting the war just a bit longer than the Americans - a couple of years longer.... The British manpower reserves where almost spent, they simply couldn't afford to throw men away on operations that only had a marginal chance of success unless sufficient reserves were available to at least hold the gained ground. The Americans on the other hand hadn't really fought before Italy (Africa doesn't really count as a major engagement when you consider how few Germans were actually left and how few operational tanks Rommel had available most of the time). The Americans also had a massive pool of reserve manpower they could draw upon and hadn't suffered the near catastrophe of Dunkirk, nor Rommels drive across North Africa and into Egypt.

[dragoon500ly]

I would tend to agree with you he was a great Division Officer, then again looking at the Afrika Corps OOB, and later the Afrikaarrmee was an oversize German Division with several allied Italian troops going along for the ride. One thing to remember he did the more with lot less, than many other German Generals were asked to do.

He proved himself both in Poland and France at the beginning of the war. Given that he never went to the Eastern Front you can't really judge how he would compared to Corps commanders out there. One thing was that him and Montgomery probably owe their Field Marshal rank to each other. Otherwise I don't see either going beyond Corps commanders much less leaders of rival Armies and later Army Groups. Every war has General or two who make in command of units that they should never have been allowed to command, but since they were Great Regiment/Brigade commanders they would naturally be Excellent Division commanders and so forth on up...

Now an Army Group Commander who really impressed the H**L out of me was Black Jack Pershing. For example, of all the senior commanders in WWI, Pershing was the only one that was a general officer prior to the outbreak of the war. He was also a trained lawer.

These two items alone allowed him to out maneuver every attempt by the British to have the AEF ship over only riflemen and machinegunners; their stated desire was to use these troops to reinforce the depleted British divisions,following the 1916/17 battles. They were to serve under "experienced British officers" The problem is looking over the histories of the period, one is left wondering just how many experienced British officers had not been killed or wounded following the battles of the Somme and Ypres to name two particulary bloody diasters.

Pershing wanted to field American divisions, under American command. And there was unholy hell to pay when it became apparant to the British that the Americans were not going to turn over their troops to British command. When reading British histories from the post war period, one is left with the impression that the Americans were idiots, commanded by cowards and fools incapable of the simplest staff work. Every American victory was achieved at tremendous cost and only because of superior British cooperation by taking pressure off the Americans where there any successes...

The stand of the 3rd Division on the Marne and the counterattack by the 2nd Division at Belleau Woods gave notice to the Germans that the "green" Americans were well trained and aggressive. To be certain, losses were heavy when attacking the entrenched Germans; but to be brutally honest, every other Allied nation that had attacked dug-in Germans had suffered worst losses.

The difference was that the Americans were cracking the German defenses. When the Germans launched their sudden counter-attacks, the Americans were holding and then launching their own counter-attacks. They were taking the hard, bloody lessons of the previous years and learning from them.

By the end of the war, the German High Command regard the Americans as their most dangerous foe.

Throughout the American involvement, Pershing guided the AEF, protecting it from the Allies and leading it through its campaigns. In the post war years, certain British historians made it a point to slam Pershing for every decision he had made. But the greatness of Pershing is that he won, defeating the Germans on the field of battle and the British in the hallways of power. And there are damn few commanders who can make that boast!!! ;)

[Legbreaker]

By the end of the war, the German High Command regard the Americans as their most dangerous foe.


Ahem....
If you dig a little deeper I think you'll find that was the Australians.....
The ANZACs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corp) suffered the greatest casualty rate of any of the western nations (because the British always put us into the thick of things), but also gained, man for man, the greatest amount of ground.

[dragoon500ly]

Firstly, Rommel was a good Divisional commander. He was not great at commanding anything much larger.
Secondly, Market Garden, in theory, was a brilliant plan. Unfortunately the necessary intelligence was not passed back to those who needed to know about it, and that little which did get back was basically dismissed as there was little supporting evidence. Montgomery cannot be blamed for not knowing about the presence of two understrength SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem if he hadn't been personally told about them (amongst other intel deficiencies).
Another problem with the operation was the radios used by the British Paras - they simply didn't work due to (I think) moisture getting to the crystals or something... If they had, then the dire situation could have been relayed back to HQ and the Poles dropped earlier (and on the right side of the river), supplies dropped in amongst the British soldiers instead of in fields covered by the Germans, and about a dozen other things too.

There were a number of other issues such as the bridge being blown in the face of the US 101st which held up the advance by about a day, the stubborn defence of the bridge at Nimegen, and the single narrow road up which nearly every man, tank, artillery piece, and especially supplies was to move. Yes, it was a complex plan, but if it had worked, if the British Paras had been able to hold out another day or two and armour reinforcements arrived....

And now on to the reason the British were so hesitant - they'd been fighting the war just a bit longer than the Americans - a couple of years longer.... The British manpower reserves where almost spent, they simply couldn't afford to throw men away on operations that only had a marginal chance of success unless sufficient reserves were available to at least hold the gained ground. The Americans on the other hand hadn't really fought before Italy (Africa doesn't really count as a major engagement when you consider how few Germans were actually left and how few operational tanks Rommel had available most of the time). The Americans also had a massive pool of reserve manpower they could draw upon and hadn't suffered the near catastrophe of Dunkirk, nor Rommels drive across North Africa and into Egypt.

The sheer concept of sending an armored corp up a narrow two-lane road that for most of its length is several feet above the polder insured the failure of Market-Garden far better than anything that the Germans could have done. Considering that most of the forces that were committed to cutting the highway were ad-hoc kampfgruppes should speak volumes about the tactical situation that XXX Corps and 1st Airborne Army faced.

To be sure the intelligence failed in warning of the presence of two understrength, battered SS Panzer Divisions. These divisions proved the key to encircling and slaughtering British 1st Airborne Division and holding the key bridge at Nimegen. But it is also true that the decision to drop the Brits over 12km from their target, and then to drop the division over three days doomed the Arnhem fight to a certain conculsion.

The failure to drop a regiment on the bridge at Nimegan was a operational failure...but the 82nd Airborne always had the primary mission of seizing a low ridge mass that provided plenty of positions for artillery observers on that damned highway.

The loss of a key bridge early in the fight also speaks volumes about the difficulty of running "a one track railroad". Airborne divisions have minimal engineer support and none of what they had was dedicated to building bridges to support armor. The failure of the Guards Armored Division to assign engineer bridging support to the front of their column was a major failure...but one forced on them by the tactical situation that they faced. But then when one throws armor up a highway covered with over a dozen bridges, would it not be fair to assume that the enemy would get lucky, at least once?

Finally, Monty did have access to a wonderful source of intelligence. The Royal Dutch Army. A full brigade was operating with the British and yet their knowledge of local conditions was ignored. And to add insult to injury, the pre-war Dutch Army staged their field exercises in the Nimegen/Arnhem area, they were well aware of the difficults of the terrain and they even knew about the Driel ferry and how it could have been used to transport reinforcements and supplies north of the Rhine.

I have always felt that Market-Garden accomplished several things; first it created a sixty-mile long bulge that led nowhere (and indeed several miles of it had to be abandoned during the fall when the Germans started flooding the Rhine); it destroyed one airborne division and shot up two others; it diverted attention from the vital clearing of Antwerp and the clearing of Antwerp's even more vital passage to the sea, causing further supply problems for the Allied forces. The planning and execution of Market-Garden showed Monty at his worse.

[dragoon500ly]

Ahem....
If you dig a little deeper I think you'll find that was the Australians.....
The ANZACs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corp) suffered the greatest casualty rate of any of the western nations (because the British always put us into the thick of things), but also gained, man for man, the greatest amount of ground.

