Little Big Horn, A Study of a Cavalry Regiment in the Indian Wars [Archive]

dragoon500ly

12-17-2010, 02:25 PM

So why the hooplaa over a battle that took place on June 25-26, 1876? After all,the root cause was a insane, glory hound named George Armstring Custer, at least that's what numerous Hollywood movies, various TV miniseries and scores of authors have told us every since that hot, summer day on a Montana Territory hillside. But when studying history, what is unearthed is many times, not what popular history says it is.

The Battle of the Little Big Horn cost the US Army 268 men killed, or just over 1% of its total authorized strength of 26,312 men. Compared to the battles of the Civil War, LBH is at most, a minor skirmish. But to the regular army of the 1870s, 1 percent of its strength was a staggering loss. During the period of the Indian Wars (1866-1891) the US Army lost 1,128 men in the trans-Mississippi West. LBH accounts for one quarter of all the men killed during this period. This makes LBH a staggering defeat when viewed in the context of the small numbers of casualties that would normally be expected in an fight with Indians.

When the Civil War ended in 1865, it brought about a reorganization of the army. The army had two roles, the first of policing the reconstruction effort in the South and the second of restoring order on the frontier. During the war, the frontier was guarded by over-stretched regular regiments or by various state militia units. The Indians took advantage of this and committed a series of depredations against white settlers, particularly in the Great Plains.

The army, following the reorganization of 1866 consisted of twenty-five regiments of infantry (two colored), ten regiments of cavalry (two colored) and five regiments of artillery. The U.S. Seventh Cavalry was a brand new regiment created as part of the 1866 reorganization. In July, 1866, George Custer, brevet major general of volunteers and permament rank of captain in the regular army, was appointed as lieutenant colonel of the new regiment. Custer joined his new regiment at its permanent station at Fort Riley, Kansas.

dragoon500ly

12-17-2010, 05:38 PM

The organization of the regiment was comprised of a regimental staff and twelve companies (the official term is company for both the cavalry and artillery regiments, troop and battery were unofficial names, although widely used).

The Regimental Staff of the Seventh Cavalry consisted of

Colonel Samuel D. Sturgis (detached service to St. Louis, Missouri
Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer (acting commander)
Major Joseph Tilford (leave of absence)
Major Lewis Merrill (detached service to Washington DC)
Major Marcus Reno
Adjutant First Lieutenant William Cooke (Custer Bn, killed in action)
Quartermaster First Lieutenant Henry Nowlan
Assistant Surgeon George Lord (Custer Bn, killed in action)
Acting Assistant Surgeon James DeWolf (Reno Bn, killed in action)
Acting Assistant Surgeon Henry Porter
Veterinary Surgeon C. A. Stein (detached to Yellowstone Depot)
Sergeant Major William Sharrow (Custer Bn, killed in action)
Quartermaster Sergeant (detached to Yellowstone Depot)
Commissary Sergeant
Saddler Sergeant John Tritten (detached to Yellowstone Depot)
Chief Trumpeter Henry Voss (Custer Bn, killed in action)
Chief Musician Felix Vinatieri (detached to Yellowstone Depot)
sixteen privates, regimental band, detached to Yellowstone Depot)

dragoon500ly

12-18-2010, 07:59 AM

The Seventh Cavalry was made up of twelve companies. In spite of what Hollywood/TV would have you believe, Companies is the correct usage. Even the Artillery Regiments called their units companies instead of batteries. The terms troop and battery were in common use during this period. You would see written orders to "Commanding Officer of Company G" for example, while on the field the verbal order would be "G Troop will advance", of course this really depended on the senior officer involved!

The organization of the companies changed several times. There is the 1866, 1869, 1870, 1874 (twice!) and the 1875 reorganizations. The basic setup on July 28, 1866 provided for the following:

Captain
First Lieutenant
Second Lieutenant
First Sergeant
Quartermaster Sergeant
5 Sergeants
8 Corporals
2 Trumpeters
2 Farriers & Blacksmiths
1 Saddler
1 Wagoner
78 Privates

The latest organization (the one used at LBH) was:

Captain
First Lieutenant
Second Lieutenant
First Sergeant
5 Sergeants
4 Corporals
2 Trumpeters
2 Farriers & Blacksmiths
1 Saddler
1 Wagoner
54 Privates

At LBH the companies looked like this:

Company A: Captain Myles Moylan; one officer killed, one officer wounded, 8 enlisted killed, 6 enlisted wounded (1 died of wounds). Total=10 killed, 6 wounded out of 55 men on roster

Company B: Captain Thomas McDougall; 1 officer killed, 2 enlisted killed, 5 enlisted wounded. Total=3 killed, 5 wounded out of 71 men on roster

Company C: Thomas Custer; 3 officers killed, 36 enlisted killed, 4 enlisted wounded (1 died of wounds). Total=40 killed, 3 wounded out of 66 men on roster

Company D: Captain Thomas Weir; 3 enlisted killed, 3 enlisted wounded. Total 3 killed, 3 wounded out of 64 men on roster

Company E: Captain Charles Ilsley; 1 officer killed, 37 enlisted killed, 2 enlisted wounded. Total=38 killed, 2 wounded out of 61 men on roster

Company F: Captain George Yates; 1 officer killed, 36 enlisted killed. Total=37 killed out of 68 men on roster

Company G: Captain Joun Tourtellotte; 1 officer killed, 13 enlisted killed, 6 enlisted wounded. Total=14 killed, 6 wounded out of 69 men on roster

Company H: Captain Frederick Benteen; 1 officer wounded, 2 enlisted killed, 20 enlisted wounded (2 died of wounds). Total= 4 killed, 19 wounded out of 55 men on roster

Company I: Captain Myles Keeogh; 2 officers killed, 36 enlisted killed, 1 wounded (died of wounds). Total=39 killed out of 65 men on roster.

Company K: Captain Owen Hale; 5 enlisted killed, 3 enlisted wounded. Total 5 killed, 3 wounded out of 69 men on roster

Company L: Captain Michael Sheridan; 1 officer killed, 44 enlisted killed, 1 enlisted wounded. Total=45 killed, 1 wounded out of 69 men on roster

Company M: Captain Thomas French; 1 officer killed, 12 enlisted killed, 11 enlisted wounded (1 died of wounds). Total=14 killed, 10 wounded out of 63 men on roster

Quartermaster Employees present: 21 men fall into this category: comprised of 3 Guides, 2 Interpreters, 1 Correspondent, 13 Packers, 1 Scout, 1 accompanying civilian. Of these, 3 Guides, 2 Interpreters, 1 Correspondent, 1 Accompanying Civilian, and 1 Packer were killed and 1 Packer wounded. Total 8 killed, 1 wounded out of 21 men present

Indian Scouts present: 51 Crow, Ree, Dak and Sioux scouts rode with the 7th Cavalry. Of these 2 were killed and 2 were wounded.

dragoon500ly

12-18-2010, 08:11 AM

When GAC split the Seventh Cavalry up on June 25, 1876, this was the tactical orginzation:

Custer's Battalion
Regimental Staff: Lieutenant Colonel George Custer
Company C: Captain Thomas Custer
Company E: First Lieutenant Algernon Smith
Compant F: Captain George Yates
Company I: Captain Myles Keogh
Company L: First Lieutenant James Calhoun

Reno's Battalion
Battalion Staff: Major Marcus Reno
Company A: Captain Myles Moylan
Company G: First Lieutenant Donald McIntosh
Company M: Captain Thomas French

Benteen's Battalion
Battalion Staff: Captain Frederick Benteen
Company D: Captain Thomas Wier
Company H: First Lieutenant Francis Gibson
Company K: First Lieutenant Edward Godfrey

Pack Train Escort
Company B: Captain Thomas McDougall
detachement of 1 NCO and 6 enlisted men from each troop.

dragoon500ly

12-18-2010, 08:37 AM

"Holy Shit! Look at all of those damned Ind----" Famous last words supposed to have been uttered by George Custer

So just how many Indians were supposed to have been present at Little Big Horn? The simple answer is that no one knows for sure.

What is known is that the villages in the Valley of the Little Big Horn River had grown considerably in size from earlier in the year. Families would leave the reservation and join others for a summer of freedom. The Indian Agents would under report these depatures in order to continue to receive supplies for the larger number, which they would then turn around and sell and pocket the profit. How large was the problem? The Standing Rock Indian Agency reported that 7,000 Indians were present, a count conducted by the Army confirmed only 2,300 were actually present.

In 1877, the Scott Expedition returned to the Little Big Horn to rebury the cavalry men, the commanding officer of the expedition, Lieutenant H.L. Scott took the time to count the number of lodge circles present in the valley. He stopped counting at 1,500. This effort, while intresting, proves little as many families often moved several times, each time leaving a lodge circle. In addition, Lt. Scott failed to count the hundreds of wickiups, brush shelters that housed one or two people.

The following are estimates of the numbers of warriors by various officers who either took part in the battle or examined the field afterwards:
Colonel John Gibbon, 2,500; 2nd Lt Luther Hale, 4,000; scout George Herendeen, 3,000; 1st Lt Charles DeRudio, 3-4,000; Captain Myles Moylan, 3,500-4,000; 2nd Lt Charles Varnum, 4,000. 2nd Lt George Wallace first estimated 3,000 and then changed his mind at the Reno Court of Inquiry, testifing that there were 9,000. Captain Frederick Benteen initially estimated 1,500 and then changed his mind and stated 8-9,000.

Even the Indians themselves could not provide an exact number. Chief Gall refused to offer any estimate; Flat Iron, 8,000; Chief Runs-the-Enemy, 2,000; Flying Hawk, 1,000 and Crazy Horse, at least 7,000. Red Cloud estimated 2,000. Allegedly, Indians believed that the number was less than a 1,000 and that anyone who counted higher than a 1,000 was dishonest.

Even the various historians have different values: Stanley Vestal, 2,500; Frazier Hunt, 1,800 to 2,000; Lewis Crawford, 2,000-2,500; Fred Dustin, 3,000-3,500; Charles Eastman, not more than 1,400; Edgar Stewart, 3,000; Robert Utley; 2,000; Jeffery Wert, 2,000; anf George Grinnell, 4,500-6,000.

The best estimate of the actual number of lodges was provided by John Gray:
Northern Cheyenne: 120
Oglala Sioux: 240
Blackfoot, Brule and Two Kettle Sioux: 120
Sans Arc Sioux: 110
Minniconjou Sioux: 150
Hunkpapa Sioux: 235
Yanktonnais and Santee Sious: 25

Gray estimates the total number of lodges at 1,000, but he does not include any Arapaho, members of this tribe were known to be present. It is estimated that each lodge would be home to two warriors, perhaps more if the older boys were counted. Add to this the large number of wickiups on the north end of the village which housed young warriors who did not live with their families; subtract the number of men who had reached old age (after their 40th birthday).....

Whatever the exact number, it is fair to assume that the Seventh Cavalry was outnumbered.

As for the Indian losses, estimated varily wildly from a low of 30-40 to as many as 500. As Custer had observed earlier "The Indians invariably endeavored to conceal their exact losses." The only Indian casualties that were found after the battle, consisted of eight bodies left within two lodges in the abandoned village. These warriors were dressed in their finest clothing and were lying on scaffolds.

Even the Indians are divided on thier own losses. Red Horse later stated that "the soldiers killed 136 and wounded 160 Sioux".

dragoon500ly

12-18-2010, 09:06 AM

What is today considered the Little Big Horn Battlefield lays on the northern side of the Little Big Horn River. Running from east to west:

The Reno-Benteen Defense Site: Here seven companies of the Seventh under the command of Major Reno held a defensive position ontop of this bluff after Renos rout from the valley floor. It lies about 600 yards north of the LBHR. Remains of the crude trench and rifle pits dug by the troopers can still be scene.

Next is Sharpshooter's Ridge located about 500 yards north of the Reno-Beenteen Defense Site. On this ridge, throughout July 26th, an Indian sharpshooter killed or wounded a number of the pinned-down troopers. This Indian gained a grudging respect for his marksmanship before being either killed or forced away from the rdige by the troopers concentrated fire.

Wier Point, located about a mile northwest of the RBDS is a small promontory above Medicine Tail Coulee. This is the location that Captain Wier and his company advanced to without orders from Reno/Benteen. From this point, Captain Wier was able to observe Indians in the distance firing at objects on the ground around Custer Hill. Weir was forced back from this point and driven back to the RBDS.

Medicine Tail Coulee runs from north of Wier Point about 300 yards to the river at the southern end of the Indian village on the opposite bank. Indians tell of a movement by part of Custer's Battalion down this ravine (either as a feint or as an attempt to attack the village). This movement met with fierce opposition and retreated north and east (up Deep Coulee?) to Battle Ridge. There are also stories that Custer was either killed or wounded during this fight.

Nye-Cartwright Ridge forms part of the divide between Medicine Tail Coulee and Deep Coulee and was named for two students who located numerous firing positions in the area. It is believed that troopers deployed in this position to cover Custer's right flank and cover the approach of the pack train.

Deep Coulee leads to the LBHR near the center of the Indian village and is located at the northern end of the Nye-Cartwright Ridge, just south of Calhoun Hill. It is believed that elements of Custer's Battalion may have retreated up this coulee after attacking down Medicine Tail Coulee and then being repulsed by the Indians. Gall and a group of warriors rode up this coulee to attack Battle Ridge near Calhoun Hill.

Calhoun Hill overlooks Deep Coulee and is the southern end of Battle Ridge. This is the location that Lieutenant Calhoun and Company L were overrun and killed by Gall and Crazy Horse.

Battle Ridge is a half-mile long ridge that is bordered by Custer Hill on the north and Calhoun Hill on the south. This us where most of the Custer Battalion fought and died. Crazy Horse is believed to have rallied a group of warriors in the village, crossed the river and then swept down Battle Ridge from Custer Hill to Calhoun Hill, killing everyone in his path.

Deep Ravine is also sometimes called North Medicine Tail Coulee by some researchers. It is located near the end of the slope that runs from Custer Hill west to the LBHR. This line is sometimes referred to as the South Skirmish Line, although there is little or no evidence of any major fighting. Indian stories hint at an attempt by a company-sized force attempting to break-out from Custer Hill/Battle Ridge. Testimony by soldiers burying their dead two days later state that 28 men of Company E were buried in a mass grave at a point some 2,000 feet from Custer Hill, near the end of Deep Ravine. These bodies have never been recovered.

Custer Hill, this is the northern part of Battle Ridge and is the location where the body of Custer and 40 of his men were found. The location is currently marked a monument erected in 1881 and bearing the names of all the officers and enlisted killed in the battle stands on top of the hill. The graveyard of Custer and his men was actually relocated to their present positions when the monument was erected.

dragoon500ly

12-18-2010, 11:32 AM

In 1870, the army's Ordnance Department held field trials of various rifles and carbines to replace the mismash of Civil War relics that armed the troops. The army sought a weapon that was reliable and used a single-shot system rather than the newer repeaters due to manufacturing cost. The initial ninety entrys from such makers Elliott, Freeman, Mauser, Peabody and Spencer were narrowed down to four: The Remington rolling block; the sliding breech block Sharps; the trapdoor Springfield and the bolt-action Ward Burton. The final selection was made by the 1872 board presided by General Alfred Terry and including Major Marcus Reno as a member. The board's decision was announced on May 5,1873 by the secretary of war.

The Model 1873 Springfield Carbine in .45/55 caliber was the winner. It was a single-shot, breech-loading carbine that measured 41.3 inches in length and weighed 6.9 pounds. Its .45-caliber cartridge used a copper-case loaded with 55 grains of black powder and an effective range of 300 yards and a maximum range of 1,000 yards. A properly trained cavalryman could fire his carbine at 15 rounds per minute. The Seventh was issued the M1873 prior to the 1874 Black Hills Expedition. The Springfield would remain the basic weapon of the army until its replacement by the Krag-Jorgensen magazine rifle in 1892.

