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#1
12-17-2010, 02:25 PM
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Little Big Horn, A Study of a Cavalry Regiment in the Indian Wars
So why the hooplaa over a battle that took place on June 25-26, 1876? After all,the root cause was a insane, glory hound named George Armstring Custer, at least that's what numerous Hollywood movies, various TV miniseries and scores of authors have told us every since that hot, summer day on a Montana Territory hillside. But when studying history, what is unearthed is many times, not what popular history says it is.
The Battle of the Little Big Horn cost the US Army 268 men killed, or just over 1% of its total authorized strength of 26,312 men. Compared to the battles of the Civil War, LBH is at most, a minor skirmish. But to the regular army of the 1870s, 1 percent of its strength was a staggering loss. During the period of the Indian Wars (1866-1891) the US Army lost 1,128 men in the trans-Mississippi West. LBH accounts for one quarter of all the men killed during this period. This makes LBH a staggering defeat when viewed in the context of the small numbers of casualties that would normally be expected in an fight with Indians. When the Civil War ended in 1865, it brought about a reorganization of the army. The army had two roles, the first of policing the reconstruction effort in the South and the second of restoring order on the frontier. During the war, the frontier was guarded by over-stretched regular regiments or by various state militia units. The Indians took advantage of this and committed a series of depredations against white settlers, particularly in the Great Plains. The army, following the reorganization of 1866 consisted of twenty-five regiments of infantry (two colored), ten regiments of cavalry (two colored) and five regiments of artillery. The U.S. Seventh Cavalry was a brand new regiment created as part of the 1866 reorganization. In July, 1866, George Custer, brevet major general of volunteers and permament rank of captain in the regular army, was appointed as lieutenant colonel of the new regiment. Custer joined his new regiment at its permanent station at Fort Riley, Kansas.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. 
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#2
12-17-2010, 05:38 PM
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The organization of the regiment was comprised of a regimental staff and twelve companies (the official term is company for both the cavalry and artillery regiments, troop and battery were unofficial names, although widely used).
The Regimental Staff of the Seventh Cavalry consisted of Colonel Samuel D. Sturgis (detached service to St. Louis, Missouri Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer (acting commander) Major Joseph Tilford (leave of absence) Major Lewis Merrill (detached service to Washington DC) Major Marcus Reno Adjutant First Lieutenant William Cooke (Custer Bn, killed in action) Quartermaster First Lieutenant Henry Nowlan Assistant Surgeon George Lord (Custer Bn, killed in action) Acting Assistant Surgeon James DeWolf (Reno Bn, killed in action) Acting Assistant Surgeon Henry Porter Veterinary Surgeon C. A. Stein (detached to Yellowstone Depot) Sergeant Major William Sharrow (Custer Bn, killed in action) Quartermaster Sergeant (detached to Yellowstone Depot) Commissary Sergeant Saddler Sergeant John Tritten (detached to Yellowstone Depot) Chief Trumpeter Henry Voss (Custer Bn, killed in action) Chief Musician Felix Vinatieri (detached to Yellowstone Depot) sixteen privates, regimental band, detached to Yellowstone Depot)
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#3
12-18-2010, 07:59 AM
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Company Organization of the 1876 Cavalry Regiment
The Seventh Cavalry was made up of twelve companies. In spite of what Hollywood/TV would have you believe, Companies is the correct usage. Even the Artillery Regiments called their units companies instead of batteries. The terms troop and battery were in common use during this period. You would see written orders to "Commanding Officer of Company G" for example, while on the field the verbal order would be "G Troop will advance", of course this really depended on the senior officer involved!
