In Defense of the Red Army

[swaghauler]

I did a bit of research into what old Soviet ships would still be serviceable in 1997 and came up with this list of "Surface Combatants" for Russia in 1997 (based on units lost to former Pact members and decommissioning/damage). Excluding subs, the Russian Navy was of almost the size as the US Navy under President Clinton (although the US ships were FAR more capable). Russia had 208 total surface combatants to the US total of 157 surface combatants (this excludes supply or landing ship transports). Here is the list I compiled of OPERATIONAL (not decommissioned or dry-docked/refitting ships).

Russian Surface Combatant Ships:

Kuznetsov Class Carrier: 1
Kirov Class Battle Cruiser Guided Missile Nuclear: 3
Kara Class Guided Missile Cruiser: 5
Kresta Class Guided Missile Cruiser: 4
Slava Class Guided Missile Cruiser: 5
Kashin Class Guided Missile Destroyers: 7
Sovremennyy Class Guided Missile Destroyers: 19
Udaloy Class Guided Missile Destroyers: 11
Krivak Class Guided Missile Frigate: 30
Neustrashimy Class Guided Missile Frigate: 30

These comprise the Russian fleet elements that are large enough to operate independently during a "blue water cruise." The following ships have limited range and/or endurance and are used in squadrons or with coastal support.

The following ships would be called "Corvettes" in the West, but the Russians often refer to them as "Frigates."

Derach Class FFGA: 3
Grisha Class FFL: 30
Nanuchka Class FSG: 33
Parchim Class FFL: 11
Paulk Class FSG: 4
Tarantul Class FSG: 12

Unfortunately, I don't have as detailed a listing for US Naval Assets (yet).

US Surface Combatant Ships:

Carriers CVN: 12
Cruisers CCG: 30
Destroyers DDG: 56
Frigates FFG: 42
Command Ships CMD: 4

These are all of the capital surface combatants still sailing in 1997. Other ships would be in "mothballs" and need at least some refurbishment before sailing again.
The US Navy doesn't have any true Corvettes but the following "Patrol Ships" could qualify.

Patrol Ships PT: 13

This is the best estimate I could come up with to accurately reflect both sides Naval strengths in 1997 (based on historical evidence). What I found surprising was just how fast President Clinton "drew down" the US navy from a 1980's high of 303 Surface Combatants (and nearly 500 total vessels). Many of these ships were NOT "mothballed" either; they were either scrapped or sold to other countries.
This could explain the Russian's success on the Naval front. The US would be spread "paper thin" hunting Russian subs and commerce raiders. This wouldn't have left many task forces for offensive operations.

[The Dark]

For the US as of 31 December 1997:

Forrestal CV: 1
Kitty Hawk CV: 2
Kennedy CV: 1
Enterprise CVN: 1
Nimitz CVN: 7
Wasp LHD: 5

Raleigh LPD: 1
Austin LPD: 3
Cleveland LPD: 7
Trenton LPD: 2

Iwo Jima LPH: 2

California CGN: 2
Virginia CGN: 2
Ticonderoga CG: 27

Spruance DD: 31
Kidd DD: 4
Arleigh Burke DDG: 21

Perry FFG: 41

[swaghauler]

For the US as of 31 December 1997:

Forrestal CV: 1
Kitty Hawk CV: 2
Kennedy CV: 1
Enterprise CVN: 1
Nimitz CVN: 7
Wasp LHD: 5

Raleigh LPD: 1
Austin LPD: 3
Cleveland LPD: 7
Trenton LPD: 2

Iwo Jima LPH: 2

California CGN: 2
Virginia CGN: 2
Ticonderoga CG: 27

Spruance DD: 31
Kidd DD: 4
Arleigh Burke DDG: 21

Perry FFG: 41

Thanks for saving me the trouble of looking those up.

Another factor to consider when comparing the navies is the Age of the fleet in question. A LARGE number of Soviet Era ships were "scrapped/salvaged" between 1998 and 2003. I can imagine a number of the Udaloys and Sovremennyys have the equivalent of an 8 Wear Value. The US fleet was much newer with the exception of the gas powered carriers (Wear of 7 or 8?) and the OHP Frigates. The Perry class was designed in 1975 with a service life of 20 years as a cost-cutting measure (most ships are designed for 40-50 years with a 20-year upgrade) and most of them were on the verge of needing an upgrade.

[The Dark]

Thanks for saving me the trouble of looking those up.

Another factor to consider when comparing the navies is the Age of the fleet in question. A LARGE number of Soviet Era ships were "scrapped/salvaged" between 1998 and 2003. I can imagine a number of the Udaloys and Sovremennyys have the equivalent of an 8 Wear Value. The US fleet was much newer with the exception of the gas powered carriers (Wear of 7 or 8?) and the OHP Frigates. The Perry class was designed in 1975 with a service life of 20 years as a cost-cutting measure (most ships are designed for 40-50 years with a 20-year upgrade) and most of them were on the verge of needing an upgrade.The Spruance class were also old by this point - the first of them was laid down in 1972 (ordered in 1970) and none remained in service more than 30 years (7 Perrys served between 31 and 34 years). The Spruances and Perrys were the "high/low" escorts in Zumwalt's fleet plan. By the early 90s, the Burkes were a badly needed upgrade. The four dead admirals (the Kidd-class) were more capable, particularly after the New Threat Upgrade allowed the Ticonderoga cruisers to take over Kidd-launched missiles in mid-flight, using the superior Aegis arrays to improve performance. Aegis was a big reason for the accelerated disposal of the cruisers and destroyers not of the Ticonderoga and Burke classes, since the newer ships were considered far more capable than even upgraded older ships.

For the Soviet ships, there are a few old ones that will still be around:
Admiral Golovko - a Kynda-class cruiser, commissioned in 1964 and serving as Black Sea Fleet flagship from 1995-1997.
Krasny Kavkaz - a Kashin-class destroyer, commissioned in 1967 and decommissioned in 1998. One of the modified Kashins with rear-firing Styx (SS-N-2) launchers.
If the Soviet Union slows the decommissioning of ships due to tensions, there were still three Skoryy-class destroyers on the books until 1994, the Besposchadnyy (commissioned 1951), Besshumnyy (also 1951), and Svobodny (1952).

[Raellus]

In the alternate timeline of T2K v1.0, the Soviets would have had three fleet carriers- the two Admiral Kuznetsovs and the Ulyanovsk, plus four Kiev class light carriers flying the newer Yak-141. Still a paltry force compared to the USN's carrier fleet, but not inconsiderable when operating close to territorial waters with land-based air cover supplementing their air groups.

[The Dark]

After double-checking, I realize I made a mistake. The new unknown-class carriers in the book I'm referencing aren't the Ulyanovsks, they're the Kuznetsovs. The timing and tonnage are wrong for the Ulyas, since the first of them wasn't laid down until 1988, and the book says the first unknown carrier launched in December 1985.

That also shows how much Soviet priorities were misunderstood, since the estimate was the Kuznetsov would carry 60-75 fixed-wing aircraft, when the project specification was to carry 33. The discrepancy is likely due to the lack of expectation that Kuznetsov would have a heavy anti-ship missile battery.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

The Soviets don't, and never have, understood the first thing about full-sized carrier operations except what they could observe secondhand. The Uly classes would've been fitted with ASMs, the launching of even one would've obscured the flight deck with smoke for 10 minutes. It had a ski-jump and side deck catapult launch, which means while launching aircraft it couldn't have retrieved them. Their problems with naval nuclear power are equally storied and their one operational carrier recently had to shift its air wing to land-based, and goes nowhere without a powered tug, so frequent are her breakdowns.

Even in T2k 1.0 I wouldn't bother worrying about Soviet naval air power in terms of carrier aircraft. The YAK-38 was a terrible aircraft; a Dauntless SBD could carry a greater bomb load.

I know this is a rah-rah go USSR thread but come on, you might as well talk about the Soviets having mecha as having operational carriers and useful aircraft.

[Raellus]

I know this is a rah-rah go USSR thread but come on, you might as well talk about the Soviets having mecha as having operational carriers and useful aircraft.

Yeah, I think you are reading too much into my posts. We all know that comparing Soviet carriers and US supercarriers is like comparing a Ford Nova to a Ferrari GTO. I think we've been pretty clear about that. We've also pointed out that Soviet carriers wouldn't have been deployed or used like USN carriers. And navalized MiG-27s and SU-27s are not useless aircraft, especially when working with land-based Bears, Blinders, and Backfires carrying long-range, supersonic ASMs. Yak-141's on the other hand, I don't know. But, AFAIK, no one here claimed that the Yak-38 was useful.

[RN7]

During the Cold War the Soviet Union could build as many tanks, fighter aircraft and nuclear armed ballistic missiles as it wanted to compete with America and the Western world, but as sea it was just simply out classed by the US Navy no matter how hard it tried to compete with it.

The Soviet Union or Russia was never considered to be a leading naval power at any era over the past two centuries, and at best it was one of the following pack of major powers with a navy that was barely ranked among the top five or lower. In both world wars its naval contribution to the wars was meagre compared to its own army and the other powers. After WW2 the Soviet Union found itself as the second most powerful country in the world, but the so called rise of its navy was also due to the practical elimination of German, Japanese and Italian naval ambitions, and the contraction of the British and French fleets due to decolonisation and economic realities.

At no point in the Cold War was the Soviet Navy a match for the US carrier fleet and the accumulative decades of American naval experience and technology. In fact until the 1970's the British Navy could even be considered to be a major threat to it until Britain decided to wind down its own naval ambitions and practically scrap its aircraft carrier fleet. The only way the Soviets could try and neutralise the threat of US carriers was by following the same route that Germany tried in both world wars when it was also outclassed by Western naval powers; submarines, and also with long ranged bombers with supersonic cruise missiles.

The Soviet carrier fleet offered little threat to US Navy carriers, and its carriers were in fact ASW platforms with a few VTOL jets of limited capabilities. The reason why Soviet ships and carriers had so many anti-ship, air defence and ASW weapons was because the Soviets recognised and were intimidated by the threat posed by the US Navy and particularly US naval aviation.

[pmulcahy11b]

When I was in ROTC in the 1980s, we all believed that sometime in the late 1980s or early 1990s, we'd be fighting the Pact in Europe, their puppets in the Middle East and Africa and Southeast Asia, and the Russians and some assorted Eastern European units in the Pacific and Alaska. If we were lucky, we might have the PRC as an ally (they hated the Russians at the time), but probably they's sit it out and close their borders unless attacked. And we were all sure, based on the amount of troops, vehicles, and aircraft the Russians and her allies could put up, and what we could put up, we'd lose in Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia. We'd be forced to go nuclear to stop the Russians et al, and that would lead to oblivion.