LOL! I'm just quoting from the Germans! They always felt that the Americans, the ANZACs and the French Colonial troops were tougher foes than the regular British/French forces. The problem is that the French Colonial troops were slaughtered early in the war trying to stabilize the front.
The ANZACs were never present in large enough numbers to dominate the Western Front. By the end of 1918 there were over two million American troops present for the next offensive.

And I've always felt that the casualties suffered by the British Colonial troops is what made Pershing so hesistant to allow the Brits to have command of American troops. To be certain, during the crisis of 1918, Pershing did allow troops to serve under the British and his fears were confirmed.

[helbent4]

Ahem....
If you dig a little deeper I think you'll find that was the Australians.....
The ANZACs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corp) suffered the greatest casualty rate of any of the western nations (because the British always put us into the thick of things), but also gained, man for man, the greatest amount of ground.

Ah, everyone likes to think they're the toughest. The Germans respected the Canadians, and called them and the Australians stosstruppen (shock troops) and considered them to be among the allies' toughest troops. In the words of the British Prime Minster Lloyd George:

"The Canadians played a part of such distinction that thenceforward they were marked out as shock troops; for the remainder of the war they were brought along to head the assault in one great battle after another. Whenever the Germans found the Canadian Corps coming into the line they prepared for the worst."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_history_of_Canada_during_World_War_I

"Australian and Canadian divisions deployed amongst British forces in France quickly came to be regarded as the best shock troops in the Allied ranks due to their ferocity in battle, and were employed accordingly."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shock_troops

"The Canadian corps, now known everywhere to consist of shock troops second to none on the western front, was frequently used as the spearhead with which to pierce particularly tough parts of the enemy defenses."

http://www.oldandsold.com/articles26/world-war-one-26.shtml

Of course, this is not to disparage all the other forces who fought bravely and of course were equally feared by the Germans.

One thing that is interesting is that aside from the native (Indian) snipers, Canadians were not known as being as good shots as the British in the early war or the Americans in the later war. The CEF was raised from a small pre-war militia and neither had the professionalism of the early BEF nor the time and resources to train like the later AEF.

Tony

[James Langham]

The sheer concept of sending an armored corp up a narrow two-lane road that for most of its length is several feet above the polder insured the failure of Market-Garden far better than anything that the Germans could have done. Considering that most of the forces that were committed to cutting the highway were ad-hoc kampfgruppes should speak volumes about the tactical situation that XXX Corps and 1st Airborne Army faced.

To be sure the intelligence failed in warning of the presence of two understrength, battered SS Panzer Divisions. These divisions proved the key to encircling and slaughtering British 1st Airborne Division and holding the key bridge at Nimegen. But it is also true that the decision to drop the Brits over 12km from their target, and then to drop the division over three days doomed the Arnhem fight to a certain conculsion.

The failure to drop a regiment on the bridge at Nimegan was a operational failure...but the 82nd Airborne always had the primary mission of seizing a low ridge mass that provided plenty of positions for artillery observers on that damned highway.

The loss of a key bridge early in the fight also speaks volumes about the difficulty of running "a one track railroad". Airborne divisions have minimal engineer support and none of what they had was dedicated to building bridges to support armor. The failure of the Guards Armored Division to assign engineer bridging support to the front of their column was a major failure...but one forced on them by the tactical situation that they faced. But then when one throws armor up a highway covered with over a dozen bridges, would it not be fair to assume that the enemy would get lucky, at least once?

Finally, Monty did have access to a wonderful source of intelligence. The Royal Dutch Army. A full brigade was operating with the British and yet their knowledge of local conditions was ignored. And to add insult to injury, the pre-war Dutch Army staged their field exercises in the Nimegen/Arnhem area, they were well aware of the difficults of the terrain and they even knew about the Driel ferry and how it could have been used to transport reinforcements and supplies north of the Rhine.

I have always felt that Market-Garden accomplished several things; first it created a sixty-mile long bulge that led nowhere (and indeed several miles of it had to be abandoned during the fall when the Germans started flooding the Rhine); it destroyed one airborne division and shot up two others; it diverted attention from the vital clearing of Antwerp and the clearing of Antwerp's even more vital passage to the sea, causing further supply problems for the Allied forces. The planning and execution of Market-Garden showed Monty at his worse.

Market-Garden NEARLY worked, it would have only taken one perhaps two of the bits of bad luck for the operation to work.

For reference I would class both Montgomery and Patton above Rommel as commanders as they both were masters of logistics, something which Rommel ignored to great cost. "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."

[Adm.Lee]

But it is also true that the decision to drop the Brits over 12km from their target, and then to drop the division over three days doomed the Arnhem fight to a certain conculsion....

The failure to drop a regiment on the bridge at Nimegan was a operational failure......

The loss of a key bridge early in the fight also speaks volumes about the difficulty of running "a one track railroad". Airborne divisions have minimal engineer support and none of what they had was dedicated to building bridges to support armor. The failure of the Guards Armored Division to assign engineer bridging support to the front of their column was a major failure...but one forced on them by the tactical situation that they faced. But then when one throws armor up a highway covered with over a dozen bridges, would it not be fair to assume that the enemy would get lucky, at least once?
...
The planning and execution of Market-Garden showed Monty at his worse.

Not just Monty, but especially the air and airborne planners. No one thought of packing a bridge onto a glider (OK, lots of gliders)? What about seizing and opening an airfield to airlift supplies (like AT guns or bridges)? IIRC, Eindhoven had an airport.

Me, I've become something of a Montgomery fan over time, recognizing that he had to work with the tools he had-- a British army that had been defeated more often than not, and was on the wrong side of the manpower curve. The British seemed to do well in controlled, "set-piece" battles, and not when improvising. Against the Germans, one needs to bring one's "A" game, and not just slap something together. That's something Alanbrooke tried very hard to impress on US staffers prior to D-Day, too.

[Sanjuro]

In WW1, the reason the Australians had the highest casualties of any combatant nation was that the ANZACs relied almost entirely on British logistical support; their army was almost all teeth and no tail. Look at the casualties as a proportion of combat troops and the figures are a lot more level. This in no way detracts from the enormous courage shown by the ANZACs; the British Army in WW1 was full of things which probably seemed like a Good Idea At The Time.
Another GIATT was the "Pals" battalion. Many units were formed of volunteers from a particular location; in extreme cases from a particular workforce. One example was the 15th Battalion Highland Light Infantry, also known as the Glasgow Tramways Battalion as many of the troops were peacetime employees in the Glasgow public transport system.
The theory was that men who had lived together, worked together and even supported the same football teams would fight well as a unit. In practice, this meant that when a battalion took heavy casualties, that could mean an entire town where almost every family had lost a member.

[Abbott Shaull]

Now an Army Group Commander who really impressed the H**L out of me was Black Jack Pershing. For example, of all the senior commanders in WWI, Pershing was the only one that was a general officer prior to the outbreak of the war. He was also a trained lawer.

These two items alone allowed him to out maneuver every attempt by the British to have the AEF ship over only riflemen and machinegunners; their stated desire was to use these troops to reinforce the depleted British divisions,following the 1916/17 battles. They were to serve under "experienced British officers" The problem is looking over the histories of the period, one is left wondering just how many experienced British officers had not been killed or wounded following the battles of the Somme and Ypres to name two particulary bloody diasters.

Pershing wanted to field American divisions, under American command. And there was unholy hell to pay when it became apparant to the British that the Americans were not going to turn over their troops to British command. When reading British histories from the post war period, one is left with the impression that the Americans were idiots, commanded by cowards and fools incapable of the simplest staff work. Every American victory was achieved at tremendous cost and only because of superior British cooperation by taking pressure off the Americans where there any successes...