The organization of the companies changed several times. There is the 1866, 1869, 1870, 1874 (twice!) and the 1875 reorganizations. The basic setup on July 28, 1866 provided for the following: Captain First Lieutenant Second Lieutenant First Sergeant Quartermaster Sergeant 5 Sergeants 8 Corporals 2 Trumpeters 2 Farriers & Blacksmiths 1 Saddler 1 Wagoner 78 Privates The latest organization (the one used at LBH) was: Captain First Lieutenant Second Lieutenant First Sergeant 5 Sergeants 4 Corporals 2 Trumpeters 2 Farriers & Blacksmiths 1 Saddler 1 Wagoner 54 Privates At LBH the companies looked like this: Company A: Captain Myles Moylan; one officer killed, one officer wounded, 8 enlisted killed, 6 enlisted wounded (1 died of wounds). Total=10 killed, 6 wounded out of 55 men on roster Company B: Captain Thomas McDougall; 1 officer killed, 2 enlisted killed, 5 enlisted wounded. Total=3 killed, 5 wounded out of 71 men on roster Company C: Thomas Custer; 3 officers killed, 36 enlisted killed, 4 enlisted wounded (1 died of wounds). Total=40 killed, 3 wounded out of 66 men on roster Company D: Captain Thomas Weir; 3 enlisted killed, 3 enlisted wounded. Total 3 killed, 3 wounded out of 64 men on roster Company E: Captain Charles Ilsley; 1 officer killed, 37 enlisted killed, 2 enlisted wounded. Total=38 killed, 2 wounded out of 61 men on roster Company F: Captain George Yates; 1 officer killed, 36 enlisted killed. Total=37 killed out of 68 men on roster Company G: Captain Joun Tourtellotte; 1 officer killed, 13 enlisted killed, 6 enlisted wounded. Total=14 killed, 6 wounded out of 69 men on roster Company H: Captain Frederick Benteen; 1 officer wounded, 2 enlisted killed, 20 enlisted wounded (2 died of wounds). Total= 4 killed, 19 wounded out of 55 men on roster Company I: Captain Myles Keeogh; 2 officers killed, 36 enlisted killed, 1 wounded (died of wounds). Total=39 killed out of 65 men on roster. Company K: Captain Owen Hale; 5 enlisted killed, 3 enlisted wounded. Total 5 killed, 3 wounded out of 69 men on roster Company L: Captain Michael Sheridan; 1 officer killed, 44 enlisted killed, 1 enlisted wounded. Total=45 killed, 1 wounded out of 69 men on roster Company M: Captain Thomas French; 1 officer killed, 12 enlisted killed, 11 enlisted wounded (1 died of wounds). Total=14 killed, 10 wounded out of 63 men on roster Quartermaster Employees present: 21 men fall into this category: comprised of 3 Guides, 2 Interpreters, 1 Correspondent, 13 Packers, 1 Scout, 1 accompanying civilian. Of these, 3 Guides, 2 Interpreters, 1 Correspondent, 1 Accompanying Civilian, and 1 Packer were killed and 1 Packer wounded. Total 8 killed, 1 wounded out of 21 men present Indian Scouts present: 51 Crow, Ree, Dak and Sioux scouts rode with the 7th Cavalry. Of these 2 were killed and 2 were wounded.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#4
12-18-2010, 08:11 AM
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Tactical Organization of the Seventh
When GAC split the Seventh Cavalry up on June 25, 1876, this was the tactical orginzation:
Custer's Battalion Regimental Staff: Lieutenant Colonel George Custer Company C: Captain Thomas Custer Company E: First Lieutenant Algernon Smith Compant F: Captain George Yates Company I: Captain Myles Keogh Company L: First Lieutenant James Calhoun Reno's Battalion Battalion Staff: Major Marcus Reno Company A: Captain Myles Moylan Company G: First Lieutenant Donald McIntosh Company M: Captain Thomas French Benteen's Battalion Battalion Staff: Captain Frederick Benteen Company D: Captain Thomas Wier Company H: First Lieutenant Francis Gibson Company K: First Lieutenant Edward Godfrey Pack Train Escort Company B: Captain Thomas McDougall detachement of 1 NCO and 6 enlisted men from each troop.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#5
12-18-2010, 08:37 AM
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Indian Strength and Losses
"Holy Shit! Look at all of those damned Ind----" Famous last words supposed to have been uttered by George Custer
So just how many Indians were supposed to have been present at Little Big Horn? The simple answer is that no one knows for sure. What is known is that the villages in the Valley of the Little Big Horn River had grown considerably in size from earlier in the year. Families would leave the reservation and join others for a summer of freedom. The Indian Agents would under report these depatures in order to continue to receive supplies for the larger number, which they would then turn around and sell and pocket the profit. How large was the problem? The Standing Rock Indian Agency reported that 7,000 Indians were present, a count conducted by the Army confirmed only 2,300 were actually present. In 1877, the Scott Expedition returned to the Little Big Horn to rebury the cavalry men, the commanding officer of the expedition, Lieutenant H.L. Scott took the time to count the number of lodge circles present in the valley. He stopped counting at 1,500. This effort, while intresting, proves little as many families often moved several times, each time leaving a lodge circle. In addition, Lt. Scott failed to count the hundreds of wickiups, brush shelters that housed one or two people. The following are estimates of the numbers of warriors by various officers who either took part in the battle or examined the field afterwards: Colonel John Gibbon, 2,500; 2nd Lt Luther Hale, 4,000; scout George Herendeen, 3,000; 1st Lt Charles DeRudio, 3-4,000; Captain Myles Moylan, 3,500-4,000; 2nd Lt Charles Varnum, 4,000. 2nd Lt George Wallace first estimated 3,000 and then changed his mind at the Reno Court of Inquiry, testifing that there were 9,000. Captain Frederick Benteen initially estimated 1,500 and then changed his mind and stated 8-9,000. Even the Indians themselves could not provide an exact number. Chief Gall refused to offer any estimate; Flat Iron, 8,000; Chief Runs-the-Enemy, 2,000; Flying Hawk, 1,000 and Crazy Horse, at least 7,000. Red Cloud estimated 2,000. Allegedly, Indians believed that the number was less than a 1,000 and that anyone who counted higher than a 1,000 was dishonest. Even the various historians have different values: Stanley Vestal, 2,500; Frazier Hunt, 1,800 to 2,000; Lewis Crawford, 2,000-2,500; Fred Dustin, 3,000-3,500; Charles Eastman, not more than 1,400; Edgar Stewart, 3,000; Robert Utley; 2,000; Jeffery Wert, 2,000; anf George Grinnell, 4,500-6,000. The best estimate of the actual number of lodges was provided by John Gray: Northern Cheyenne: 120 Oglala Sioux: 240 Blackfoot, Brule and Two Kettle Sioux: 120 Sans Arc Sioux: 110 Minniconjou Sioux: 150 Hunkpapa Sioux: 235 Yanktonnais and Santee Sious: 25 Gray estimates the total number of lodges at 1,000, but he does not include any Arapaho, members of this tribe were known to be present. It is estimated that each lodge would be home to two warriors, perhaps more if the older boys were counted. Add to this the large number of wickiups on the north end of the village which housed young warriors who did not live with their families; subtract the number of men who had reached old age (after their 40th birthday)..... Whatever the exact number, it is fair to assume that the Seventh Cavalry was outnumbered. As for the Indian losses, estimated varily wildly from a low of 30-40 to as many as 500. As Custer had observed earlier "The Indians invariably endeavored to conceal their exact losses." The only Indian casualties that were found after the battle, consisted of eight bodies left within two lodges in the abandoned village. These warriors were dressed in their finest clothing and were lying on scaffolds. Even the Indians are divided on thier own losses. Red Horse later stated that "the soldiers killed 136 and wounded 160 Sioux".