And yet we were patriotic, young, and ready regardless what might happen!

[pmulcahy11b]

During the Cold War the Soviet Union could build as many tanks, fighter aircraft and nuclear armed ballistic missiles as it wanted to compete with America and the Western world...

What we had was a massive technological edge. Not just in ships, but almost every weapon we had. That's what finally crashed the Soviet economy -- trying to keep up with us technologically. They simply couldn't no matter how hard they tried. And they did try, and failed.

But we at ROTC all knew that our technological edge would not be enough. They'd overwhelm us with sheer numbers. They would throw chemicals around like cotton candy. And we would be forced to go nuclear. And we all know where that would have lead.

[recon35]

You're right, Paul. As a cadet at the Citadel from '86-'89, I fully anticipated things to go hot some time in the 90's. It didn't dampen my willingness to serve in the least. Frankly, I still have no love for the Russians...

[The Dark]

Yeah, I think you are reading too much into my posts. We all know that comparing Soviet carriers and US supercarriers is like comparing a Ford Nova to a Ferrari GTO. I think we've been pretty clear about that. We've also pointed out that Soviet carriers wouldn't have been deployed or used like USN carriers. And navalized MiG-27s and SU-27s are not useless aircraft, especially when working with land-based Bears, Blinders, and Backfires carrying long-range, supersonic ASMs. Yak-141's on the other hand, I don't know. But, AFAIK, no one here claimed that the Yak-38 was useful.

There were only four Yak-141 prototypes. If they'd gone into production, they'd likely have turned out to be roughly equivalent to the Sea Harrier, possibly slightly inferior. Russia had no intent to put them on Kievs because the navalised MiGs and SUs were superior aircraft. Proposed armament loadouts were:

Air to air:
4x R-77 Adder
2x R-77 Adder & 2x R-27 Alamo

Air to ship:
2x R-73 Archer & 2x Kh-35 Kayak
4x Kh-35 Kayak
2x R-77 Adder & 2x Kh-35 Kayak

Air to ground:
4x Rocket Pod (I think UB-13L, but I'm not sure)
6x 250kg bomb
2x R-77 Adder & 2x Kh-31 Krypton
2x R-73 Archer & 2x Kh-25 Karen
4x UPK-23-250 gun pods

Kayaks weren't available until 2003, so they would only have had the much lighter Krypton or much shorter ranged Karen for anti-ship strikes.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

More thread necromancy from me...

An article from an Australian newspaper that illustrates the thinking in the West in regards to the military of the Soviet Union. The article dates from 1983 and I point it out because I believe that this sort of information was likely a big influence on the game (the 1st edition being published in 1984) and quite possibly directly responsible for what we now view as the designers over-estimation of Soviet capabilities.
Like many of you probably do, I recall the anti-West protests that occurred every time one of the major NATO partners did something but how they staid curiously silent whenever the Soviets did the same thing. This article makes mention of that particular phenomena in light of the Soviet weapons build-up and the Soviet sponsored World Peace Council - Si vis pacem, para bellum indeed.

Overall an interesting window into the mindset in the 1980s and as mentioned, I link it here because I think it is a good illustration of what would have influenced the game designers at the time. Considering the lack of publicly available information they had back then, this sort of information would probably have been a significant contribution to the design process.
https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/116374838/12937787

[Raellus]

Russia had no intent to put them [Yak-141s] on Kievs because the navalised MiGs and SUs were superior aircraft.

:confused:

But the Kievs were too small to launch navalized MiG-29s and SU-27s, and the Yak-141 was a direct replacement for the Yak-38, carried by the Kievs.

@SSC:

I found this quote quite telling,

"Much of the new policy of the Americans in publicising the latest Soviet weapons systems and military strengths is aimed at maintaining
US levels of defence expenditure against an increasingly recalcitrant Congress."

I've often wondered if the Cold War overestimations of Soviet military technology capabilities were an honest mistake born of genuine fear, or a deliberate manipulation of the Pentagon, Congress, and the American public by what Eisenhower dubbed, the military-industrial complex. Regardless, as a kid, I found it all very convincing.

And not all Soviet-era weaponry was crap. Yes, most of it was crude compared to Western equivalents, but a lot of it was very capable- some of it superior. I've said it many times here, especially in this thread, but quantity is a quality all its own, and the Soviets' numerical advantage in most weapon systems should not be discounted. The Nazis learned, to their detriment, that superior German weapon systems (like the Tiger and mature Panther tanks) did not necessarily cancel out the numerical superiority of equivalent Allied weapon systems. In the end, it didn't matter that a Tiger could kill 4 Shermans for every Tiger lost when the allies could put at least 5 Shermans into the field for every Tiger. In a WWIII, the same would very likely be true of the relationship between, say, an M1 and a swarm of T-72s.

I digress. I agree with your point that the designers of the original T2K only had so much information to go on, and some of the information available to them was not particularly accurate. IMHO, for the most part, they did a heck of a job with what they had.

[ChalkLine]

There's also a lot of western myths about the Red Army that were strange to say the least. A lot of people seemed to think the USSR would adopt pre Operation Bagration human wave tactics from World War Two when the societs were desperate. Another was that there was still Kommisars in the Redd Army when they were actually removed in 1943 because they immobilised command procedures. Instead the second in command of a battalion was the automatic zampolit who had to give a lecture or two every now and then and organise the sporting timetable :)

The NKVD 'blocking troops' dated from a desperate time when the Nazis had to be made to buy every metre of the Rhodinya with blood and kit. They were never considered a good idea by anyone, just an emergency procedure and were never even considered for later actions.

In the 2nd Chechen War the Russian Army had shown that when reorganised, paid well and equipped well with new gear and special equipment and troops they could take the battle to the Chechens and win decisively. They adopted modern western concepts quickly and are now equal in capacity and technology (except night vision tech, which they steal) with the west. This might well have been what later war troops looked like.

What really defined the Red Army though was how it used artillery. In the west the emphasis has long been on precision strikes but in the east this is seen as unnecessary. Instead they just use a lot more tubes than the west would ever consider. This allows them to blanket sectors with rocket and tube artillery to deny movement and support.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Oh yes indeed. That particular quote - "Much of the new policy of the Americans in publicising the latest Soviet weapons systems and military strengths is aimed at maintaining US levels of defence expenditure against an increasingly recalcitrant Congress." - strikes me in the same way as you, was it a genuine mistake due to ignorance, over-estimation brought about by fear/paranoia or deliberate hyperbole to get more money for the military budget?

But yes, no matter what brought it about, that information was viewed in a particular way by the public and that seems to have worked in favour of a larger military budget.
I still have some of the aircraft books I bought from back in that time and when it came to the new unknown fighters (I believe they were identified as Ramskoye prototypes or something like that before they were found out to be MiG-29 and so on), the trend tends to be to overestimate their potential capabilities. But ultimately, the US strategy of forcing the Soviets to spend more of their GNP on their military worked. Was releasing these estimates/data about Soviet equipment part of that strategy? I certainly don't know but I can easily see that it could have been.

And I have no disagreements with you about Soviet equipment. The Soviets had a different mindset for their designs and sometimes this had significant advantages as witnessed by my post about T-34's mounted as memorials being brought back to driving capacity for use in parades and by The Dark's post about an IS-2 being recovered from a memorial and put into use during the Ukraine conflict. As the article I was referencing inferred, sometimes the simpler "cruder" designs are better for the end user than the more sophisticated, complex designs - particularly when it comes to who the end user is. A lot of Soviet equipment was designed specifically knowing that conscripts would be either operating it, or maintaining/servicing it.
Stalin's statement of "Quantity has a quality all its own" was better suited for the level of technical expertise expected from Soviet conscript troops.

The Soviets certainly had some outstanding areas of expertise, their knowledge of theoretical physics was apparently better than the West's, they were further advanced than the West in terms of supersonic thrust vectoring for aircraft although the counterbalance to a lot of those advantages was their lower levels of metallurgical knowledge (hence the use of titanium for aircraft where the West was using alloys).
So after all my blathering, my point is, like every organism that has ever existed, the Soviet Union was a more complex beast than the simplistic observation of "they make peasant weapons for use by a peasant army".

And further to that, my point is - it's easy now to criticise GDW's treatment of the Soviet threat and to note how much weaker the Soviets really were but back when GDW was designing the game, we were living under a cloud of the Doomsday Clock, "WW3 at any minute", "Reds under the bed", the Soviets being the largest exporter of weapons in the world, Soviet sponsored terrorism in the West and numerous proxy wars being fought between the great powers and so on.
Given the potential fear that that engendered, I believe we can give the GDW crew some leeway in designing a game that was built around the very real fears of the time.

[Legbreaker]

Given the potential fear that that engendered, I believe we can give the GDW crew some leeway in designing a game that was built around the very real fears of the time.
Also, it's a GAME. The PACT forces NEED to be strong so as to bring about the situation we see in July 2000. Reality really doesn't have much place in T2K, at least not on the larger scale.

[Vespers War]

Oh yes indeed. That particular quote - "Much of the new policy of the Americans in publicising the latest Soviet weapons systems and military strengths is aimed at maintaining US levels of defence expenditure against an increasingly recalcitrant Congress." - strikes me in the same way as you, was it a genuine mistake due to ignorance, over-estimation brought about by fear/paranoia or deliberate hyperbole to get more money for the military budget?

A large part of it was the 1976 creation of Team B, the outside "experts" (all of hawkish inclination) who were convinced that the National Intelligence Estimate was underestimating the Soviet threat and that detente was an existential danger to the United States. As an example of the quality of their work, one of their arguments was that the Soviets were working on a submarine that was acoustically undetectable, and the fact that we had no evidence of it was evidence that the system worked.

Post-collapse documents showed that the CIA was actually overestimating the Soviet military (from 1978-85, the low end of their range of estimates for the number of Russian nuclear warheads exceeded the actual number every year, and from 1974-86 the rate of modernization was overestimated every year). The Team B estimates were even higher - they claimed there would be 500 Backfire bombers by 1984. Fewer than 250 were in service in 1984, and less than 500 were built by the time production ended in 1997. Team B also overestimated the bomber's range. They believed Soviet missiles were more accurate than they were, and that the USSR was about to deploy a mobile anti-ballistic missile system. They anticipated wide deployment of the SS-16 (which never entered service) and conversion of the SS-20 to ICBM status (which never happened). They also anticipated the near-term entry into service of Soviet charged particle beam weapons.

As bizarre as it sounds now, the Soviet capabilities in T2K are actually less than what Team B was presenting to the government as official estimates (although probably slightly more than what the CIA's Team A was presenting).

