In Defense of the Red Army [Archive]

Raellus

06-20-2009, 04:39 PM

I just finished Red Army by Ralph Peters, a fine novel of WWIII set in Europe. What sets this novel apart from contemporaries like Red Storm Rising and Team Yankee is that it is written entirely from the POV of its Soviet protagonists. It's very well written and focuses more on the various characters (from lowly NCOs to general officers) than on militiary technology. It doesn't reference specific weapon platforms, allowing the reader to imagine either a MiG-27 or SU-35, depending on his/her preference. It pulls no punches in examining the faults of the Soviet Military of the mid to late '80s, but it also highlights several of its comparitive strengths.

Anyway, it got me thinking about a conventional war in Europe between the Soviet Union/WTO and the U.S./NATO, circa the mid '80s or, following the v1.0 timeline, the late '90s.

A lot of folks seem to hold the opinion that the Soviet Union, even at the height of its military powers, could never have had significant successes against NATO forces in a conventional land/air war in Europe. They make several arguments to back up this assessment. I'd like to take some time to rebutt some of these arguments and then open a discussion.

1.)The Soviets had inferior military technology.

True, in almost every category of military hardware, NATO gear was superior. NATO gear has repeatedly trumped Soviet gear over the years, most recently in Iraq. But, one must keep in mind the way in which that Soviet gear was used (see point #2). And, for the most part, Iraq's Soviet/Russian gear was of the export variety, meaning that it did not have the full capabilities of the platforms used by the Soviets. In other words, a Soviet MiG-29 would have better radar, avionics, and missiles than an export model employed by Iraq or Serbia. Some Soviet systems have proven to be remarkably capable. For instance, modern Russian ATGMs were able to able to savage Israeli Merkava Mk. III and IV MBTs in Lebanon a few years back. The Merkava IV is arguably the most modern and heavily armored tank in the world and around a dozen were destroyed by Russian-made ATGMs. I believe a Soviet SAM shot down an F-117 in the Balkans. Other Soviet systems, although less capable than their NATO counterparts, have proven track records of robustness and serviceability.

2.) Soviet model armies have repeatedly been defeated by Western model armies. This proves the superiority of the Western model and the inherent inferiority of the Soviet one.

Yes, the Iraqis followed, to a degree, a Soviet model. The Iraqi army was, for all intents and purposes, a joke. It was poorly led, poorly supplied, poorly motivated, etc. This trend was also in evidence in the varios Israeli-Arab wars of the '60s and '70s, in that the Western model IDF repeatedly defeated its more numerous, Soviet model adversaries. But simply because a Soviet-backed military fell to a de facto NATO model army, does not mean that the same thing would have occured had it been the Red Army vs. NATO. This sort of "once-removed" argument is not valid. If it were, what would it say about the U.S. when the South Vietnamese, who it trained and supported with massive amounts of American hardware, were decisively defeated by the Soviet-supported North Vietnamese army?

3.) The Soviet officer corps was poor in quality, with rigid systems of command that discouraged junior officers from showing innitiative.

This is true, to some extent. Conscripted Soviet non-coms especially were of low quality, having received very little training and lacking the experience that comes with years of voluntary service. But, historically, the Soviets have shown a surprising ability to adapt and evolve under harsh battlefield conditions. The Soviet army of 1941 was slow, under-supplied, and poorly led. But, by 1944, the Soviet Army was arguably more flexible and better led than its western Allies and their German adversaries. Hitler underestimated the abilities of the Red Army. I would argue that we not make the same mistake.

4.) The Soviets suffered through a long and ultimately unsuccessful war in Afghanistan. If they couldn't defeat the Afghani Mujahadin in the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan, they couldn't possibly have defeated NATO armies on the forrested plains of Europe.

This argument doesn't hold much water. Comparing an unconventional, guerrilla war in the difficult terrain of Afghanistan with a conventional war in Europe is comparing apples and oranges. The U.S. was unable to achieve its strategic objectives in Vietnam. Four presidential administrations tried and failed to defeat the communist insurgency in Vietnam. In keeping with the arguments made by detractors of the Red Army, it follows that the U.S. and its allies, unsuccessful in Vietnam, could not have defeated the Soviet Union in Europe. Furthermore, the U.S. and its NATO allies have still not pacified/stablilized Afghanistan after nearly a decade of occupation and military operations there. Does this mean NATO could not have defeated the Red Army of the late '80s? What's even more telling is the relative superiority in technology enjoyed by U.S./NATO forces today, as compared to the Soviet Army of the 1980s.

5.) The Soviets performed badly against the Chechnyans in the mid to late '90s. This proves that the Soviet Army wouldn't have performed well against NATO.

Once again, this is the same sort of apples to oranges argument outlined in #4. And, the Russian Army that bogged down in the streets of Grozny was an army that had suffered near on a decade of financial and institutional neglect after the collapse of Soviet Communism. This was not the fully funded Red Army of the '80s. It was a severely under-funded, ad hoc military with extremely low morale and very poor training (due largely to lack of funds). Imagine if the U.S. military's funding was cut by 75-90%. Would anyone expect it to perform as well in combat as it would have at its full funding levels?

6.) Conscript armies, like the Red Army of its heyday, are inferior to volunteer armies, like those of the U.S. and most of NATO.

Once again, this is true, but to a very small degree. But look at how well the mostly conscripted Red Army performed late on in WWII. Look at the combat record of the Israeli Army, most of which is made up of conscipts and reservists (themselves former conscripts). Furthermore, one could argue that the Soviet soldier is in some ways superior to his western counterparts. He's used to living with less than most westerners. He's tough, fit, and used to deprivation, harsh discipline and following orders. Many Red Army units were responsible for producing some, if not most, of their own food. This agricultural skill/experience would prove invaluable in the later years of the Twilight War.

Also, having a largely conscript army would help streamline mobilization because many reserve and newly mobilized units would have at least rudimentary military training already, due to their earlier conscript experience.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Now, here are two more arguments in favor of the Soviet army that are often wilfully overlooked or casually dismissed.