The stand of the 3rd Division on the Marne and the counterattack by the 2nd Division at Belleau Woods gave notice to the Germans that the "green" Americans were well trained and aggressive. To be certain, losses were heavy when attacking the entrenched Germans; but to be brutally honest, every other Allied nation that had attacked dug-in Germans had suffered worst losses.

The difference was that the Americans were cracking the German defenses. When the Germans launched their sudden counter-attacks, the Americans were holding and then launching their own counter-attacks. They were taking the hard, bloody lessons of the previous years and learning from them.

By the end of the war, the German High Command regard the Americans as their most dangerous foe.

Throughout the American involvement, Pershing guided the AEF, protecting it from the Allies and leading it through its campaigns. In the post war years, certain British historians made it a point to slam Pershing for every decision he had made. But the greatness of Pershing is that he won, defeating the Germans on the field of battle and the British in the hallways of power. And there are damn few commanders who can make that boast!!! ;)

Funny thing about the UK and US being Allies in both wars. Both aways try to claim it was the other who actually won the War, and not a group effort... Okay WWI there were other factors... But WWII was won due to the shear weight of three allied forces squeezing a nation like a pimple...

[Abbott Shaull]

The sheer concept of sending an armored corp up a narrow two-lane road that for most of its length is several feet above the polder insured the failure of Market-Garden far better than anything that the Germans could have done. Considering that most of the forces that were committed to cutting the highway were ad-hoc kampfgruppes should speak volumes about the tactical situation that XXX Corps and 1st Airborne Army faced.

To be sure the intelligence failed in warning of the presence of two understrength, battered SS Panzer Divisions. These divisions proved the key to encircling and slaughtering British 1st Airborne Division and holding the key bridge at Nimegen. But it is also true that the decision to drop the Brits over 12km from their target, and then to drop the division over three days doomed the Arnhem fight to a certain conculsion.

The failure to drop a regiment on the bridge at Nimegan was a operational failure...but the 82nd Airborne always had the primary mission of seizing a low ridge mass that provided plenty of positions for artillery observers on that damned highway.

The loss of a key bridge early in the fight also speaks volumes about the difficulty of running "a one track railroad". Airborne divisions have minimal engineer support and none of what they had was dedicated to building bridges to support armor. The failure of the Guards Armored Division to assign engineer bridging support to the front of their column was a major failure...but one forced on them by the tactical situation that they faced. But then when one throws armor up a highway covered with over a dozen bridges, would it not be fair to assume that the enemy would get lucky, at least once?

Finally, Monty did have access to a wonderful source of intelligence. The Royal Dutch Army. A full brigade was operating with the British and yet their knowledge of local conditions was ignored. And to add insult to injury, the pre-war Dutch Army staged their field exercises in the Nimegen/Arnhem area, they were well aware of the difficults of the terrain and they even knew about the Driel ferry and how it could have been used to transport reinforcements and supplies north of the Rhine.

I have always felt that Market-Garden accomplished several things; first it created a sixty-mile long bulge that led nowhere (and indeed several miles of it had to be abandoned during the fall when the Germans started flooding the Rhine); it destroyed one airborne division and shot up two others; it diverted attention from the vital clearing of Antwerp and the clearing of Antwerp's even more vital passage to the sea, causing further supply problems for the Allied forces. The planning and execution of Market-Garden showed Monty at his worse.

The plan would of worked much better if one would of cut it down and executed in three separate segments. The Allied Airborne Army would of been put to better use with smaller hops instead of trying to capture and enemy held route deep towards the Rhine.

The one thing to remember it was success overall but at a very high cost. Much like Malta was success for the Germany but at a very high cost.

Also it delayed other operation for clearing ports that were needed.

[Abbott Shaull]

Not just Monty, but especially the air and airborne planners. No one thought of packing a bridge onto a glider (OK, lots of gliders)? What about seizing and opening an airfield to airlift supplies (like AT guns or bridges)? IIRC, Eindhoven had an airport.

Me, I've become something of a Montgomery fan over time, recognizing that he had to work with the tools he had-- a British army that had been defeated more often than not, and was on the wrong side of the manpower curve. The British seemed to do well in controlled, "set-piece" battles, and not when improvising. Against the Germans, one needs to bring one's "A" game, and not just slap something together. That's something Alanbrooke tried very hard to impress on US staffers prior to D-Day, too.

I think the near failure of this operation force home to the US and UK the lessons that were learned by the Germans. Russians had learned enough watching the German at Malta and is why they didn't conduct any large Airborne operation during the war, even though they had several Airborne Corps. Malta itself had stopped the Germans from using it airborne troops in such assaults. Operation Market Garden was the last major operation of this type. When the 17th Airborne Division made the next combat jump it was only to the east of German position on the other side of the whatever river it was... I want to the Rhine into Germany itself, in an operation that would be conducted by Airmobile and Air Assault troop as oppose to Airborne units.

[dragoon500ly]

Market-Garden NEARLY worked, it would have only taken one perhaps two of the bits of bad luck for the operation to work.

For reference I would class both Montgomery and Patton above Rommel as commanders as they both were masters of logistics, something which Rommel ignored to great cost. "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."

Like the saying goes "Close only counts in horseshoes and with hand grenades."

It is to the everlasting credit of the 1st Allied Airborne Army and XXX Corps that Market-Garden achieved as much as it did. In spite of the bad luck, poor intelligence and piss-poor planning, it came so close to success by the sheer drive and courage of the men who fought and died for that damned highway.

No doubt that both Montgomery and Patton rated better than Rommel as battlefield commanders...on the other hand, how's this for a dream team...

Patton as army commander, Montgomery as his chief of staff and Rommel commanding the 2nd Armored Division!

[Sanjuro]

Without wanting to build up Montgomery's reputation (and acknowledging his appalling lack of diplomacy when dealing with the US) the thing I find easiest to understand is his caution. In common with most British Generals of WW2, he had fought in WW1 as a junior officer, and had seen how easily an entire army could be destroyed by poor command decisions. Indeed, he often showed a level of regard for the soldiers under his command which even modern generals could learn from.

[Raellus]

Without wanting to build up Montgomery's reputation (and acknowledging his appalling lack of diplomacy when dealing with the US) the thing I find easiest to understand is his caution. In common with most British Generals of WW2, he had fought in WW1 as a junior officer, and had seen how easily an entire army could be destroyed by poor command decisions. Indeed, he often showed a level of regard for the soldiers under his command which even modern generals could learn from.

Monty was a cautious and capable commander. His one foray into daring resulted in the "bridge too far" debacle. His reputation suffered because he often promised much more than he could deliver (D-Day/Normandy) and he was not shy about taking more than his fair share of credit for victories in which he played a supporting role (the relief/counterattack phases of the Battle of the Bulge). He also constantly demanded more from Ike- more authority, more divisions, more fuel, more operational freedom, etc.- despite his overall lack of success in Europe.

I believe that he did genuinely care about his men but he also cared far too deeply for his own reputation and legacy and, somewhat ironically, this is what has damaged it.

At the risk of getting flamed here, I think Monty is somewhat overrated. But then again, I think Patton and Rommel are a bit overrated as well.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

My dad was stationed in Spain at Torejon(sp) AFB in the early 60s and he told me a hell of a funny story...

The USAF base was situated inside a larger Spanish military base, so there were essentially two perimeters: the inner one guarded by the US and the outer one, guarded by the Spaniards.

There had been some concern that the buffer between the outer and inner perimeter wasn't as well guarded as it might be, and that the Spanish had a lackadaisical approach to base security there, so one bright young lieutenant one night had the idea of investigating this and catching the Spanish perimeter guards slacking off so he could file a formal report. He took a hapless corporal with him in a flight-line pickup truck...