[StainlessSteelCynic]

@ Vespers War - That's some interesting information. While I was vaguely aware of some of it, I didn't know the extent it influenced US military policy. I wonder what their motivation was, were they genuinely afraid the Soviets were beating the West, were they just so hawkish that they wanted to be the "biggest kid on the block" or were they motivated by the potential financial gain through R&D or manufacture of weapons & gear to "defeat" the Red Menace? Or perhaps something else?

Mind you, the Soviets certainly did not help to dispel the notion. They were happy to make some outlandish claims regarding their technology. Again, it's a complex situation and not something that should be dismissed simply as nationalist propaganda as I've read some anecdotal reports that the Soviets were worried about Western tech and thus allegedly became desperate to convince their own people & allies that they actually were superior to the West. So it wasn't always propaganda to be directed at the Western world, sometimes it was meant for their own allies.

The best example of that I know of is from a former co-worker of mine who was Czechoslovakian by birth. His mother had been a nurse for the Germans in WW2 and so they faced a bit of discrimination from the post-war government at times (and the family's Germanic name didn't help!). This convinced him to escape the country and move to Australia (which he and his wife did by taking a "holiday" in Yugoslavia). One tale he told was of his cousin who had apparently worked with the Soviet Army during his period of conscript service.

His cousin had told him that the Russians had laser weapons, apparently many Czechoslovak soldiers "knew" about them. These laser weapons were allegedly able to scorch a football field sized area from kilometres away. My co-worker firmly believed it was true, even when I presented evidence that the whole story was probably a massive exaggeration.

It doesn't matter now that it turned out to be all false or at best, greatly exaggerated. What matters is that at the time, some people actually believed it and some people found they could easily present those pieces of information to claim that the Soviets were a massive threat.
I'm reminded of what Chalkline mentioned in another thread - given the levels of info manipulation at the time and what would have made it's way out to the public, GDW's estimate of Warsaw Pact forces is on the lower end of the over-estimatations of Communist capability!

[Raellus]

Western airframes, avionics, and pilot training were all generally superior to their Soviet counterparts throughout the entirety of the Cold War. That is a given.

However, here is yet more evidence that technical superiority does not necessarily translate to victory.

During a joint exercise between the USAF and the Indian Air Force, the latter, flying MiG-21s and SU-27 variants, roundly defeated a force of F-15C Eagles in air-to-air combat.

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25274/f-15s-arrive-for-rebooted-cope-india-air-combat-drill-as-us-indian-relations-tighten

Yes, the parameters of the exercise did favor the IAF, but still, if technical superiority always translates to victory, the IAF would not have won.

In a v1.0 T2K situation, the Red Air Force would have had several months of aerial combat experience versus the Chinese Air Force before the war with NATO kicks off.

[ChalkLine]

Actually soviet metallurgy was considerably better than western equivalents and soviet guns, up until the 120mm Rhienmetall gun, tended to be better as well. A lot of the cannon stuff the west used came from soviet ideas and built on their prototypes, which is why espionage was such a big thing.
Western electronics, plastics and ceramics were a lot better than soviet efforts though. Western electronic miniaturisation was also better.

[RN7]

Western airframes, avionics, and pilot training were all generally superior to their Soviet counterparts throughout the entirety of the Cold War. That is a given.

However, here is yet more evidence that technical superiority does not necessarily translate to victory.

During a joint exercise between the USAF and the Indian Air Force, the latter, flying MiG-21s and SU-27 variants, roundly defeated a force of F-15C Eagles in air-to-air combat.

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/25274/f-15s-arrive-for-rebooted-cope-india-air-combat-drill-as-us-indian-relations-tighten

Yes, the parameters of the exercise did favor the IAF, but still, if technical superiority always translates to victory, the IAF would not have won.

In a v1.0 T2K situation, the Red Air Force would have had several months of aerial combat experience versus the Chinese Air Force before the war with NATO kicks off.

If this is from the Cope India air combat exercise at Gwalior in 2004 I think it was the USAF deliberately wanting to lose to bolster its case for buying the F/A-22 and F-35 at the time.

[Raellus]

If this is from the Cope India air combat exercise at Gwalior in 2004 I think it was the USAF deliberately wanting to lose to bolster its case for buying the F/A-22 and F-35 at the time.

I suppose that could have been the case, but this sounds like an excuse for losing.

[Raellus]

According to this write-up, it sounds like tactics and equipment played a very big roll in the exercise results.

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26880/enough-with-the-indian-mig-21-bison-versus-pakistani-f-16-viper-bullshit

Also, if it was just the USAF putting on a show to convince Congress to buy more shiny new toys, then why allow the older, "obsolete" MiG-21 platforms to do the most damage?

-

[StainlessSteelCynic]

According to this write-up, it sounds like tactics and equipment played a very big roll in the exercise results.

http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26880/enough-with-the-indian-mig-21-bison-versus-pakistani-f-16-viper-bullshit

Also, if it was just the USAF putting on a show to convince Congress to buy more shiny new toys, then why allow the older, "obsolete" MiG-21 platforms to do the most damage?

-
That was an interesting read and again it shows that how skilled/experienced you are and how well you use your equipment is often times much more important than how up to date something is.

[Raellus]

This is an interesting piece on F-117 Nighthawk combat ops over Serbia. Apparently, a second Nighthawk was hit by a Serbian SAM.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37894/yes-serbian-air-defenses-did-hit-another-f-117-during-operation-allied-force-in-1999

I'm glad we never had to find out, but I really wonder how a full-spectrum air war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have played out.

I just recently re-read Red Storm Rising and, although I still enjoyed it, one thing that really bothered me about Clancy and Bond's vision- especially in light of this story- is how ineffective Soviet AAA/SAM defenses are against NATO strike and attack aircraft. There's no Red Army bridge, command post, fuel depot, or tank farm that NATO aircraft don't manage to destroy in the novel.

I could forgive the authors this vision if they'd written this after Desert Shield/Storm, because I think that experience convinced many that Soviet-made air defenses were no match for NATO aircraft. I still content that this lesson was wrong- the Gulf War was not a peer v. peer conflict. It was like an NFL team (the Coalition) playing against a Pop Warner [under 12] team whose players had a few pieces of adult-size pads (the Iraqis). Against a modern, full-scale, integrated, Soviet air defense (AAA & SAM) network, I think NATO aircraft would have sustained significant losses.

-

[StainlessSteelCynic]

For what it's worth, there were a few "voices in the wilderness" back in the early 2000s who disagreed with the popular view that air forces win wars that seemed to form after the Gulf War.
They argued that the air campaign against the Iraqis was pretty much a one-sided affair with Iraqi air defence being lacklustre and no real test of coalition doctrine/equipment/enemy suppression.
They argued that it was a false assumption to conclude that Western air forces would dominate the skies and win the war and that the assumption came about because the coalition forces never had much opposition for control of the skies.
Against any enemy that put up a proper fight in the air, the situation would be very different.

[Legbreaker]

For what it's worth, there were a few "voices in the wilderness" back in the early 2000s.....

As I've said before, and will probably keep saying for another 50 years, the Iraqi army was not a valid test to see how NATO would have done against the Soviets. The majority of Iraqi equipment simply wasn't up to the same standard as the Pact and lacked components such as the more advanced armour, targeting systems and so on (downgraded export versions). Their training was....lacking, and morale outside the Republican guard virtually non-existent.

[Southernap]

I'm glad we never had to find out, but I really wonder how a full-spectrum air war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have played out.

I just recently re-read Red Storm Rising and, although I still enjoyed it, one thing that really bothered me about Clancy and Bond's vision- especially in light of this story- is how ineffective Soviet AAA/SAM defenses are against NATO strike and attack aircraft. There's no Red Army bridge, command post, fuel depot, or tank farm that NATO aircraft don't manage to destroy in the novel.

I could forgive the authors this vision if they'd written this after Desert Shield/Storm, because I think that experience convinced many that Soviet-made air defenses were no match for NATO aircraft. I still content that this lesson was wrong- the Gulf War was not a peer v. peer conflict. It was like an NFL team (the Coalition) playing against a Pop Warner [under 12] team whose players had a few pieces of adult-size pads (the Iraqis). Against a modern, full-scale, integrated, Soviet air defense (AAA & SAM) network, I think NATO aircraft would have sustained significant losses.

-

So a couple of things about the Serbian Operations with the F-117. I have friends who were in the planning cells at the time that all went down in the air war over Kosovo. There was serious mistakes made by the USAF and NATO air commanders that others had warned the planners about. Such things as always flying on a specific time and always having specific types of electronic warfare occur at both the ingress and egress points. Then there was actionable intelligence developed by some NATO and USN assets which showed that the Serbians were detecting the F-117s by using an old Soviet method, which we knew about but assumed only the Soviets did. That was using phone line connections and a bi-static radar setup. The USAF did the fingers in ears and "I can't hear you lalalalallal" method. There were too many folks in senior leadership of the USAF that believed the vaporware on what LO tech offered and still only say the 1991 footage of the F-117 in operation as being the benchmark. They didn't want to hear from folks who had flown against it or trained against in at places like Yuma, Fallon, or Nellis. That it could be beaten with the right tactics and that if we don't do dumb things we open ourselves up to getting beaten. Which as they say is now the history.

If you do some reading of US air ops against some Soviet air defense systems and some of the US operations in the early 80s. There is strong evidence that one could penetrate the Soviet air defense corridor and lay weapons on theater and strategic targets. This is even before Mathias Rust did his stunt in 1987 (https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20609795) with his C172.
There have been EP-3s, RC-135s, and other national security aircraft that were shown to have penetrated the edges of Soviet Air Defense systems and survived. Similarly, if you read some of the recent books by John Lehman and a few others in the Cold War era; they talk of the USN and RN conducting carrier operations in the Norwegian Sea, Bearing Sea, Sea of Japan all well with in range of Soviet Air defenses and being able to get with in a hair's breath of the 12 nautical mile limit before the Soviets knew who was there and what was going on. In some cases with a full on SIOP styled Alpha strike from the carrier decks.

One of the things about both Tom Clancy and Larry Bond is they knew when to listen and in the case of Tom Clancy, he was smart that he started to put various pieces of separate information and draw sometime accurate information. There is even video of talking to NSA staffers (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VS54M5Mqa9M) about how he collected information from folks and how he go to some of his logical conclusions.

Also, if you re-read RSR; he doesn't talk about the Soviet Air Strikes against NATO land forces. We read a few about the US Carriers, and Larry Bond has actually mentioned that was a huge gaming event (https://www.wargamevault.com/product/140136/Dance-of-the-Vampires) that lead to trying to figure out how to write that specific chapter with an ending in mind. Otherwise, there is no talk about how the Soviet air power does to NATO or is even able to penetrate the NATO IADS belt.