The troopers were also issued the Model P 1872 Colt single-action revolver which was chosen because of its simpler operation, stronger parts and reliability. This .45-caliber weapon had a 7.5-inch barrel, fired six metallic cartridges loaded with 28 grains of black powder and had an effective range of 60 yards.

At the Battle of the Little Big Horn, the troopers of the Seventh were issued 100 rounds of carbine ammunition, half carried in their saddle bags and half carried in issue ammo boxes holding 28 rounds or in the new "prairie belts" that held 50 rounds (the prairie belt was a leather belt with leather thimble loops sewed on). A disadvantage of the prairie belt was the interaction of the chemicals used in the tanning process interacting with the copper cases, resulting in deposits on the cartridge. The trooper was also issued 24 rounds for his revolver, six in the weapon and 18 carried in a small pouch on his belt.

Contrary to Hollywood/TV, the frontier trooper did not carry his issue saber into the field. The saber was a heavy, cumbersome and noisy weapon that was merely an ornament for the parade field. Only one officer, 1st Lt Charles DeRudio, who had served as a cavalryman in Europe, carried his saber into LBH.

In the years since 1876, there has been a stream of debates about the malfunctions of the Springfield carbine. The primary cause was the use of copper cases, combined with a defective extractor mechanism and simple dirt, could cause the base of the cartridge to be torn away when the block was opened. This would leave the body of the cartridge stuck inside the firing chamber, requiring the use of a pocket knife or horseshoe nail to pry the cylinder out prior to reloading and firing. While this is a known problem, just how bad was this defect at LBH?

The best source is the 1983-1986 archaelogical survey conducted by Dr. Richard A. Fox . A study of recovered .44/55-caliber cartridge casings confirmed that very few displayed evidence of pry or scratch marks. On the Custer portion of the battlefield only 3 of 88 casings showed any evidence of pry marks. On the Reno-Benteen Defense Site, out of 257 casings, only 7 showed evidence of prying. Based on this sample, it appears that malfunction caused by the carbines jamming was, at best, minimal and therefore cannot be considered to be a factor in the defeat.

There is another possibility in that the men simply ran out of carbine ammunition, Each trooper only carried 50 rounds in his cartridge belt. The additional 50 rounds in his saddle bags were lost when the Indians stampeded the horses. Fifty rounds fired in the heat of battle could be expended in a very short period of time. The Colt revolvers, with their 24 rounds of ammo, would not have lasted long.

Remember that Custer dispatched an urgent message to the pack train asking that the regimental ammo reserve be brought forward. There is a possibility that rather than jamming carbines, the real cause of Custer's defeat is that his men simply ran out of ammunition.

This would also explain why Custer's command was strung out along Battle Ridge instead of being formed into a compact defensive position. The companies to the south, may have been trying to hold open a corridor for the pack train and the ammunition reserve.

dragoon500ly

12-18-2010, 05:21 PM

One of the enduring myths of LBH is that the Indians were armed with Winchester rifles and that this allowed them to overwhelm Custer's Battalion under the sheer weight of their firepower. At LBH the Indians were armed with weapons ranging from warclubs, bows and arrows, lances, knives, tomahawks and a wide array of old and new firearms. The Indians obtained their firearms through a variety of means ranging from trade, gun running, capture from enemies, or issued by the US government for hunting purposes.

The archaeological excavations of the battlefield, starting in 1983 recovered cartridge casings from 45 different makes of firearms used by 371 different individuals. This evidence confirms that the Indians were in possession of Spencers, Sharps, Smith & Wessens, Evans, Forehand & Wadworths, Remingtons, Henrys, Starrs, Winchesters, Maynards and Enfields, as well as Springfields and Colts captured from the cavalry.

An intresting view on the weapons used by the Indians came from the last survivor of the battle, Private Charles Windolph, a Medal of Honor winner with Company H. Windolph stated that at least half of of the Indians were armed with bows and arrows, another quarter were armed with old muzzleloaders and single-hot rifles, and the remainder were armed with repeaters.

Major Marcus Reno stated in his Court of Inquiry that "the Indians had Winchester rifles and the column made a large target for them and they were pumping bullets into it." The Winchester was THE weapon of choice of the Indians whenever they could get get their hands on it.

The Winchester Model 1866 fired a .44-caliber, 200-grain bullet with 28 grains of black powder. It had a magazine capacity of seventeen rounds and had an effective range of 100 yards and a maximum range of about 400 yards. Its main advantage was its high rate of fire of 34rpm, compared to the 17rpm of the Springfield.

Indian tactics called for the warriors to remain hidden a safe distance away while they fired an endless barrage of arrows at the cavalrymen. Add to the arrow barrage the favored Indian tactic of infiltrating as close as possible to the cavalry and then using the awesome short range firepower of the Winchester...this allowed them to acheive complete fire-superiority over the cavalry.

Abbott Shaull

12-18-2010, 05:30 PM

Wow. They only had 100 carbine rounds and 24 pistol rounds.

Yeah I would say it probably more lack of resupply of ammo, in combination with some reckless tactics, and some disregard of orders (depending on how you look at it). It kinda like reading one of those Second from disaster shows. Not one thing in particular may have led to a lost battle, but enough incidents happen during a timeline that led to failure.

I do find it interesting that Major Reno wasn't court martial afterwards, but considering how many Officers in the Army felt about GAC. There were many who felt he only got to his position by luck and hadn't really earned his way to position he held in the war and lack the experience of the post Civil War Army that held too.

On a side note, same Lt. Colonel GAC, seems to have been suspended from command of the said regiment, and was court martial for being AWOL due to the fact he went to see his wife.

copeab

12-18-2010, 05:40 PM

Wow. They only had 100 carbine rounds and 24 pistol rounds.

100 rounds per rifle wasn't far off "official issue" numbers in WWII.

mikeo80

12-18-2010, 05:44 PM

What I find the most unusual tale of June 26, 1876, is the note sent by GAC via Pvt John Martin to Captain Benteen.

GAC commanded 5 companies of the 7th Cav
Reno commanded 3
Benteen commanded 3
One company was with the pack train.

WHAT IF.....

Benteen had not been ordered by GAC to scout the left flank, instead stay with Reno, and the pack train to form a more compact unit.

Could the 7 Companies do more than the 5 with Custer?

Hard to tell. Reno and Benteen fought for 2 days once reunited until reinforced by Terry. Probably would have made no difference on "Last Stand Hill"...But one of those little "what if's" of history

mikeo80

12-18-2010, 05:49 PM

Wow. They only had 100 carbine rounds and 24 pistol rounds.

I do find it interesting that Major Reno wasn't court martial afterwards, but considering how many Officers in the Army felt about GAC. There were many who felt he only got to his position by luck and hadn't really earned his way to position he held in the war and lack the experience of the post Civil War Army that held too.

Major Reno was court martialed for "improper advancements on a fellow officer's wife" in 1877.

What the press did to him is very familiar to what happens today if a military officer "gets out of line".

dragoon500ly

12-18-2010, 05:51 PM

When you look at the available ammo loadout, you need to consider the means of transport. The typical cavalry mount has a useful load of 240 pounds. Attached is a list of equipment to be carried by a trooper for a five day patrol.

Halter: 2lbs 1oz
Watering Bridle: 1lb, 1.5oz
Bridle: 2lbs 13oz
Saddle: 14lbs 13.5oz
Saddle Bags: 2lbs 2oz
Filling of near side pouch of saddle bags,
10lbs of rations with meat in the can: 11lbs 2 oz
Filling of off side pouch of saddle bags,
1pr socks, 1 pr drawers, 2 shirts, 40rds carbine ammo, toilet articles: 7lbs 8
oz
Forage Sack with 15lbs of oats: 15lbs 6oz
Lariat and pin: 3lbs 1.5oz
Overcoat: 4lbs 6.5oz
Brush and shoe pouch: 1lb
Near-side pocket, curry comb and brush: 1lb
Off-side pocket, 2 horseshoes, 15 shoe nails: 2lbs
Saddle cover: 1lb
Surcingle: 11.5oz
Saber & slings: 4lbs 13oz
Waist belt and plate: 1lb
Pistol and holster: 3lbs 2oz
Carbine sling and swivel: 10lbs 4 oz
Carbine cartridge box: 1lb
24rds carbine ammo in box: 2lbs
Pistol cartridge pouch: 4oz
12rds pistol ammo in pouch: 14oz
Man: 140lbs

Total weight: 240lbs 12.5oz

As you can see, there is not a lot of room for extra gear, this is perhaps the major reason why the saber was left in garrision, that 4lbs and 13oz translates allowed for extra carbine/pistol ammo.

dragoon500ly

12-18-2010, 06:04 PM

I do find it interesting that Major Reno wasn't court martial afterwards, but considering how many Officers in the Army felt about GAC. There were many who felt he only got to his position by luck and hadn't really earned his way to position he held in the war and lack the experience of the post Civil War Army that held too.

Reno called for and was granted a Court of Inquiry, this court was little more than a dog-and-pony show, carried out by career military officers who wanted nothing more than to white-wash the entire LBH episode. Aided by the effort by the Seventh's remaining officers to avoid disgrace the unit. Their stories differed from reports made at the time, the only testimony against Reno was made by several of the civilian packers whose testimony was dismissed.

The finding of the court was as follows: "The conduct of the officers throughout was excellent, and while subordinates, in some instances, did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires animadversion (criticism or censure) from this Court."

It was later discovered that one of the Courts officers Colonel Wesley Merritt had "closeted with the Recorder alone for several hours, and, it is understood, did most of the work of the decision, the Recorder having no voice save to present the case on trial."

Merritt had hated Custer since their days in the Cavalry Division of the Army of the Potomac and there was little doubt among the handful of Custer supporters that he had taken full advantage to blacken the name of his old rival.

dragoon500ly

12-18-2010, 06:08 PM

WHAT IF.....

Benteen had not been ordered by GAC to scout the left flank, instead stay with Reno, and the pack train to form a more compact unit.

Could the 7 Companies do more than the 5 with Custer?

Hard to tell. Reno and Benteen fought for 2 days once reunited until reinforced by Terry. Probably would have made no difference on "Last Stand Hill"...But one of those little "what if's" of history

A more intresting "what if" is if Major Reno had not been present. In this case Benteen would have had the command of the valley fight. While everyone notes that Benteen hated Custer, nobody disputes Benteen's willigness to fight. Would he have paused halfway down the valley and go on the defensive? Or would he have driven his charge home and completed the scatter of the Indians?

weswood

12-18-2010, 07:05 PM

Were theCompanies broken down further as we know them today into plattoons & squads?

Abbott Shaull

12-18-2010, 11:04 PM

Were theCompanies broken down further as we know them today into plattoons & squads?

Wouldn't know. During the Civil War a Infantry Company was divided into two platoons. There really wasn't such a thing as squads if I remember the organization. It was more or less ad hoc below. One has to remember tactics still weren't much more advance in lining the companies in lines of two, hence two platoons and then fire at each other....

Abbott Shaull

12-18-2010, 11:14 PM

dragoon500ly

12-19-2010, 07:27 AM

Were theCompanies broken down further as we know them today into plattoons & squads?

In 1874, the US Army adopted a new tactics manual, authored by Emory Upton. Prior to this time, each regiment generally used thier own, unique version, based on their colonel's experience. The Upton manual did away with this and brought the army a common system of drill. Another advantage of the Upton manual is that it took into account the increasing use of the breech-loading and repeating carbines.

As part of this change, Upton introduced the "set of fours" as the basic tactical unit. Also referred to as a squad, the set of fours allowed for simplified operations, increased speed, and eliminated cumbersome maneuvers.

Platoons, at least as we know them today, did not exist. If a smaller unit was needed, then the company was split into two even parts and these were called platoons. The company would often be split into platoons for the dismounted skirmish role, since Upton called for each company to maintain a small reserve. One platoon skirmished while the other platoon stood ready to reinforce the skirmish line, restock ammo, or mount charges to restore the line.

Skirmish tactics called for the cavalry to fight dismounted and deployed in a line with every 4th trooper acting as horse-holder for the rest of the set of fours. Skirmishers deployed with 5 yards between each trooper and 15 yards between each set of fours. The commander could order a wider or closer interval, depending on the situation.

When ordered to engage, the odd-numbered men would fire first and start reloading, then the even-numbered men would fire and reload, this would continue until the command to cease fire was given. Dismounted skirmishers would stand or kneel to fire as they thought best, they could even seek cover, but not at the expense of firepower. The skirmish line could deliver direct or oblique fire as needed.

Within the battalion organization, "wings" could be used, at the commander's discreation. The companies would be organized according to their commander's seniority. The Custer battalion, based on Indian testimony, operated in two wings. The Right Wing consisted of Companies C, I and L, with Captain Myles Keogh commanding. The Left Wing consisted of Companies E and F with Captain George Yates commanding.

Just as a note, some authors group the wings differently, and even split up one company to bring the wings "up to equal strength". The Upton manual, allows for wings of different sizes and a company would never be broken up this manner.

dragoon500ly

12-19-2010, 07:36 AM

Looking at the numbers that are present per company, the Cavalry had two Platoons. The thing is they had 5 Sergeants after the company First Sergeant. Usually the 1st Lt commanded the 1st Platoon and the 2nd Lt commanded the 2nd Platoon. The senior Sergeant was usually teamed with 2nd Lt platoon and the next senior would be with the First Lt platoon. If IIRC the Corporals would at time act more like E-5 of today Squad Leaders.

The command structure called for the Captain to command the company and the 1st and 2nd Lieutenants to act as file-closers and supervise the skirmish fight. The sergeants and corporals also acted as file closers and directed the fire of individual sets of fours. Don't forget the the platoon of the 1870s was never considered to be a tactical unit by itself, it was a temporary spliting of the company based on the situation.

As a sidebar, of the 43 officer positions authorized the Seventh, 15 officers were either detached for service or on leave of absence.

dragoon500ly

12-19-2010, 07:49 AM

"The soldiers were a superb lot of men physically. The outdoor life had developed them into perfect specimens of vigorous manhood. The soldiers, injured to many years of hardship, were the perfection of physical manhood. Their brawny limbs and lithe, well-poised bodies gave proof of the training their outdoor life had given."

But enough about me. :p

Elizabeth "Libby" Custer wrote this description of the men of the Seventh in her autobiography in 1913. But the question remains, just what sort of men made up the Seventh? They have been demonized as drunken rapists and murderers, as elite soldiers in the finest regiment, as raw recruits thrown into battle with little or no training and slaughtered on the alter of "manifest destiny".

Historical records give names, birth places, locations of enlistment, age, height and a rough description of hair color, eye color and complexion. We therefore have an idea how old they said they were and how tall. From army regulations, medical reports and personal recollections it is possible to build up a physical profile.

Taken as a group, the Seventh Cavalry was composed of career military men. As Snow and Fitzpatrick say in their work "They are, after all, a fairly typical sample of US Cavalry troopers of the Indian-fighting Army, who, along with the Indian, the Mountain Man, the Cowboy, the Outlaw, the Lawman and other subspecies of the Westerner, form the cast of the longest-running morality play in American history, The Winning of the West."

dragoon500ly

12-19-2010, 08:10 AM

In order to join the Army in the 1870s, the recruit presented himself to a recruiting depot; located in many of the larger cities. He would provide two recommendations, in written form, attesting to his fine character. The recruiting officer would then take the recruit and have him examined by a military surgeon to determine his fitness for service.

The physical exam was always conducted by a surgeon who followed written regulations concerning the inspection and acceptability of the recruit. However, the surgeon was caught on the horns of a dilemma. The surgeon was charged with insuring the selection of thebest quality men, while, on the other hand, having to please the recruiting officer, who was more concerned with numbers and quotas than of quality. Deja vu anyone?