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#6
12-18-2010, 09:06 AM
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Battlefield Terrain
What is today considered the Little Big Horn Battlefield lays on the northern side of the Little Big Horn River. Running from east to west:
The Reno-Benteen Defense Site: Here seven companies of the Seventh under the command of Major Reno held a defensive position ontop of this bluff after Renos rout from the valley floor. It lies about 600 yards north of the LBHR. Remains of the crude trench and rifle pits dug by the troopers can still be scene. Next is Sharpshooter's Ridge located about 500 yards north of the Reno-Beenteen Defense Site. On this ridge, throughout July 26th, an Indian sharpshooter killed or wounded a number of the pinned-down troopers. This Indian gained a grudging respect for his marksmanship before being either killed or forced away from the rdige by the troopers concentrated fire. Wier Point, located about a mile northwest of the RBDS is a small promontory above Medicine Tail Coulee. This is the location that Captain Wier and his company advanced to without orders from Reno/Benteen. From this point, Captain Wier was able to observe Indians in the distance firing at objects on the ground around Custer Hill. Weir was forced back from this point and driven back to the RBDS. Medicine Tail Coulee runs from north of Wier Point about 300 yards to the river at the southern end of the Indian village on the opposite bank. Indians tell of a movement by part of Custer's Battalion down this ravine (either as a feint or as an attempt to attack the village). This movement met with fierce opposition and retreated north and east (up Deep Coulee?) to Battle Ridge. There are also stories that Custer was either killed or wounded during this fight. Nye-Cartwright Ridge forms part of the divide between Medicine Tail Coulee and Deep Coulee and was named for two students who located numerous firing positions in the area. It is believed that troopers deployed in this position to cover Custer's right flank and cover the approach of the pack train. Deep Coulee leads to the LBHR near the center of the Indian village and is located at the northern end of the Nye-Cartwright Ridge, just south of Calhoun Hill. It is believed that elements of Custer's Battalion may have retreated up this coulee after attacking down Medicine Tail Coulee and then being repulsed by the Indians. Gall and a group of warriors rode up this coulee to attack Battle Ridge near Calhoun Hill. Calhoun Hill overlooks Deep Coulee and is the southern end of Battle Ridge. This is the location that Lieutenant Calhoun and Company L were overrun and killed by Gall and Crazy Horse. Battle Ridge is a half-mile long ridge that is bordered by Custer Hill on the north and Calhoun Hill on the south. This us where most of the Custer Battalion fought and died. Crazy Horse is believed to have rallied a group of warriors in the village, crossed the river and then swept down Battle Ridge from Custer Hill to Calhoun Hill, killing everyone in his path. Deep Ravine is also sometimes called North Medicine Tail Coulee by some researchers. It is located near the end of the slope that runs from Custer Hill west to the LBHR. This line is sometimes referred to as the South Skirmish Line, although there is little or no evidence of any major fighting. Indian stories hint at an attempt by a company-sized force attempting to break-out from Custer Hill/Battle Ridge. Testimony by soldiers burying their dead two days later state that 28 men of Company E were buried in a mass grave at a point some 2,000 feet from Custer Hill, near the end of Deep Ravine. These bodies have never been recovered. Custer Hill, this is the northern part of Battle Ridge and is the location where the body of Custer and 40 of his men were found. The location is currently marked a monument erected in 1881 and bearing the names of all the officers and enlisted killed in the battle stands on top of the hill. The graveyard of Custer and his men was actually relocated to their present positions when the monument was erected.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#7
12-18-2010, 11:32 AM
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Weapons at Little Big Horn-The Cavalry
In 1870, the army's Ordnance Department held field trials of various rifles and carbines to replace the mismash of Civil War relics that armed the troops. The army sought a weapon that was reliable and used a single-shot system rather than the newer repeaters due to manufacturing cost. The initial ninety entrys from such makers Elliott, Freeman, Mauser, Peabody and Spencer were narrowed down to four: The Remington rolling block; the sliding breech block Sharps; the trapdoor Springfield and the bolt-action Ward Burton. The final selection was made by the 1872 board presided by General Alfred Terry and including Major Marcus Reno as a member. The board's decision was announced on May 5,1873 by the secretary of war.