A.) Weight of numbers. The Red Army had more of everything- men, tanks, artillery tubes, aircraft, etc. than NATO. The only area in which the opposite was true was in naval power. Even if the Soviets lost men and material at a rate 3x that of their enemies, the Red Army would still outnumber them. The Red Army's superior numbers in artillery would prove especially troublesome for NATO.

B.) Experience. By the time the Twilight War kicked off in Europe, the Red Army- especially its officer corps- would have operational and tactical combat experience from their campaign in China. As any combat veteran can tell you, there's simply no substitute for experience. Soviet general and staff officers would have invaluable hands-on experience which most of their NATO counterparts would lack.

There you have it. The arguments of a Red Army apologist. Let the debate begin!

Ramjam

06-20-2009, 06:22 PM

That was the biggest fear NATO had during the cold war. Bodies on the front-line.

They were far better geared than the WP, but the kill ratio needed to keep on top of any WP attack was something stupid like 50:1.

Now the Coalition forces in the Gulf War in 91 didn't even reach that number against a army that was basiclly in retreat by the time the ground forces got involved.

The general thought going around Germany if the cold war ever did go hot but with no nukes involved was the WP would reach the channel ports within 7 days thus stopping alot of reinforcements getting to the front.

The only way NATO would be able to stop or shall I say slow the advance would be with tac-nukes. NATO thus would be damned if they did and damned if they didn't.

O'Borg

06-20-2009, 07:04 PM

I think using the IDF conscript army as an example is a bit misleading. Without wishing to get too political, I'll just say my limited experience from the few Israeli's I've met has given me the impression that as a culture, they have a lot of self confidence. Put them in a uniform, give them top class equipment and training and convince them their homeland will be crushed if they dont fight, and its a far cry from a Soviet peasant being press ganged, fed on raw potatoes and issued with kit they soon find isn't as good as the stuff the other guy has.
The IDF may have a lot of conscripts, but they're motivated, well trained and well equipped.
The Soviets weren't, except during WW2 when their enemies thought them subhuman and ethnically cleansed them. In a very real sense they were fighting for their survival.

I prefer to think of the hypothetical Soviet invasion of Western Europe in the following terms :
Imagine the latter half of WW2, but give the Allied forces low morale and poor leadership, and the Germans naval & air superiority and remove Hitler's tactical and strategic blundering from the equation.

Raellus

06-20-2009, 07:31 PM

Put them [the Israelis] in a uniform, give them top class equipment and training and convince them their homeland will be crushed if they dont fight, and its a far cry from a Soviet peasant being press ganged, fed on raw potatoes and issued with kit they soon find isn't as good as the stuff the other guy has.

It sounds like you're referring to the modern IDF. The IDF of 1948-1967 was equipped with cast-off, second-grade weapons and equipment (Shermans, Super Mysteres and essentially stolen Mirages, FN battle rifles, etc.). That they did as well as they did against the lavishly Soviet-equipped armies of the Arab states speaks volumes about the average Israeli's (of that generation, at least) fighting prowess. I guess that kind of proves your point, huh? That said, your description of the average Soviet conscript sounds like it was given by a Wermacht staff officer during the planning for Operation Barbarossa. That was a bit of a mistake back then. I don't think it's very wise to make that mistake again. See my next response to your argument.

In more recent times, the technologically superior IDF has had trouble with guerilla-style adversaries (The second Lebanon War and the recent fighting in Gaza). This has been with 100% air superiority.

The Soviets weren't, except during WW2 when their enemies thought them subhuman and ethnically cleansed them. In a very real sense they were fighting for their survival.

I'm sure that the Soviet propaganda apparatus would whip up the Red Army with reminders of what a unified, militarily aggressive Germany was capable of doing to Mother Russia. After West German army (in the v1.0 timeline) crossed the frontier into East Germany, I think your average Soviet soldier (or prospective soldier) would have little trouble finding the motivation to fight hard on their western front. Plus, as I mentioned in my original post, some Red Army units would already have combat experience from China (and some officers and non-coms would have served in Afghanistan). I really don't think the image of press-ganged, potato-eating, simpletons is entirely fair or accurate, especially by the time the Twilight War kicked off in Europe.

I prefer to think of the hypothetical Soviet invasion of Western Europe in the following terms :
Imagine the latter half of WW2, but give the Allied forces low morale and poor leadership, and the Germans naval & air superiority and remove Hitler's tactical and strategic blundering from the equation.

This is an interesting way of looking at it. I'm still not sure, given the conditions you listed, that the Germans could have achieved more than an operational stalemate against the massive weight of Allied men and material. That's kind of what we're looking at in the later stages of the Twilight War.

Grimace

06-20-2009, 09:36 PM

I'm with you Raellus in thinking that the Red Army would've been a lot harder to defeat than people think. Too often people are pointing at the rapid decline seen in the 90s and early 2000s as "proof" that the Soviet Union was a hollow shell of military power. I think those times were more indicative of the degradation that occurs when national morale coupled with massively suffering economy did to the military. Those things wouldn't have occurred in the middle of a war like the Twilight war.

And the general lack of "awesomeness" by our forces in Kosovo against Serbian forces seems to support my idea that: on the desert, we're something to be feared with our gadgetry, but put us in the mountains, with low clouds and forests and AAA and an enemy who's not stuck on open, flat ground and we're not the super amazingness that we appear in the desert. We're good, no doubt, but we're not going to inflict the massive losses that we saw in the desert. An awful lot of tanks, vehicles and men left Kosovo after some 60 days of constant air strikes.

Against the Soviets we would have suffered many more losses against many more foes.

Fusilier

06-21-2009, 05:43 AM

Agreed. Nobody can say for certain what would happen, but I don't think it would be a decisive victory for NATO.

Often the centerpiece of the counter argument that the WP would fail miserably is by relating a hypothetically WW3 with what happening in both Iraq wars. I feel that is a poor comparison and isn't evidence at all.

Anything else I'd add would be simply echoing your statements.

Targan

06-21-2009, 07:17 AM

I am impressed with your reasoning Raellus. I hope the DC Working Group read this thread.

headquarters

06-21-2009, 08:55 AM

I think the analyzis is valid. Also the technological superiority that west often boast is not as advanced as we think / thought.