[Raellus]

If you do some reading of US air ops against some Soviet air defense systems and some of the US operations in the early 80s. There is strong evidence that one could penetrate the Soviet air defense corridor and lay weapons on theater and strategic targets. This is even before Mathias Rust did his stunt in 1987 (https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20609795) with his C172.
There have been EP-3s, RC-135s, and other national security aircraft that were shown to have penetrated the edges of Soviet Air Defense systems and survived. Similarly, if you read some of the recent books by John Lehman and a few others in the Cold War era; they talk of the USN and RN conducting carrier operations in the Norwegian Sea, Bearing Sea, Sea of Japan all well with in range of Soviet Air defenses and being able to get with in a hair's breath of the 12 nautical mile limit before the Soviets knew who was there and what was going on. In some cases with a full on SIOP styled Alpha strike from the carrier decks.

I humbly admit that you're more widely read on this particular topic than I am. I have a clarifying question: When you say NATO aircraft penetrated the edges of Soviet AD networks and survived, do you mean they did so completely undetected, or that the Soviets didn't launch SAMs at them?

If it's the former, that's an impressive feat by NATO. If it's the latter, thank God the Soviets showed restraint. By the same token, NATO showed similar restraint. Soviet aircraft routinely violated neutral and NATO airspace during the Cold War (and Russian aircraft continue to do so today). But there's a big difference between not knowing someone is there and deciding not to to shoot at them when you do.

Also, if you re-read RSR; he doesn't talk about the Soviet Air Strikes against NATO land forces. We read a few about the US Carriers, and Larry Bond has actually mentioned that was a huge gaming event (https://www.wargamevault.com/product/140136/Dance-of-the-Vampires) that lead to trying to figure out how to write that specific chapter with an ending in mind. Otherwise, there is no talk about how the Soviet air power does to NATO or is even able to penetrate the NATO IADS belt.

Yes, Clancy and Bond kind of hand-waved the WTO air forces out of existence after describing how F-119 'Frisbees' destroyed most the Red Air Forces 'Mainstay' AWACs aircraft. This allowed NATO to establish air superiority over the FEB. This, IMHO, was a case of wishful thinking. In RSR, NATO AD has no trouble swatting Frogfoots and Hinds out of the sky, but NATO aircraft are able to hit anything they want to.

A sim is one thing; the real world is quite another.

-

[Olefin]

Soviet Air Doctrine was not flexible enough and was a big thing that the Germans during WWII and the US and NATO would have been able to take advantage of during WWIII if it had occurred. Yes they had good pilots and good planes - but what they didnt have was an ability to be flexible - that was one thing we learned the hard way over Vietnam.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Part of that was due to the Soviet reliance on Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI)
Once the intruding aircraft was detected, a CGI controller would direct Soviet aircraft against the intruder and direct the air battle. The Soviet pilots were not given much control over their tasks and thus had little flexibility.
There was a very long command chain that controlled their actions and made their decisions for them.

I recall hearing a related comment by some South African PMC who had a number of Russian pilots in their company to fly Mi-8/Mi-17 helicopters. This was sometime in the late 2000s. The comment was essentially that the Russian pilots lacked initiative and had to be told what to do most of the time. Basically the Russian pilots needed to be supervised because if something out of the ordinary came up, they had not been trained to react to it but to wait for someone higher up the command chain to make a decision for them.

[Raellus]

True, but that was starting to change in the late 1980s. When the Cold War ended, the Soviets were attempting to follow the NATO model, fielding increasing numbers of Mainstay AWACs so that their fighters/interceptors would not be so reliant on GCI. Also, their new fighters (Fulcrums and Flankers) were equipped with passive IR detection equipment so that they wouldn't be so reliant on radar (making them harder to detect by ELINT means). This was pretty innovative for the time, and has just recently started to be implemented on Western combat aircraft.

I am not claiming that the WTO would have won an air war with NATO. The latter had a decided edge in electronics and training. I just don't think it would be the cakewalk that some- Like Clancy and Bond, for example- think it would have been. NATO air superiority after the first 48 hours? That's a resounding NO from me.

-

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Oh definitely and I do not disagree with you. If anything, I think the Soviet layered AA network would have made life very difficult for NATO air forces. The whole rationale behind the A-10 design was that the air environment would be tough to survive so at the very least, that's a tacit acknowledgement from the USAF that the Soviets would not be so easily overcome.

[Olefin]

also I have read RSR - and it wasnt a cake walk - the F-19's took horrendous losses as did the other attack aircraft - and the Soviets had their moments too when they succeeded against all odds as well - the way I read it by the time it was all done and said the US and NATO were close to 40 percent losses in a short war - and the A-10's paid a big price for their successes

By comparison the Gulf War was the cakewalk for sure

[Raellus]

Cool. I just finished rereading it a couple of weeks ago, so it's pretty fresh in my mind.

also I have read RSR - and it wasnt a cake walk - the F-19's took horrendous losses as did the other attack aircraft -

Yes, but that's after something like 6 weeks of constant combat ops, and multiple HQs, fuel depots, bridges, tank farms, etc. successfully destroyed. By a single squadron.

and the Soviets had their moments too when they succeeded against all odds as well -

Yes, but only in the naval air war. Over the European FEB, nope. I can't recall a single instance of a successful significant* Soviet air attack over land in the book.

*Like destroying more than a couple of tanks.

-

[Olefin]

Cool. I just finished rereading it a couple of weeks ago, so it's pretty fresh in my mind.



Yes, but that's after something like 6 weeks of constant combat ops, and multiple HQs, fuel depots, bridges, tank farms, etc. successfully destroyed. By a single squadron.



Yes, but only in the naval air war. Over the European FEB, nope. I can't recall a single instance of a successful significant* Soviet air attack over land in the book.

*Like destroying more than a couple of tanks.

-

They took out an AWACS and gained control of the air over the battlefield during a critical moment during one of the Soviet ground attacks that lead to their getting the river crossing that almost won them the war.

The initial Soviet Naval Aviation attack that nailed the NATO fleet and took out the Foch and almost took out the Nimitz.

The ambush of the B52's over Iceland that cost the US several bombers.

The final air battle over Iceland when they pushed their planes to the limit and managed to take out a bunch of NATO fighters despite being outmatched and out numbered.

The ground attack aircraft that almost managed to win them a battle earlier until their own ground to air missiles started taking out the attack planes.

Was actually just re-reading it in the last few days

I actually think the depiction of the Red Army in the book was very good and showed the book was not a one sided book

[Southernap]

I humbly admit that you're more widely read on this particular topic than I am. I have a clarifying question: When you say NATO aircraft penetrated the edges of Soviet AD networks and survived, do you mean they did so completely undetected, or that the Soviets didn't launch SAMs at them?

If it's the former, that's an impressive feat by NATO. If it's the latter, thank God the Soviets showed restraint. By the same token, NATO showed similar restraint. Soviet aircraft routinely violated neutral and NATO airspace during the Cold War (and Russian aircraft continue to do so today). But there's a big difference between not knowing someone is there and deciding not to to shoot at them when you do.

-

As I have read its both. FleetEx 83-1, a Task Force of 3 US carriers operated in the Bearing Sea and on over to near the Sea of Okhostk where they flew against NORAD and the JASDF pretending to be Soviet strike groups. Other times they flew strike packages up to the 12NM limit before turning away. In some cases, again according to write ups in various books and historical magazines. The Soviets didn't see the strike packages until they were at the limit or when someone broke radar silence. In some cases the strike aircraft were able to fly across Soviet military installations in the Kurils without being shot at by any of the air defense equipment and the systems only going into a fire control track well after the aircraft disappears over the radar horizon.

Along with that during parts of 1983 and even 1981 to 1982, again based on some readings of technical journals and historical reports at places like the US Naval War College or the US Air War College online reading libraries, the aggressive use of the EP-3 and RC-135s to fly and try to penetrate Soviet or even Soviet Client states like Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Eastern Germany (over the Baltics), etc. Before either a radio command or fighters escorts approached to turn the aircraft away. All in attempts to get both up to date ELINT OrBATs and to get doctrinal assessments of how the air defense systems worked.

Similarly during Northern Wedding 1982, the USS America was able to shake her Soviet tails in a storm just off Scotland. Using some other neat tricks via the NSA and some recording emissions on a couple of destroyers. Get up near Spitsbergen doing flight ops without being seen by Soviet Naval intelligence assets. Then flew coordinated strikes in both conventional mission planning and what SIOP called for against NATO target ranges near Tormso and Bardufoss. As well as have their ASW aircraft start to track Soviet submarines, including their boomers as they entered the ice pack areas in international waters.
Again the Soviets didn't see the aircraft until radio transmissions occurred with either datalinks back to NATO or the carrier, if not verbal radio transmissions. At which the Soviets lost their minds and flushed a bunch of stuff. Then later filed diplomatic protests.

Read up about some of the exercises in Nellis and in Yuma (a USMC airbase in AZ with a huge target range). In both places there was a ton of practice not only doing Red Flags and the Marine Weapons and Tactics Instructor Courses. They practiced as if they had to penetrate the Soviet IADS in Europe or in one of the other spheres (like Norway or the Med). With tactics like NOE flying, coordinated strikes against command nodes for the air defenses systems, and the heavy use of EW assets (both in collecting and ECM/ECCM).

From what I have read the assumption in what was released unclassified in the early 80s exercises. That NATO Tactical Air Forces over Europe in a general war would be able to hack it for about 14 days before losses, supply issues, and battle fatigue would have driven them from the field. That is why the whole AirLand battle doctrine was created. Get in with the first 96 hours the good licks in the Soviets air defense systems (again command HQs, static radars and SAM sites, air bases). Then switch to supporting the ground forces while reserves from the US arrived. It was even gamed out that the US Navy once it had good control of the Western Mediterranean and Baltic approaches would have carrier aircraft fly strikes into Europe with whole air wings supporting ground offensives by the US Army or even the use of a Marine Amphibious Brigade landing on the Danish Coast or into Italy driving into PACT territory.

So I am not saying it would be easy, or a cake walk at all. I am just saying that post Vietnam, the US air forces learned a bunch and worked hard on what it would take to crack that hard nut of Soviet air defenses over central Europe. Yet, there was growing evidence by the 1980s and even more so by the late 1980s that the Soviets were not the insurmountable threat that some played them to be, nor would they have been push overs. Rather it was going to be ugly and it was going to be who broke first attrition wise.
____________________________________

Oh definitely and I do not disagree with you. If anything, I think the Soviet layered AA network would have made life very difficult for NATO air forces. The whole rationale behind the A-10 design was that the air environment would be tough to survive so at the very least, that's a tacit acknowledgement from the USAF that the Soviets would not be so easily overcome.