The Model 1873 Springfield Carbine in .45/55 caliber was the winner. It was a single-shot, breech-loading carbine that measured 41.3 inches in length and weighed 6.9 pounds. Its .45-caliber cartridge used a copper-case loaded with 55 grains of black powder and an effective range of 300 yards and a maximum range of 1,000 yards. A properly trained cavalryman could fire his carbine at 15 rounds per minute. The Seventh was issued the M1873 prior to the 1874 Black Hills Expedition. The Springfield would remain the basic weapon of the army until its replacement by the Krag-Jorgensen magazine rifle in 1892. The troopers were also issued the Model P 1872 Colt single-action revolver which was chosen because of its simpler operation, stronger parts and reliability. This .45-caliber weapon had a 7.5-inch barrel, fired six metallic cartridges loaded with 28 grains of black powder and had an effective range of 60 yards. At the Battle of the Little Big Horn, the troopers of the Seventh were issued 100 rounds of carbine ammunition, half carried in their saddle bags and half carried in issue ammo boxes holding 28 rounds or in the new "prairie belts" that held 50 rounds (the prairie belt was a leather belt with leather thimble loops sewed on). A disadvantage of the prairie belt was the interaction of the chemicals used in the tanning process interacting with the copper cases, resulting in deposits on the cartridge. The trooper was also issued 24 rounds for his revolver, six in the weapon and 18 carried in a small pouch on his belt. Contrary to Hollywood/TV, the frontier trooper did not carry his issue saber into the field. The saber was a heavy, cumbersome and noisy weapon that was merely an ornament for the parade field. Only one officer, 1st Lt Charles DeRudio, who had served as a cavalryman in Europe, carried his saber into LBH. In the years since 1876, there has been a stream of debates about the malfunctions of the Springfield carbine. The primary cause was the use of copper cases, combined with a defective extractor mechanism and simple dirt, could cause the base of the cartridge to be torn away when the block was opened. This would leave the body of the cartridge stuck inside the firing chamber, requiring the use of a pocket knife or horseshoe nail to pry the cylinder out prior to reloading and firing. While this is a known problem, just how bad was this defect at LBH? The best source is the 1983-1986 archaelogical survey conducted by Dr. Richard A. Fox . A study of recovered .44/55-caliber cartridge casings confirmed that very few displayed evidence of pry or scratch marks. On the Custer portion of the battlefield only 3 of 88 casings showed any evidence of pry marks. On the Reno-Benteen Defense Site, out of 257 casings, only 7 showed evidence of prying. Based on this sample, it appears that malfunction caused by the carbines jamming was, at best, minimal and therefore cannot be considered to be a factor in the defeat. There is another possibility in that the men simply ran out of carbine ammunition, Each trooper only carried 50 rounds in his cartridge belt. The additional 50 rounds in his saddle bags were lost when the Indians stampeded the horses. Fifty rounds fired in the heat of battle could be expended in a very short period of time. The Colt revolvers, with their 24 rounds of ammo, would not have lasted long. Remember that Custer dispatched an urgent message to the pack train asking that the regimental ammo reserve be brought forward. There is a possibility that rather than jamming carbines, the real cause of Custer's defeat is that his men simply ran out of ammunition. This would also explain why Custer's command was strung out along Battle Ridge instead of being formed into a compact defensive position. The companies to the south, may have been trying to hold open a corridor for the pack train and the ammunition reserve.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#8
12-18-2010, 05:21 PM
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Weapons of Little Big Horn-The Indians
One of the enduring myths of LBH is that the Indians were armed with Winchester rifles and that this allowed them to overwhelm Custer's Battalion under the sheer weight of their firepower. At LBH the Indians were armed with weapons ranging from warclubs, bows and arrows, lances, knives, tomahawks and a wide array of old and new firearms. The Indians obtained their firearms through a variety of means ranging from trade, gun running, capture from enemies, or issued by the US government for hunting purposes.