Lack of real enviroment testing and steady propaganda on our side led us to believe that our stuff and our organization is so and so much better.

The basis for stating this is contradictory. Nato nuclear weapons strategy was made to beat back the superior numbers of the soviets .Meaning that our gear and organization couldnt do it alone.

Legbreaker

06-21-2009, 08:56 AM

It's basically the same way I've thought the war would progress. As you've stated Rae, the Soviets, and almost all of the countries in the WP had experienced combat in China for at least nine months (the timeline is unclear as to when exactly war broke out - sometime in 1995, presumably in the second quarter from how I read it).
Sure, most of those experienced units were still in the east, but it's not too much to believe veterans were rotated out back west and into training and command positions (especially the wounded).

I believe given the circumstances leading up to the war we're presented in the histories, the initial sucess of NATO most definately would have been neutralised, then reversed by the WP forces. Also, given the usual reluctance of so called "free" western democracies to implement conscription until the last possible minute, NATO reserves in the initial months would have been extremely limited.

Just imagine for a moment. War in Europe breaks out with the bulk of WP forces already committed in the east. Is there a pressing need in the eyes of the populace to sign up immediately? No, they've been told for decades their "boys" are worth fifty of those filthy commies.

Time goes past and all the ready units have been committed for the drive east. China falls apart (something nobody saw coming in a hurry, but nobody saw nukes being used either) and hundreds of thousands, if not millions of battle hardened WP troops and equipment are released to Europe.

And so the various governments begin recruiting in ernest, perhaps a few even implementing conscription. Now they've got the troops, but it'll take months to train them all to combat readiness, equip them, and send them over to the front lines, all while the remnants of NATO units are desperately trying to hold back the hordes of the WP bent on recapturing their homelands and teaching those child eating capitalists a lesson!

Adm.Lee

06-21-2009, 12:08 PM

I have to agree that, if the Soviets were "up" and willing and ready to fight, they could do NATO a LOT of damage. If they've had time to prune out the deadwood (both people and policies) that accumulates in peacetime, the likelihood of that happening increases. I have to wonder, though, how easy it would be to support a fight against the Chinese, make the Far Eastern Front(s) into wartime-capable forces, and shuffle the Western and Southwestern Fronts' leadership and forces into wartime status, too.

If anything, I think the Western and SW TVDs might fall apart even quicker than in canon, if they are really caught flat-footed by the German unification.

Along those lines, though, I and some other had disagreements with Peters' ending: the West German government threw in the towel, seeing the civilian casualties the Soviet forces were deliberately inflicting. Peters is a really good writer and analyst, however, so I am willing to chalk it up to literary license.

kato13

06-21-2009, 12:43 PM

Deleted a duplicate post.

Personally I feel the declassified materials released since 1989 drastically lower my opinion of what the USSR was capable of long term. They could have caused incomprehensible damage to western Europe in a short conflict, possibly destroying NATO but IMO internal pressures and logistical issues would have dealt them a serious blow if the conflict went on beyond 3 months.

Grimace

06-21-2009, 01:23 PM

See, I view the ability of the Soviets to enhance the longer something goes on. Look at the Soviets preceeding World War 2. On paper they could probably hold out 1-2 month tops. How long was it before they came roaring back and whalloped the Wermacht in WW2? It was certainly well after 2 month of fighting.

The whole thing that people tend to forget is that Russia has this weird sort of perseverence under adverse pressure. Sure, we might have been able to stymie the Soviet advance, but what are we going to do? Sit there? No...we'd try pushing back...going into Russia. And that would create a major issue, not only in terms of what we can do, but what we'd do to the Soviet mindset.

So I certainly see the Soviets lasting longer than 3 months. And the longer they last, the nastier they'd get, IMO.

kato13

06-21-2009, 01:34 PM

I guess the speed of the breakup of the Soviet Union makes me think that the Politburo would have lost control of the remote areas after a certain amount of time. A starving population due to a lack of trucks and fuel plus interdiction of the trans-Siberian railroad would also cause severe issues. I am not really doubting the army I am doubting the strength of the "Union" in the USSR.

copeab

06-21-2009, 04:04 PM

Raellus

06-21-2009, 04:18 PM

Personally I feel the declassified materials released since 1989 drastically lower my opinion of what the USSR was capable of long term. They could have caused incomprehensible damage to western Europe in a short conflict, possibly destroying NATO but IMO internal pressures and logistical issues would have dealt them a serious blow if the conflict went on beyond 3 months.

I'd be interested to read this stuff. I'm not sure exactly what materials you're referring to but I am aware of the great internal and external pressures the Soviet economy was under during the late eighties. It simply could not compete with capatalist systems in the global, free market economy. But we're talking about a wartime economy here and that is quite different. A command economy has certain advantages over free market economies in wartime. For example, workers need not be paid in cash. Resources needed for war-related production can simply be commandeered instead of paid for. The USSR had a wealth of natural resources and wouldn't need to look outside its borders for much, negating the need to use hard-to-find hard capital. The Soviet Union prior to WWII was no economic powerhouse but it was able to mobilize and retool its industries to produce massive amounts of military hardware. In many ways, the pre-WWII economy was in worse shape than the USSR or 1989. The West simply doesn't have those luxuries.

Most wartime economies rely on defecit spending, and a command economy allows for a certain degree of added leeway that capitalist economies won't sanction. Just look at the defecit the U.S. has run up during the last 8 or so years which was due, in large part, to financing two "low-level intensity" wars. If anything, the western [capiltalist]democracies may have more trouble ramping up and maintaining the flow of weapons, munitions, and supplies under high-intensity war conditions. If the argument is that the Soviet Union couldn't have paid for a full-scale, two front war, it could just as easily be argued that the NATO nations couldn't have either.

With almost a year of full-scale combat with China under its belt, the Soviet Union would be well on its way to achieving a wartime economy. As Leg pointed out, reserve units would already be at least partially mobilized and factories would already be cranking out replacement weapons and munitions by the time Germany sprung its surprise reunification party. In that regard, at least, the Soviets would certainly have a leg up on the West.

Raellus

06-21-2009, 04:27 PM

In T2K, not only are the Soviets not receiving military aid from the US/UK, but she has to fight them as well. Also, who is going to open up a second front against Germany in T2K? France?