Talking to friends who were in the USN aviation community and some of the Marines that were neighbors of mine in the time period. There was tactical doctrine for the tankers and anti-tank teams to not only kill the tanks, but their priority list was roughly this:

Command tanks or vehicles
Mobile air defense systems
Everything else on the battlefield

since killing the mobile air defense systems would not only allow for the A-10s to survive, but also the AH-1 and AH-64s to survive as well. The attack helos had the same target lists when working in conjunction with the A-10s.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Talking to friends who were in the USN aviation community and some of the Marines that were neighbors of mine in the time period. There was tactical doctrine for the tankers and anti-tank teams to not only kill the tanks, but their priority list was roughly this:

Command tanks or vehicles
Mobile air defense systems
Everything else on the battlefield

since killing the mobile air defense systems would not only allow for the A-10s to survive, but also the AH-1 and AH-64s to survive as well. The attack helos had the same target lists when working in conjunction with the A-10s.
Can't get air support until you control the air so yeah, I completely understand their priority list and again, it shows that the US (and presumably NATO in general) had a good idea of Soviet capabilities and did not treat them as though they would be a pushover (nor impossible to beat for that matter).

[Raellus]

Another challenge NATO would face during the Twilight War, especially in Europe, is the dynamic of coalition warfare. I think it would be a lot easier for the Soviets to operate a unified command, directing its WTO "allies" by dictate. I don't think the U.S. would find its NATO allies quite as compliant.

We saw this in WWII. There was a lot of politicking among the Western Allies- the tension between SHAEF Eisenhower and Montgomery caused all kinds of issues for the Western Allies between D-Day and VE Day. The Soviets, on the other hand, treated their allies as would a slave-driver; as a result, there was far less drama and much better unity of command.

With NATO already fractured by the outset of WWIII (in the v1 timeline, at least), the tension among allies would already be high.

This, I think, would be an advantage for the Soviets.

-

[Legbreaker]

That can however also be a strength for the west - they've got the flexibility to come up with different ideas that wouldn't be allowed in the more authoritarian Pact.
The trick is balancing the two factors.

[Raellus]

That can however also be a strength for the west - they've got the flexibility to come up with different ideas that wouldn't be allowed in the more authoritarian Pact.
The trick is balancing the two factors.

That's a good point. A lot would depend on leadership. A team of good leaders could make coalition warfare into a significant strength. Of course, the opposite is also true.

-

[Legbreaker]

Given leaders in the west generally get promoted due to ability rather than political reasons (yes, there are definitely exceptions), I'm thinking the west is probably a little better off than they otherwise could be.

[Raellus]

Given leaders in the west generally get promoted due to ability rather than political reasons (yes, there are definitely exceptions), I'm thinking the west is probably a little better off than they otherwise could be.

Good point, but the Soviets have also been known to produce their fair share of top-shelf field leaders. In WW2, the Soviets had a lot of good field generals (Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovski, Vasilevski)- as good, if not better, than many of the Western Allies' storied leaders.

The West has traditionally been more patient with generals. They tend to get more chances before being sacked. This can be a good thing, because it allows them time to learn form their mistakes and grow. On the other hand, it allows ineffective generals to remain in place for longer, and that's almost always a bad thing.

The Soviets took a different route. Their generals knew that a lack of results could lead to a one-way ticket to the gulag, or a bullet in the back of the head. This tends to motivate, but it also creates leaders who are reckless or extremely averse to risk-taking. Either product can lead to disaster on the battlefield. I reckon that more than a few potentially brilliant Soviet generals never got past their first mistake.

I guess leadership is one of the biggest "intangibles" when it comes to predicting the outcome of a war.

-

[RN7]

In regards to Soviet/Russian air defences I think their SAM's were good but there fighters were a mixed bag.

Soviet/Russian medium and long ranged SAM systems from the S-300 (SA-10) to the latest S-500 are excellent, and would give NATO aircraft a lot of trouble. I would say they were ahead of NATO until the late 90's early 2000's when the treat ballistic missile from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea forces the west to pump money into developing more capable SAM systems.

Soviet/Russian fighter aircraft were never really a match for the best Western aircraft. The Mig-29/Mig-31/Su-27 generation were as good or better than any European NATO aircraft and export variants of American fighters, but not a good as the F-16/F-15/F-18s that US forces used. Training standards and AWACs was also inferior to NATO. There were some elite squadrons with better trained pilots and the latest Soviet arms and sensors, but on the whole they would have been in trouble outside of the USSR/Russia and Warsaw Pact territory beyond their SAM network. The current crop of modern Russian 4th and 4.5th Generation Su-27 Fulcrum derivatives or Mig-35 and the Chinese fighters are also not as good as US 4.5 and 5th Generation fighters or the latest variant of the 4.5 Generation Eurofighter despite what Russia and China say. Their 5th Generation is still at the prototype stage despite nearly two decades of development, whereas the US already has a 6th generation prototype flying.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Raellus, this may interest you. It's an answer by David Rendahl to the question: - Was the Soviet Union ever superior to the United States in any way during the Cold War (1945-1991)?
David's credentials include British army & British police intelligence and also as a researcher & analyst at Jane's Information Group.

Direct link to David's answer
https://qr.ae/pNJNJN

This is the link for the original page. Many of the other posts on the page are not necessarily relevant or are too biased or too ignorant to be particularly useful.
https://www.quora.com/Was-the-Soviet-Union-ever-superior-to-the-United-States-in-any-way-during-the-Cold-War-1945-1991

[Raellus]

Thanks for sharing that piece, SSC. The author's comparative analysis of weapon ground-based systems is interesting (and I'm not just saying that because much of it supports the thesis of the thread OP), but his strategic analysis is quite illuminating, and particularly germane to the v4 World At War controversy/debate. A particularly eye-opening quote follows:

"Launching a conventional war with limited aims in Northern Europe (Seven Days to the Rhine) with an openly declared promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, would produce such a shock to our system it would have been economically catastrophic.

Recovery from that would have put Russia and the USA on more equal financial terms as much of the Dollar economy is based on confidence and communication, while the Russian economy was captive. It may not be a plan to take over the world, but quite possibly enough coercion to get the world to pay them off - give them Germany, Denmark, Holland and back off from China to stop them slapping us about.

It was unlikely, but many historical pivots only needed a gentle push off the cliff. In August 1991 I sat in a tank shed in Hohne listing to the BBC news tell us about the Soviet coup in Moscow . Gorbachev was rumoured to have been killed, the Tamanskya Guards Division were rolling around the Kremlin, shady generals were in charge and unhappy with the imminent end of Soviet power. There were still millions of WarPac soldiers and tons of equipment within a day’s drive from our position.

It was genuinely the scariest couple of days of my career."

-

[RN7]

Raellus, this may interest you. It's an answer by David Rendahl to the question: - Was the Soviet Union ever superior to the United States in any way during the Cold War (1945-1991)?
David's credentials include British army & British police intelligence and also as a researcher & analyst at Jane's Information Group.

Direct link to David's answer
https://qr.ae/pNJNJN

This is the link for the original page. Many of the other posts on the page are not necessarily relevant or are too biased or too ignorant to be particularly useful.
https://www.quora.com/Was-the-Soviet-Union-ever-superior-to-the-United-States-in-any-way-during-the-Cold-War-1945-1991

That's a good read and very informative about the capabilities and doctrine of NATO and Soviet forces throughout the Cold War.

I've always thought that NATO would have been better equipped to deal with the Soviets in Europe if the Germans or British had led the land forces instead of the Americans. They were more focused on the Soviet threat in Europe and seemed to be able to develop land systems more quickly that were needed to counter the Soviets. This of course would have been impossible as America was the leader of the West and by far the biggest defence spender in NATO.

[rcaf_777]

I've always thought that NATO would have been better equipped to deal with the Soviets in Europe if the Germans or British had led the land forces instead of the Americans. They were more focused on the Soviet threat in Europe and seemed to be able to develop land systems more quickly that were needed to counter the Soviets. This of course would have been impossible as America was the leader of the West and by far the biggest defense spender in NATO.

what a thought interesting Idea, yes the us have money but the germans own the land lol

[Raellus]

Posted in the Putin's War in Ukraine thread:

Is anyone else surprised by how poor the Russian troops have performed? Don't get me wrong, I'm glad that they are doing badly, but I thought that even without their heavy artillery they would make quicker progress than they have. Has the average Russian infantryman been proved to not be as capable as we expected them to be?

Yes. And it's got me thinking. If the Soviet military at the height of the Cold War performed nearly as poorly as the Russian military in 2022, then Twilight:2000 becomes a fantasy RPG. We can't have that.

One could certainly argue that Russia's poor performance in the first week of its Ukrainian adventure is evidence that the Soviet Army wouldn't have stood a chance against NATO in a large-scale conventional war. Although there is a strong case to be made for that, in the spirit of this thread's foundational premise, I'm going to argue against that conclusion.

The Soviet military performs best when there is an existential threat to the Motherland. It did not perform well in the largely unprovoked Winter War against Finland, or the 1939 joint invasion of Poland. The Soviet Army excelled when it's back was against the wall (Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk), then turned successful defense into devastating offense. After almost collapsing under the weight of Barbarossa '41, the Red Army staged an epic come-back and went on to smash the Wehrmacht decisively, time and again.

In the v1 T2k timeline, the USSR is once again under existential threat. It really only starts kicking ass in central Europe when NATO forces are on the doorstep of the Soviet frontier.

Also, the Soviet military was designed to be wielded like a sledgehammer, not a precision scalpel. Russia's clumsy attempts to ape the successful strategy and tactics of the US invasion of Iraq has revealed its ill-suitedness for such focused operations. In T2k, the Soviets start having success when they begin employing massed artillery fires, Army-level attacks, and waves of AFVs. And then, of course, there's its use of battlefield tactical nukes.

Lastly, say what you will about the clunkiness of Soviet-era Red Army organization, logistics, and CnC, but its virtue lay in its simplicity, redundency, and sheer scale. Russia's attempt at a lean, mean military machine has revealed systematic flaws and shortcomings resulting from the last decade's attempts at "streamlining".

-

[unipus]

Part of the confusion, I think, is that Putin has tried to paint this conflict (to the West) as an existential threat. NATO on the doorstep of Russia itself!

Yet judging from the confusion and awful morale of the Russian troops (which could be less than the full truth but seems too widespread to be made up) along with the substantial internal protest, it seems that Russians themselves don't believe this, at all.

(the same thing could be said to some degree about Iraq in 2004, but the coalition troops themselves were pretty gung-ho about it at least, for the most part)

[swaghauler]

Posted in the Putin's War in Ukraine thread:



Yes. And it's got me thinking. If the Soviet military at the height of the Cold War performed nearly as poorly as the Russian military in 2022, then Twilight:2000 becomes a fantasy RPG. We can't have that.