Now as an interlude, (and pop personally witnessed this) when you drew weapons for guard duty in the USAF, you were issued an M1 Carbine and a sidearm, you signed for them, for the ammo, and you returned them afterward. The Spanish base security guys...not so much. You walked up, asked for a weapon, took what you got handed. You might get a grease gun, an STG-44, a bolt-action rifle, or, in some cases, a BAR.

So back to our lieutenant...out into the perimeter they went.

At a guardpost, some of the Spanish guards were doing their thing (which usually involved cooking and girlfriends), and our Lieutenant ordered his driver to, as they went into a gully, kill the headlights and then as they got to the top of the rise, kill the engine and coast up to the guard point, and they'd just see about all of this nonsense...

As soon as they topped the rise, everyone on that side of the base heard a fusillade of shots that seemed to go on for a minute or two (so dad says). He was close enough that he'd actually heard it - and before the sirens started, right after the shooting, they hear this voice shout: "ALTO."

Amazingly, the Lt. and his driver were unhurt (as soon as the fire zeroed on them they got small behind the engine block of the flight line truck they were in), but the front end of the truck was utterly destroyed by BAR fire.

Needless to say, no more questions were raised about the efficacy of the Spanish Nationals and their perimeter guarding capabilities...

[James Langham]

Funny thing about the UK and US being Allies in both wars. Both aways try to claim it was the other who actually won the War, and not a group effort... Okay WWI there were other factors... But WWII was won due to the shear weight of three allied forces squeezing a nation like a pimple...

A friend of mine likes the Russian historical view:

"Operation Bagration starts which will eventually result in the Red Army reaching Berlin. Oh yes about the same time the British and Americans launch a diversion in the west."

Maybe we should add Zhukov and Koniev to the list of great generals.

[James Langham]

The plan would of worked much better if one would of cut it down and executed in three separate segments. The Allied Airborne Army would of been put to better use with smaller hops instead of trying to capture and enemy held route deep towards the Rhine.

The one thing to remember it was success overall but at a very high cost. Much like Malta was success for the Germany but at a very high cost.

Also it delayed other operation for clearing ports that were needed.

One thing that is often forgotten is that in the months leading up to September a number of these smaller operations had been conceived and abandoned as the ground troops reached the drop zones before the airborne could be deployed!

The biggest problem with Market Garden (in hindsight) is that it is an all or nothing affair, without reaching Arnhem it gives you no advantage. What is so frustrating is how close it comes and how many little things conspire against success.

[dragoon500ly]

Funny thing about the UK and US being Allies in both wars. Both aways try to claim it was the other who actually won the War, and not a group effort... Okay WWI there were other factors... But WWII was won due to the shear weight of three allied forces squeezing a nation like a pimple...

There is a story that engraved over the main entrance of the German Officer's Academy, in letters 25cm tall and lines with gold leaf is the phase

"NEVER FIGHT A TWO FRONT WAR, DAMN IT!"

Right underneath that in letters equaly high is the phase

"NEVER, EVER, INVADE RUSSIA, DAMN IT"

[helbent4]

Maybe we should add Zhukov and Koniev to the list of great generals.

James,

Maybe? Of course!

Tony

[dragoon500ly]

One thing that is often forgotten is that in the months leading up to September a number of these smaller operations had been conceived and abandoned as the ground troops reached the drop zones before the airborne could be deployed!

The biggest problem with Market Garden (in hindsight) is that it is an all or nothing affair, without reaching Arnhem it gives you no advantage. What is so frustrating is how close it comes and how many little things conspire against success.

If my memory is correct, I want to say there was something on the order of 14-15 operations that were planned and dropped due to the speed of the ground advance.

To be sure 1st Allied Airborne Army wanted to get back into the fight and one of the things that came out of Market-Garden was the speed with which they were able to plan and launch over 35,000 paratroopers. Just that was a major feat.

But Market-Garden also showed the weakness of airborne forces, unless they can be quickly reinforced by the ground forces, the paratroopers get cut up quickly.

Before the paratroop mafia jumps over this ole tanker, the stands of the 101st and 82nd in the Battle of the Bulge showed off their capability...but let us not forget that the 101st was encircled in Bastogne with the remaining elements of CCR, 9th Armored Division, CCB, 10th Armored Division, a battalion of SP tank destroyers, three battalions of 155mm howitzers and 4.5in guns, as well as survivors of the 28th Infantry Division (Team SNAFU), hardly the "all-airborne" fight that is remembered.

The 82nd fought elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division trying to break through to relieve KG Pieper. Until the 82nd was reinforced by major elements of the 3rd Armored Division, they were not able to maintain a line...bazookas, 57mm antitank guns and satchel charges had a rather hard time in slowing down Panthers and King Tigers.

[Abbott Shaull]

If my memory is correct, I want to say there was something on the order of 14-15 operations that were planned and dropped due to the speed of the ground advance.

To be sure 1st Allied Airborne Army wanted to get back into the fight and one of the things that came out of Market-Garden was the speed with which they were able to plan and launch over 35,000 paratroopers. Just that was a major feat.

But Market-Garden also showed the weakness of airborne forces, unless they can be quickly reinforced by the ground forces, the paratroopers get cut up quickly.

Before the paratroop mafia jumps over this ole tanker, the stands of the 101st and 82nd in the Battle of the Bulge showed off their capability...but let us not forget that the 101st was encircled in Bastogne with the remaining elements of CCR, 9th Armored Division, CCB, 10th Armored Division, a battalion of SP tank destroyers, three battalions of 155mm howitzers and 4.5in guns, as well as survivors of the 28th Infantry Division (Team SNAFU), hardly the "all-airborne" fight that is remembered.

The 82nd fought elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division trying to break through to relieve KG Pieper. Until the 82nd was reinforced by major elements of the 3rd Armored Division, they were not able to maintain a line...bazookas, 57mm antitank guns and satchel charges had a rather hard time in slowing down Panthers and King Tigers.

Hey I do understand. I always thought it was silly that they expected Airborne/Air Assault/Light Infantry Anti-Tank teams to seriously be much more of speed bump against heavily armed force.

[Abbott Shaull]

If my memory is correct, I want to say there was something on the order of 14-15 operations that were planned and dropped due to the speed of the ground advance.

To be sure 1st Allied Airborne Army wanted to get back into the fight and one of the things that came out of Market-Garden was the speed with which they were able to plan and launch over 35,000 paratroopers. Just that was a major feat.

But Market-Garden also showed the weakness of airborne forces, unless they can be quickly reinforced by the ground forces, the paratroopers get cut up quickly.


That is another thing that many people fail to take into account too. For the most part after the Airborne Divisions had been withdrawn back to England were time and again alerted to only have someone to overrun their drop zone.

[Adm.Lee]

That is another thing that many people fail to take into account too. For the most part after the Airborne Divisions had been withdrawn back to England were time and again alerted to only have someone to overrun their drop zone.

This is one big reason that some generals advocated smaller airborne forces, assigned further down the chain of command. IIRC, Patton suggested a regiment per field army, for short-range operations like bridge-grabbing. The planning was assumed to be less time-consuming.

To drag this back towards T2k, Soviet Fronts and Tank Armies each have a desant (air-assault) brigade assigned, for just this kind of thing.

[Abbott Shaull]

This is one big reason that some generals advocated smaller airborne forces, assigned further down the chain of command. IIRC, Patton suggested a regiment per field army, for short-range operations like bridge-grabbing. The planning was assumed to be less time-consuming.