Yes, but the Soviet military c. 1989 was much larger and more capable than the Red Army c. 1941. It wouldn't require the thousands of trucks, tanks, guns, and aircraft it so desperately needed during the first couple of years of WWII.

One great advantage of the Soviet Union of the '80s was the sheer size of its military, and, as I've mentioned already, the massive numbers of trained reservists (former conscripts) ready to be mobilized at relatively short notice. The West simply couldn't match the WTO's ability to quickly call up huge numbers of troops. This would give the Red Army a significant strategic and operational advantage in the first three months of a European War. Mobilization in the WTO would be well underway before the West even got started.

If the Soviet Navy could somehow interdict reinforcements and munitions shipments from the U.S. to Europe, this edge could be maintained or an even wider gap opened. But this is a topic for a naval warfare thread.

Graebarde

06-21-2009, 04:45 PM

As a cold war soldier with boots on the ground from 74-84 (two tours) in FRG, all I can say is during the first tour (74-79 prior to the upgrading of armored units to M1/M2 series vechicles from M60/M113 series) I encounted NO one in the US forces (of course I was not an orficer, but....) that counted the threat of the Red Horde as a push over. In fact there was a joke at the time floating around after SHAFE commander was asked the question about the Reds being on the Rhine in a week.. Troops in the field responded "Only if they can get fuel in Frankfurt." Depending on HOW and when the show would start some of the first tank battles would be fought by units exiting their motorpools.

This pessamistic attitude changed some when the M1/M2 came into the theater about 1980 (second tour) supported by Hogs (A10) and Apache gunships, though everyone still realized it was a 'slow'em down for REFORGER troops to get on the ground' scenario. We all realized, at the lower levels even if the brass as optimistic, it would NEVER be a walk in the park. Numbers do count and we knew that even with superior weapons and markmanship/gunnery, every shell had to be a kill shit, which most everyone also realized was NOT probable. I will say there were periods of pucker factor during both my tours.

When and how would they gain the best results if they decided to attack NATO? During the period of Dec 20- Jan 6 (many troops celebrating the holidays and many on leave) and attack from garrison with no and minimal warning. I knew this and my first Christmas was a shock there when at midnight the flares and fireworks were set off and I was home asleep. Cheeseeeeeeeee... I knew they were in the wire for sure. Paranoia will destroy ya, but it can also keep you alive if controlled.

Grae.

kato13

06-21-2009, 05:09 PM

If the argument is that the Soviet Union couldn't have paid for a full-scale, two front war, it could just as easily be argued that the NATO nations couldn't have either.

IMO the Soviet economy was a house of cards. In your opinion a pure military economy might add tape to the cards, in my opinion it would be like trying to take said house on a cross country drive. This was a nation with tremendous productivity problems under the best of situations, the chaos of war would not help them any IMO.

The USSR had complete top down power. If they could have waved their hand and established even a partial wartime economy to improve their long term productivity problems, why didn't they. I agree with you is that patriotism (at least in the ethnically dominant Russian areas) could be used to offset the some of the hardships of war, but in the militarily suppressed areas, including the outer provinces and eastern Europe, I am not sure how well patriotism would counter the pain of an empty belly.

You are also right in you assertion that what happens in the Atlantic would be the determining factor, as the US would not suffer anywhere near the disruption as Europe and the USSR would. Until you throw nukes into the equation US productivity (especially in agriculture) would be a tremendous long term strength. Again what we have learned about the weaknesses of the Soviet Navy don't help their long term prospects IMO.

Raellus

06-21-2009, 05:29 PM

I am impressed with your reasoning Raellus. I hope the DC Working Group read this thread.

Thanks, Targan. I hope I've given them something to think about.

One last thing before I give someone else a turn.;)

Although it is true that most NATO weapons systems/platforms were (and continue to be) superior in most respects to Soviet gear throughout the Cold War, it bears keeping in mind that shortly before the collapse of the USSR, the Soviets were starting to roll out some pretty capable systems. Due to the massive military funding cuts that started around '91, most of those systems either withered on the vine or were ordered/employed in only very limited numbers. I think many of us tend to imagine the late '80s matchups of Challengers vs. T-72s, or F-15s vs. MiG-23s when we try to envision the Twilight War. Soviet reserve units are often tooling around in T-55s and BMP-1s. By the Twilight War, the Soviets would be fielding considerably better front line gear and better gear would have trickled down to many second and third line units. Here's a brief list of stuff well down the pipeline by 1991, IRL:

The T-90 tank, combining and upgrading the best features/components of the T-72 and T-80.

The BMP-3: probably the most heavily armed IFV in the world.

The BMD-3: ditto for airborne troops.

The BTR-90: a marked improvement in the series, with a heavy armament in its own right.

The 2S19 152mm SP gun.

The SU-30/32/33/34/35: Several very capable air superiority, multirole, and strike members of the excellent SU-27 family.

The Kamov KA-50 Hokum attack heli (and probably a couple hundred Mi-28 Havocs).

The An-94 assault rifle: This is a bit of a late addition, but it combines a fairly revolutionary firing mechanism with tried and true Kalashnikov features.

And perhaps even a regiment or two of T-95 tanks...

In the Twilight timeline, by 1996, these systems would have been in fairly widespread service with Guards and Category I divisions, freeing up the next lower level of gear (T-72s, BMP-2s, MiG-29 etc.) for Category II divisions and so forth, in a sort of trickle-down effect of major weapons systems. In 2000, you might still see a few T-62s and MiG-21s, but, by '97 those would be used in deep reserve units only.

After the nukes, though, a lot of old T-62s and T-55 and such would likely still be in reserve storage, ready to head for the front. NATO likely couldn't match that.

Raellus

06-21-2009, 05:46 PM

The USSR had complete top down power. If they could have waved their hand and established even a partial wartime economy to improve their long term productivity problems, why didn't they?

You're right, Kato. They wouldn't have been able to sustain it during peace time (I think I mentioned this), just as our U.S. economy will not be able to sustain massive defecits built up, in large part, to wartime military budgets for very much longer. I'm just saying that the Soviets would have the means, and probably the will, to tighten the "People's" belts during wartime and forestall, at least, a total collapse of their economy. IRL, they couldn't expect their people to accept such measures when peace existed.