One could certainly argue that Russia's poor performance in the first week of its Ukrainian adventure is evidence that the Soviet Army wouldn't have stood a chance against NATO in a large-scale conventional war. Although there is a strong case to be made for that, in the spirit of this thread's foundational premise, I'm going to argue against that conclusion.

The Soviet military performs best when there is an existential threat to the Motherland. It did not perform well in the largely unprovoked Winter War against Finland, or the 1939 joint invasion of Poland. The Soviet Army excelled when it's back was against the wall (Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk), then turned successful defense into devastating offense. After almost collapsing under the weight of Barbarossa '41, the Red Army staged an epic come-back and went on to smash the Wehrmacht decisively, time and again.

In the v1 T2k timeline, the USSR is once again under existential threat. It really only starts kicking ass in central Europe when NATO forces are on the doorstep of the Soviet frontier.

Also, the Soviet military was designed to be wielded like a sledgehammer, not a precision scalpel. Russia's clumsy attempts to ape the successful strategy and tactics of the US invasion of Iraq has revealed its ill-suitedness for such focused operations. In T2k, the Soviets start having success when they begin employing massed artillery fires, Army-level attacks, and waves of AFVs. And then, of course, there's its use of battlefield tactical nukes.

Lastly, say what you will about the clunkiness of Soviet-era Red Army organization, logistics, and CnC, but its virtue lay in its simplicity, redundency, and sheer scale. Russia's attempt at a lean, mean military machine has revealed systematic flaws and shortcomings resulting from the last decade's attempts at "streamlining".

-

You are making a significant mistake here. Not in assuming that the PACT forces would be as ill-prepared logistically, but in assuming that the effect would be the same as this modern-day conflict with Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine have roughly the same number of ground combatants with all of the Ukrainian people defending their soil. The Ukrainians have compact logistics tails (they are literally fighting in their own front yards) and short lines of communication. Russia's Command and Control as well as her logistics tail are at the very end of their "reach" in range. Training is roughly equal as the Russians have very little money to train their conscripts. This is a 1v1 scenario. The outcome is uncertain because Russia can only supply around 150K troops with her current logistics tail. This is obviously stretching her command and control to the limits as well. Victory is not certain due to Russia's limited economy (10th in the World) potentially collapsing and leaving her army starved of supplies and munitions. The Russians may have a majority conscript army, but there are several elite volunteer units too. Those units are fighting in the Crimea and Donetsk regions and have done FAR BETTER than the conscripts from Belarus.

The PACT, however, was an economic beast (because of the number of countries Russia could exploit). They also outnumbered NATO between 3 to 1 in troops and tanks, and up to 5 to 1 in APCs. They also held a 3 to 1 advantage in artillery. Even IF half the PACT forces turned tail to run, it was STILL a 1v1 fight for NATO. In addition, NATO really didn't hold a technological superiority in equipment until the late 80s. An M60 with a 105mm is technically just a match for a T62. Thus nothing could be guaranteed for certain given the numbers NATO was facing. Even if the first waves panicked and fled in terror, how do you [NATO] resupply when the next wave is rolling over the hill? Numbers DO MATTER, just not as much as they used to. Additionally, the Soviets had the ability to resupply from a number of countries so they could build multiple logistics tails coming in from many directions, whereas the Russians in Ukraine do not.

[swaghauler]

Part of the confusion, I think, is that Putin has tried to paint this conflict (to the West) as an existential threat. NATO on the doorstep of Russia itself!

Yet judging from the confusion and awful morale of the Russian troops (which could be less than the full truth but seems too widespread to be made up) along with the substantial internal protest, it seems that Russians themselves don't believe this, at all.

(the same thing could be said to some degree about Iraq in 2004, but the coalition troops themselves were pretty gung-ho about it at least, for the most part)

With US troops in Iraq, I think they still were running on the wave of anger over 911. Combine that with US Iraqi relations and it was enough "motivation" to take the fight to the Iraqis.

[chico20854]

I have recently read this analysis by RUSI (https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine), a high-quality British think tank (and the longer document that this page is a summary of).

It summarizes many of the tactical changes the Russian Army has udnergone since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. A big picture summary is that they have been forced to abandon their elaborate combined arms-deep strike doctrine and revert to a much more typically Russian form of warfare - throwing hordes of low quality troops at enemy defensive lines, supported by massive amounts of artillery fire. (The report notes that the artillery fire is slacking off this year in comparison to last year as supplies run low, and that the anture of fire support has shifted, with much heavier use of 120mm mortars and much less use of MRLs and 152mm howitzers.) Tanks have in many cases been relegated to heavily protected mobile artillery (better able to withstand Ukrainian counterbattery fire than towed guns or mortars) or long-range standoff fire support; the armored thrust into gaps in enemy lines has once again proved suicidal when the enemy closes the gap and surrounds the cut-off armored force. The document also details other changes in infantry organization, engineer operations and electronic warfare.

I think that many of these changes would be mirrored in the in-game 1998 and (in some parts 1997) campaigns. (Some, such as the extensive use of low-cost drones for reconnaissance and artillery spotting, would not). On ground human tactical and operational reconnaissance by Spetsnaz teams has largely ceased as the highly trained operators are used as assault infantry, lavish artillery fire is curtailed by low stockpiles, and tanks are used as fire support rather than to create breakthroughs. Mobilization-only divisions from the interior are used as cannon fodder infantry to hold ground and create opportunities for better formations to attack through. Mortars replace tube artillery as ammunition becomes scarce. I think current Russian engineer and EW operations are better than their Soviet counterparts would be, since the Russian economy produces more and better construction materiel that can be used by engineers and export control failures have enabled the Russians to field much more sophisticated electronic warfare equipment than the Soviets could.

What are your thoughts folks????

[Adm.Lee]

I think that many of these changes would be mirrored in the in-game 1998 and (in some parts 1997) campaigns. (Some, such as the extensive use of low-cost drones for reconnaissance and artillery spotting, would not). On ground human tactical and operational reconnaissance by Spetsnaz teams has largely ceased as the highly trained operators are used as assault infantry, lavish artillery fire is curtailed by low stockpiles, and tanks are used as fire support rather than to create breakthroughs. Mobilization-only divisions from the interior are used as cannon fodder infantry to hold ground and create opportunities for better formations to attack through. Mortars replace tube artillery as ammunition becomes scarce. I think current Russian engineer and EW operations are better than their Soviet counterparts would be, since the Russian economy produces more and better construction materiel that can be used by engineers and export control failures have enabled the Russians to field much more sophisticated electronic warfare equipment than the Soviets could.

What are your thoughts folks????

No arguments from me.

[Ursus Maior]

I concur with the RUSI analysis being a good blueprint for T2K with some caveats: First of all, I think the Soviet Army (and, depending on the timeline/edtion used: its allies) would have to fare a lot better in initial attacks on Western forces than the Russian Armed Forces did during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Eventually, however, Soviet forces would be depleted as much as Russian forces are and when this bough breaks, Soviet solutions to the operational situation will look similar to Russian ones. I also think, the authors of the game have anticipated some of these solutions fairly well.

First, force generation will resort to mobilization, but it probably would not be full or even total mobilization in the beginning, because that would tank the industry. With no Western allies providing food, ammunition and transport vehicles via lend & lease, the USSR needs to come up with these resources on its own. That limits how many men it can take out of the labor force. But mobilization will creep up eventually, partially because it's bound to happen and partially because alternate sources will run dry. These alternate sources are international volunteers, a limited resource, given that many parts of the world are aflame at the same time, and prison populations.

Generation of war materiel will fare similarly, I presume. We all know of the hodgepodge of vehicles in T2K, the constant downgrading of planned inventories for a unit given. One just has to look at the development of Wehrmacht divisions from 1939 to 1945: the final waves of deployment were hardly recognizable from an early war point of view. What is also likely is that local workshops near the front would set up production, delivering much needed support weapons and mobility solutions. While a local shop cannot produce field guns, cannons or howitzers, let alone ATGMs, mortars and recoilless rifles are much easier to manufacture with primitive tools, as are first generation assault/battle rifles and submachine guns. For mobility, carts - both hand and animal drawn - are easily constructed as are bicycles.

All in all, Soviet solutions might look similar to Russia solutions today on the tactical level, because operational and strategic possibilities and solutions will dictate certain developments. However, with key components of today's Ukrainian solutions and developments missing, counter batter radar, artillery outranging Russian guns and drones aka tactical and operational real time aerial reconnaissance missing, some developments will not take place. The Soviet army of 1997-2000 will not have to worry (or at least far less) loosing troops and assets in its rear area to long range strikes. This will enable the Soviets (but also the Western allies) to set up cantonments for regiments/brigades upwards and dispatch individual (augmented) companies to the frontline (i. e. into artillery ranges) with the cantonments in villages or towns no more than 30 km from the respective FLOT. This makes transits to and from the front possible without motorization, i. e. per bicycle, horse, cart or even on foot. Between FLOT and division cantonment a battalion HQ will provide C² in the assembly area, about 5-15 km from FLOT.

Also, with aerial reconnaissance playing almost no roll, the ratio of indirect rounds fired and infantry killed (especially in massed attacks) will look very different. Additionally, scouting ahead of small unit assaults and raids will have a more conventional look with LRRP becoming an important asset for all units battalion size and up. Often lacking radios, information will flow extremely slowly, with no reinforcements or "cavalry to the rescue" available if a patrol comes under fire. The former will mean that along static front lines infantry can move unprotected, but once in sight and range of the enemy, these troops will fare the same as in World War One: water cooled machine guns and mortars being available en masse. The difficulty of generating reliable intelligence on the enemy, especially behind FLET will maximize the fog of war, making all assets of aerial reconnaissance (IMINT) as well as HUMINT and SIGINT forms extremely valuable. To be clear on that: The front lines in Poland might be as static as the Western front in parts, but commanders will have less reconnaissance available to themselves than their counterparts in France in Belgium 80 years earlier.

This would a) make offensives much more riskier to conduct and b) would necessitate reconnaissance by force much more often, depleting relevant and highly specialized units much more quickly than previously. This might be the most important reason, why we only get about one offensive per side per year: Readying personnel, materiel, logistics and especially one's intelligence picture would be too much a task to conduct more than once, especially after the nuclear attacks devastating most industries, population centers and critical infrastructure.

The NATO attack of Operation Reset probably had a fairly good picture of the next 100-200 km of enemy positions, but had the misfortune of running into a Soviet offensive force just having finished preparations for their own offensive.

[Raellus]

Great analysis, guys. I'd like to add a few thoughts.

As I've stated here before- ad nauseum, probably- the Soviet military was scarily effective when it fought following the model established by the Red Army of the last two years or so of the Second World War- utilizing the blunt instruments of massive artillery prep, large-scale infantry attacks, and massed heavy armor. Historically, when the Russian army has tried to ape Western armies, it's failed pretty miserably.