The archaeological excavations of the battlefield, starting in 1983 recovered cartridge casings from 45 different makes of firearms used by 371 different individuals. This evidence confirms that the Indians were in possession of Spencers, Sharps, Smith & Wessens, Evans, Forehand & Wadworths, Remingtons, Henrys, Starrs, Winchesters, Maynards and Enfields, as well as Springfields and Colts captured from the cavalry. An intresting view on the weapons used by the Indians came from the last survivor of the battle, Private Charles Windolph, a Medal of Honor winner with Company H. Windolph stated that at least half of of the Indians were armed with bows and arrows, another quarter were armed with old muzzleloaders and single-hot rifles, and the remainder were armed with repeaters. Major Marcus Reno stated in his Court of Inquiry that "the Indians had Winchester rifles and the column made a large target for them and they were pumping bullets into it." The Winchester was THE weapon of choice of the Indians whenever they could get get their hands on it. The Winchester Model 1866 fired a .44-caliber, 200-grain bullet with 28 grains of black powder. It had a magazine capacity of seventeen rounds and had an effective range of 100 yards and a maximum range of about 400 yards. Its main advantage was its high rate of fire of 34rpm, compared to the 17rpm of the Springfield. Indian tactics called for the warriors to remain hidden a safe distance away while they fired an endless barrage of arrows at the cavalrymen. Add to the arrow barrage the favored Indian tactic of infiltrating as close as possible to the cavalry and then using the awesome short range firepower of the Winchester...this allowed them to acheive complete fire-superiority over the cavalry.
__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#9
12-18-2010, 05:30 PM
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Wow. They only had 100 carbine rounds and 24 pistol rounds.
Yeah I would say it probably more lack of resupply of ammo, in combination with some reckless tactics, and some disregard of orders (depending on how you look at it). It kinda like reading one of those Second from disaster shows. Not one thing in particular may have led to a lost battle, but enough incidents happen during a timeline that led to failure. I do find it interesting that Major Reno wasn't court martial afterwards, but considering how many Officers in the Army felt about GAC. There were many who felt he only got to his position by luck and hadn't really earned his way to position he held in the war and lack the experience of the post Civil War Army that held too. On a side note, same Lt. Colonel GAC, seems to have been suspended from command of the said regiment, and was court martial for being AWOL due to the fact he went to see his wife.
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#10
12-18-2010, 05:40 PM
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#11
12-18-2010, 05:44 PM
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The interesting "What if" of LBH
What I find the most unusual tale of June 26, 1876, is the note sent by GAC via Pvt John Martin to Captain Benteen.
GAC commanded 5 companies of the 7th Cav Reno commanded 3 Benteen commanded 3 One company was with the pack train. WHAT IF..... Benteen had not been ordered by GAC to scout the left flank, instead stay with Reno, and the pack train to form a more compact unit. Could the 7 Companies do more than the 5 with Custer? Hard to tell. Reno and Benteen fought for 2 days once reunited until reinforced by Terry. Probably would have made no difference on "Last Stand Hill"...But one of those little "what if's" of history
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#12
12-18-2010, 05:49 PM
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What the press did to him is very familiar to what happens today if a military officer "gets out of line".
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#13
12-18-2010, 05:51 PM
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When you look at the available ammo loadout, you need to consider the means of transport. The typical cavalry mount has a useful load of 240 pounds. Attached is a list of equipment to be carried by a trooper for a five day patrol.
Halter: 2lbs 1oz Watering Bridle: 1lb, 1.5oz Bridle: 2lbs 13oz Saddle: 14lbs 13.5oz Saddle Bags: 2lbs 2oz Filling of near side pouch of saddle bags, 10lbs of rations with meat in the can: 11lbs 2 oz Filling of off side pouch of saddle bags, 1pr socks, 1 pr drawers, 2 shirts, 40rds carbine ammo, toilet articles: 7lbs 8 oz Forage Sack with 15lbs of oats: 15lbs 6oz Lariat and pin: 3lbs 1.5oz Overcoat: 4lbs 6.5oz Brush and shoe pouch: 1lb Near-side pocket, curry comb and brush: 1lb Off-side pocket, 2 horseshoes, 15 shoe nails: 2lbs Saddle cover: 1lb Surcingle: 11.5oz Saber & slings: 4lbs 13oz Waist belt and plate: 1lb Pistol and holster: 3lbs 2oz Carbine sling and swivel: 10lbs 4 oz Carbine cartridge box: 1lb 24rds carbine ammo in box: 2lbs Pistol cartridge pouch: 4oz 12rds pistol ammo in pouch: 14oz Man: 140lbs Total weight: 240lbs 12.5oz As you can see, there is not a lot of room for extra gear, this is perhaps the major reason why the saber was left in garrision, that 4lbs and 13oz translates allowed for extra carbine/pistol ammo.
__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#14
12-18-2010, 06:04 PM
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The finding of the court was as follows: "The conduct of the officers throughout was excellent, and while subordinates, in some instances, did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires animadversion (criticism or censure) from this Court." It was later discovered that one of the Courts officers Colonel Wesley Merritt had "closeted with the Recorder alone for several hours, and, it is understood, did most of the work of the decision, the Recorder having no voice save to present the case on trial." Merritt had hated Custer since their days in the Cavalry Division of the Army of the Potomac and there was little doubt among the handful of Custer supporters that he had taken full advantage to blacken the name of his old rival.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. Last edited by Targan; 12-18-2010 at 10:40 PM. Reason: Fixed broken quote
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#15
12-18-2010, 06:08 PM
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__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#17
12-18-2010, 11:04 PM
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#18
12-18-2010, 11:14 PM
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Looking at the numbers that are present per company, the Cavalry had two Platoons. The thing is they had 5 Sergeants after the company First Sergeant. Usually the 1st Lt commanded the 1st Platoon and the 2nd Lt commanded the 2nd Platoon. The senior Sergeant was usually teamed with 2nd Lt platoon and the next senior would be with the First Lt platoon. If IIRC the Corporals would at time act more like E-5 of today Squad Leaders.