In order for the v1 timeline to work, one must suspend disbelief and accept that the Soviet peacetime economy was sustained until '95 or so before wartime economic measures were put in place. By '97, pretty much every power involved in the Twilight War has an effed-up economy. If one's not willing to accept this, then there's the v2 and T213 timelines to choose from.

I agree with you is that patriotism (at least in the ethnically dominant Russian areas) could be used to offset the some of the hardships of war, but in the militarily suppressed areas, including the outer provinces and eastern Europe, I am not sure how well patriotism would counter the pain of an empty belly.

I agree that the more reluctant Soviet republics wouldn't readily accept the added privations of a wartime economy. In canon, the other shoe drops in 1999 or so when various Soviet republics break away. I'd have to research it more but it seems odd that the GDW folks had entire Soviet divisions made up of particular ethnic groups. In canon, many of these groups mutiny at the first opportunity. It was my understanding that, IRL, different ethnicities were separated and mixed in with majority Russian soldiers, partly in order to avoid such situations.

You are also right in you assertion that what happens in the Atlantic would be the determining factor, as the US would not suffer anywhere near the disruption as Europe and the USSR would. Until you throw nukes into the equation US productivity (especially in agriculture) would be a tremendous long term strength. Again what we have learned about the weaknesses of the Soviet Navy don't help their long term prospects IMO.

I'm not saying interdiction of Atlantic supply routes would harm the U.S. economy or its industrial base, just that it would further hinder the flow of fighting men and material to Europe. This could have had dire consequences for the hard pressed NATO units fighting off the masses of the Soviet/WTO armies in Germany.

kato13

06-21-2009, 06:13 PM

In order for the v1 timeline to work, one must suspend disbelief and accept that the Soviet peacetime economy was sustained until '95 or so before wartime economic measures were put in place.

Since the fall of the Berlin wall I have had the Soviets find massive Oil reserves on their Chinese Border. After reading "The Bear and The Dragon" I added large gold veins spanning the Sino/Russo border. This helps me explain how the Soviet economy could survive and adds another reason for the initial Soviet/Chinese conflict.

Raellus

06-21-2009, 08:50 PM

Since the fall of the Berlin wall I have had the Soviets find massive Oil reserves on their Chinese Border. After reading "The Bear and The Dragon" I added large gold veins spanning the Sino/Russo border. This helps me explain how the Soviet economy could survive and adds another reason for the initial Soviet/Chinese conflict.

Nice. This would work either with or without the fall of the Berlin Wall (i.e. in either the v1 or v2 timeline).

Targan

06-21-2009, 10:47 PM

Numbers do count and we knew that even with superior weapons and markmanship/gunnery, every shell had to be a kill shit, which most everyone also realized was NOT probable.
Kill shit? Sounds messy :D

Jason Weiser

06-22-2009, 08:53 AM

Abbott Shaull

06-22-2009, 12:06 PM

The Soviet Army is much more capable than lot of the forces that model after them. The engagements in Yugoslavia should give a better picture what will probably happen. As Grae, if, and that a big if, did hold and we move towards the Soviet Union, the war becomes another creature that many in NATO didn't want to think about.

Now a lot depends on if the Soviet had been at war with like China before or not. Either way they will still have a large force in Easter Europe. Much like Desert Shield/Storm where the US had to keep the same size force in Europe, even if they brought NG and Reserves units into Germany to free Regulars for service in the Middle East and reducing the war stock in Europe. The Soviet would be no different. Yeah they would strip units here and there, the Pact would still provide headache if NATO attacked, and they would have more than enough to offer a initial black eye if they had attack.

Either way, depending on the tide of the war, Tactical Nukes would be used. Now, would they be NATO, Pact, or French is up for debate. If NATO hadn't used them by a point, the French would for sure done so to slow the Soviets down. On the other hand if NATO was able to stop the flow, and started to enter Poland, I don't think the Soviet would have a problem of making the region of the Warta River a radioactive parking lot. In Soviet war games this was done, but the Soviets told the Poles that it was NATO nukes.

Then again once they start using Nukes it doesn't really matter who owned previously of it going off. One thing is for sure, both side will try to equal the other and get one up. France wether it was actively in the war or sitting on the sideline would be hit, just to keep their troops from joining later. Everyone will be having a bad day.

Raellus

06-22-2009, 12:48 PM

Targan, Rae;
We've had many of these discussions of this very nature. And to be sure, the Red Army is no pushover by any means. But let's keep in mind a few factors:

1. This is not the "Ivan's decided to take a Sunday Drive to the Rhine" scenario. Matter of fact, she's been in a ruinous war in China for the last year or so before NATO gets involved and it's making Afghanistan look like a live-fire exercise. Whole divisions are being wiped out, war stocks are being dipped into, and with Web's timeline (which is the basis for a lot of our work), he has a lot of that stock being given out to the Third World.

Why, exactly, would they be giving away their reserve military stocks? This doesn't make a lot of sense being as the USSR is engaged in a major war against China. I'm not sure why some folks are so quick to accept arguments that weaken the T2K v1 USSR and so quick to dismiss arguments that strengthen it. I should make this into my thesis statement. Perhaps this is why I feel the need to keep bringing this issue up.

Most of the breakdown for Ivan between 1995 and 1997 is logistical, (never a Soviet strong suit).

Never? This is a bit of an overstatement. By 1944, the Red Army was supporting massive numbers of troops, tanks, and aircraft in a steady, innexorable advance over hundreds of miles. I do see your point about the vulnerability of Soviet supply routes to the China front but I'm not sure how it's germaine to your arguments regarding the war in Europe where there would be hundreds of overland supply routes between Mother Russia and the front in Germany/Poland.

In the west, once the USAF and RAF enter the fray, I'd say Air Superiority, if not local air dominance at times, is a given..The SAF is tired from the op tempo in China and has according to canon, stripped the western military districts for aircraft to support the effort in China. Wanna guess what happens after the SAF and Warpac airfields are dealt with? Interdiction round the clock.