In Ukraine over the last year, we've witnessed the rise and fall of the Russian Battalion Tactical Group. It's ironic, because I think divisions in 2000 (T2kU) would resemble BTGs, albeit on a slightly larger scale (roughly equivalent to 2 BTGs- what the Russians now call a brigade). This article does a good job of explaining the BTG concept, its evolution during the Cold War, and its apparent failure in Ukraine.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/getting-know-russian-battalion-tactical-group

This excerpt is particularly germane to our discussion of warfare in the later years of the Twilight War.

"Over time, divisions and regiments became fairly proficient in combined arms combat, but the nature of the battlefield was changing. Modern weapons forced units to spread out in order to survive. The future battlefield would be fragmented, with gaps between units, open flanks and combat not only at the front line, but also throughout the battlespace. The concept of the front line itself was being challenged. It thus became obvious that the battalion was a prime component of future war and battalions had to fight combined to win. The problem was how to combine branches into battalions and fight effectively."

A fragmented battlefield, with "gaps between units, open flanks, and combat not only at the front line" is almost a perfect summary of how canon describes the European battlefield in the last year or two of the Twilight War.

Before condemning the Soviet military of the late Cold War period based largely on the piss-poor performance of the modern Russian military in Ukraine, we have to remember that warfare has changed quite a bit over the past 30-plus years. One very big difference is the proliferation of UAVs/drones, especially small, relatively inexpensive off-the-shelf civilian models repurposed for combat roles. To say nothing of their direct strike capabilities, UAVs/drones provide real-time aerial reconnaissance capabilities- often down to the platoon level- that even the most modern NATO militaries lacked through the IRL 1990s. Combined with the more widespread availability/use of long-range precision artillery munitions (e.g. Excalibur), there's very little that can't be spotted with drones and hit by artillery within 10-20 kilometers of the forward edge of battle. Precision munitions aren't even necessary, as drones can still provide BVR spotting and corrections for unguided artillery. The drone-artillery team makes concentrating assault forces behind the lines for large-scale attacks without quickly coming under accurate artillery fires nearly impossible; likewise, ammunition and supply depots, headquarters, SAMs, and other rear area services are now much more vulnerable to destruction by accurate artillery fire.

None of this would be the case- at least to the degree that it is today- in a WWIII fought in the mid-to-late 1990s. Drones did exist of course, but in nowhere near the numbers that they are today. Corps and divisions would have had access, but not, as it is today, companies, platoons, and even squads.

-

[Vespers War]

One area where I think the T2K Soviet Army would fare better than modern Russia is getting reserve materiel refurbished and into service. The Twilight Soviets didn't go through the period of neglect and looting where everything that wasn't nailed down was sold off and everything that could be pried up wasn't nailed down. It would take much longer for them to have to dip into the deep reserves of obsolete vehicles.

[Ursus Maior]

One area where I think the T2K Soviet Army would fare better than modern Russia is getting reserve materiel refurbished and into service. The Twilight Soviets didn't go through the period of neglect and looting where everything that wasn't nailed down was sold off and everything that could be pried up wasn't nailed down. It would take much longer for them to have to dip into the deep reserves of obsolete vehicles.

I'd say that's a solid yes and no. We now know that this looting, neglect and corruption were already rampant during the 1980s and possibly earlier. However, the wholesale clearance of depots worth of older tank models, complete neglect of maintenance and pilfering of high-value parts (especially optics and electronics) probably started only in the 1990s or maybe the late 1980s. It then continued in the 2000s and probably became even worse under the current (and then) president, when organized crime and security apparatus became fully one and at the same time the big army was de facto abolished with the concept of maintaining only a small expeditionary force with far fewer conscripts and a focus on contract soldiers ("kontraktniki").

In fact, for those timelines that incorporate the 1991 August Coup or any other hardliners and their reforms and internal cleanings, getting rid of organized crime metastasizing within the security apparatus as well as other forms of corruption and pilfering would be the main goal. No Soviet (or other) army can hope to win a long war without knowing what it has in stores and how long it will take to refurbish depot material or manufacture new equipment and vehicles.

[KozmasSchmierfink]

A problem I have with the current timeline in-game vs what we've learned of Russian forces in Chechnya (twice), Georgia, and Ukraine since 2014, is the hand-waving over the internal dissent inside the Soviet Union around the time of the failed coup. The army with which the USSR would be attacking Sweden and the Balts would be one that had suffered significant internal purges and expended much of it's combat power fighting internal enemies along the fringes. I see motivation as a serious problem due to the forces of entropy and dissolution that were already full-steam ahead when the coup happened. Maybe they maintain order in the Moscow/St Pete corridor and some other places... but we should talk about what that post-coup environment would have really looked like...

[Raellus]

A problem I have with the current timeline in-game vs what we've learned of Russian forces in Chechnya (twice), Georgia, and Ukraine since 2014, is the hand-waving over the internal dissent inside the Soviet Union around the time of the failed coup. The army with which the USSR would be attacking Sweden and the Balts would be one that had suffered significant internal purges and expended much of it's combat power fighting internal enemies along the fringes. I see motivation as a serious problem due to the forces of entropy and dissolution that were already full-steam ahead when the coup happened. Maybe they maintain order in the Moscow/St Pete corridor and some other places... but we should talk about what that post-coup environment would have really looked like...

That's a good point. This is a big reason that I favor the v1 chronology (no coup, no end of the Soviet Empire) over the 2.2 and 4e chronologies. I've also homebrewed a timeline where the coup occurs in late 1989, before the East Bloc and Soviet Union really start falling apart. There would probably still be insurrections in a few particularly restive SSRs to put down, but the Soviet military would not be in such a shambles as they were IRL, around the beginning of the First Chechen War (c.1994). A stronger, less disorganized, less demoralized Soviet military probably would have dealt with localized rebellions and such more effectively.

Alternate 1989 Timeline:

https://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.php?t=6906

-

[KozmasSchmierfink]

I think we can get there but with a partial slide to oligopoly as key functionaries who control state industries and local commanders of CA and interior ministry troops become de-facto social controllers. I would envision the Tsentr having tenuous control over local officials on whom they would rely for the illusion of continuity. I see the beginning of the required conflict as more local commanders, whether out of delusion, Caesarism or accelerationist aims, start local trouble that they can’t solve and force Moscow’s hand. It’s not hard to get to a local commander recommending nuclear employment over a military task they can no longer solve through conventional means.

[Raellus]

I think we can get there but with a partial slide to oligopoly as key functionaries who control state industries and local commanders of CA and interior ministry troops become de-facto social controllers. I would envision the Tsentr having tenuous control over local officials on whom they would rely for the illusion of continuity. I see the beginning of the required conflict as more local commanders, whether out of delusion, Caesarism or accelerationist aims, start local trouble that they can’t solve and force Moscow’s hand. It’s not hard to get to a local commander recommending nuclear employment over a military task they can no longer solve through conventional means.

Could you expand on these ideas a bit? I'm interested, but I don't quite follow. Is this pre or post-coup (I assume post)? Is this part of the lead-up to WWIII?

-

[KozmasSchmierfink]

Even with a successful coup the empire’s falling apart and separatist/nationalist tendencies have metastasized in the Baltics, Caucasus, the ‘stans and even Ukraine though that’s more nuanced and complex. To hold the system together would have required the buy-in of the controllers of state enterprises and the chairmen of the various constituent republics, oblasts, okrugs and so on along with local forces whether those were army or interior ministry or KGB border forces. So how do you get their buy-in? Autonomy of some sort. And it would be obvious to any but the most ardent true believers at this point that if the Tsentr is conceding more authority in order to maintain the illusion of control then local control is really what matters.
But when you ceded central control then local decisions can get out of hand and local commanders become local powers and hold the loyalty of their troops by having access to food, money and other rents to distribute to them and their families. Hence oligopolies and caesarism.

[KozmasSchmierfink]

So now you have the ambition of local commanders and Party apparatchiks creating local realities and when that involves breakaway states and former Pact members you get incursions that Moscow may or may not have the means to stop or turn back so has to support. Or has to manufacture an existential threat to provide a justification for continuing. And in a situation like that, one can’t very well lose …

[Raellus]

We've discussed NATO's willful choice to rely more on achieving air superiority than on investing in SHORAD systems for its ground troops during the late Cold War (and through the 2020s). It now appears that the Ukrainians are having to lie in the bed that NATO made. We're seeing strong evidence that a lack of SHORAD makes armor vulnerable to attacks by Russian attack helicopters.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-armor-appears-to-have-a-russian-attack-helicopter-problem

-

[KozmasSchmierfink]

Yeah you can definitely argue that like Russian forces are reliant on their air defense umbrella, NATO/US forces need that assumed air superiority. Certainly makes breaching operations easier when everything in the air is yours...

of course every time I see a map with symbology on it I want to break out my doctrinal pins...

[bash]

While NATO/US prefers air superiority I'd say that even without it their use of AWACS makes up a bit for SHORAD. Anything bigger than a drone that leaves the ground is going to be seen and tracked by AWACS which can guide weapons to shoot it down.

Even with NATO AWACS planes over friendly countries or international airspace the lack of Ukrainian air and ground assets compatible with NATO systems mean they can't use the AWACS umbrella a NATO army could.

I think AWACS integration was a better investment for NATO. That's not to say SHORAD is not worthwhile. But the reality is AWACS integrated weapons have a much longer detection and engagement range than SHORAD.

For instance the Russian helicopter ATGMs have an 8km stand-off range. I don't know that you're going to be able to build a SHORAD system (without AWACS or aerial radar) with a 9+ km engagement range. The missiles might have the range but you need sensors to be able to see and shoot something that from the perspective of the system is right on the horizon.

[Raellus]

For instance the Russian helicopter ATGMs have an 8km stand-off range. I don't know that you're going to be able to build a SHORAD system (without AWACS or aerial radar) with a 9+ km engagement range. The missiles might have the range but you need sensors to be able to see and shoot something that from the perspective of the system is right on the horizon.

Your points regarding AWACS and comparative weapons ranges are well taken.

As this thread is, by design, an apologetic for the Soviet military, I shall endeavor to provide a couple of counterpoints.

Not all Soviet helicopter-launched ATGMs outrange NATO SHORAD systems.

One of the most common Soviet helicopter-mounted ATGMs, the AT-9 Spiral, has a maximum range of 6km (product-improved versions introduced later have a range of 8-10km). The Stinger and Roland SAMS each have a range of 8km so, depending on the version of Spiral, either side has a slight range advantage.

The longer range AT-16 Scallion (10-12km) is only carried by KA-50 Hokum, of which the Soviets had relatively small numbers, compared to their older models of attack helicopters.