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#19
12-19-2010, 07:27 AM
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As part of this change, Upton introduced the "set of fours" as the basic tactical unit. Also referred to as a squad, the set of fours allowed for simplified operations, increased speed, and eliminated cumbersome maneuvers. Platoons, at least as we know them today, did not exist. If a smaller unit was needed, then the company was split into two even parts and these were called platoons. The company would often be split into platoons for the dismounted skirmish role, since Upton called for each company to maintain a small reserve. One platoon skirmished while the other platoon stood ready to reinforce the skirmish line, restock ammo, or mount charges to restore the line. Skirmish tactics called for the cavalry to fight dismounted and deployed in a line with every 4th trooper acting as horse-holder for the rest of the set of fours. Skirmishers deployed with 5 yards between each trooper and 15 yards between each set of fours. The commander could order a wider or closer interval, depending on the situation. When ordered to engage, the odd-numbered men would fire first and start reloading, then the even-numbered men would fire and reload, this would continue until the command to cease fire was given. Dismounted skirmishers would stand or kneel to fire as they thought best, they could even seek cover, but not at the expense of firepower. The skirmish line could deliver direct or oblique fire as needed. Within the battalion organization, "wings" could be used, at the commander's discreation. The companies would be organized according to their commander's seniority. The Custer battalion, based on Indian testimony, operated in two wings. The Right Wing consisted of Companies C, I and L, with Captain Myles Keogh commanding. The Left Wing consisted of Companies E and F with Captain George Yates commanding. Just as a note, some authors group the wings differently, and even split up one company to bring the wings "up to equal strength". The Upton manual, allows for wings of different sizes and a company would never be broken up this manner.
__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#20
12-19-2010, 07:36 AM
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Quote:
As a sidebar, of the 43 officer positions authorized the Seventh, 15 officers were either detached for service or on leave of absence.
__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#21
12-19-2010, 07:49 AM
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The Men of the Seventh
"The soldiers were a superb lot of men physically. The outdoor life had developed them into perfect specimens of vigorous manhood. The soldiers, injured to many years of hardship, were the perfection of physical manhood. Their brawny limbs and lithe, well-poised bodies gave proof of the training their outdoor life had given."
But enough about me.  Elizabeth "Libby" Custer wrote this description of the men of the Seventh in her autobiography in 1913. But the question remains, just what sort of men made up the Seventh? They have been demonized as drunken rapists and murderers, as elite soldiers in the finest regiment, as raw recruits thrown into battle with little or no training and slaughtered on the alter of "manifest destiny". Historical records give names, birth places, locations of enlistment, age, height and a rough description of hair color, eye color and complexion. We therefore have an idea how old they said they were and how tall. From army regulations, medical reports and personal recollections it is possible to build up a physical profile. Taken as a group, the Seventh Cavalry was composed of career military men. As Snow and Fitzpatrick say in their work "They are, after all, a fairly typical sample of US Cavalry troopers of the Indian-fighting Army, who, along with the Indian, the Mountain Man, the Cowboy, the Outlaw, the Lawman and other subspecies of the Westerner, form the cast of the longest-running morality play in American history, The Winning of the West."
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#22
12-19-2010, 08:10 AM
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Recruitment and the Recruit Medical Exam-1870s style
In order to join the Army in the 1870s, the recruit presented himself to a recruiting depot; located in many of the larger cities. He would provide two recommendations, in written form, attesting to his fine character. The recruiting officer would then take the recruit and have him examined by a military surgeon to determine his fitness for service.