To drag this back towards T2k, Soviet Fronts and Tank Armies each have a desant (air-assault) brigade assigned, for just this kind of thing.

Yeah I was about to say that the Soviet at certain command levels were suppose to have an assigned Air Assault Brigade. While in each Motorized Rifle Division in theory one of the Rifle Regiments was suppose to be a Airmobile trained...

[bobcat]

A friend of mine likes the Russian historical view:

"Operation Bagration starts which will eventually result in the Red Army reaching Berlin. Oh yes about the same time the British and Americans launch a diversion in the west."

Maybe we should add Zhukov and Koniev to the list of great generals.

yes they do understand how to utilize Russia's greatest defensive weapon. specifically old man winter.(or is old man winter simply Russia's greatest general?)

[helbent4]

yes they do understand how to utilize Russia's greatest defensive weapon. specifically old man winter.(or is old man winter simply Russia's greatest general?)

Bob,

Really, did Russian soldiers (or generals) actually do anything significant during WWII? I mean, it was pretty much like winter came to the not-Western Front and all the hundreds of Germans walking across the steppes there froze to death. When he heard the the American were invading Normandy Hitler committed suicide in the bunker. Game over!

Oh wait, there was the single most crucial turning point in the war, the Battle of the Bulge, won single-handedly by Patton and the 82nd Airborne. Other minor things happened, but trust me, they were really unimportant.

Zhukov and Konev were clearly proficient and aggressive generals, effective in all seasons and in offensive operations. By the end of the war, the Soviets had evolved into skilled, experienced and tenacious soldiers, fully skilled in the art of war. Still, it seemslike only General Winter that ever seems to get any the credit.

Tony

[James Langham]

Hey I do understand. I always thought it was silly that they expected Airborne/Air Assault/Light Infantry Anti-Tank teams to seriously be much more of speed bump against heavily armed force.

If that is all you have...

Actually in that sort of terrain you have a chance, admittedly not a big one.

[dragoon500ly]

Yeah I was about to say that the Soviet at certain command levels were suppose to have an assigned Air Assault Brigade. While in each Motorized Rifle Division in theory one of the Rifle Regiments was suppose to be a Airmobile trained...

The Soviets fielded enough airmobile brigades/battalions at the Army level that they didn't need to airmobile a motor-rifle regiment. That capability was always talked up in the Infantry Journal, but the Soviets took pretty much the same view that the US did during the 80s, you got mech infantry and you have airmobile infantry, both had specialized skills and therefore there was little cross-training.

[dragoon500ly]

Bob,

Really, did Russian soldiers (or generals) actually do anything significant during WWII? I mean, it was pretty much like winter came to the not-Western Front and all the hundreds of Germans walking across the steppes there froze to death. When he heard the the American were invading Normandy Hitler committed suicide in the bunker. Game over!

Oh wait, there was the single most crucial turning point in the war, the Battle of the Bulge, won single-handedly by Patton and the 82nd Airborne. Other minor things happened, but trust me, they were really unimportant.

Zhukov and Konev were clearly proficient and aggressive generals, effective in all seasons and in offensive operations. By the end of the war, the Soviets had evolved into skilled, experienced and tenacious soldiers, fully skilled in the art of war. Still, it seemslike only General Winter that ever seems to get any the credit.

Tony

And it does't help that its hard to get English translations of the Russian histories of the Great Patriotic War. After getting torn to pieces by the Germans in the early point of the war, the Russian tactical art got better, a lot better than Western historians acknowledge. But, from the Western viewpoint, the image of massed human wave assaults throwing themselves into the teeth of the German defenses has been an image that is almost impossible to dispel.

[Abbott Shaull]

There is a story that engraved over the main entrance of the German Officer's Academy, in letters 25cm tall and lines with gold leaf is the phase

"NEVER FIGHT A TWO FRONT WAR, DAMN IT!"

Right underneath that in letters equaly high is the phase

"NEVER, EVER, INVADE RUSSIA, DAMN IT"

Well at least they learned their lesson the second time around almost properly... Of course, their allies were the ones that started WWI and they were along for the ride...

[Abbott Shaull]

The Soviets fielded enough airmobile brigades/battalions at the Army level that they didn't need to airmobile a motor-rifle regiment. That capability was always talked up in the Infantry Journal, but the Soviets took pretty much the same view that the US did during the 80s, you got mech infantry and you have airmobile infantry, both had specialized skills and therefore there was little cross-training.

Yeah, I don't doubt that many commanders wouldn't want to use their Mechanized force as an Airmobile unit.

It was interesting in the 1980's when the Army was expanded, most of the units that on paper that had been added were Light Infantry Divisions which included what Mechanized and Armor capabilities that the 25th Infantry Division had being stripped from them. Many of these Light Infantry Divisions were suppose to have a Brigade trained in Airmobile operations. Again from a person who was with the 25th during this time, his Brigade was the said designate Brigade that they were also training for use of HMMWV and other similar vehicles for mobility too.

The idea of cross-training the two no matter what is bad idea. Either way the troop don't feel comfortable with the airmobile operations and next is the minor worry is how the units once the mission is accomplish is to retrieve it vehicles that they left behind.

What I don't understand tries to prop the illusion that the either the 101st or 82nd would be deployed entirely as a unit. In almost every action since Vietnam War after the 101st was withdrawn, neither Division has deployed with more than two-thirds of it assets. The two exception would be 1991 and 2003. Even in 2003 as far as I can tell, they had Brigades in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 2003 almost every time their Division HQs are sent to Iraq they have commanded maybe a Brigade or two of their troops, but also had various Heavy/Mechanized/Armor Brigade and at times various Marine units.

Not saying there will ever come a time when having the Divisional size Airborne or Air Assault won't come in handy or for that fact having the XVIII Airborne Corps organization lean toward being light. They have their place and their maybe a need in future.

The sad reality is their will always be disparity between people who are sent to Mechanized/Armor and Light/Airborne/Air Assault units. I was never sold on the Styker on concept or their Brigade without any Armor for support. I understand they are suppose to be intermediate type force that can be moved quickly, but their was this minor operation in Northern Iraq that moving the M1s into place with proper airfield it could be done. Slowly yes, but it can be done. Then you head to Afghanistan and the outcries that the 5.56N isn't effective. Along with grumbling of being strapped with the M4 Carbine and M16 Rifle still. Just seems to me once we are out of Iraq totally and Afghanistan the US Army in general will forget rapidly the lesson that both places have taught it....

[dragoon500ly]

Think about the state of the Regular Army as of 1983;

Forward deployed in Germany:

Berlin Brigade
3rd Brigade, 2nd Armored Division
10th, 69th, 94th and 108th Air Defense Artillery Brigades
V Corps, consisting of;
3rd Armored Division
8th Mechanized Infantry Division
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
41st, and 42nd Field Artillery Brigades
VII Corps, consisting of;
1st Armored Division
3rd Mechanized Infantry Division
3rd Brigade, 1st Mechanized Infantry Division
2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
17th, 72nd and 210th Field Artillery Brigades

Forward deployed in Korea

2nd Infantry Division

In Hawaii (to reinforce Korea)

25th Light Infantry Division

In Panama

193rd Infantry Brigade

In the US

I Corps (to reinforce Korea)

9th Motorized Infantry Division
7th Light Infantry Division
6th Light Infantry Division (forming in Alaska and not ready until 1985)

III Corps (REFORGER)
6th Air Cavalry Combat Brigade
1st Cavalry Division
2nd Armored Division
1st Mechanized Infantry Division
4th Mechanized Infantry Division
5th Mechanized Infantry Division
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment
75th and 212th Field Artillery Brigades
11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade

XVIII Airborne Corps (Strategic Reserve)

82nd Airborne Division
101st Air Assault Division
24th Mechanized Infantry Division
194th Armored Brigade
197th Mechanized Infantry Brigade
18th Field Artillery Brigade

With the exception of an airborne battalion task force in Italy you now have the front line combat strength of the US Army and their assigned areas of operations. As you can see with one exception (24th MID) every heavy unit the Army had was dedicated to Germany.