An IR-guided SHORAD system with a range of 10-15km would have given NATO ground forces a security blanket against Soviet attack aircraft.

Regarding NATO AWACs, there's no doubt it was/is a huge force multiplier for NATO. The Soviets were not unaware of this. I suspect that the Soviets had plans in place to neutralize NATO's advantage in that department, to some extent. I wouldn't be surprised if one of those plans involved attacking at least some of them on the ground at the outset of armed conflict with NATO.

Although NATO AWACS would be very well defended in the air, they can't hide (as long as their radar is turned on). The Soviets developed an AAM specifically to attack large aircraft like the AWACS and JSTAR at very long ranges- the hypersonic AA-13 Axehead (200+km range at Mach 5). Once they ran out of AA-13's, I can see the Soviets launching barrages of slightly shorter-ranged AA-9s (75-100km), and even AS-11s HARMS (120km) at any surviving NATO AWACS. The Soviets wouldn't even have to kill them (the AWACS) to reduce their impact on the battlespace- they could neutralize them by disrupting their operations or denying them certain sectors of airspace over the front).

And jammers might be able to screen Soviet attack helicopters operating at tree-top level.

I think NATO made a mistake putting all its eggs in once basket by choosing to skimp on SHORAD capabilities v. the Soviets.

-

[bash]

Note I completely agree WRT NATO putting their air defense eggs in one basket. If their AWACS umbrella ever comes down or they have to operate without it they're incredibly vulnerable to things like attack helicopters. I'd include low-flying cruise missiles in that threat bucket too. Even non-nuclear cruise missiles could severely damage NATO rear lines lacking both good SHORAD and AWACS/air cover. A bunch of dudes with Stingers wouldn't quite suffice.

[ToughOmbres]

We've discussed NATO's willful choice to rely more on achieving air superiority than on investing in SHORAD systems for its ground troops during the late Cold War (and through the 2020s). It now appears that the Ukrainians are having to lie in the bed that NATO made. We're seeing strong evidence that a lack of SHORAD makes armor vulnerable to attacks by Russian attack helicopters.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-armor-appears-to-have-a-russian-attack-helicopter-problem

-

The Stinger's have not completely driven the Russian Air Force from the sky but have clearly made a difference. I wonder if even older British blowpipe MANPADS would still be useful against Russian aircraft?

NATO collectively made a budget decision regarding short range air defense to some extent during and certainly after the end of the Cold War. Why would you need much air defense when you will have air superiority if not outright air supremacy? ADA systems are in many ways like the old railway operating companies. We would never need them-until you can't get contractors to do the work.

There was a USAF open estimate that Russia retains perhaps 1,500 aircraft on inventory. My guess is that only 30% or so would be operational-in a pinch somewhat larger numbers could be pushed in the air. The Russians probably aren't going to risk any more aircraft against even short range air defense unless absolutely necessary. Now helicopters-the Russians seem to be cautiously using those with more success. For now.

[Raellus]

A lot of reporting on the Coalition air forces' performance against the Iraqi's Soviet-style (and equipped) air defenses tends to portray it as more or less of a cakewalk for the former, allowing Coalition air power to strike Iraqi ground forces almost at will, thereby dramatically impacting the course of the ground war. Some use these portrayals to argue that NATO would perform similarly against Soviet air defenses, allowing NATO aircraft to quickly focus more on tactical battlefield support. While it is true that the Coalition was able to establish air superiority over most of the battle space relatively quickly, it wasn't easy. The Coalition forces experienced some unanticipated challenges, and were forced to make some major adjustments on the fly; otherwise, the air campaign would have been significantly more costly (for the Coalition) than it turned out to be. This brief article does a good job of describing some of the challenges faced by Coalition air forces, and explains how they led to the adoption of different tactics.

https://theaviationgeekclub.com/the-story-of-package-q-airstrike-the-largest-operational-f-16-mission-of-all-time-that-made-usaf-realize-that-big-formations-werent-as-good-as-stealthy-precision-strikes/

From this analysis, I would argue that the Soviet's denser, more complex air defense networks and more capable systems would have presented a much bigger challenge to NATO air forces than the Iraqis ever did, and that NATO losses would be much higher than they were in the Gulf. A deadlier threat environment would have necessitated similar, if not more dramatic, tactical adjustments (namely, smaller, stealthier strike packages), which would have reduced the impact of NATO air power on Soviet ground force operations.

-

[Homer]

I’d offer that 1999s Allied Force is a better look at what may have happened in a peer fight. Even with the lessons learned from ODS and a massive overmatch in firepower, Serbia was able to maintain a credible GBAD threat and deflect a proportion of NATOs efforts throughout the conflict by using anti-SEAD tactics, deception, and dispersal. Despite fielding a smaller force than the Iraqis, the Serbs were able to retain an effective air defense force.

[Raellus]

Good call, Homer. In terms of air-defenses, the Serbs arguably did more with less than the Iraqis- that shouldn't be overlooked.

-

[bash]

Something to keep in mind between Iraq, Serbia, and a T2K war would be the context of the air defenses and the ROE of the attacking force. In Iraq their air defense had to defend huge areas and the ROE for Coalition forces was "shoot anything dangerous looking". In Serbia the air defenses had much smaller coverage areas covering parent formations. The Coalition ROE were more restrictive as well.

In a T2K WWIII there would likely be good defenses on the Soviet side but a fairly lax ROE for NATO forces. NATO would also have the benefit of B-2s and F-117s for taking out air defense HQs and/or batteries themselves. So definitely not a cakewalk for NATO but the Soviets also wouldn't have an impenetrable wall of air defenses.

[Raellus]

Something to keep in mind between Iraq, Serbia, and a T2K war would be the context of the air defenses and the ROE of the attacking force. In Iraq their air defense had to defend huge areas and the ROE for Coalition forces was "shoot anything dangerous looking". In Serbia the air defenses had much smaller coverage areas covering parent formations. The Coalition ROE were more restrictive as well.

In a T2K WWIII there would likely be good defenses on the Soviet side but a fairly lax ROE for NATO forces. NATO would also have the benefit of B-2s and F-117s for taking out air defense HQs and/or batteries themselves. So definitely not a cakewalk for NATO but the Soviets also wouldn't have an impenetrable wall of air defenses.

Good points. Would the US have risked B-2s for anything but nuclear strikes, though? I'm not well versed on late-Cold War SAC doctrine, but I would hazard a guess that B-2s would not be released to deliver conventional strikes anywhere near the FEB. F-117s might have good success against Soviet air defenses initially, but the Soviets probably would have "cracked the code" pretty quickly. IIRC, the Serbians allegedly figured out a way to detect and track them using ground-based radars (shooting down at least one F-117 with a SAM), and the IRST capabilities of the MiG-29 and SU-27 would mitigate, to some degree, the F-117's stealth capabilities v. radar.

-

[ToughOmbres]

My own view is that Command would be loathe to risk the (presumably) small number of B-2's available in the Twilight War for anything other than extremely high priority nuke targets. Command (again in my view) would be only slightly less likely to risk the small number of F117's against Air Defense targets and then only the top priority such as radars-even assuming you could boost the numbers slightly with increased wartime production.

[bash]

You both may be right about the B-2 but I think the Nighthawks would definitely be used to break down air defenses. I'd imagine a NATO air in Eastern Europe would end up looking a lot like Desert Storm. Nighthawks taking out fixed radars and C2, Phantoms running Wild Weasel missions, and Aardvarks reupholstering everything with every stand-off weapon that can be mounted.

I agree that the Soviets will have a better response than the Iraqis though. Just better integration of their air defense, better intelligence on NATO's stealth assets, and better equipment will even the odds a bit. I think the air defenses USSR proper would main unassailable until TDM but I don't think Eastern Europe would remain quite as secure.

[Ursus Maior]

The B-2 Spirit only reached IOC on 1 January 1997. Depending on edition/timeline that means there would be only very few B-2 operating, indeed. Original production ended in 2000, but that was only the case, because Clinton had one of the prototypes rebuilt into a 21st Block 30 fully operational B-2. The peak of production was around 1989, so all historical 21 planes would/should/could be available for T2K.

[Raellus]

I think that we can all agree that the Russian military hasn't performed well during Putin's War in Ukraine, especially during the first 1-2 years. Extrapolating from that, it would be easy to conclude that the Late Cold War Soviet military would have been handled rather easily by NATO in a general European War. Perhaps that's a mistake.

Russia's been able to sustain it's "Special Military Operation" for over two years, under broad economic sanctions, and without fully mobilizing the Russian economy for total war. Recently, Russian forces have seized the initiative and are threatening to push the UAF back on a broad front after achieving a significant penetration of UAF defensive lines west of Avdkiivka.

This speaks to Russian resiliency, doggedness, and resourcefulness.

-

[Vespers War]

I think that we can all agree that the Russian military hasn't performed well during Putin's War in Ukraine, especially during the first 1-2 years. Extrapolating from that, it would be easy to conclude that the Late Cold War Soviet military would have been handled rather easily by NATO in a general European War. Perhaps that's a mistake.

Russia's been able to sustain it's "Special Military Operation" for over two years, under broad economic sanctions, and without fully mobilizing the Russian economy for total war. Recently, Russian forces have seized the initiative and are threatening to push the UAF back on a broad front after achieving a significant penetration of UAF defensive lines west of Avdkiivka.

This speaks to Russian resiliency, doggedness, and resourcefulness.

-

I'm not sure Russia's inability to break a stalemate with a country that had a pre-war army 20% its size, a GDP 10% as large, and 33% of its population is a particular testament to their capabilities.

Edit: the rough equivalent for the United States would be getting stalemated by Brazil.

[Raellus]

I'm not sure Russia's inability to break a stalemate with a country that had a pre-war army 20% its size, a GDP 10% as large, and 33% of its population is a particular testament to their capabilities.

I'm not saying that the Russian military is good. My point is that, despite its many serious flaws, it's maybe not as bad as many analysts claimed it to be up until this year, or so. And, currently, there's growing concern that Russia may be about to break that stalemate, so the jury's still out on that point.

Edit: the rough equivalent for the United States would be getting stalemated by Brazil.

To be fair, the USA has been definitively stalemated by two far less powerful countries during the last 50 years (essentially bracketing the Late Cold War period), so we're not the world-beaters the jingoists proclaim us to be either.

I'm very much aware that all of these comparisons are apples-to-oranges. There are simply too many variables at play in each case to draw any meaningful conclusions re a hypothetical WWIII. We're dealing with a lot of counterfactuals. Essentially, I've been playing devil's advocate in this thread, trying to find a bright side for those who want to believe that a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Late Cold War period would have been evenly matched, or at least competitive. IMHO, that's an essential premise of TWILIGHT:2000 in all of its iterations.

-