The physical exam was always conducted by a surgeon who followed written regulations concerning the inspection and acceptability of the recruit. However, the surgeon was caught on the horns of a dilemma. The surgeon was charged with insuring the selection of thebest quality men, while, on the other hand, having to please the recruiting officer, who was more concerned with numbers and quotas than of quality. Deja vu anyone? The regulations for recruit exams had not changed very much since the 1850s. The recruit was to be examined individually during daylight hours in a well-lighted room. The sober recruit was to enter the room stripped (if dirty, he was to be bathed before entering the exam room), where he would walk briskly around several times. He would then hop around the room, first on one foot and then on the other. After this, the surgeon placed his hand on the recruit's chest and checked for an abnormal heartbeat (the stethoscope was a new instrument in the 1870s and not widely used). The recruit was then made to stand at attention while the surgeon examined his head, eyes, ears, mouth and nose. The surgeon looked for abnormalities such as fractures, depressions, diseases, deafness, unintelligible speech and poor eyesight. The recruit then stretched out his arms at right angles to his body and then touched his shoulders with his hands; placed his hands together over his head and then turned his head and coughed while the surgeon checked for hernia. The surgeon checked the fingers and thumbs for their dexterity. He would also check the chest capacity and looked over the recruit's legs to determine if they were sturdy and could carry the man's weight. Finally, the recruit would bend over and grab his buttocks while the surgeon checked for piles or hemorroids. Hemorroids were cause for rejection but not outright rejection. If there was more than one old pile and it waslarger than a marble, or if one old pile was ulcerated, or if one pile, was associated with a varicose vein, then the recruit was rejected. The surgeon also checked vision for myopia, although recruits with sight defects were acceptable. Hearing was examined for deafness, which was cause for rejection. Among the other causes for rejection were atrophied testicles and extreme bowed legs (ironic since the recruits would be spending long days in the saddle). After passing the exam, the recruit was found fit for service, sworn in, placed in uniform and then sent for three months training before joining his regiment. For soldiers heading west this was Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, Missouri. Recruits received, at best, a brief introduction to army life at the recruit barracks. Most training was limited to close-order drill. When the recruit arrived at his post, the regiment and company provided his real training, mostly by on-the-job training.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#23
12-19-2010, 08:24 AM
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Age of the Men
During the 1870s, the Army had several different minumum ages for enlistment. In 1874 this was 16. Recruits aged between 16 and 18 were limited to musician positions and recruits aged between 18 and 21 needed parental or guardian consent. The normal minimum age was 21.
The reason for establishing a minimum age was twofold. First was the concern that the ability of youths to provide adequate service while also enduring the physical hardships that military life entailed. Second, and a more humanitarian one, was for the youth's growth and developmental well-being. During the mid 1800s there was a belief that overwork, including military life, drained the energy required for normal development, stunting growth and leading to smaller, deformed adults. The maximum age for a first enlistment was more rigid than the minimum age. It was 30 years old for the cavalry. Once a man enlisted, reenlistments could occur well past the age of thirty. The US Army at this time did not have a mandatory retirement age. Research into the records of the members of the Seventh shows some intresting numbers. The average age of a trooper was 25.6 years and the median age, which is less affected by extreme ages was 24. The typical trooper would have been full-grown and in the bloom of his early adulthood, well capable of bearing the strain of military life. The following table shows a the enlistment ages of the Seventh 17 = 1 18 = 8 19 = 7 20 = 8 21 = 193 22 = 96 23 = 59 24 = 53 25 = 38 26 = 65 27 = 72 28 = 47 29 = 36 30 = 31 31 = 18 32 = 15 33 = 23 34 = 15 35 = 14 36 = 8 37 = 8 38 = 1 39 = 5 40 = 6 41 = 1 42 = 1 43 = 1 44 = 2 45 = 5 46 = 1 48 = 1 49 = 1
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#24
12-19-2010, 08:31 AM
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I think it's worth noting that in Vietnam where the Australians were issued with L1A1 SLR rifles, "first line" ammunition load was just 60 rounds of 7.62N, 200 rounds of 5.56N (for those handful who found themselves with an M16) and 600 rounds belted for the M60s.
The US Cavalry with their 100 and 24 were much better supplied when you think about it.
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If it moves, shoot it, if not push it, if it still doesn't move, use explosives. Nothing happens in isolation - it's called "the butterfly effect" Mors ante pudorem
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#25
12-19-2010, 09:04 AM
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Quote:
Then again we didn't have supply trains following us everywhere in the field...
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#26
12-19-2010, 11:24 AM
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While a very small portion of the information is likely incorrect (as time changes so much in history, it seems) this is a very good display of the information for the Battle of Little Big Horn.
Two years ago I made the trip to the Battle of Little Big Horn. If you guys ever get a chance, it's a rather sombering place to visit that really drives home what these guys in the 7th Cavalry experienced. Seeing the grave markers placed where (supposedly) each man fell, the white stone with the individual name on it standing out against the golden wild grass of the hills, it really gives you an idea of not only where they were, but what they were up against. I can also say, based on the chase-kills and surrounded death-pockets where the men died, there was well more than a thousand indians. Five to 1 odds would be something that the cavalry would have handled better. 10 or 20 to 1 would certianly cause the panic, the desperation, and the last ditch attempts to survive on terrain that offered no real place to hide or escape. It's a whole different experience when you put yourself into the battle and see what they saw. Very enlightening, yet very sombering.
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#27
12-19-2010, 11:54 AM
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Have any of you been to the LBH battle site? I've been there, very interesting stuff. Of course they take you on the tour and give you the "official" story, but you can gather quite a bit from just wondering around the place. I've not done an indepth study like dragoon500ly has here, but from my experience of touring the site I would have to make the assumption that Custer was an incompetent.
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#28
12-19-2010, 04:22 PM
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The sad thing about LBH is not that Custer was an idiot. Custer had been fighting Indians off and on since 1867. He was regarded as being an advocate of the Indians, and had earned their respect as a warrior.