The regulations for recruit exams had not changed very much since the 1850s. The recruit was to be examined individually during daylight hours in a well-lighted room. The sober recruit was to enter the room stripped (if dirty, he was to be bathed before entering the exam room), where he would walk briskly around several times. He would then hop around the room, first on one foot and then on the other. After this, the surgeon placed his hand on the recruit's chest and checked for an abnormal heartbeat (the stethoscope was a new instrument in the 1870s and not widely used).

The recruit was then made to stand at attention while the surgeon examined his head, eyes, ears, mouth and nose. The surgeon looked for abnormalities such as fractures, depressions, diseases, deafness, unintelligible speech and poor eyesight. The recruit then stretched out his arms at right angles to his body and then touched his shoulders with his hands; placed his hands together over his head and then turned his head and coughed while the surgeon checked for hernia.

The surgeon checked the fingers and thumbs for their dexterity. He would also check the chest capacity and looked over the recruit's legs to determine if they were sturdy and could carry the man's weight. Finally, the recruit would bend over and grab his buttocks while the surgeon checked for piles or hemorroids. Hemorroids were cause for rejection but not outright rejection. If there was more than one old pile and it waslarger than a marble, or if one old pile was ulcerated, or if one pile, was associated with a varicose vein, then the recruit was rejected.

The surgeon also checked vision for myopia, although recruits with sight defects were acceptable. Hearing was examined for deafness, which was cause for rejection. Among the other causes for rejection were atrophied testicles and extreme bowed legs (ironic since the recruits would be spending long days in the saddle).

After passing the exam, the recruit was found fit for service, sworn in, placed in uniform and then sent for three months training before joining his regiment. For soldiers heading west this was Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, Missouri. Recruits received, at best, a brief introduction to army life at the recruit barracks. Most training was limited to close-order drill. When the recruit arrived at his post, the regiment and company provided his real training, mostly by on-the-job training.

dragoon500ly

12-19-2010, 08:24 AM

During the 1870s, the Army had several different minumum ages for enlistment. In 1874 this was 16. Recruits aged between 16 and 18 were limited to musician positions and recruits aged between 18 and 21 needed parental or guardian consent. The normal minimum age was 21.

The reason for establishing a minimum age was twofold. First was the concern that the ability of youths to provide adequate service while also enduring the physical hardships that military life entailed. Second, and a more humanitarian one, was for the youth's growth and developmental well-being. During the mid 1800s there was a belief that overwork, including military life, drained the energy required for normal development, stunting growth and leading to smaller, deformed adults.

The maximum age for a first enlistment was more rigid than the minimum age. It was 30 years old for the cavalry. Once a man enlisted, reenlistments could occur well past the age of thirty. The US Army at this time did not have a mandatory retirement age.

Research into the records of the members of the Seventh shows some intresting numbers. The average age of a trooper was 25.6 years and the median age, which is less affected by extreme ages was 24. The typical trooper would have been full-grown and in the bloom of his early adulthood, well capable of bearing the strain of military life.

The following table shows a the enlistment ages of the Seventh

17 = 1
18 = 8
19 = 7
20 = 8
21 = 193
22 = 96
23 = 59
24 = 53
25 = 38
26 = 65
27 = 72
28 = 47
29 = 36
30 = 31
31 = 18
32 = 15
33 = 23
34 = 15
35 = 14
36 = 8
37 = 8
38 = 1
39 = 5
40 = 6
41 = 1
42 = 1
43 = 1
44 = 2
45 = 5
46 = 1
48 = 1
49 = 1

Legbreaker

12-19-2010, 08:31 AM

Abbott Shaull

12-19-2010, 09:04 AM

I think it's worth noting that in Vietnam where the Australians were issued with L1A1 SLR rifles, "first line" ammunition load was just 60 rounds of 7.62N, 200 rounds of 5.56N (for those handful who found themselves with an M16) and 600 rounds belted for the M60s.

The US Cavalry with their 100 and 24 were much better supplied when you think about it.
Yeah, but coming from a time in which you would have at min over twice as much 5.56N rounds.

Then again we didn't have supply trains following us everywhere in the field...

Grimace

12-19-2010, 11:24 AM

While a very small portion of the information is likely incorrect (as time changes so much in history, it seems) this is a very good display of the information for the Battle of Little Big Horn.

Two years ago I made the trip to the Battle of Little Big Horn. If you guys ever get a chance, it's a rather sombering place to visit that really drives home what these guys in the 7th Cavalry experienced. Seeing the grave markers placed where (supposedly) each man fell, the white stone with the individual name on it standing out against the golden wild grass of the hills, it really gives you an idea of not only where they were, but what they were up against. I can also say, based on the chase-kills and surrounded death-pockets where the men died, there was well more than a thousand indians. Five to 1 odds would be something that the cavalry would have handled better. 10 or 20 to 1 would certianly cause the panic, the desperation, and the last ditch attempts to survive on terrain that offered no real place to hide or escape.

It's a whole different experience when you put yourself into the battle and see what they saw. Very enlightening, yet very sombering.

Punkpogoer

12-19-2010, 11:54 AM

Have any of you been to the LBH battle site? I've been there, very interesting stuff. Of course they take you on the tour and give you the "official" story, but you can gather quite a bit from just wondering around the place. I've not done an indepth study like dragoon500ly has here, but from my experience of touring the site I would have to make the assumption that Custer was an incompetent.

dragoon500ly

12-19-2010, 04:22 PM

The sad thing about LBH is not that Custer was an idiot. Custer had been fighting Indians off and on since 1867. He was regarded as being an advocate of the Indians, and had earned their respect as a warrior.

There is no doubt that Custer failed to believe his scouts about the true size of the villages in the valley. In accordance to his instructions from Terry and his on instincts as a fighter, he decided to attack. In all fairness, throughout the entire history of the Indian Wars (1866-1891) whenever any army column attacked an Indian village, the Indians broke and ran, except for this one time at LBH. Custer went into battle expecting to win, Indian testimony shows that he maneuvered his battalion to support Reno. But when Reno broke and routed out of the valley, then the Indians were able to focus on Custer and his battalion. The very layout of the slaughtered cavalrymen shows that Custer expected Benteen to bring up his squadron and the pack train with its ammo reserve.

From Custer Hill, down Battle Ridge and Calhoun Hill, the positions of the fallen speak of an attempt to hold a line to allow reinforcements and resupply to join Custer. When the Indians managed to overwhelm the cavalry on Calhoun Hill and then start rolling up the line towards Custer Hill, then the cavalry men, on foot, running out of ammo, and demoralized by the sudden turn of events, started running for safety. At some point, a company of cavalry made an attack down Deep Ravine trying to make for the river only to be stopped and cut-down.

The more I research LBH, the more I shift through the Court of Inquiry documents, the reports filed after the battle, the more I get the sense of an effort to white-wash the whole affair, to blame the dead for the failure and to release the living from any sense of responsability.

No, Custer was not an idiot, seeking glory on a battlefield, if any officer every deserved that title, then it would be Captain Fetterman. Was Custer perfect, by no means is this so. Did he make mistakes, certainly, but no more than any other cavalry officer serving in the West.

dragoon500ly

12-20-2010, 06:52 AM

This is the makeup of the Terry Column on May 18, 1876:

The fighting element
7th Cavalry: 28 officers, 747 enlisted
2 companies, 17th Infantry & 1 company, 6th Infantry:
8 officers, 135 enlisted
1 section of Gatling Guns (drawn from 20th Infantry):
2 officers, 32 enlisted, 3 .50-caliber Gatlings
45 Indian Scouts

The supply train
114 six-mule teams, 37 two-horse teams, 70 other wagons and 85 pack mules with 179 civilian packers.

dragoon500ly

12-20-2010, 07:18 AM

The Terry Column had joined with the Gibbon Column at the mouth of the Rosebud River. An officer's call was held to plan the next course of action.

The current situation was this: General Terry knew of the presence of General Crook's column, but did not know just where Crook was presently operating. The operations of Gibbon's Montana Column and Terry's Dakota Column could only be coordinated in the most general way. At the conference, Terry was very doubtful of the ability of the two columns to assist each other in case of contact with the hostile Indians. Terry ended a dispatch to General Sheridan with the words; "I only hope that one of the two columns will find the Indians. I go personally with Gibbon..."

It was believed that the Indians were encamped at the head of the Rosebud River or on the Little Big Horn River, a divide of only 15-20 miles of ridges separating the two. Terry decided that Custer would strike the blow. This was a disappointment to Gibbon and his column, elements of which had been in the field since February 22nd, monitoring the movements of the Indians until the three columns could get into position to attack.

Terry's reasons for selecting the Seventh for the honor of the attack were good ones. The Seventh was all cavalry and could pursue the Indians if the attempted to escape while Gibbon's column was half infantry and in the rapid approach march to the Indian camp, could become separated. The Seventh was the numerically stronger than Gibbon's column and Terry made the decision that the strongest unit should strike.

The most recent report from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in regard to the number of hostiles absent from the agencies, estimated a figure of not more than 1,500 warriors. Custer stated at the conference that this figure was not correct and that there probably three times that number. The conference broke-up around sundown and Custer followed Terry to his tent where the two spent some time in converstation.

Officer's call brought his subordinates to Custer's tent. Orders were given to prepare the pack mules (there were 12 assigned to each troop) in the morning with 15 days rations of bard bread, coffee and sugar and 12 days rations of bacon. Twelve of the strongest mules were to carry the 24,000 rounds of the regiment's reserve ammo. Each trooper was to be issued 100 rounds of carbine ammo and 24 rounds of pistol ammo. For every horse, 12 pounds of oats were to be carried, with care to ration it after lengthy marches. Custer also suggested that extra forage might come in handy, but the troop commanders foresaw difficulties in packing the extra forage. "Well gentlemen," Custer replied, "you may carry what supplies you please; you will be held responsible for your companies. The extra forage was only a suggestion, but this fact bear in mind, we will follow the trail for 15 days unless we catch them before that time expires, no matter how far it takes us from our base of supplies. We may not see the supply steamer again. You had better carry along an extra supply of salt, we may have to live on horse meat before we get through."

While the troopers made their preparations, Custer was accosted by Major James Brisbin, Gibbon's second in command. Brisbin offered Custer four troops of the 2nd Cavalry, but Custer declined. Stating, "The 7th can handle anything it meets." An plea was made by Lieutenant Low to take all or part of his Gatling detachement was also refused, on the grounds that the cumbersome guns, pulled by condemned horses might impede the 7th's march.

dragoon500ly

12-20-2010, 07:38 AM

By mid-morning of July 22nd, 1876, the Seventh was ready for its 15 day planned march. Custer received Terry's written orders. The instructions wer implicit and fixed the location of the hostiles. This is the order:

Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory
June 22, 1876

Lieutenant Colonel Custer
7th Cavalry

Colonel,

The Brigadier General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken leads. Should it be found, as it appears almost certain that it will be found,to turn towards the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn towards the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course, its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.

The Department commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should throughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's column, with information of that result of your examination. The lower part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon's command. The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks if the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you to report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the mean time you receive further orders.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant

E.W. Smith, Captain 18th Infantry
Acting Assistant Adjutant General

Legbreaker

12-20-2010, 08:04 AM

"Condemned horses" to pull the gatlings?
Does this mean they were no longer suitable for riding?

bobcat

12-20-2010, 09:38 AM

Abbott Shaull

12-20-2010, 01:54 PM

Yeah that is one things we don't realize when we look back in history. The modern Fire Team, Squad, Platoon, and Battalion organization that we take for granted today weren't used as they are today. Even in today standards Regiment and Battalion are used to mean the same thing.

Many of times when Battalions were mention it was just a collection of Companies being lead by either the senior Company Commander or one of the staff officers from Regiment with whatever resource the Regiment Commander would offer for support.

Yes 1st Lt, 2nd Lt, and many of the NCOs were there to make sure that troops on the firing line followed orders.

Also it wasn't uncommon for Officers in the various regiments to be seconded for other duties leaving most Regiments short of their TO&E for Officers. There was full Colonel listed as member of the Regiment, but it seems for most of the 7th Cavalry existence that Lt Colonel Custer was "acting" commander something that I hadn't known. That was even doing a report on the battle back in school. Then again there wasn't this thing called the internet to find all of this information either...

dragoon500ly

12-20-2010, 02:09 PM

"Condemned horses" to pull the gatlings?
Does this mean they were no longer suitable for riding?

overaged, injured or otherwise unsuitable for riding.

dragoon500ly

12-20-2010, 02:14 PM

i completely agree. these brave riders where screwed as soon as they stepped out. one can argue weapons and tactics all day long but at those odds, even if they could have carried twice as much ammo. they would have been slaughtered. the purest sign of how overwhelmed they were is the fact they resorted to killing their mounts to use as cover. something everyone under a stetson knows is only done when you know you not coming out alive.

One of intresting things about LBH is that there is very little reference to the cavalry shooting their mounts and using them as breastworks with the exception of a dozen or so mounts on Custer Hill.

The Upton manual stresses that the horses were to be pulled back behind cover, this distance was to be anywhere from 50-200 yards behind the skirmish line.

There is a lot of reference to horses having been shot during the course of the battle, but Indian oral tradition has always held that the mounts were shot in the course of the battle or were stampeded by various warriors.

dragoon500ly

12-20-2010, 02:18 PM

Abbott Shaull

12-20-2010, 02:51 PM

LOL, internet is a wonderful thing, but I got always get more satisfaction from a good book, I've been collecting manuals and books on various topics since I was 13. My wife keeps threatening to open a library just to get the books out of the house!

Yeah I understand what you mean. I wish I had all the book that I have purchased on military history. I don't know where they would all go, but it would be nice to have the entire collection on hand. One thing with these new eBook have over the physical book is that your collection is condense, on the other hand sometimes the physical page is better to show too...lol

I remember 20 years ago how computers were suppose to turn us into paperless society. In reality it has only made it where it uses more paper, because everyone has to have their own hard copy of things. Maybe eBooks trend will help some of that out, and you don't have to load box after box of often heavy books when you move too.

Abbott Shaull

12-20-2010, 02:56 PM

One of intresting things about LBH is that there is very little reference to the cavalry shooting their mounts and using them as breastworks with the exception of a dozen or so mounts on Custer Hill.

The Upton manual stresses that the horses were to be pulled back behind cover, this distance was to be anywhere from 50-200 yards behind the skirmish line.

There is a lot of reference to horses having been shot during the course of the battle, but Indian oral tradition has always held that the mounts were shot in the course of the battle or were stampeded by various warriors.

That was one of the things that I always found discouraging when I was doing my report back in grade school. This was back like 1979 or 1980 time frame, that one book would say that horse were shot and used as improvised breast-works with drawing to that effect. While others made reference to the oral history that they were chased away...

I guess in many ways the little things that added up to Custer defeat there as add to the legend and myths that persist to this day of what happen there.

Grimace

12-21-2010, 12:24 AM

that one book would say that horse were shot and used as improvised breast-works with drawing to that effect. While others made reference to the oral history that they were chased away...

Or, the more likely situation, there was some of each. All those men means there were a lot of horses as well. Some may have been run off, others may have been kept, shot by indians (though that would be somewhat doubtful that they would do such a thing on purpose...the Indians treasured horses) or killed by desperate cavalryman who wanted some sort of cover when they realized they were literally surrounded by indians and their fellow troopers were dying all around them.

Being at the battle site showed very plainly that there was NO cover for Custer's men. The trees that are within a mile of the place where Custer fell are all probably only 40-60 years old. So those trees weren't even there during the battle and they were only in a location where Benteen could have used them had they existed at the time. Where Custer was...no trees. Simple, exposed hillside.

dragoon500ly

12-21-2010, 05:06 AM

Or, the more likely situation, there was some of each. All those men means there were a lot of horses as well. Some may have been run off, others may have been kept, shot by indians (though that would be somewhat doubtful that they would do such a thing on purpose...the Indians treasured horses) or killed by desperate cavalryman who wanted some sort of cover when they realized they were literally surrounded by indians and their fellow troopers were dying all around them.