When RDF was formed; they basically took the XVIII Airborne Corps, moved 6th Air Cav Combat Brigade over and added 1st Marine Division and 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade. The only "heavy" division was still the 24th MID.

The problem with RDF is that it was "rapidly deployable" but it had the offensive capability of the the New Orleans Saints at that time, in other words, NONE. As Desert Storm proved, the US was sweating bullets that Saddam would not decide to push into Saudi Arabia before 24th MID arrived and the only hope of ejecting the Iraqis out of Kuwait was to move VII Corps from Europe and bring it to the Persian Gulf. And until the "heavies" showed up, Saudi Arabia depended on Allied airpower and the infantry of 82nd/101st...

This is why there was such a push to deploy Stryker. I'm not defending the weapon system, but the concept is sound. The US needed a better means of ground power projection than foot infantry. But Stryker should have been used to replace the Light Infantry Divisions instead of gutting the heavy divisions.

[dragoon500ly]

You know, we slam the Stryker brigades pretty hard here...as anyone ever given thought to having to go to war with these?

The Pentomic Division: the concept is simple; your division has five battlegroups, each consisting of a infantry battalion, a tank company, a cavalry troop and a battery of artillery. Division has Davy Crockett/Honest John support (complete with tacnukes!!!!) and a battalion of 155mm for general support (did I mention complete with tacnukes?). Downside is your "division" is now more like a reinforced brigade. Plus side is that you can now field more divisions for the same money AND they can survive a nuclear war!!!!!!!

The TriCap Division: this concept was really pulled out of the bottom of somebody's duffle bag! Your division consists of a Brigade of Attack Helicopters, a Brigade of Airmobile Infantry and a Brigade of Armor. You use the airmobile infantry to set a blocking position to use the numerous TOW/Dragons they have, the attack helicopters shoot the shit out of any tanks moving and your armor brigade conducts its set-piece counterattack.

:rolleyes:

[Panther Al]

I don't slam the concept, I'm slamming the vehicle and they way it was selected, for more, I'll post in Fiddlers Green in a few minutes.

[Abbott Shaull]

If that is all you have...

Actually in that sort of terrain you have a chance, admittedly not a big one.

Yes in some cases you may have chance to survive, but odds are way stacked in the armor force favor...

[Abbott Shaull]

You know, we slam the Stryker brigades pretty hard here...as anyone ever given thought to having to go to war with these?

The Pentomic Division: the concept is simple; your division has five battlegroups, each consisting of a infantry battalion, a tank company, a cavalry troop and a battery of artillery. Division has Davy Crockett/Honest John support (complete with tacnukes!!!!) and a battalion of 155mm for general support (did I mention complete with tacnukes?). Downside is your "division" is now more like a reinforced brigade. Plus side is that you can now field more divisions for the same money AND they can survive a nuclear war!!!!!!!

The TriCap Division: this concept was really pulled out of the bottom of somebody's duffle bag! Your division consists of a Brigade of Attack Helicopters, a Brigade of Airmobile Infantry and a Brigade of Armor. You use the airmobile infantry to set a blocking position to use the numerous TOW/Dragons they have, the attack helicopters shoot the shit out of any tanks moving and your armor brigade conducts its set-piece counterattack.

:rolleyes:

Hey I kinda like the TriCap Division outfit. If one looked at the 2nd Infantry Division before 9-11 it was basically the same thing with it 1 brigade with 2 Air Assault Battalions. Then again in Korea it might make sense. Never made it over there. Besides they had to do something with all those surplus aircraft after Vietnam...

The Pentomic Division was someone the wet dream of those who brought us the Unit of Action concept....before they relabeled them Brigade Combat Teams...lol

[Abbott Shaull]

When RDF was formed; they basically took the XVIII Airborne Corps, moved 6th Air Cav Combat Brigade over and added 1st Marine Division and 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade. The only "heavy" division was still the 24th MID.

The problem with RDF is that it was "rapidly deployable" but it had the offensive capability of the the New Orleans Saints at that time, in other words, NONE. As Desert Storm proved, the US was sweating bullets that Saddam would not decide to push into Saudi Arabia before 24th MID arrived and the only hope of ejecting the Iraqis out of Kuwait was to move VII Corps from Europe and bring it to the Persian Gulf. And until the "heavies" showed up, Saudi Arabia depended on Allied airpower and the infantry of 82nd/101st...

This is why there was such a push to deploy Stryker. I'm not defending the weapon system, but the concept is sound. The US needed a better means of ground power projection than foot infantry. But Stryker should have been used to replace the Light Infantry Divisions instead of gutting the heavy divisions.

Yes depending on whose reports you look at, many of the division based in the US without forward deployed Brigade had round-out brigade while other places would lead one to believe that they may be a complete division sets. The only two exceptions were the 82nd and 101st even they had issues at time with troop strengths.

Little after this the 10th Mountain with two Brigade was raise too. The 2nd Brigade of it still was parked at Fort Benning getting certified and waiting for facilities at Fort Drum to be completed as late 1988. It was another Division that had round-out unit.

At the time the 9th Infantry Division was suppose to test various piece of equipment to provide something that had more bite than the Light/Airborne/Air Assault units provided, but not require the heavy lift that was needed to move an Mechanized/Armor Division.

Yeah 1991 only reminded the Brass why the 9th has wasted so much of the 80s looking at Combine Arms that gave the RDF plan something with teeth.

As for the 24th Mechanized Division, yeah they were technically part of the XVIII Corps, but it wouldn't take much to strip it of personnel to reinforce III Corps various divisions. Much like the remains of the 9th had done to them as they were being drawn downed for deactivation as well as the 6th and 7th Light Infantry Divisions were begin deactivated too.

[Abbott Shaull]

What Light Divisions were there left to convert... The 25th and 10th Mountain? Yeah I agree with that the 2nd Infantry Division organization should of been left intact as two of its three combat Brigades were transferred to the States. I believe for the 25th Infantry Division there are 3 Stryker Brigades and 1 Airborne Brigade and I think 10th Mountain has 1 Stryker Brigade or that was one of the ideas that I know that was going around.

I did notice that there were plans to add a 5th Brigade to the remaining Armor/Mechanized/Cavalry Divisions that would of been essential new Styker Brigades. The striking to me is when the Army looked to transformed into Units of Actions the 3 or so Stryker Brigades that they had already fielded or in training were left untouched. By this time the 2nd Armored Cavalry had already turned it M1s and M3s for HMMWVs and then it later was converted to Stryker Brigade.

Every Division with the exceptions of those converted to Stryker or plans to be converted to Stryker concept were the ones gutted. Why does the Stryker Brigade still have 3 Stryker Infantry Battalions, 1 Cavalry Squadron (RSTA), 1 Artillery Battalion, plus the two support Battalions. Which leaves these Brigade as the largest combat Brigade left in the Army.