Air superiority a given? How is this not an underestimation? Is this based on the U.S.'s performance against the Iraqi AF? Serbia? We've already established that this is not a fair or accurate comparison. Even if the Soviet Air Force was as depleted as you claim, the Soviets still have a massive ground-based air defense network in eastern Europe. Whether it could be eliminated so easily is still up for debate. Even if Europe was stripped on first-line combat aircraft, much of it could and no doubt would be sent back to Europe ASAP after the German gambit. The Soviets always placed a huge emphasis on defending its airspace and NATO's AFs would have been a much greater threat than the Chinese AF. I would argue that the Soviet AF on the China front would be stripped and the bulk of its aircraft rushed west if for no other reason than to defend the Motherland from the mere threat of NATO air power.

I'm also of the opinion that you are overstating Soviet air losses in the East. For one thing, the Chinese AF of the v1.0 timeline could not have been as powerful in '95 as it was in reality, but Web and others seem to be predicating Twilight Chinese AF capabilities on relatively recent developments instead of in keeping with the alternate v1 timeline. With tensions high between the Soviets and Chinese, the Soviets wouldn't have sold SU-27s to China as they did IRL and China's indigenous air industry wouldn't yet be able to produce anything approaching that quality. They only just started to produce their own indigenous 4th generation fighter during the last couple of years, IRL. Aircraft provided to China by the West as military aid would take time to train on and deploy operationally and by that time, most of the "original" Chinese AF would be destroyed. It's not like if you can fly a MiG-21 knock-off, you can just hop into the cockpit of an F-16 and go to town- at least not very effectively. Imagine a fresh-out-of-training Chinese pilot in an F-20 or whatever going up against a Soviet ace in a MiG-29 or SU-27.

I think Webstral's China timeline, although of excellent quality overall, departs somewhat liberally from canon in the beefing up of the Chinese AF.

And once again, by the time that W. Germany launched its forced reunification, Soviet war industries would be operating at close to full swing. As long as attrition of trained pilots wasn't too high, replacement aircraft could eventually be fielded. In this regard, at least, the WTO would have a leg up on NATO.

The Soviet Army is tired. Alluding to point 1, the casualty rate in China has been nothing short of horrendous. Whole divisions are gone and the Soviets are trying to run a war through two railways each a single track in either direction. In the West, they're down a Combined Arms Army and several Air Armies (see point 1). China is a drain on the Soviets, one they cannot win short of use of WMD, which they resort to in July of 1997. Only then does China collapse.

I see your point here, and I think it's a good one. Perhaps I understated the negative effects of the war with China while trumpetting the valuable tactical and operational experience the Red Army would gain from it. But, I think that Abbot makes an important point that the Soviets would not trust the West enough to severely deplete their "occupation" armies there by shipping them all off to Europe. Although canon describes the strain on the Red Army's forces in Europe, I'm not sure where it mentions only one CA army and several AA armies left behind. If this is canonical, I apologize and I will have to rethink this point.

There is no Soviet navy to interdict the convoys anymore, the Soviet Long Range aviation forces would be slaughtered in any conventional bombing campaign against North America...Thus, the escalation to strategic attacks against the US is almost a foregone conclusion.

No Soviet Navy? Now I'm confused. Even if, as canon describes, the Soviet surface navy was bottled up and destroyed early on in the war, there would at least be a few SSNs, SSGNs, and diesel boats out there, staking out the sea lanes. Also, if the Soviets could somehow neutralize or suppress NATO airpower in the GIUK gap, they could still strike at convoys with land based Backfire and Blackjack bombers. I would never argue that those assets would be used to attempt conventional bombing of targets in the CONUS.

No, the Soviet navy couldn't cut the sea lanes, even temporarily. But just one large RO-RO ship sunk and the U.S. could lose close to an armored bigade in one fell swoop. How long would it take for that kind of loss (of tanks and such, not shipping) to be replaced? Would the NATO armies have time to wait? I'd argue that the strategic supply lines between the U.S. and Europe are far more vulnerable to interdiction than the lines between the U.S.S.R. and Europe. To suggest that the Soviet navy would be impotent against NATO is the ultimate in underestimation.

As for equipment, we've taken quite a few approaches in that regard, but I'll let Chico handle that as he's been handling most of the "crunchier" factors.

I'm looking foward to hearing from him.

In closing, I just can't see how canon can be supported if the v1 timeline's Soviet military is as crap-tastic as some folks seem to be claiming. Against NATO air superiority and naval superiority, and a fast, uninterrupted flow of fresh U.S. troops and hi-tech (read "superior") weapons and equipment that you are arguing for here, how could the WTO hold out as long as canon describes? Are you suggesting that the use of tac-nukes is the only way the Soviets are able to compete on the European battlefied? If so, then I've got to stick by my assertion that the Soviet military is being wilfully underestimated.

Jason Weiser

06-22-2009, 02:56 PM

Why, exactly, would they be giving away their reserve military stocks? This doesn't make a lot of sense being as the USSR is engaged in a major war against China. I'm not sure why some folks are so quick to accept arguments that weaken the T2K v1 USSR and so quick to dismiss arguments that strengthen it. I should make this into my thesis statement. Perhaps this is why I feel the need to keep bringing this issue up.

I concede here, but YMMV.

Never? This is a bit of an overstatement. By 1944, the Red Army was supporting massive numbers of troops, tanks, and aircraft in a steady, innexorable advance over hundreds of miles. I do see your point about the vulnerability of Soviet supply routes to the China front but I'm not sure how it's germaine to your arguments regarding the war in Europe where there would be hundreds of overland supply routes between Mother Russia and the front in Germany/Poland.