There is no doubt that Custer failed to believe his scouts about the true size of the villages in the valley. In accordance to his instructions from Terry and his on instincts as a fighter, he decided to attack. In all fairness, throughout the entire history of the Indian Wars (1866-1891) whenever any army column attacked an Indian village, the Indians broke and ran, except for this one time at LBH. Custer went into battle expecting to win, Indian testimony shows that he maneuvered his battalion to support Reno. But when Reno broke and routed out of the valley, then the Indians were able to focus on Custer and his battalion. The very layout of the slaughtered cavalrymen shows that Custer expected Benteen to bring up his squadron and the pack train with its ammo reserve. From Custer Hill, down Battle Ridge and Calhoun Hill, the positions of the fallen speak of an attempt to hold a line to allow reinforcements and resupply to join Custer. When the Indians managed to overwhelm the cavalry on Calhoun Hill and then start rolling up the line towards Custer Hill, then the cavalry men, on foot, running out of ammo, and demoralized by the sudden turn of events, started running for safety. At some point, a company of cavalry made an attack down Deep Ravine trying to make for the river only to be stopped and cut-down. The more I research LBH, the more I shift through the Court of Inquiry documents, the reports filed after the battle, the more I get the sense of an effort to white-wash the whole affair, to blame the dead for the failure and to release the living from any sense of responsability. No, Custer was not an idiot, seeking glory on a battlefield, if any officer every deserved that title, then it would be Captain Fetterman. Was Custer perfect, by no means is this so. Did he make mistakes, certainly, but no more than any other cavalry officer serving in the West.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#29
12-20-2010, 06:52 AM
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The Terry Column of 1876
This is the makeup of the Terry Column on May 18, 1876:
The fighting element 7th Cavalry: 28 officers, 747 enlisted 2 companies, 17th Infantry & 1 company, 6th Infantry: 8 officers, 135 enlisted 1 section of Gatling Guns (drawn from 20th Infantry): 2 officers, 32 enlisted, 3 .50-caliber Gatlings 45 Indian Scouts The supply train 114 six-mule teams, 37 two-horse teams, 70 other wagons and 85 pack mules with 179 civilian packers.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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#30
12-20-2010, 07:18 AM
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June 22, 1876
The Terry Column had joined with the Gibbon Column at the mouth of the Rosebud River. An officer's call was held to plan the next course of action.
The current situation was this: General Terry knew of the presence of General Crook's column, but did not know just where Crook was presently operating. The operations of Gibbon's Montana Column and Terry's Dakota Column could only be coordinated in the most general way. At the conference, Terry was very doubtful of the ability of the two columns to assist each other in case of contact with the hostile Indians. Terry ended a dispatch to General Sheridan with the words; "I only hope that one of the two columns will find the Indians. I go personally with Gibbon..." It was believed that the Indians were encamped at the head of the Rosebud River or on the Little Big Horn River, a divide of only 15-20 miles of ridges separating the two. Terry decided that Custer would strike the blow. This was a disappointment to Gibbon and his column, elements of which had been in the field since February 22nd, monitoring the movements of the Indians until the three columns could get into position to attack. Terry's reasons for selecting the Seventh for the honor of the attack were good ones. The Seventh was all cavalry and could pursue the Indians if the attempted to escape while Gibbon's column was half infantry and in the rapid approach march to the Indian camp, could become separated. The Seventh was the numerically stronger than Gibbon's column and Terry made the decision that the strongest unit should strike. The most recent report from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in regard to the number of hostiles absent from the agencies, estimated a figure of not more than 1,500 warriors. Custer stated at the conference that this figure was not correct and that there probably three times that number. The conference broke-up around sundown and Custer followed Terry to his tent where the two spent some time in converstation. Officer's call brought his subordinates to Custer's tent. Orders were given to prepare the pack mules (there were 12 assigned to each troop) in the morning with 15 days rations of bard bread, coffee and sugar and 12 days rations of bacon. Twelve of the strongest mules were to carry the 24,000 rounds of the regiment's reserve ammo. Each trooper was to be issued 100 rounds of carbine ammo and 24 rounds of pistol ammo. For every horse, 12 pounds of oats were to be carried, with care to ration it after lengthy marches. Custer also suggested that extra forage might come in handy, but the troop commanders foresaw difficulties in packing the extra forage. "Well gentlemen," Custer replied, "you may carry what supplies you please; you will be held responsible for your companies. The extra forage was only a suggestion, but this fact bear in mind, we will follow the trail for 15 days unless we catch them before that time expires, no matter how far it takes us from our base of supplies. We may not see the supply steamer again. You had better carry along an extra supply of salt, we may have to live on horse meat before we get through." While the troopers made their preparations, Custer was accosted by Major James Brisbin, Gibbon's second in command. Brisbin offered Custer four troops of the 2nd Cavalry, but Custer declined. Stating, "The 7th can handle anything it meets." An plea was made by Lieutenant Low to take all or part of his Gatling detachement was also refused, on the grounds that the cumbersome guns, pulled by condemned horses might impede the 7th's march.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis.
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