While rest of the army went from Armor/Mechanized Brigades converted from there 2:1 mix of battalions depending on if it was Armor or Mechanize Brigade which didn't have a Cavalry Squadron into two Heavy Battalions (Task Forces, one retaining an Mechanized Infantry title and the other an Armor title), 1 Cavalry Squadron (RSTA) (magically be converting the remain Brigade if you believe what some sources would like you to believe), and reduce Artillery Battalion dropping a Fire Battery and having it Forward Support Battalion and new Special Support Battalion made up troop taken from Division support units. Some have charge that this was largely a mistake in reducing these Brigades by 1/3 of the former combat power, when in reality they were ahead somewhat. When you realize that Mechanized and Armor Battalions had been reduced to 3 Companies instead of 4 Companies they had back in the 1980s and early 1990s. The two Heavy Task Forces had 2 Armor and 2 Mechanized Companies for a total of 4 of each. The old Mechanized Brigade had 6 Mechanized and 3 Armor Companies. The old Armor was reverse. So technically the Heavy Brigades lost one combat Company and one Artillery Battery. Yet, they gain in Special Support Battalion troops, the Cavalry Squadron (RSTA) giving the Brigade commander eye and ears with having to rely on the Battalions recon elements or Divisional Cavalry Squadron assets. With excess Armor and Mechanized Companies, Battalion HQs, and the Artillery Batteries were used to form newly retasked Brigades. Namely the Engineer and Artillery Brigades HQs depending on which reports you go by. Oh yeah Engineer Company were added to each Heavy Battalion or a Engineer Battalion was added to the Brigade again there are various conflicting reports.

The 82nd and 101st Division basically lost 1/9th of the combat Infantry Battalion since the new Unit of Action was also shoved on them. With Brigade going from 3 Battalions, 1 Field Artillery Battalion, and Forward Support Battalion into 2 Battalions, 1 Field Artillery Battalion (again reduced by one Battery), Forward Support became the Support Battalion, with Cavalry Squardon (RSTA) and Special Troop Battalions added. Ironically this conformed to the 173rd Airborne Brigade that had been used in Northern Iraq with huge success according to reports with slight modifications to it organization. The 10th Mountain did the same thing with it two brigade. What happen was the excess Artillery Batteries and extra Battalions were used in the Field Artillery Brigade to convert it into another combat Brigade. The excess Airborne and Air Assault Battalion were used by some reports to help make the Cavalry Squadrons depending on who was writing the reports.

With that done supposedly the Cavalry Squadrons (RSTA) at brigade level were suppose to be almost identical from Division to Division, but by looking at various sites it doesn't seem to be the case.

So I don't see where the Heavy Divisions were gutted in favor of the new Stryker Brigades. If any Division has a reason to complain it would be the 2nd Infantry. They went from having 1 Armor, 1 Mech, and 1 'Air Assault' Brigades to having 1 Armor and 3 Stryker Brigade (reinforcements) to support them. Granted on paper each of other division, their brigades lost some combat power, but for the Heavy Divisions the change from 9 Battalion with 3 Companies for 27 Companies to 8 Battalions with 4 Companies increasing to 32 Companies. Artillery wise they lost one fire Battery. The Light units effectively lost 3 companies and 1 battery.

So it kinda a mix bag of things. Like I said I wish the Strykers Brigades had seen the same cuts. Then instead of the 8 they have now, they could have 12 Stryker Brigades...lol Of course, with the Armor Company that they airlifted to Support the 173rd Airborne Brigade that they haven't attached an Armor Company to all Brigade and Divisional Cavalry Squadrons of the 10th, 25th, 82nd, 101st Divisions!

[dragoon500ly]

The whole thing with the Division XLVIIXIVLIIIMLIII (:rolleyes:) is that it seems to take a great leap back from what we know works.

I was around when we made the leap from 3 companies up to 4 smaller companies...we found that the additional of the 4 company gave us a lot better tactical flexibility over the "old" 3 company battalion....so a dozen years later, we get the "4 companies is inefficient"? The tank platoon used to be 5 tanks, we found that 4 tanks was the most efficient balance between staying power and flexibility...now its 3 tanks?!?!?!

I think some dipshit in the Pentagon may have had an accident with Windows!

[Abbott Shaull]

The whole thing with the Division XLVIIXIVLIIIMLIII (:rolleyes:) is that it seems to take a great leap back from what we know works.

I was around when we made the leap from 3 companies up to 4 smaller companies...we found that the additional of the 4 company gave us a lot better tactical flexibility over the "old" 3 company battalion....so a dozen years later, we get the "4 companies is inefficient"? The tank platoon used to be 5 tanks, we found that 4 tanks was the most efficient balance between staying power and flexibility...now its 3 tanks?!?!?!

I think some dipshit in the Pentagon may have had an accident with Windows!

Tank platoon are down to three...Wow... Yeah if you look at the Soviet Divisions and Regiments were 3:1 ratios for Tanks and Mechanized. Then again they have ran anywhere from 3 to 5 tank to platoon depending what type of tank unit the Company was assigned too. So it not only the Generals in the Pentagon who can't get their shit together... Also Germany had debated these things and mix of Brigades too over the year too.

[bobcat]

ah generals in general don't know what they're doing. thats why they aren't specialists or sergeants. then again is the SPC4's and SGT's ran the army the ACU fiasco would have never happened, we'd have jumpable rucks, and the army would actually be run like an organisation or professional soldiers.

[dragoon500ly]

Hey I kinda like the TriCap Division outfit. If one looked at the 2nd Infantry Division before 9-11 it was basically the same thing with it 1 brigade with 2 Air Assault Battalions. Then again in Korea it might make sense. Never made it over there. Besides they had to do something with all those surplus aircraft after Vietnam...

The Pentomic Division was someone the wet dream of those who brought us the Unit of Action concept....before they relabeled them Brigade Combat Teams...lol

I always thought that the 2ID was a division who seriously needed professional mental help. Every time I have run the TO&E, I get a headache! :rolleyes:

[Abbott Shaull]

I always thought that the 2ID was a division who seriously needed professional mental help. Every time I have run the TO&E, I get a headache! :rolleyes:

Yeah, I hear you. From the reports and stories that I read on the Korean War that it having a Mechanized and Heavy Brigade there something of a pipe dream of them being effective.

I notice that 6th, 7th, and 25th Light Infantry Divisions with the 9th Motorized Division were scheduled to reinforce the 8th Army. Again like with the Reforger units to bad none of these Division had complete sets on active duty. The 6th, 7th, and 10th Mountain seemed to have largest amount of support units that were also NG too. So again they would rely on holding a line and wait...

[Abbott Shaull]

ah generals in general don't know what they're doing. thats why they aren't specialists or sergeants. then again is the SPC4's and SGT's ran the army the ACU fiasco would have never happened, we'd have jumpable rucks, and the army would actually be run like an organisation or professional soldiers.

It what happens when you O-6s with spare time...

[Panther Al]

ah generals in general don't know what they're doing. thats why they aren't specialists or sergeants. then again is the SPC4's and SGT's ran the army the ACU fiasco would have never happened, we'd have jumpable rucks, and the army would actually be run like an organisation or professional soldiers.

You know, speaking as a former SSG, that whole comment makes my head ache. I'm not a fan of dumbass officers, of which their is plenty, but NCO's can fuck up a unit faster than any officer- and its more common. The procurement process is ate up from the ground up, but there was valid, reasonable, reasons for the decisions they made, right or wrong. The jobs that NCO's and Officers have is totally different, and they have totally different requirements for training. A private does what is needed now, his NCO plans what needs to be done in the next few days, its up to the officer to plan further out. Most officers are capable, smart, and hard working. Give them respect: they worked for it. And what ever you do, don't batch them in front of your 1SG or SGM, he'll eat you alive.