Actually, the major limiting factor in Soviet offensives during WWII was the spearheads outrunning their supplies. Yes, this occurred to all sides but the Soviets actually had a real problem with it especially since the Germans retreated sometimes faster than the Soviets could catch up (Then again, Hitler's meddling ameliorated this, much to the Soviet Army's joy). As for the Twilight 2000 side, it is germane. China is going to fall apart once NATO enters the war..The BAM and Trans-Siberian are going to be hit hard by cruise missiles and air attacks...and cut. Not to mention in the West, we're probably going to try to hit just about every bridge over the Warta.

superiority a given? How is this not an underestimation? Is this based on the U.S.'s performance against the Iraqi AF? Serbia? We've already established that this is not a fair or accurate comparison. Even if the Soviet Air Force was as depleted as you claim, the Soviets still have a massive ground-based air defense network in eastern Europe. Whether it could be eliminated so easily is still up for debate. Even if Europe was stripped on first-line combat aircraft, much of it could and no doubt would be sent back to Europe ASAP after the German gambit. The Soviets always placed a huge emphasis on defending its airspace and NATO's AFs would have been a much greater threat than the Chinese AF. I would argue that the Soviet AF on the China front would be stripped and the bulk of its aircraft rushed west if for no other reason than to defend the Motherland from the mere threat of NATO air power.

Remember the Luftwaffe's already done some of the work penetrating that air defense network, and said network has been the subject of 40+ years of ELINT work. We know a lot about it...there will be losses, but in the end, we'll take it down. Canon agrees with us...see Black Madonna.

Why, exactly, would they be giving away their reserve military stocks? This doesn't make a lot of sense being as the USSR is engaged in a major war against China. I'm not sure why some folks are so quick to accept arguments that weaken the T2K v1 USSR and so quick to dismiss arguments that strengthen it. I should make this into my thesis statement. Perhaps this is why I feel the need to keep bringing this issue up.

I concede here, but YMMV.

Never? This is a bit of an overstatement. By 1944, the Red Army was supporting massive numbers of troops, tanks, and aircraft in a steady, innexorable advance over hundreds of miles. I do see your point about the vulnerability of Soviet supply routes to the China front but I'm not sure how it's germaine to your arguments regarding the war in Europe where there would be hundreds of overland supply routes between Mother Russia and the front in Germany/Poland.

Actually, the major limiting factor in Soviet offensives during WWII was the spearheads outrunning their supplies. Yes, this occurred to all sides but the Soviets actually had a real problem with it especially since the Germans retreated sometimes faster than the Soviets could catch up (Then again, Hitler's meddling ameliorated this, much to the Soviet Army's joy). As for the Twilight 2000 side, it is germane. China is going to fall apart once NATO enters the war..The BAM and Trans-Siberian are going to be hit hard by cruise missiles and air attacks...and cut. Not to mention in the West, we're probably going to try to hit just about every bridge over the Warta. Also, I don't know if you're aware of this, but EVERY truck driver in the Soviet Union was a military reservist. So, if you call these guys up, as well as reacquisition a lion's share of the air and rail transpo in the country, it's going to strain the civilian sector, a lot as time goes on..hence the economic collapse argument.

I'm also of the opinion that you are overstating Soviet air losses in the East. For one thing, the Chinese AF of the v1.0 timeline could not have been as powerful in '95 as it was in reality, but Web and others seem to be predicating Twilight Chinese AF capabilities on relatively recent developments instead of in keeping with the alternate v1 timeline. With tensions high between the Soviets and Chinese, the Soviets wouldn't have sold SU-27s to China as they did IRL and China's indigenous air industry wouldn't yet be able to produce anything approaching that quality. They only just started to produce their own indigenous 4th generation fighter during the last couple of years, IRL. Aircraft provided to China by the West as military aid would take time to train on and deploy operationally and by that time, most of the "original" Chinese AF would be destroyed. It's not like if you can fly a MiG-21 knock-off, you can just hop into the cockpit of an F-16 and go to town- at least not very effectively. Imagine a fresh-out-of-training Chinese pilot in an F-20 or whatever going up against a Soviet ace in a MiG-29 or SU-27.

I think Webstral's China timeline, although of excellent quality overall, departs somewhat liberally from canon in the beefing up of the Chinese AF.

True, but you underestimate the other factors that China would have...a ton of gun based ADA assets...supplemented by Western supplied GFCS systems and missiles...and those don't need as MUCH training. As that equipment arrives in theater, Soviet losses are going to go up. Also, Chinese militia units are going to hit airfields in the Soviet rear any way they can. Will they get to the SU-24s and TU-22s? No, but they will give the SU-25 and MiG-27 bases a rough time. Not to mention? Manchuria, flying in winter and with Tchaikovsky, most of the raids are at night...accidents and PM failures happen.

And once again, by the time that W. Germany launched its forced reunification, Soviet war industries would be operating at close to full swing. As long as attrition of trained pilots wasn't too high, replacement aircraft could eventually be fielded. In this regard, at least, the WTO would have a leg up on NATO.

They are, with no slack if anything else happens....NATO entering the war broke the back of the Soviet Union economically. The trained pilot numerical advantage would only last for a while....

I see your point here, and I think it's a good one. Perhaps I understated the negative effects of the war with China while trumpetting the valuable tactical and operational experience the Red Army would gain from it. But, I think that Abbot makes an important point that the Soviets would not trust the West enough to severely deplete their "occupation" armies there by shipping them all off to Europe. Although canon describes the strain on the Red Army's forces in Europe, I'm not sure where it mentions only one CA army and several AA armies left behind. If this is canonical, I apologize and I will have to rethink this point.

The Soviets are doing this because they are desperate. They didn't commit enough troops to decide the matter in the first place in Manchuria. And GSFG isn't going to be invading Germany anytime soon, so moving a Category I Army East is not going to be a disaster. It's alluded to in canon...as with the earlier comment, I will post the quotes when I get home, am at work now(things are a bit slow right now). Those Cat I forces in Germany are required...and why mobilize Mobilization Only divisions if things aren't going badly.

No Soviet Navy? Now I'm confused. Even if, as canon describes, the Soviet surface navy was bottled up and destroyed early on in the war, there would at least be a few SSNs, SSGNs, and diesel boats out there, staking out the sea lanes. Also, if the Soviets could somehow neutralize or suppress NATO airpower in the GIUK gap, they could still strike at convoys with land based Backfire and Blackjack bombers. I would never argue that those assets would be used to attempt conventional bombing of targets in the CONUS.