Being at the battle site showed very plainly that there was NO cover for Custer's men. The trees that are within a mile of the place where Custer fell are all probably only 40-60 years old. So those trees weren't even there during the battle and they were only in a location where Benteen could have used them had they existed at the time. Where Custer was...no trees. Simple, exposed hillside.

It all comes back to the Upton manual, the cavalry were taught to fight as dismounted skirmishers, and while a trooper was allowed to take cover, this was only if it did not interfere with the skirmish line. There are a lot of references to the troopers actually being discouraged from seeking cover.

Photos of the battlefield taken in 1878-79 confirm that there was very few trees, mostly in the ravines and along the LBHR. There was some sage and lots of tall grass. One of the intresting things about the battlefield is the somewhat gentle slopes of some of the key areas. For example, there is a low ridge facing Battle Ridge that is known as Henryville (the Fox dig found over 100 Henry/Winchester casings here). You can walk up the slope to a point where you can still stand erect and be in a position to see the cavalry positions along Battle Ridge. Take another couple of steps and you can whip up your rifle, fire a couple of rounds and then step back into safety. And this is one of four locations within easy rifle shot (150-300 yards) of the cavalry positions.

Dr. Fox has a rather intresting theory of what is called bunching. The tactical manual required the file closers, i.e. the officers and ncos to remain standing in order to better direct fire of the kneeling skirmishers. As the Indian attacks became increasingly heavy, these key people were killed or wounded. The effect on the enlisted men would be to move closer to the remaining command structure. This would lead to gaps in the skirmish line that would be exploited by the Indians, who would take advantage to gett closer, kill more exposed troopers, force the remaining troopers to bunch closer and repeat the process over and over. The good doctor was trying to explain why several of the cavalry graves (the Custer bn was buried were they fell) are grouped together in rather small areas (Keogh and Custer areas). Its an intresting theory.

mikeo80

12-21-2010, 07:09 AM

I thought it might help to see where BLBH took place and the best know movements of the pricipals involved.

http://www.nps.gov/libi/planyourvisit/upload/LIBImap1.pdf

Hope this helps.

Mike

dragoon500ly

12-21-2010, 08:02 AM

Of the men of the Seventh, about 57% were born in the United States, remember those old classic John Ford cavalry movies with the old First Sergeant with a thick Irish accent?

Canada = 14
Denmark = 3
England = 40
France = 8
Germany =126
Ireland = 128
Italy = 6
Scotland = 12
Switzerland = 13
Other = 17

Connecticut = 8
Illinois = 17
Indiana = 23
Kentucky = 20
Maine = 13
Maryland = 15
Mass. = 45
Michigan = 8
Missouri = 8
New Hampshire = 7
New Jersey = 11
New York = 101
Ohio = 61
Penn. = 81
Other = 59

Immigrants were not confined to the lower ranks:

Captain Myles Keogh: Ireland
1st Ly Henry Nowlan: Corfu
1st Lt Charles DeRudio: Italy
1st Lt W.W. Cooke: Canada
1st Lt Donald McIntosh: Canada
1st Lt Henry Jackson: England
1st Lt Edward Mathey: England

Finally, a brief of mention of race. The Army of this period has a segregated one until the Korean War. The Seventh was a white regiment. Only two members were of other races. Civilian Interpreter Isaiah Dorman was African-American and married to a Santee Sioux woman, he was killed in the rout from the valley fight. First Lieutenant Donald McIntosh was of mixed ancestry, Scottish-Indian, he was a member of an old Canadian trading family.

dragoon500ly

12-21-2010, 08:43 AM

"There was Sergeant John McCaffery and Captain Donahue,They made us march and toe the mark, in gallant Company Q. Oh the drums would roll upon my soul, this is the style we'd go. Forty miles a day on beans and hay, in the Regular Army O."

Two New York vaudevillians sang this song in 1876, popularizing a song to which the Regulars themselves would add verses. But often public irreverence was a less pleasant affair. With the end of the Civil War, the beloved Boys in Blue had, once again, became hated mercenaries---an army that was dismissed by the New York Sun as "composed of bummers, loafers, and foreign paupers."

The Regular of 1876 was paid $13.00 a month in federal greenbacks that was often not accepted in the various frontier towns, to add insult to injury, the soldier would often have to "redeem" his paper money with coinage, and often had to pay a fee to do this. From his pay, the soldier would have deductions for such things as drawing too much clothing (especially if the issue boots wore out before they were due to be replaced) as well as the requirement to pay the company tailor at least once every three months, Charges for this service could range from $6.00 for altering a dress coat, $1.00 for alterations to the service blouse and $3.00 for letting out or taking in the seams of his pants. Ten dollars every three months was a high price when the soldier only earned $39.00 and many soldiers bitterly complained about why they had to pay the company tailor for work that the government had already paid the contractor for.

Typically, the soldier would receive very rudimentary training (little more than close-order drill) and his first issue of clothing at one of the recruit barracks and then was transferred to his post. Where he often shared a straw-filled mattress with his "bunkie". If he had enlisted in the infantry, he would serve three years, five years as a cavalryman, unless, of course, he deserted (about one third of those enlisted inbetween 1867 and 1891 deserted). If the trooper stayed, he faced isolation, wretched food, shoddy clothing and sometimes ferocious discipline. Enterainment might include bad whiskey and fornication with laundresses, Indian women or prostitutes.

The Regular's best hope of overcoming the Indian's superiority as a fighter lay in his steadiness and discipline. But his training in marksmanship, horsemanship and the other skills needed by a soldier was often neglected, mostly due to soldiers being kept busy as manual labor to build or sustain their posts.

The soldier might never see a hostile Indian, but when he did, he was always outnumbered. Congress limited the strength of the Army at 25,000 in 1874 and the Army usually numbered under 19,000. Much of this force was still serving on Resonstruction duty in the South. A German immigrant, a former Prussian military officer, had this to say about his fellow soldiers: "The handsome, finely organized cavalries of Europe know nothing of real hard cavalry work. For the work I have seen a squadron of United States Cavalry perform on the plains, German would send two regiment, and deem it hard service."

In spite of the fighting of the Indian Wars, Congress provided no moral support, in 1877, barely a year after the Little Big Horn, a appropriations dispute left the Army payless from June until November, even as soldiers died fighting in the Nez Perce War.

If the solder proved himself brave, he might receive the nation's only military decoration, the Medal of Honor (Thomas Custer, brother of George, was one of only a handful of men to win the Medal of Honor, twice). The only other acknowledgement of valor was the seldom adwarded Certificate of Merit. The Certificate was rarely adwarded because money was often tight and its recipients were paid an extra two dollars a month.

Hollywood often characterizes the soldier as little more than a brute, murdering and raping helpless Indians as part of the country's brutal drive westward. The reality was that the soldier often sympathized with the plight of the Indains and often married Indian women. If the trooper stayed in service after 1905, he could wear the Indian Campaigns Medal, forever marking him as a soldier on a vanished frontier.

dragoon500ly

12-21-2010, 08:59 AM

Each and every day of a trooper's day was carried out in a rigidly organized routine. Here is a typical "training roster".

5:45am Assembly for trumpeters
6:00am Reveille and roll call
6:30am Mess Call (breakfast)
7:30am Fatigue Call (work details)
8:00am Sick Call
8:55am Assembly of trumpeters
9:00am Assembly of Guard Detail
9:45am Recall from Fatigue Duties
10:00am Drill
11:30am Recall from Drill
11:45am First Sergeant's Call (for morning reports)
12:00pm Mess Call (lunch)
1:00pm Drill for target practise (Mon/Weds/Fri);
drill for saber practise (Tue/Thur)
2:00pm Fatigue Call
4:15pm Recall from Fatigue duties
4:30pm Stable Call (care for horses)
5:30pm Recall from stable
6:00pm Mess Call (dinner)
7:00pm Retreat and Roll Call
8:55pm Assembly for trumpeters
9:00pm Last Call
9:30pm Lights Out

You will note that there was daily weapons practise. This did not necessarily mean with ammunition since the Army only issued 90 rounds per man, per year. This would be firing drill, cleaning weapons or close-order drill with weapons.

dragoon500ly

12-21-2010, 09:17 AM

For the enlisted men there was a prescribed daily ration of 12oz of pork or bacon(20oz of salt or fresh beef could be substituted); 22oz of bread (if the post had a bread oven) or 16 ounces of hard bread (often called hard crackers; this was a simple flour and water biscuit measuring 3 1/8" by 2 7/8" by 1/2") substituted when the trooper was on field rations. In addition, the commissary would issue, each day, the following rations for 100 men: 8lbs of ground coffee; 15lbs of beans or peas; 10lbs of rice or hominy; 30lbs of potatoes; 1qt of molasses; 15lbs of sugar; 3lbs 12oz of salt; 4oz of pepper; 1 gallon of vinegar. In addition, each company was required to raise a garden in order to provide fresh vegetables for its men, but in the harsh Plains climate, these gardens often failed.

In garrison, the troopers endured countless rounds of hash, stews and salt meat, with very little variation. In the field, their ration was salt pork or bacon, hard crackers and coffee, sometimes with wild game added to the mix.

Officers, received the same basic ration of salt meat and bread as the troopers, they also received a monthly allowance of foodstuffs: 2 cans of peaches; 1 can of oysters; 1/2 can of jam; 1/2 can of jelly; 4 cans of tomatoes; 2 cans of corn; 1 can of peas; 2 cans of milk; 3lbs of soda crackers; 2 1/2lbs of mackerel; 1 1/2 lbs of dried beef; 2lbs Coffee; 2 1/2lbs of sperm candles; 1/4lb of officer's soap; 1/4 gallon maple syrup; 1 1/2lbs of dried peaches and 2lbs of lard.

Both officers and enlisted could supplement thier rations by purchasing supplies from the post sutler. The sutler enjoyed the sole monopoly for selling goods to the soldiers and often charged exorbitant prices, for example, a sutler could purchase a can of oysters for 29 cents and then retail it for $1.00, fruits in cans were higher priced.

Troopers could purchase items at the sutler on a credit system, to be redeemed on the next pay day. If a trooper was approaching his discharge date and owed the sutler money, the sutler could prevent the discharge from being completed, until the trooper had paid his bill, in full.

dragoon500ly

12-21-2010, 09:51 AM

Since the cavalryman was enlisted for a term of 5 years, he was entitled to be issued a basic issue of clothing and then yearly issues of clothing until the end of his service. Here is what the Quartermaster pawned of on its helpless victims!

The issue is given in the following format: 1st/2nd/3rd/4th/5th/total

Cap, Complete: 2/1/2/1/1/7
Hat with trimmings: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Fatigue forage caps: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Plume: 1/0/1/0/0/2
Eagle and Ring: 1/0/1/0/0/2
Cover: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Coat: 2/1/2/1/2/8
Trousers: 3/2/3/2/3/13
Flannel Shirt: 3/3/3/3/3/15
Flannel Drawers: 3/2/2/2/2/11
Bootees, pair: 2/2/2/2/2/10
Boots: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Stockings, pair: 4/4/4/4/4/20
Greatcoat: 1/0/0/0/0/1
Stable Frock: 1/0/1/0/0/2
Blanket: 1/0/1/0/0/2

Bootees were made of heavy leather, rough-side out, contained no grommets in the lace holes and had heavy rawhide laces. It was a ankle-high, square toe shoe that was issued to all enlisted men, regardless of branch. Both hand-sewn and pegged bootees were in service and they were disliked due to the clumsy shape of the heel. The heel was both flat and awakened and not very high. When a soldier was issued a pair of booteees he would usually go to a shoemaker, spend 75 cents of his pay and have the heels replaced with a smaller, higher heel.

An infantryman could make a pair of bootees last about two weeks on a march. A soldier who were a pair for more than six weeks was exceptional. A infantryman was issued 4 pairs of bootees a year but usually wore out eight. It was not uncommon for men to wear out their issue, draw another two pairs of bootees and then find themselves charged $6.00 for overdrawing clothing.

A boot ended just under the bend of the knee and behind the leg, arching higher up in front so that the leather protected the knee cap. A boot would typically measure 15 1/2 inches in back and 19 1/2 inches in front. The boot had a 1 1/2-inch cuban-style heel with a heavy arched insole as well as square toes. The tops were made of calf skin while the lowers were made of heavier leather.

Abbott Shaull

12-21-2010, 06:26 PM

Gee not much has change...lol...

dragoon500ly

12-22-2010, 06:57 AM

Gee not much has change...lol...

LOL, Quartermasters never change.

Of intrest is comparing the qualification rounds fired between then and now (okay 1987!!)

90 rounds a year back then...and 125 rounds in 1987.

dragoon500ly

12-22-2010, 07:36 AM

Compared to the Indians, a column of Regulars was a cumbersome and slow-moving thing. A typical Indian war party would consider a move of 40 miles to be, well, taking their time. The Indians would ride at a fast trot, switching from horse to horse so that their mounts didn't become fatigued.

While the cavalry was considered to the arm most likely to finally close with the Indians, having infantry included in the column was not considered to be a serious handicap; men could survive hardships better than horses and over long periods of time, the foot soldiers could outmarch the mounted solders at a respectable rate of 20 miles a day.

The largest handicap in bring large forces against the Indians was the sheer difficulty of keeping them adequately supplied. Traveling light and fast, was a strictly short-term measure, an officer once compared the usual expedition to a chained dog, "within the length of the chain irresistible, beyond it powerless. The chain was its wagon train and supplies."

Troop and supplies could be moved by railroads, where they existed. Steamers could move supplies up rivers to where the troops were, but only if the rivers and creeks were navigable. Normally, wagon trains or steamers, usually owned by civilians, stockpiled supplies. Wagons then shuttled between these depots and the field forces.

The supplies consumed were impressive. The daily ration for the soldier, weighed about 5lbs per man with its normal packing. Horses required 12lbs of grain daily. Reserve carbine ammunition weighed 105lbs per 1,000 round box. Terry's column alone required some eight tons of supplies each day. And although the Terry column only carried enough supplies to last until resupply by steamer, the supply train consisted of 1,604 horses and mules; even with the wagons rolling four abreast, it stretched out over a half mile.

While an infantry company needed one six-mule wagon to haul its supplies, each cavalry troop required three such wagons due to the forage needs since the cavalry mounts could not exist on grass, even when grass existed. Wagons were more fuel efficient than pack mules; a 6-mule wagon could carry a practical load of roughly a ton, the same 6 mules could carry only 1,200lbs when used as pack mules. Since a pack mule required 10lbs of grain for its own needs, it could eat all of its load in 20 days.

But Indians could go were the wagons could not and only be using pack mules could the Army have any hope of following them. Mule trains did not use the "Hollywood" mode of attaching the mule to the one in front, with a cursing trooper leading the whole string. A pack mule train consisted of 14 men assigned to every 50 mules, this included a pack master, his assistants, a blacksmith, and a cook. The mules were trained to graze within earshot of their bell horse, they simply followed the sound of the bell as they moved at a speed of about 5 miles an hour.

But this was a professional organized and experienced train. Terry later complained that since no such train had ever been organized in his department, the he was "necessarily dependent upon wagons." though he did take some 250 pack saddles along along with 95 pack mules, to be reinforced with mules from his wagons.

Once separated from the Terry Column, Custer's supply train number some 175 mules; including 12 per company; 12 carrying the reserve ammunition, 4 for the regimental headquarters staff, 2 for medical supplies, 2 to carry tools and camp gear and 11 for the use of the Indian Scouts, packers and civilians. So bad was the straggling of the mules, due to the speed of the march, that Custer finally detailed 1 NCO and 6 enlisted from every company to expedite their progress.

dragoon500ly

12-22-2010, 07:59 AM

dragoon500ly

12-22-2010, 08:22 AM

Marcus A. Reno.

A lot of debate surrounds Custer's second-in-command and his (mis)conduct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. His conduct after the battle also leads to questions about Reno's capability as an officer.