Gah, defending officers, what a strange world. :)

[Abbott Shaull]

You know, speaking as a former SSG, that whole comment makes my head ache. I'm not a fan of dumbass officers, of which their is plenty, but NCO's can fuck up a unit faster than any officer- and its more common. The procurement process is ate up from the ground up, but there was valid, reasonable, reasons for the decisions they made, right or wrong. The jobs that NCO's and Officers have is totally different, and they have totally different requirements for training. A private does what is needed now, his NCO plans what needs to be done in the next few days, its up to the officer to plan further out. Most officers are capable, smart, and hard working. Give them respect: they worked for it. And what ever you do, don't batch them in front of your 1SG or SGM, he'll eat you alive.

Gah, defending officers, what a strange world. :)

Well said...

[helbent4]

And it does't help that its hard to get English translations of the Russian histories of the Great Patriotic War. After getting torn to pieces by the Germans in the early point of the war, the Russian tactical art got better, a lot better than Western historians acknowledge. But, from the Western viewpoint, the image of massed human wave assaults throwing themselves into the teeth of the German defenses has been an image that is almost impossible to dispel.

Lee,

A great book I recommend for anyone wanting a good appreciation of how Russia fought in WWII, and how they saw themselves is "Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army 1939-45." It's based on historical records from Russian archives, diaries, letters, and personal anecdotes.

For one thing, the Red Army of 1941 which used human wave attacks was largely dead by 1942. Taking their place were professional officers and soldiers, with technical skills and training.

http://www.amazon.com/Ivans-War-Life-Death-1939-1945/dp/0805074554

Moving onto the Pentomic divisions, S&T had a couple wargames in the Cold War Battles series that features them: as an optional unit is Budapest '56 and the focus of Wurzburg Pentomic:

http://cf.geekdo-images.com/images/pic733555.jpg

There's a fascinating write-up of the Pentomic concept. Great in theory but difficult to pull off in practice!

http://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/42256/cold-war-battles-2-kabul-79-pentomic-wurzburg

Tony

[dragoon500ly]

Lee,

A great book I recommend for anyone wanting a good appreciation of how Russia fought in WWII, and how they saw themselves is "Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army 1939-45." It's based on historical records from Russian archives, diaries, letters, and personal anecdotes.

For one thing, the Red Army of 1941 which used human wave attacks was largely dead by 1942. Taking their place were professional officers and soldiers, with technical skills and training.

http://www.amazon.com/Ivans-War-Life-Death-1939-1945/dp/0805074554

Moving onto the Pentomic divisions, S&T had a couple wargames in the Cold War Battles series that features them: as an optional unit is Budapest '56 and the focus of Wurzburg Pentomic:

http://cf.geekdo-images.com/images/pic733555.jpg

There's a fascinating write-up of the Pentomic concept. Great in theory but difficult to pull off in practice!

http://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/42256/cold-war-battles-2-kabul-79-pentomic-wurzburg

Tony

I have a copy somewhere around the house. I for one am very intrested in the Russian view of the war, but I'm handicapped by only being to speak basic Russian, you know "give me a bottle of vodka", "I'd like the house special", "how much for your daughter", and a few of the cruder insults, you know, what any GI knows. And its hard to get copies of the Russian works on the subject at least in the land of "if its not invented here, it can't be any good!"

Ah the pentomic division, they only redeeming feature is that the battle group commander gets to play with tacnukes by himself. Operationaly, it sucked wind!

[Adm.Lee]

An interesting thing about the Pentomic division I found. I read Gen. Maxwell Taylor's memoir a while ago. He wrote about thinking that conventional divisions seemed awful vulnerable to nuke strikes, and that something should have been done. Many pages later, he mentions that another reorganization needed to be done. Nothing is said about the actual planning, testing or deployment of the Pentomics, much less that it happened on his watch as Chief of Staff of the Army (1955-59).

I think that silence spoke volumes about the Pentomic division.

I can remember when I was in high school, I found my dad's "Army officer's guide," copyright 1961. Under a listing of the various Army posts were some of the unit assignments. As a budding wargamer, I loved that, and tried to construct an OOB. But, I knew WW2 wargames, so "battlegroups" as permanent units, subordinate to divisions, related to regiments? That really confused me. Since Pop didn't really start active duty until '64 (and never served with troops) and it was then about 20 years later, he really couldn't explain it, either.

[dragoon500ly]

An interesting thing about the Pentomic division I found. I read Gen. Maxwell Taylor's memoir a while ago. He wrote about thinking that conventional divisions seemed awful vulnerable to nuke strikes, and that something should have been done. Many pages later, he mentions that another reorganization needed to be done. Nothing is said about the actual planning, testing or deployment of the Pentomics, much less that it happened on his watch as Chief of Staff of the Army (1955-59).

I think that silence spoke volumes about the Pentomic division.

I can remember when I was in high school, I found my dad's "Army officer's guide," copyright 1961. Under a listing of the various Army posts were some of the unit assignments. As a budding wargamer, I loved that, and tried to construct an OOB. But, I knew WW2 wargames, so "battlegroups" as permanent units, subordinate to divisions, related to regiments? That really confused me. Since Pop didn't really start active duty until '64 (and never served with troops) and it was then about 20 years later, he really couldn't explain it, either.


By the mid-1950s, the Army though a general war would be too expensive to fight by conventional means due to the Warsaw Pact having an overwhelming advantage in men and resources than NATO. The answer appeared to be to increase the firepower of a division. One of the stumbling blocks to this was the lack of understanding of the effects of tacnukes. The general consenus was that tacnukes could be used much like like field artillery. This is the backdrop for the development of the Pentomic Division.

In its final form, the pentomic division consisted of five battle groups (Headquarters & Service Company, 5 Infantry Companies and one mortar battery each) that replaced the original three infantry regiments. Conventional and nuclear artillery, tank, signal, and engineer battalions, and a reconnaissance squadron with ground and air capabilities were added to the division. The division was also authorized trains, which included a transportation battalion, an aviation company, and an administration company. The transportation battalion was to have sufficient armored personnel carriers to move an entire battle group at one time. The aviation company, the first of its type, was to be placed in the trains for better supervision of its maintenance. The pentomic division was authorized about 13,500 men of all ranks--a reduction of nearly 4,000 from the 1955 infantry division.

The pentomic division was seen as an effective organization, able to operate widely dispersed on the nuclear battlefield. There were also other reasons for converting divisions to the new concept. The defense budgets of the 1950s concentrated on new missiles, aircraft and ships and left little money for the mundane items such as rifles, machineguns and trucks.

The pentomic division, with its usage of tacnukes became a means in itself for the Army to become part of the nuclear arsenal budget.

So what killed the pentomic division? As was demonstrated in a series of wargames, the pentomic division and its independent battle groups was highly dependent on communications for it work at its best. As better understanding of the effects of even tacnukes became available, the pentomic division proved to be almost impossible to co-ordinate based on the standard of communications technology of the time.

[Adm.Lee]

Sorry, I guess I should have added that I had figured it out since then, once I took up looking for Cold War stuff.

[dragoon500ly]

I was recently conducting an audit at this little place called Fort Benning, got to watch a daylight gunnery exercise demo the latest fixes to the ole Stryker combat system. Namely my favorite POS, the 105mm armed version. :rolleyes:

Anyhow, our fearless crew was motoring down the range and I mentioned to the major that was conducting our tour, that the last time that I had witnessed this, the crew managed to roll their vehicle over. The major got a little huffy and assured me that such a thing would never happen with the latest mods....

Right on Station Six, the Stryker went around a corner and engaged a target with its gun at the nine o'clock position. Sure enough, the crew fired and scored direct hit, at the same time the vehicle slowly rolled over on its right side.

Glancing at the red-faced major, I mentioned, in an awe-struck voice, "those new mods work! The last time I saw this they rolled 180 degrees, this time it was only 90!!!!!"

;)