Reno graduated West Point in 1857, after taking six years to complete the five year program. He served as a brevet 2nd Lieutenant with the 1st Dragoons on the Washington and Oregon frontiers. He was promoted to 2nd Lieutenant in 1858, to 1st Lieutenant in April of 1861 and to Captain in November of 1862. He commanded a troop in the renamed 1st Cavalry in the 1862 Maryland campaign. He was injured in 1863 and served for a time on recruiting and staff duty and on the Army's Cavalry Bureau. He rejoined the Army of the Potomac in May 1864 and served as chief of staff of Sheridan's Cavalry Division, and later as colonel of the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry and then as commander of a cavalry brigade. By the end of the Civil War, his brevets included colonel of Regulars and brigadier general of volunteers.

He was promoted to major in the Seventh in December of 1868. Following the Battle of the Little Big Horn, His behavior as the acting commander of the Seventh became so bizarrely officious and obnoxious that on July 24, 1876, he was placed under arrest after a dispute with Colonel Gibbon. General Terry apparently considered relieving Reno as well, noting in his journey that "Reno's self important rudeness makes him unbearable." Considering Reno's performance and the outcome of the battle, it seems like this would be an odd time for self-important airs.

Reno was courts-martialed in 1877 for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen," including taking "improper and insulting liberties with a fellow officer's wife." Reno was found guilty and President Hayes commuted his sentence of dismissal from the service to two years suspension without pay.

During this period of suspension, Reno came under increasing attack by Libby Custer and several newspapers for his conduct at LBH. This led to him requesting a Court of Inquiry to clear his name just two days before the statutes of limitations on any possible charges expired. Five months later, a relucant War Department finally ordered the court convened.

The CoI was held at Chicago's Palmer House Hotel and was unable to subpoena the man who might have provided the most damaging testimony. Captain Thomas Weir had died less than six months after the battle "terribly used up with liquor". But the court did hear most of the surviving officers as well as a few enlisted men and civilians.

The three man panel, chaired by Colonel Wesley Merritt, concluded after four weeks of testimony that "While subordinates in some circumstances did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires animadversion from this Court." While it was not quite a verdict of "Not Proven", it was a decidely halfhearted "clearing" of Reno's name. Merritt was quoted as privately remarking; "Well, the officers wouldn't tell us anything, and we could do no more than damn Reno with faint praise."

Even Colonel Graham, relictant to believe that officers would deliberately perjure themselves, believed some had been "evasive" and all had been "more or less reluctant," answering only when specifally asked and volunteering no information. Yet the impression that the court was merely a white-wash was based not merely on the suspicions that the officers had closed ranks, but also on the reluctance of the Court to probe for the truth with questions. Furthermore, even the evidence actually heard could have justified a harsher verdict, given Reno's rout-like "charge" to the bluffs and his loss of command control during the Weir Point episode.

Certainly the Army, which never sought to try Reno on any charges related to the battle, had nothing to gain by reopening the wounds of LBH, especially since Reno, even if a court confirmed the worst suspicions of incompentence and cowardice, was due to rise to a colonelcy through seniority. There was also the honr of the Seventh to consider, as well as the reputations of its surviving officers. Captain Benteen, in spite of his lack of respect for Reno, later confessed that the court; "knew there was something kept back by me, but they didn't know how to dig it out by questioning, as I gave them no chance to do so."

One civilian witness, Fred Gerard, later claimed that the officers knew that anyone making himself obnoxious to the defense would incur the wraith of superiors.

Later in 1879, Reno was again courts-martialed for "conduct unbecoming," on charges including peeping through the window of his commanding officer's daughter and attempting to brain a lieutenant with a billiard cue. THis time President Hayes failed to interced and Reno was dismissed from the service. Still striving for reinstatement, he died of complications due to tongue cancer in 1889.

Reno won a posthumous victory of sorts in 1967 when the Army Board for Correction of Military Records met in response to an appeal from Reno's great-grand nephew. For no apparent reason, the board simply jettisioned the considered opinions of Reno's colleagues and President Hayes, termed his dismissial "unjust" and ordered his records "corrected" to indicate an honorable discharge. One historian would later term it "a very silly procedure." But it did entitle Reno to be reburied in a military cemetery and he was duly interred with the pomp and honors due a military officer....at Little Big Horn National Military Cemetery.

Abbott Shaull

12-22-2010, 09:08 AM

LOL, Quartermasters never change.

Of intrest is comparing the qualification rounds fired between then and now (okay 1987!!)

90 rounds a year back then...and 125 rounds in 1987.

1988 and 1989 weren't much better...lol I believe fired more rounds during the 3 months of Basic/AIT than I did in who year usually.

Abbott Shaull

12-22-2010, 10:19 AM

I posted earlier a copy of General Terry's famous written order to Colonel Custer on the day that the Seventh broke off from the column and started its march to the Little Big Horn. I was hoping for some debate on the order and if Custer had really disobeyed orders when he launched his attack.

In the years since 1876, the Terry order has been argued, since the Officer's Call on June 21, Custer was already well awareof how the campaign was to progress, this order was simply written to confirm this. right?

Colonel William Pond (ret) conducted an analysis which is intresting on many points: "No matter what Custer does, Terry is protected. If Custer does everything that Terry thinks, and wins, Terry told him to, and the credit is his. If Custer does and is defeated, Terry told him to use his discretion and the blame is Custer's. On the other hand if Custer disregards what Terry thinks and wins, Terry gave him the discretion to do it, and credit is due Terry. If he loses, he disobeyed orders and again the blame is his alone."

Other historians regard the Terry order as so vague that Custer could not have disobeyed them, unless he disobeyed his own opinion as to his best course of action. Others argue that Custer's determination to strike the Indians on his own simply made him indifferent to his orders, especially since he had supposedly told a friend of his determination to "cut loose" from Terry and operate independently.

Another factor is the question of whether Terry verbally modify these orders prior on the morning of the 22nd. In 1896, General Nelson Miles cited an affidavit which had Terry, tell Custer: "Use your own judgement, and do what you think best if you strike the trail; and whatever you do, hold on to your wounded." Miles thought this "a most reasonable conversation." Others questioned the likelihood of such a conversation, citing Terry's caution against Custer abandoning the wounded as most unlikely. Miles later identified his eyewitness only as "Custer's servant." Libby Custer possessed a copy of the affidavit but never defended its authenticity. The affidavit was not published until 1953 were it was revealed that the affiant was Mary Adams, Custer's negro servant. Statements made by three surviving Seventh Cavalry officers, taken in 1924 stated that no servant had accompanied the Dakota Column and another witness had "Maria", Libby Custer's housemaid at Ft Lincoln. At this point, the affidavit was regardless as useless.

However, in 1983, historian John Manion produced evidence which establised the presence of Mary Adams with the column, but also explain "Maria" as Mary's sister, both women being employed as house servants by the Custers. But even this evidence does not confirm the affidavit's contents as to the real nature of Terry's verbal orders to Custer.

The orders as written show clearly that General Terry was covering all bases, another thing that hasn't change much since their time. The orders appear to direct Custer to follow one course of action while in the next breath he gets told to use his best judgement. In either direction if Custer luck held out, it would be Terry taking the credit. If it failed Custer was the only to blame.

As you have state, you have drawn same conclusion from the orders and I think many of us drew from the same conclusion.

I am concern that General Terry would go through the express effort to write out the last part for Custer to use his best Judgement. That part is usually the unspoken part of one written orders. We have to remember back in time period they didn't have the ability to call back to HQs and ask for permission. It where it was better to do something first and then ask for forgiveness, than do nothing and fail attitude came from.

The only time I know of orders being written in such way, were back in the Civil War. Where many of the top players during this time had fought. The purpose was to give the subordinate freedom to act as they felt they should since they were Johny on the spot. With the clear intention of any failures would rest with the subordinate and keep the commander clear of the matter coming through the fan of fallout.

Of course hearing the conversation where General Terry may have verbally modify the orders does on one hand surprise me. First off during the Civil War, the only time verbals orders were issued at this level were in time of distress. In many cases, when said orders were later disputed due to the fact they were rarely recorded, and infrequently were passed along by some aid. While at others the Chief of Staff were known to issue verbal orders in the name of their Commander too. Again when disputed there was general no record. In almost every case where things went badly, especially for the Union side the commanding officer would find themselves relief of duty.

Especially in the East during the Civil War there were times when due to verbal orders a senior Commander had been removed from command to be replace by the same people who units had failed, but due to lack of documentation that they failed in executing their supposed orders were allow to raise to Corps and Army Commanders. In fact even Major General Meade, Major General Sherman, and Lt. General Grant all been accused of various forms of misconduct before and during their various command stints.

Now back to George A. Custer, one of the things that many Regular Army Officers would keep noting during his military career was that Custer was only Regular Army Captain and was Brevet to Major General during the Civil War. Most of the jumps of rank from Captain to that Major General was due to fact that he served as aid to Major General McCleallan and then after he removed from command of the army he came to the attention of Major General Pheasonton who happen to command a Division of Cavalry. It was Pheasonton who promoted Custer from Captain of Regular Army to Brigadier General of Volunteers and assigned him to command a Brigade before the Battle of Gettysburg. From this point on Custer star would raise.

Then fast forward to the end of the war. Custer was still listed as Captain in the Regular Army, but again jumped to Lt. Colonel due to his successes he had during the Civil War and 2nd in command of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. A unit for most part until his death he held, most of the time as 'acting' Commander, but due the actual commander of the Regiment being sent of to fill some other duty.

The facts are that many Officers in the US Army didn't care for one Lt. Colonel George A. Custer. Many felt he hadn't proven himself, and felt he was under qualified for his position in his command. General Terry was one of those officers who felt this way, hence is why he issued the orders in this way. It was common practice for senior Officers who felt they had limit control over subordinates or wanted to find a reason to relieve someone.

Then again if IIRC, some of the orders from even the War Department and directly from President Lincoln were similarly worded. Again this is due to the direct fact of life at the time. The Officer who was conducting the operation was to Johny on the spot and was to act as they felt was required, and yes they would be second guess later if they failed. This was general unwritten rule for any written orders, the only times it seems to be include when the Commander who issued the order felt it important enough to express, said unwritten part to remind the subordinate that they could use their better judgement because they were trusted when the subordinate had shown they wouldn't always use the initiative. Or as the case seem here invite the subordinate to use their initiative in hopes they second guess themselves long enough to give the commander to catch up and claim any victory to their credit, while leaving failures to be the subordinate fault solely.

dragoon500ly

12-22-2010, 12:11 PM

And that is the problem with the orders. Have to agree that Custer was possibly one of the most hated regimental commanders in the army....and then you have how Benteen felt about Custer!

As long as Custer came up with the vistories, he was the darling, but when he was defeated.......

Abbott Shaull

12-22-2010, 05:50 PM

Yes that is how it always is. If Commander can win he is well liked, when they lose they are out in the dog house. Officers in the Civil War were made by having lucky days, and the days they were so lucky, well they were soon out of job. It was mentality that stayed with the regular Army for a long time...

It was Custer was liked by Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and others who were still in high places that help keep Custer in command of the 7th Cavalry and reason why the Colonel who was the actual Commander in postings in Washington to keep him out of Custer hair. I am guessing that he wasn't a Custer fan either. *shrug*

Abbott Shaull

12-22-2010, 06:02 PM

Legbreaker

12-22-2010, 06:09 PM

...the group that highly modify their uniform to their taste.
So much for uniforms actually being, well, uniform.... :confused:

dragoon500ly

12-22-2010, 06:28 PM

Like I said he was court martial for being AWOL and suspended but somehow retained the rank of Lt Col and 'acting' Commander/field commander depending on what accounts you read. General Sheridan seems to be the driving force behind this and the fact that the actual Colonel of the Regiment was detailed elsewhere.

General Grant was known to wear a uniform that were the same issued to Private. While Custer fell in the group that highly modify their uniform to their taste. All other Colonels and General of all ranks fell somewhere between the two.

Too be brutally honest, even Custer admited that his Civil War tastes in uniform were "above and beyond"....but as Custer proved on day 3 of Gettysburg, he was highly visible to his troops, and since he led at least three charges against Stuart's cavalry and was seen by one of his Michigan troopers "running his saber into the belly of a Rebel cavalryman, as you can imagine, the men fight well for such a general!"

Call it what him what you want, Custer may have been a vain, glory-hungry, undiscplined jackass...but when the time came to fight, he did better than most of his peers.

Abbott Shaull

12-22-2010, 06:42 PM

mikeo80

12-22-2010, 07:32 PM

Yes and it is reason why Cavalry Colonels and Generals would have the most outlandish uniforms. So when they were in the mist of the fight, their troopers who happen to be watching would notice and fight harder or so the theory goes...

A note of interest in my opinion.

Grant and Sherman wore what amounted to the normal wear of a private with only the insignia on their shoulders denoting their rank.

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/ulysses-s-grant/pictures/ulysses-grant-field.htm

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/sherman/pictures/william-sherman-portrait.htm

And yet, these were the two generals credited with the victory of the North over the South.

Adm.Lee

12-22-2010, 07:36 PM

Abbott Shaull

12-22-2010, 07:54 PM

A note of interest in my opinion.

Grant and Sherman wore what amounted to the normal wear of a private with only the insignia on their shoulders denoting their rank.

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/ulysses-s-grant/pictures/ulysses-grant-field.htm

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-generals/sherman/pictures/william-sherman-portrait.htm

And yet, these were the two generals credited with the victory of the North over the South.

Yeah already pointed that out and Grant had nasty habit of being drunk too.

Abbott Shaull

12-22-2010, 07:57 PM

I'm sure that's what Patton thought, too, re: uniform modifications. Note, that was back in his days as a brigade/division commander.

If he had lost any of his battles, I'm sure he would have been remembered only as the "goggle-eyed maniac" that the 1970 movie almost portrayed him.

He was known to lose a battle or two, the fact was much like Grant and Sherman and other Generals who keep their job for the most part, they have to win most of the times. Where as many of the Generals that the Union went through during the Civil War would at best have one or two victories and the have one or more lost battles that would doom them...

dragoon500ly

12-22-2010, 08:11 PM

He was known to lose a battle or two, the fact was much like Grant and Sherman and other Generals who keep their job for the most part, they have to win most of the times. Where as many of the Generals that the Union went through during the Civil War would at best have one or two victories and the have one or more lost battles that would doom them...

And then there was Hooker and Burnside and what a pair of horses' arses they were!

Abbott Shaull

12-22-2010, 08:58 PM

And then there was Hooker and Burnside and what a pair of horses' arses they were!

Hooker and Burnside... One sad thing after they both failed as Army Commanders, their superiors were going to allow them back as Corps Commanders. Burnside took up the offer and his former Corps was turned over to him and they were sent to occupational duty away from the Army of the Potomac. Hooker on the other hand didn't want to be put in position where one of his subordinates may one day find themselves his commander was released from the Army.

Many of the failed commanders of the forces of the Union in the East were in general with the exception of McClellan were offered to re-take their place in Corps commands, but many refused. Strangely enough McClellan was allowed to do so command twice. Some were transferred from various Department to others after being relieved.

McDowell is the only commander of an Army that I know where he went to Division after the First Battle of Bull Run, then became Corps Commander and like many he had an independent command that wasn't part of the much larger Army operating in Virginia. Then when three independent Corps had been formed into the Army of Virgina under General Pope due to defeat of the at Second Battle of Bull Run was strip of his command and was no longer allowed to hold command position even though it wasn't his fault for that that lose.

Being a Union General was no treat. You had three career paths of death, force retirement, or success. Then add to the fact that many of them had very little military experience or had been out of the military for years, while others had none. It not surprising that so many Brigadier and Major Generals on both side lost their lives and/or captured during the war. Why for the first couple year the Union went through so many who were forced out.

While on the Confederate side not many Generals were forced to retired for failures. Many would lose their position to be place back into similar position again. General Bragg and General Hood remind me of two generals that probably would of done better as Corps commanders but made it to Army Commander and they for a while with several other cast of Generals rotated through the various variation of Armies that fought first along the Mississippi, then what was called the West, and finally in Georgia and the Carolinas.

It was funny that the Confederates did have several Lt Generals and I am not sure if they had two full Generals, I think General Johnston who commanded the Army that would become the Army of Northern Virginia before Robert E. Lee took command. After being wounded in rotated between assignment in Richmond, VA and various postings to the West as they continue to fight a losing battle out there.

The Union Army in contrast until Grant was made Lt General and moving out of the field to Washington. The one thing is everyone remember Lt General Grant and Major General Sherman as the major two commanders. In fact, Major General Meade on paper was still the Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac. I say on paper since most of the time Grant established a field HQ almost near by to make sure the AoP and the various other independent commands working to take Richmond would cooperate and Meade only had true command at the times when Grant had to be in Washington attending to business that the Chief of the Army had to conduct with the War Department, Department of the Army, and with the President. Even though it wasn't unheard of for the President of the United States to visit the field HQs too. One of the few times in history when sitting President would visit field HQs.

dragoon500ly

12-23-2010, 07:55 AM

One of the many questions about LBH is just how ready were the troopers to fight effectively on 25 June, 1876? This was first brought out in the Reno Court of Inquiry and debated by historians ever since.

One of the stories brought out at the CoI was the presence of a number of untrained raw recruits as well as the fact that the regiment, as a whole, was exhausted by the time it reached the battlefield, thus resulting in the poor showing of the Seventh.

The first portion of this argument holds that raw recruits lack sufficient training to fight alongside seasoned veterans. The ability to fight effectively depends upon the foundations of discipline and skills in weaponary and marksmanship. This, of course, requires careful training over a period of time.

The records shows that about 150 recruits joined the Seventh in 1875, with about 60 of them having had prior service. Another 62 are claimed to have joined prior to the LBH Campaign, but only 54 can be verified by the records. Most likely these men were untrained as cavalrymen; theor daily activities consisting of guard duty, fatigue duty, and the monotonous garrison routine. The lack of training for these new recruits can be placed onto the failure of Major Reno, who commanded the Seventh during Custer's absence in Washington DC during the preparations for the campaign. Reno neglected to schedule target practise or the rudiments of cavalry tactics. To be sure, the Springfield and Colt designs did not require a rocket scientist to figure out how to load, aim and fire. But the Springfield carbine required a technique of loading and extracting that required proper learning and practise in order to acheive its maximum rate of fire. Training in the basic of horsemanship, other than mucking out stalls, was lacking as well.

Upon first examination, the presence of these recruits are a detriment to the ability of the Seventh against the Indians as was stated in the Reno Court of Inquiry. In an article in 1936, 2nd Lieutenant Charles Varnum, a LBH participant stated that the number of recruits who took part in the battle was greatly exaggerated at the CoI in order to aid in Reno's defense. Varnum claimed that most of the recruits had been left at the Powder River base camp and that no company had more than two recruits present on the final march.

A search of the regimental records confirms Varnum's statement. At the time of the battle, a total of 37 recruits (those who signed up in 1876) were on detached duty at Powder River. One was at Ft Abraham Lincoln, another was in confinement at the post stockade and two were in route to the fort. Nine were detailed with the pack train escort and only four remained with the companies assigned to Reno's Battalion. No recruits were assigned to the Custer Battalion.

Another problem that plagued cavalry units throughout the Indian Wars is the number of "green" horses experiencing combat for the first time. It has been estimated that as many as 50% of the Seventh's mounts were newly acquired. And the reactions of these new mounts tothe sounds, smells and chaos of a battlefield would have had an effect on the ability of the Seventh to fight effectively.

The second of Reno's allegations concerned that the troopers were too exhausted to fight effectively. The regiment had traveled 113 miles, with little sleep or nourishment between June 22 and June 25. A long, hard march such as this would certainly create a state of tiredness that would have prevented anyone from operating at peak effectiveness. Field rations of hard bread, bacon and coffee, supplemented with some wild game and mile malnourishment would unquestionably sap the spirit and result in a breakdown of discipline and morale.

The troopers of Seventh were Regulars, however, experienced in Indian fighting and could be expected to perform under the worst of conditions. And a number of these troopers had brazed freezing temperatures and a blizzard to successfully attack Black Kettle's village at the battle of the Washita in November 1868.

There is another factor to consider when judging combect effectiveness is the one factor that can overcome fatigue and hunger. As any combat veteran knows, adrenaline-fueled engery can play a major role in quickly readying the mind and body for battle. Senses and concentration is heightened and while fatigue may become a factor during a prolonged battle, men trained to fight usually respond quite well in the short term. Whether the Custer Battalion could have faired better had they enjoyed a good night's sleep and a full belly, is a matter of conjecture.

dragoon500ly

12-23-2010, 08:17 AM

For the troopers pinned down at the Reno-Benteen Defense Site, by June 26, the lack of water was becoming a serious problem. While the troopers had started out with mostly full canteens when the seige began, much of that water had been delpeted and the men were reduced to drinking the juice from a handful of fruit cans or sucking on potatoes, but many of the wounded were now suffering under the hot Montana sun.

It is believed that heat was one reason that the Indians chose not to launch any serious attackes on the hill. Not only would such an assault caost many Indian lives, but it was evident that soonner or later, the troopers would need to move down a 600 yard long ravine in order to procure water, and that ravine was held by the Indians.

Captain Benteen, acting on his own, made the decision to drive the Indians from the ravine. He led a dismounted charge toward the surprised Indians, killing several of them and chasing away the others, without the loss of a man until the return to the line when one trooper was shot and killed. While this cleared the ravine, anyone attempting to reach the river at the mouth would have to cross about 30 feet of open ground, with Indian sharpshooters firing from the opposite bank.

Benteen declined to order any man to make the attempt, instead he called for volunteers. After the volunteers had collected every possible container that could hold water, four of the best shots available, George Geiger, Henry Meckling, Otto Voit and Charles Windolph were deployed as a skirmish line and ordered to lay down fire across the river. The initial mission was a success, although one man was killed and seven were wounded. Later water carriers acted on their own until about noon, when the Indian firing decreased and additional troopers were sent to fill canteens and other receptacles.

For their bravery, twenty-four Seventh Cavalry troopers were adwarded the Medal of Honor, the largest number ever cited in any single engagement in U.S. history. These men are:

Company A: Sergeant Stanislas Roy, Privates Neil Bancroft and David Harris

Company B: Sergeants Rufus Hutchinson, Benjamin Criswell and Thomas Murray, Privates Thomas Callan, Charles Cunningham and James Pym.

Company C: Sergeant Richard Hanley and Private Peter Thompson

Company D: Privates Abram Brant, Frederick Deetline, William Harris, Henry Holden, George Scott, Thomas Stivers, Frank Tolan, and Charles Welch

Company G: Private Theodore Goldin

Company H: Sergeant George Geiger, Privates Henry Mechlin, Otto Voit and Charles Windolph

dragoon500ly

12-23-2010, 08:37 AM

After the last of the Custer Battalion had fallen, the Sioux and Cheyenne women and a number of children and older men descended on the field of battle to help their warriors loot and mutilate the bodies in every conceivable manner, many beyond all recognition. The actual extent of the mutilation has always been a subject of debate with many eyewitnesses claiming that there was very little and an equal number claiming that it was widespread. The difference of the testmony can be explained due to the assignment of various troops to bury the dead, and certain postions may have received more postdeath mutilation than others.

The acts of mutilation that can be documented include dismemberment of amrs, legs, hands, fingers and penises; decapitation; scalping, lacrations and slashes from knives, tomahawks and axes; skulls crushed with stone mallets, and multiple gunshots and arrows fired from close range. The battlefield was said to have been littered with hands, heads, feet and legs that had been removed.

Those troopers lying facedown were likely killed by a Cheyenne, who were known to believe that it was bad luck to leave an enemy facing the sky. The Sioux traditionally marked a dead enemy with a slashed thigh. The Indians even went so far as to mutilate some of the dead horses. For unknown reasons, the names of the dead had been cut out of the few items of clothing (an undershirt or a pair of socks) not stripped from the bodies. Everything of value, money, watches, rings, and so on was stripped from the bodies.

Captain Thomas Custer was singled out for perhaps the worst treatment and he was only identified by tattoos on one arm. First Lieutenant Edward Godfrey described his body: "It was lying face down, all the scalp was removed, leaving only tufts of his fair hair on the nape of his neck. The skull was smashed in and a number of arrows had been shot into the back of the head and in the body. The features where they had touched the ground were pressed out of shape and were somewhat depressed. In turning the body, one arm which had been shot and broken, remained under the body; this was pulled out and on it we saw 'T.W.C.' and the goddess of liberty and the flag. His belly had been cut open and his entrails protruded."

The extent of Tom Custer's abuse has caused some to believe that the Sioux warrior Rain-in-the-Face had made good on his threat to cut out Custer's heart and eat it as revenge for his arrest in 1875. Captain Benteen, however, stated that Custer's heart had not been cut out.

The naked body of George Custer, from all accounts, was not mutilated. He was found in a sitting position leaning against and between two troopers, his face was said to be wearing the expression of a man who "had fallen asleep and enjoyed peaceful dreams". Custer was found with two wounds, a bullet in front of the left temple and another in the left breast.

Chief Gall said in 1886 that GAC had not been scalped "because he was a big chief and we respected him," which is very unlikely because the Indians did not know that they were fighting Custer. Cheyenne Kate Bighead stated that Custer was not mutilated out of respect for their tribal sister Mo-nah-se-tah, who was believed to have gained Custer's affection while working as his translator in 1868. Kate also stated that the women had thrust a sewing awl into Custer's ears to "improve his hearing" because he had not heard the Indians when he smoked the peace pipe with them in 1867. Many historians belive that GAC's body was mutilated, but the truth was deliberately withheld out of respect for the feelings of Libbie Custer.

dragoon500ly

12-23-2010, 09:12 AM

By the time that the Terry-Gibbon Column and the survivors of the Reno-Beteen Battalions marched the four miles north to view Custer's slaughtered command, the more than 200 bodies, along with numerous hourse carcasses, had been decomposing in the summer heat for two days. First Lieutenant Edward Godrey described the scene as the column approached: "We saw a large number of objects that looked liked white boulders scattered over the field and it was announced that these objects were the dead bodies." Captain Thomas Weir exclaimed: "Oh, how white the look! How white!." First Lieutenant Francis Gibson sadly said: "It was the most horrible sight my eyes rested on." Captain Frederick Benteen look down at Custer's body and said, with emotion: "There he is, God damn him, he will never fight anymore!"

The gruesome task of burying the dead began soon after and continued at until the evening of June 28, when the regiment marched away with the wounded on litters to the mouth of the Little Big Horn River.

The soldiers on the burial detail, many of whom were quickly overcome with nausea and vomiting, did not possess proper digging implements. Only a dozen or so spades, shovels and picks, found in the debris of the Indian villages, were available, so they used anything that could scoop away the dirt to hasten the job. The soil was described as dry and porous, resembling sugar, so burial was at best a token gesture. The dead were buried where they fell and they were covered over with sagebrush and dirt or rolled into shallow trenches. The officers were identified by writing thier names on slips of paper, which was then stuffed into cartridge cases and hammered into the crude cedar stakes placed near the gravesites.

The bodies at the various locations were counted, 42 on Custer Hill, 28 in Deep Ravine and 208 or 210 along Battle Ridge and an approximate total of 263 when all the officers, enlisted, civilians and scouts had been tallied.

On June 25, 1877, one year to the day, Captain Henry Nowlan and Company I of the Seventh arrived at the battlefield with the mission of colecting the remains of the officers who had fallen. Nowlan was accompanied by First Lieutenant Hugh Scott, Colonel Michael Sheridan (brother of Phil Sheridan) and all of the Crow scouts that had been with Custer the year before. Fortunately, there would be no need for guesswork to identify the dead officer's, Nowlan had been provided with a map that showed where each officer was buried.

Only one officer was reburied on the field. The father of 2nd Lieutenant John Crittenden, an infantry colonel, had said, "Let my boy lie where he fell." Crittenden's body was placed in a coffin and reburied where he fell. In September, 1931, his remains were moved to the nearby National Military Cemetery.

The remains of the other officers from both the Reno and Custer battlefields were gathered up and transferred to pine boxes for transport to cemeteries designated by the next of kin. At this time, many of the enlisted men were either reburied individually where they fell or gathered together in mass graves. The group of 28 bodies that were buried in Deep Ravine have never been located.

GAC had told his wife that when the time came, he wanted to be buried at the US Military Academy at West Point and she was determined to honor his wishes. Libby was advised to wait until the fall to hold the funeral as West Point was relatively vacant during the summer. Custer's remains were stored at a valult in Poughkeepsie, New York.

On October 10, 1877, crowds lined the Hudson River as the bunting-draped Mary Powell, her flags flying at half mast brought Custer's remains to the south dock of the academy. The casket was escorted by a cavalry detachment to the chapel.

Shortly after 2pm, Major General John Schofield, commandant of the Military Academy, escorted Libbie into the chapel. Classes had been suspended and the cadets crowded into the chapel to witness the event. The West Point chaplain, Doctor John Forsyth, conducted an Episcopal service, concluding with the 19th Psalm. Afterward, cadets carried the casket to a caisson, which bore it to the cemetery. A lone horse, displaying a pair of cavalry boots with spurs, with the toes pointed to the rear, followed the caisson. The procession halted at the cemetery, the chaplain spoke again, three volleys were fired and George Armstrong Custer was laid to rest. In 1933, Libbie Custer was buried beside her husband.

In 1881, the remains of the enlisted men were removed from the scattered graves on the battlefield and reinterred in a mass grave under the base of the imposing granite monument that was erected on Custer Hill. The names of the dead, a number of which are spelled incorrecly, were inscribed on the monument. Marble headstones were placed around the battlefield to provide a rough guide as to where the soldiers had been killed.

The final resting places of the officers who were killed on June 25, 1876 are as follows:

1st Lt James Calhoun: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

1st Lt William W. Cooke: Hamilton Cemetery, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

2nd Lt John J. Crittendon: Custer National Military Cemetery

LTC George A. Custer: US Military Academy at West Point Cemetery

Capt Thomas W. Custer: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

Dr. James M. DeWolf: Woodlawn Cemetery, Norwalk, Ohio

2nd Lt Henry M. Harrington: body never found

2nd Lt Benjamin H. Hodgson: Laurel Hill Cemetery, Philadelphia, PA

Capt Myles W. Keogh: Fort Hill Cemetery, Auburn, NY

Dr. George E. Lord: Custer National Military Cemetery

1st Lt Donald McIntosh: Arlington National Cemetery, Washington DC

1st Lt James E. Porter: body never found

2nd Lt William V.W. Reilly: Mount Olivert Cemetery, Washington DC

1st Lt Algernon E. Smith: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

2nd Lt James G. Sturgis: body never found

Capt George W.M. Yates: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

Abbott Shaull

12-23-2010, 10:47 AM

So their bodies weren't found, or were they unable confirm their bodies from the rest of troops?

dragoon500ly

12-23-2010, 12:24 PM

So their bodies weren't found, or were they unable confirm their bodies from the rest of troops?

More like they were unable to confirm their bodies from the rest of the troops. The body of one of the intererperters, Mitch Boyer, was only discovered in 1987. They were able to ID it due to skull/facial reconstruction

As it stands right now, there are still 28 bodies missing, the men who died in Deep Ravine.

Stich2.0

12-23-2010, 04:15 PM

They were able to ID it due to skull/facial reconstruction

I think you are making all of this up. They didn't have CSI in the civil war.

Abbott Shaull

12-23-2010, 05:06 PM

copeab

12-23-2010, 06:47 PM

I think you are making all of this up. They didn't have CSI in the civil war.

The body he referenced identified in this manner was found in 1987 (see the previous sentence in his port). They did have CSI then. I am assuming they had a photograph to compare the reconstruction to.

mikeo80

12-23-2010, 07:58 PM

The naked body of George Custer, from all accounts, was not mutilated. He was found in a sitting position leaning against and between two troopers, his face was said to be wearing the expression of a man who "had fallen asleep and enjoyed peaceful dreams". Custer was found with two wounds, a bullet in front of the left temple and another in the left breast.

There is an interesting side note to GAC's wounds. There are several accounts by Native Americans that GAC was at least wounded early in the BLBH. THese accounts were recorded in the late 1910's to 1930's.

As the part of the 7th under Custer attacked the village, the soldiers suddenly stopped and retreated after a period of confusion. This activity was confirmed by the archeology of LBH battlefield.

Was Custer already dead?
Seriously wounded, then moved to top of Last Stand Hill?
Could this be why the Doctor with GAC's Companies set up in the Last Stand Hill area?

Unknown, but the sudden incapacitation of GAC could explain why the 5 companies with GAC seemed to loose agressive action after the attempt on the village.

Something else to consider, General Terry stated that the wound to the head was "blackened".

Self inflicted?
Shot by some last member of the 7th to make sure GAC was dead before the over run by the Indians?

Mike

helbent4

12-23-2010, 08:47 PM

The body he referenced identified in this manner was found in 1987 (see the previous sentence in his port). They did have CSI then. I am assuming they had a photograph to compare the reconstruction to.

Brandon,

Or, Stitch2.0 lives in an alternative timeline where the US Civil war lasted until 1876/1877 or indeed, 1987 and forensic science therefore remains underdeveloped. Obviously some quantum internet error!

Regarding the blackening that Mike mentions, it could have been a coup-de-grace administered post-mortem by the Indians.

Tony

dragoon500ly

12-23-2010, 09:32 PM

I think you are making all of this up. They didn't have CSI in the civil war.

Sigh.....you really should stay current on recent events. What happened is that they recovered the skull on the bank of the Little Big Horn River. The skull was turned over to a facial reconstruction artist, you know, the people who take measurements on the thickness of muscle and fat and then scuplt a face to match the skull? The only person that matched the result was Mitch Boyer, who was killed with the Custer Battalion.

They have also used this technique to sculpt seven faces of troopers who were found in the recent digs, to date, the remains of Sergeant Miles O'Hara; Sergeant Edward Botzer; Corporal George Lell and Private Vincent Charley have been identified by this method.

Another technique that is being used is one developed by the FBI. They take a photo of the skull and then run known photos of troopers to find a match. This software was developed to ID missing persons when human remains were found.

As for me making this up....may I take the time to refer you to a most excellent resource, the book "They Died With Custer" by Douglas D. Scott, P.Willey and Melissa A. Connor. Its an excellent examination of the Seventh Cavalry and goes into this process in much greater detail.

And next time, when you decide to call someone down who has taken the time to research the subject, please, take the time to research it for yourself. It will save you the embrassment.

Have a Nice Day!

dragoon500ly

12-23-2010, 09:35 PM

That is what I figured. Shame they couldn't use modern stuff to id them all. Yeah, it understandable that they could lose the position for the 28 buried. Probably they believed they were in one place and actually in another place completely.

Its more a matter of where the bodies were buried. The 28 men were buried in Deep Ravine, most accounts state that a wall of the ravine was undermined and collapsed on them. The years of runoff from the rains this area is known for most likely washed them down the Little Big Hirn River.

Dr. Fox has conducted at least three digs around the location indicated on the burial map and only bone fragments have been recovered.

mikeo80

12-23-2010, 09:47 PM

Regarding the blackening that Mike mentions, it could have been a coup-de-grace administered post-mortem by the Indians.

Tony

This is also a distinct possibility!

When Captain Weir led the abortive move of Company D from the Reno-Benteen position to what is now called Weir Point, it was observed that there were a large group of Indians still firing towards Last Stand Hill. Weir and his party assumed that Custer was still fighting. This is a possibility, but more likely, this was the Indians making sure that any one on LSH was dead.

Just offered the "blackening" as a discussion point.

Mike

dragoon500ly

12-23-2010, 09:53 PM

There is an interesting side note to GAC's wounds. There are several accounts by Native Americans that GAC was at least wounded early in the BLBH. THese accounts were recorded in the late 1910's to 1930's.

As the part of the 7th under Custer attacked the village, the soldiers suddenly stopped and retreated after a period of confusion. This activity was confirmed by the archeology of LBH battlefield.

Was Custer already dead?
Seriously wounded, then moved to top of Last Stand Hill?
Could this be why the Doctor with GAC's Companies set up in the Last Stand Hill area?

Unknown, but the sudden incapacitation of GAC could explain why the 5 companies with GAC seemed to loose agressive action after the attempt on the village.

Something else to consider, General Terry stated that the wound to the head was "blackened".

Self inflicted?
Shot by some last member of the 7th to make sure GAC was dead before the over run by the Indians?

Mike

When you discuss the movements of the Custer Bn, there is one key to watch for, this is the movement of the "Grey Horse Troop", Company E was mounted on grey/white horses and this has been used to confirm the movements of the Left Wing of the Battalion. Indian oral traditions hold that the leader of the Grey Horse Soldiers was wounded during their initial attack down Deep Coulee. Does this refer to GAC, Captain Yates (commanding the Left Wing) or 1st Lieutenant Algernon Smith (the acting company commander)? No one may ever know for sure.

It is known that the Custer Bn fell back to the line Custer Hill-Battle Ridge-Calhoun Hill shortly afterwards, was this due to the wounding/death of GAC? Or is it simply a move to the higher terrain? Both can be argued.

As for the position of Doctor George Lord on Custer Hill, this can also be explained. Dr. Lord was a member of the regimental staff, he would have been near GAC as a matter of course. Once again Indian oral tradiations hold that the end of the Custer Bn, after the start of the attacks led by Chief Gall and Crazy Horse came "as swiftly as a herd of buffalo can run." There would have been no time for Dr. Lord to move anywhere else on the battlefield.

While there is no doubt that the Custer Bn went on the defensive early on. This does not indicate that Custer being wounded/killed had caused it. For example, the senior company commander's, Captain Myles Keogh, Captain Thomas Custer and Captain George Yates were all experienced Indian fighters and fully capable of taking over the command of the battalion. Please remember that Indian oral traditions hold that many of the cavalry mounts were run off early; Custer had also dispatched a message to Benteen to bring up the packs as quickly as possible, a possible indicator of an ammunition shortage, finally, the positions of at least three companies stretched down Battle Ridge-Calhoun Hill, indicate an attempt to open a path for the movement of Benteen's Battalion and the pack train.

And finally, General Terry mentioned that the wound to Custer's head was blackened, several years afterwards. All accounts of those officer's who were present when GAC's body was found, stated that neither wound was blackened, indicating long range fire was responsible. Even Captain Benteen, who was noted as hating Custer, never stated that Custer committed sucide. This does not mean that the possibility did not exist, but IMO, I feel that Custer was wounded earlier in the fight and then killed when the position on Custer Hill was overrun. Terry's observation of the blackening has always been felt by many historians as just another way of blackening GAC's reputation.

dragoon500ly

12-23-2010, 09:55 PM

Brandon,

Or, Stitch2.0 lives in an alternative timeline where the US Civil war lasted until 1876/1877 or indeed, 1987 and forensic science therefore remains underdeveloped. Obviously some quantum internet error!

Regarding the blackening that Mike mentions, it could have been a coup-de-grace administered post-mortem by the Indians.

Tony

Well, as any Son of the South will assure you, The War of Northern Agression is simply in a temporary state of cease-fire. Hostilities will recommence shortly.

;)

Panther Al

12-23-2010, 10:03 PM

One of my old history teachers when I was in the south absolutely refused to call the war of northern aggression anything but, and said the same thing about resting up. The really amusing part is when he actually brought up the size and quality of southern national guard units and compared them with "those peoples" units. Almost made me a believer he did.

dragoon500ly

12-23-2010, 10:08 PM

Stich2.0

12-23-2010, 10:20 PM

Civil war is ancient history. CSI is cooler.

http://img69.imageshack.us/img69/4006/csimiamionelinerssplitt.jpg

helbent4

12-23-2010, 11:09 PM

Stich2.0:

HA! :D

Well, as any Son of the South will assure you, The War of Northern Agression is simply in a temporary state of cease-fire. Hostilities will recommence shortly.

;)

Lee,

Well get on with it, already! What's the bloody hold up?

I can see the natural end-game right now:

http://pt.withy.org/ptalk/archives/images/canada20.gif

Tony

Panther Al

12-23-2010, 11:27 PM

LOL.

That is soooo wrong its right. Though I think we could have at least grabbed Alberta and SK without too much trouble.

Not sure where the newfies would jump, but the frenchies would jump ship at the least.

(And I can call them newfies, for I am a son of one!)

dragoon500ly

12-24-2010, 07:26 AM

[QUOTE=Abbott Shaull;28710]Many of the failed commanders of the forces of the Union in the East were in general with the exception of McClellan were offered to re-take their place in Corps commands, but many refused. Strangely enough McClellan was allowed to do so command twice. Some were transferred from various Department to others after being relieved.[QUOTE]

And the only reason why "Little Mac" was brought back was that the available pool of generals was so poor. What finally nailed McClellan's coffin shut was his piss-poor performance at Antitem. Had the chance to smash the Army of Northern Virgina, but, in essence, let each of his corps launch its own attack, none of which were coordinated by McClellan. Cany we say defeat in detail?

[Quote]McDowell is the only commander of an Army that I know where he went to Division after the First Battle of Bull Run, then became Corps Commander and like many he had an independent command that wasn't part of the much larger Army operating in Virginia. Then when three independent Corps had been formed into the Army of Virgina under General Pope due to defeat of the at Second Battle of Bull Run was strip of his command and was no longer allowed to hold command position even though it wasn't his fault for that that lose.[QUOTE]

One almost has to admire General Pope, he gets his army cut to pieces, and yet was able to push a lot of blame for his own failures onto the shoulders of McDowell. At least Lincoln was able to read through Pope's BS.

[QUOTE]While on the Confederate side not many Generals were forced to retired for failures. Many would lose their position to be place back into similar position again. General Bragg and General Hood remind me of two generals that probably would of done better as Corps commanders but made it to Army Commander and they for a while with several other cast of Generals rotated through the various variation of Armies that fought first along the Mississippi, then what was called the West, and finally in Georgia and the Carolinas.[QUOTE]

Being a Confederate General was no joke either. A lot of people point out the failures of the Union command, but since they were attacking most of the war, the failures of their Generals was much more obvious. The Confederates were able to fight defensively and this concealed the weakness of their own generals. General Johnson was always considered to be a better general than Lee, but when Johnson launced his attack at Shiloh, he had so little control that Beauregard was able to force a pure Napoleonic assault on the Confederates, in terrain that can only be described as "cut-up". While the Rebels were able to inflict major losses on Grant and force him into a small perimeter, the timely reinforcements by the Union Army of the Ohio allowed Grant to counterattack and win a bitter victory at Shiloh.

As for John Bell Hood....he was a great brigade commander, a fair division commander and as an army commander, he was the best thing that happened to the Confederate Army of Tennessee, at least as far as the Union was concerned. During the Union retreat to Nashville, Hood took a chance to nail the Union rear guard at the Battle of Franklin, the result, Hood lost a quarter of his army and didn't even delay the rear guard. Yet Hood felt that it was a victory because he had taught his men how to fight!?!?!?!?!??

At the Battle of Nashville, General Thomas scored the only total destruction of a Confederate army when his attack smashed Hood's defenses. By the end of the summer, the Army of the Tennessee, back at its start point in Georgia, could muster a little over 5,000 men...and they were assigned the mission of stopping Sherman's March...

dragoon500ly

12-24-2010, 07:31 AM

[QUOTE=helbent4;28774]Stich2.0:

HA! :D

Lee,

Well get on with it, already! What's the bloody hold up?

I can see the natural end-game right now:

Tony[/QUOTE}

It should read the Republic of Texas...I can see they left out the New England states....there has to be a reserve for the liberals to roam, I guess.

dragoon500ly

12-24-2010, 07:48 AM

Nowdays, the use of the brown leaf is considered to be a filthy, disease-ridden habit. In the nineteenth century, tobacco was considered to be a necessary habit. It helped to relive fatigue and hunger, and it also helped to relive boredom.

During the 1870s, it was possible for a trooper to draw a Tobacco Ration from the government. This amount to one pound per man, per month. The trooper had to reimbused the government for the cost of the tobacco, but this was at the rate that the government had purchased it, amount to about $1.14 a pound in 1876.

Only enlisted men were able to draw the ration although officers could make their purchases direct from the commissery.

During 1878, the army sold 43,285 pounds of chewing tobacco and 27,282 pounds of smoking tobacco.

According to the FDC, about 35% of Americans use tobacco...in contrast, in the Seventh Cavalry, the usage is well over 90%! Even in today's army, tobacco usage is heavier than with civilans, but it only averages about 44%.

Abbott Shaull

12-24-2010, 07:58 AM

Yes, but too many people fail to realize that General Lee wasn't the first choice for the job of leading the 'Main Confederate Army' in the East. It was only after General Johnson had been wounded on the field that General Lee was moved from wherever they had him to take command of the field army.

Yes General Hood as with some of the rotating lineup up out west were excellent Brigade commander, others could lead a Division, a share could lead Corps and few were qualified to lead an Army. The trouble for the south is there wasn't a large pool of unqualified political appointees to take their place like the North had. The strength is that the pool they had, were currently serving officers in the US Army previous to the Confederate State breaking away.

Not all of the Southern born officer resigned from the Union Army, but also there were a share of Northern born officers who resigned to fight for the Confederacy too.

dragoon500ly

12-24-2010, 08:14 AM

One of the many common questions about LBH is why didn't GAC take the Gatlings with him on the march. A detachment of three .50-caliber Gatlings had been assigned to the Terry column, manned by a detachment of soldiers from the 20th Infantry Regiment.

On the plus side, there is no argument about the firepower that a single Gatling could deliver, a rate of fire of some 350rpm had to be respected. The Gatlings were mounted on a artillery limber and had a box mounted on either side of the gun, each holding 24 40-round magazines, a third box was mounted underneath the gun, and it held 2,000 rounds in their packing boxes. The limber was attached to a artillery cassion that held another 6,000 rounds of boxed ammo. Each gun was manned by a six man crew (piece commander, gunner, loader and three men to pass ammo and reload magazines).

The downside of the Gatlings also bear no argument. These guns were of the same design of the original Civil War-era Gatlings and were known to be prone to malfunction; often jamming from the residue from firing black powder or overheating. Firing the guns to fast ran the risk of having bullets strike a support bar at the muzzle end, sending pieces of bullet and bar flying, usually back towards the crew. The Gatlings were designed to repel massed attacks, such as those customery in the Civil War, it is doubtful that the Indians would have been so accomdating. One other thing to consider is that the Gatlings were mounted on artillery limbers, which meant that the crew had to stand erect in order to work the piece, making them ideal targets for Indian sharpshooters.

Perhaps the major factor in the decision not to take the Gatlings lies in the simple difficulty of getting them to the battlefield. Each gun was drawn by four condemned horses (no longer suitable for riding) and each obstacle would have required the horses to be unhitched, the guns moved across the obsticale and then rehitched, thus greatly impeding the progress of the column. On the march of Terry's column, this drawback was known to have delayed the arrival by at least one day.

There are even historians who suggest that the Gatlings would have so slowed the arrival of the Seventh by at least two days, allowing him to link up with the Terry-Gibbon column and allowing the unified command to attack the Indian village, thus leading to a TERRY-GIBBON LAST STAND!

Custer is also known to have discussed the Gatling Guns with scout Fred Girard prior to the march. Girard was of the opinion that the Indians would not charge the Gatlings or simply stand around getting picked off by the weapons. The scout told Custer that a twelve-pounder mountain howitzer would be more effective as they could destroy the village by lobbing in shells from a mile away.

The effectivness of the mountain howitzer had been proven by Colonel Kit Carsen in November, 1864 at Adobe Walls, Texas. Carsen had commanded fewer men than Custer and faced more Indians, in fact the largest concertation of Indians ever known on the plains, and was able to destroy a large Kiowa-Comanche village and prevent himself from being surrounded by several thousand warriors due to the two mountain howitzers he had brought along.

Finally, General Nelson Miles wrote to General Sherman on July 8, 1876, that Gatlings "are worthless for Indian fighting."

Stich2.0

12-24-2010, 09:04 AM

Three United States Army National Guard soldiers (MSgt. William Connors, Pvt. Michael McCluskey, Cpl. Richard Langsford) are a tank crew participating in a war game being conducted near the Battle of Little Bighorn site of Lieutenant Colonel George Custer's last stand. Their orders coincide with the route of Custer and his men.

As they follow the route, they have several strange occurrences such as Indian battle cries, and horses running. As there is nobody there, the men examine the possibilities and come to the conclusion that they've somehow gone back in time. They report to their commanding officer what had occurred and are reprimanded.

The following day they again begin to experience the same strange occurrences. Their commanding officer contacts them via radio and orders them to return to base when they try to explain what is happening. They break contact, and the commanding officer sends out MP's to search for them.

The three men, however, abandon their tank and continue along on foot with their side arms and rifles. They find a group of tepees and one of the soldiers goes to investigate; he soon returns, with an arrow protruding from his back.

The troops climb up a ridge where they find the battle. They join it and are never seen again. Later, the commanding officer finds the Custer Battlefield National Monument and the graveyard of the soldiers killed at the Battle of Little Bighorn. An MP reports back that all they found was the abandoned tank. The officers then notice the names of the missing soldiers on the monument with the names of the men killed in the battle. The commanding officer states that it was a pity that the missing soldiers could not have taken the tank back with them to the battle.

dragoon500ly

12-24-2010, 11:23 AM

Stich2.0

12-24-2010, 02:59 PM

Its from the original Twilight Zone TV series. Its nothing but pure Hollywood...

But it could be real. It could be based on a true story. You can't prove that it isn't just a amazingly cool story dreamed up by Rod Sterling.

Fusilier

12-24-2010, 03:07 PM

As they follow the route, they have several strange occurrences such as Indian battle cries, and horses running. As there is nobody there, the men examine the possibilities and come to the conclusion that they've somehow gone back in time.

LOL - well obviously.

helbent4

12-24-2010, 04:44 PM

LOL - well obviously.

Fuse,

I'm sure we could prove it, somehow.

That said, I remember seeing a documentary about this, hosted by Rod Serling. The rusty M1911s, M1 carbines and shell casings they recovered when they went over every inch of the LBH battlefield are now kept on display at the memorial. They caused quite an uproar when they were found. President Gore had to make a statement about it and everything! If I were them, I would have stayed with the bloody tank! I mean, seriously, don't they have to pay for it if they lose it or something?

Then later, saw another documentary about how a teenager used a DeLorean to escape from Libyan terrorists, accidentally going back in time in the process. He had to make sure his parents met and fell in love so he could be born. He also discovered rock and roll. But because he left a book of sports records behind, a then-childhood bully ended up controlling his town in the future. After, he had to go even further back in time to save his great-grandparents (who looked suspiciously like him and his birth mother, implying an uncomfortable degree of consanguinity, but never mind) during the Old American West from a giant mechanical spider controlled by a bitter Confederate General name Loveless. It must be true, I saw it on TV.

"TV is real, TV is very real!" - Reggie's boyfriend, "Night of the Comet"

Tony

Abbott Shaull

12-24-2010, 07:53 PM

Wow...Thanks for the laugh...

Raellus

12-31-2010, 04:01 PM

dragoon500ly

12-31-2010, 04:37 PM

I'm just finishing The Last Stand by Nathanial Philbrick (I've also read his other excellent histories, In the Heart of the Sea and Mayflower) about Custer's defeat at the Little Bighorn. Have either of you read it? If not, I highly recommend it. It's really well-written and researched.

Based on my reading, I think that you can put Custer's defeat down to three major factors: Poor intelligence/inadequate battlefield reconaissance, disunity among the regiment's officers (most notably, the extreme antipathy between Custer, Reno, and Benteen- and the latter two didn't much care for one another, either), and Custer's decision to split up his command into no less than three parts in the face of a numerically superior enemy.

Just picked up Last Stand and started reading it.

There was an article a few years ago in the Armored Journal about a war game that was run by the War College. They presented LBH in more modern terms and changed the names of the innocent of course, but the intresting thing to come out was just how many officers split their battalion task force and did the same sort of flanking maneuver as GAC. The general conclusion is that Custer's basic battle plan was sound...."hold them by the nose and kick them in the ass!"

If Reno had engaged the Indian villages, yes he would have been outnumbered, but the Custer battalion would have been crossing the Little Big Horn River and hitting the Indians on the cavalry right flank while Benteen's battalion would have been doing the same thing on the left flank. The failure of Reno to take his objective, the failure of Benteen to complete his maneuver as planned; the failure of the both battalions to move towards Custer or to even send dispatches alerting Custer to the failure of Reno'a attack are what led to Custer being hit by the majority of the Indians present. It was not until the 20th Century when some historians started playing "armchair general" that the debate on Custer's splitting the regiment caused his defeat. His tactics were known to his fellow officers, and most importantly, they did not condemn his tactics.

Raellus

12-31-2010, 06:08 PM

If Reno had engaged the Indian villages, yes he would have been outnumbered, but the Custer battalion would have been crossing the Little Big Horn River and hitting the Indians on the cavalry right flank while Benteen's battalion would have been doing the same thing on the left flank. The failure of Reno to take his objective, the failure of Benteen to complete his maneuver as planned; the failure of the both battalions to move towards Custer or to even send dispatches alerting Custer to the failure of Reno'a attack are what led to Custer being hit by the majority of the Indians present. It was not until the 20th Century when some historians started playing "armchair general" that the debate on Custer's splitting the regiment caused his defeat. His tactics were known to his fellow officers, and most importantly, they did not condemn his tactics.

Yes, indeed. If his plan had worked, he'd have won the career-elevating, legacy-ensuring victory that he craved. Military historians would be hailing him as a military genius instead of branding him a rash fool. I'm not sure it's Custer-bashing or airmchair generalling to be critical of his decision. It's a military maxim dating back millenia not to divide your force in the presence of numerically superior enemy. He had information to suggest that the village he was attempting to find was far larger than any other he'd seen and he chose to split his command anyway. If he'd only split it once, his plan might actually have worked or, at the very least, his battalion wouldn't have been wiped out. Instead, he split it three times (Reno, Benteen, two wings of his own battalion) and, as a result, one of the groups (his battalion) was wiped out and another (Reno's) nearly so.

Considering his horrible relationships with Benteen and Reno, Custer should have kept them closer. It seems odd that he gave them the leeway that he did, considering that both of them had made no secrets for the contempt and lack of respect they had for their nominally superior officer. As it stands, Benteen ignored a direct, written order to rejoin Custer and Reno, drunk on duty, was a silly mess throughout the battle. Custer gave them the rope, and they hung him with it. The decision to split the command into three plus separate elements that could not offer mutual support is Custer's fault alone, and the genesis of his eventual defeat.

Abbott Shaull

12-31-2010, 11:25 PM

dragoon500ly

01-01-2011, 07:48 AM

Yes it was wisdom of not dividing one forces goes way back before the Indian Wars, but it was tactic that the US had used time and again with success. So yeah the tactic, just happen not to work too well this time. When most of the times the Indian would cut and run, why would he stake this time was any different.

Why indeed!

Now if you want to argue gross stupidity, the classic example would have to be the Fetterman Massacre during the Red Cloud War of 1866-1868.

Explorer John Bozeman pioneered a route to the newly discovered Montana goldfields that passed directly through the Sioux hunting grounds in 1863. By 1865, the government had completed a road from Fort Laramie, Wyoming into Montana (the Bozeman Trail). Oglala Sioux chief Red Cloud and other Sioux bands showed their support for developement of the area by attacking miners, army patrols and wagon trains that trespassed onto thie land that had been promised them by under terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 (WHAT, you expect the government to actually keep their own treaties?)

In 1866, the army attempted to negotiate a new treaty, but Red Cloud's demand that no new forts be built halted the treaty talks. The army built two new forts to protect the Bozeman Trail, Phil Kearny in Wyoming and C.F. Smith in Montana and reinforced Fort Reno in Wyoming.

Red Cloud retaliated by a series of hit-and-run attacks that harasses the soldiers at every turn with over 2,000 warriors, including such raising war leaders as Rain-in-the-Face, Gall and Crazy Horse, and managed to keep Fort Phil Kearny under near constant seige. A favorite target of the Indian raids were the parties that were sent out to cut wood and hay. Into this situation, enters one Captain William J. Fetterman, 27th Infantry. Fetterman is perhaps the closest to matching Hollywood's version of GAC, brash, hard-headed, and certain of his own greatness, Fetterman held the Sioux Indians in the highest disregard, being best remembered for his boost that he "could ride through the entire Sioux nation with eighty good men."

On December, 21, 1866, Captain Fettermen got his chance.

A woodcutting detail had been sent out and came under Sioux attack. Fetterman was ordered to take a detail to reinforce the woodcutting detail. Instead, Fetterman followed a party of Indians, led by Crazy Horse, who proceeded to flee from Fetterman's command. Violating his orders not to ride over Lodge Pole Ridge, Fetterman followed the decoy party into the teeth of Red Cloud's Sioux warriors. By sheer luck, Fetterman was facing 2,000 Sioux warriors with 80 infantry and cavalrymen. The results were foregone, Fetterman and his 80 men were annihilated.

The Red Cloud War continued through 1867 and ended in the Wagon Box Fight on August 2, 1867. A woodcutting detail was ambushed six miles from Phil Kearny. The Indians, over the course of four hours, alternated in between sniping and attacks before reinforcements from Phil Kearny arrived. The soldiers were armed with Spencer rifles and managed to inflict heavy losses on the Indians...estimates for Indian losses range from 60 killed to 6 killed, the soldiers lost 6 killed and 2 wounded.

The constant harassment made the soldiers virtual prisoners inside their forts and safe travel over the Bozeman Trail was impossible. The government finally gave in to the situation and the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 ended hostilities. The government agreed to abandon the forts on the Bozeman Tail and to provide the Sioux a reservation that encompasses almost all of South Dakota west of the Mississippi River. Whites were expressly forbidden to trespass on Indian lans. More than 200 chiefs signed the treaty on July 2, 1868. Red Cloud did not sign until November 6, following the withdraw of the soldiers from the forts. The forts were literally burned down by the waiting Sioux before the soldiers were out of sight.

Abbott Shaull

01-01-2011, 09:38 AM

Why indeed!

Now if you want to argue gross stupidity, the classic example would have to be the Fetterman Massacre during the Red Cloud War of 1866-1868.

Explorer John Bozeman pioneered a route to the newly discovered Montana goldfields that passed directly through the Sioux hunting grounds in 1863. By 1865, the government had completed a road from Fort Laramie, Wyoming into Montana (the Bozeman Trail). Oglala Sioux chief Red Cloud and other Sioux bands showed their support for developement of the area by attacking miners, army patrols and wagon trains that trespassed onto thie land that had been promised them by under terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 (WHAT, you expect the government to actually keep their own treaties?)

In 1866, the army attempted to negotiate a new treaty, but Red Cloud's demand that no new forts be built halted the treaty talks. The army built two new forts to protect the Bozeman Trail, Phil Kearny in Wyoming and C.F. Smith in Montana and reinforced Fort Reno in Wyoming.

Red Cloud retaliated by a series of hit-and-run attacks that harasses the soldiers at every turn with over 2,000 warriors, including such raising war leaders as Rain-in-the-Face, Gall and Crazy Horse, and managed to keep Fort Phil Kearny under near constant seige. A favorite target of the Indian raids were the parties that were sent out to cut wood and hay. Into this situation, enters one Captain William J. Fetterman, 27th Infantry. Fetterman is perhaps the closest to matching Hollywood's version of GAC, brash, hard-headed, and certain of his own greatness, Fetterman held the Sioux Indians in the highest disregard, being best remembered for his boost that he "could ride through the entire Sioux nation with eighty good men."

On December, 21, 1866, Captain Fettermen got his chance.

A woodcutting detail had been sent out and came under Sioux attack. Fetterman was ordered to take a detail to reinforce the woodcutting detail. Instead, Fetterman followed a party of Indians, led by Crazy Horse, who proceeded to flee from Fetterman's command. Violating his orders not to ride over Lodge Pole Ridge, Fetterman followed the decoy party into the teeth of Red Cloud's Sioux warriors. By sheer luck, Fetterman was facing 2,000 Sioux warriors with 80 infantry and cavalrymen. The results were foregone, Fetterman and his 80 men were annihilated.

The Red Cloud War continued through 1867 and ended in the Wagon Box Fight on August 2, 1867. A woodcutting detail was ambushed six miles from Phil Kearny. The Indians, over the course of four hours, alternated in between sniping and attacks before reinforcements from Phil Kearny arrived. The soldiers were armed with Spencer rifles and managed to inflict heavy losses on the Indians...estimates for Indian losses range from 60 killed to 6 killed, the soldiers lost 6 killed and 2 wounded.

The constant harassment made the soldiers virtual prisoners inside their forts and safe travel over the Bozeman Trail was impossible. The government finally gave in to the situation and the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 ended hostilities. The government agreed to abandon the forts on the Bozeman Tail and to provide the Sioux a reservation that encompasses almost all of South Dakota west of the Mississippi River. Whites were expressly forbidden to trespass on Indian lans. More than 200 chiefs signed the treaty on July 2, 1868. Red Cloud did not sign until November 6, following the withdraw of the soldiers from the forts. The forts were literally burned down by the waiting Sioux before the soldiers were out of sight.

Wow talk about stupidity...

dragoon500ly

01-01-2011, 12:27 PM

Wow talk about stupidity...

Yup...the Fetterman episode is the closest to the Hollywood version of LBH.

And the whole Red Cloud War was a defeat for the army...helps explain why they were so determined to push forward in the 1870s..

Abbott Shaull

01-01-2011, 08:20 PM

Yeah I understand that....

dragoon500ly

01-02-2011, 06:54 AM

I hold the work of Dr Fox on LBH to be a real breakthrough in the study of what happened to the Custer Battalion...until I managed to get my hands on some of the Upton manual of cavalry tactics...

Dr Fox talks alot about what he called bunching on the field, for those of us who have walked the battlefield, you see single tombstones then pairs of tombstones (long claimed to be the bodies of "bunkies" these are really mismarked graves of single troopers, the dirt being scooped up from either side to make a mound left two "grave" depressions), and finally you see clusters of tombstones, especially around one of the markers for an officer's grave.

The bunching theory is basically that as command & control breaks down, the troops crowd together, each man inching closer to another as the skirmish line breaks down. Then, eventually, the men start to flee the skirmish line, again moving closer to each in a blind effort to seek mutual support/courage. The end of the bunching theory holds that the troopers fled back to their officers and clustered around the last vestigae of command, shortly before the Indians overran the troopers. This was especially used to explain the rather large cluster of dead troopers found on Battle Ridge around the body of Captin Keeogh.

I'm trying to confirm this by getting additional pages from the Upton manual, but I have found several references to the troops should rally on their officers in the event of the skirmish line being hard pressed. Was the bunching caused simply by troopers falling back on their officer? Or is Dr Fox correct in stating that this is simply a sign of the breakdown of the battalion in the face of heavy pressure?