No, the Soviet navy couldn't cut the sea lanes, even temporarily. But just one large RO-RO ship sunk and the U.S. could lose close to an armored bigade in one fell swoop. How long would it take for that kind of loss (of tanks and such, not shipping) to be replaced? Would the NATO armies have time to wait? I'd argue that the strategic supply lines between the U.S. and Europe are far more vulnerable to interdiction than the lines between the U.S.S.R. and Europe. To suggest that the Soviet navy would be impotent against NATO is the ultimate in underestimation.

They aren't...We have the Soviets doing things like Primus and other actions to attempt to do SOMETHING. But the fact is, by early 1997, the Soviet fleet is gutted and most of their forward bases around the world have either been badly damaged (Camn Rahn Bay) or occupied (Aden). Cuba is neutral and the Backfire regiments have had the heart ripped out of them. In short, they could kill NATO merchants, but not in any significant number to prevent the reinforcement of Europe. Therefore...those units must not be allowed to leave the US.

In closing, I just can't see how canon can be supported if the v1 timeline's Soviet military is as crap-tastic as some folks seem to be claiming. Against NATO air superiority and naval superiority, and a fast, uninterrupted flow of fresh U.S. troops and hi-tech (read "superior") weapons and equipment that you are arguing for here, how could the WTO hold out as long as canon describes? Are you suggesting that the use of tac-nukes is the only way the Soviets are able to compete on the European battlefied? If so, then I've got to stick by my assertion that the Soviet military is being wilfully underestimated.

In this scenario...in a Soviet thrust towards the Rhine, it's different...they aren't having competing strains on their logistical networks, they aren't in a war that's eating whole divisions by the battle and flooding hospitals in the Soviet Union...The Soviet Army was a OFFENSIVE instrument. It was designed to strike hard, and strike first. In a defensive arrangement in a fight not on Soviet soil with a ruinous war that's sending thousands of shattered vets home and making the breadlines long even by Soviet standards? That's a damn open question.

chico20854

06-22-2009, 04:48 PM

I hope the DC Working Group read this thread.

We are. Things have been hectic! (But the subway is all fouled up tonight so I'm not getting home anytime soon!)

Jason has stated some of his feelings. I'm working on the Soviet orbat and am more optimistic about Soviet performance. There are a heck of a lot of units! (As far as Soviet reinforcements from the West: 1 CAA from GSFG, 1 from Byelorussia, 1 from Ukraine, 37 tactical aviation regiments (3 Air Armies, roughly) plus Long-Range Aviation and Naval Aviation bomber regiments, and 2 Polish, 2 Czech, 2 East German and 1 Bulgarian division plus Hungarians & misc. other Pact allied brigades).

We made some adjustments to the model Soviets in GDW's Third World War wargame. We made the T-90 (GDW T-90, not IRL upgraded T-72 that is now called T-90) on par with the M1A1. Likewise, the BMP-3, in service with Cat A & B Divisions in the Western USSR, is nasty. On the air side, the Soviets have some really dangerous aircraft out there, gleaned from Paul's Best Aircraft That Never Was page.

As a result of this discussion, I'm going to suggest that we raise the proficiency ratings of Soviet units in the Far East to levels on par with US troops. (Proficiency covers a multitude of factors - morale, training, C3I capability, robustness of the logistical system, efficiency of loss replacement, etc. In many of these areas the Red Army is deficient, but combat experience in China would fix many of those deficiencies in units in combat. Given the size of the Red Army and the strains on the Soviet economy, I'm not sure that they would spread meaningfully across the system in the 15 months or so before war breaks out in the West. The Afghanistan model - where reforms took a few years to spread as the the conflict went on - is my model here, cognizant of the apples-oranges of guerrilla war in Afghanistan vs armored combat in China.) When those units come back west they will be a challenge for NATO units. (I also model the learning effect of combat experience for Soviet units entering action in Iran from Afghanistan - the 103rd Guards Airborne Division is as tough as the Marines that come to evict it from Bandar Abbas)

Those units coming back to the West will, unfortunately, be a slow process due to the limited transportation network through Siberia (finished goods - in 1996 vehicles, ammo & troops - go East, raw materials go West). With a war economy those raw materials are going to be in great demand, and the sea route - which in the 80s took roughly half of all Soviet westbound tonnage, mostly through the Indian Ocean - closed. In the winter there will be a trickle of cargo going by road, but the roads are unpaved (even now!) and impassible for many parts of the year (and trucks capable of travelling long distances on such roads are best used to support forward armies, requiring so much maintenance & support as to be almost useless).

As far as the amount of new equipment in service, I'm modelling fairly significant numbers. Soviet tank production 1990-1995 averages 3000 per year (plus exports), APC production almost as high. Total Soviet tanks in service are about 63,000, 2/3 T-64 or later (additional thousands are in non-Soviet Pact service), with an additional 15,000 T-55 series tanks and WWII-vintage AFVs in reserve. This is enough to equip 190 of the roughly 280 Red Army divisions at full strength, and the remainder (mobilization-only) at about 50% of full strength. Soviet artillery strength is about 30,000 tubes (mortars over 120mm, MRLs, guns & howitzers). (And many of the non-Soviet Pact have over 2000 tubes each!) And the equipment sent to the Far Eastern Front is not top of the line gear - there's no need for it to be, since the vast majority of the PLA is equipped with cheap Chinese copies of Soviet equipment of 1955 vintage. So the brand-new T-90s, BMP-3s and Su-27s are sitting in the Western military districts, facing NATO.

The vast amounts of Western aid don't ever really start arriving in quantity enough to change the course of the war - by the time Western nations negotiate arms export contracts, ramp up production, figure out how to deliver the weapons past a Soviet blockade, train Chinese troops to use them and adjust Chinese tactics to use Western weapons - the war in the West is raging and the production gets diverted to NATO use.

By way of comparison, the US starts the war with about 16,000 tanks in inventory, many of which aren't assigned to combat units, and a little less than 10,000 artillery tubes. The NATO allies bring more in, but overall they're outgunned at day one.

The war is rough on both sides - the Luftwaffe is trashed by Frontal Aviation interceptors (and it might have been wiped out had Soviet airfields in Germany not been attacked by NVA forces on the first day of the Reunification). The Soviets have some tricks up their sleeves - such as anti-AWACS long-range AAMs, Shtora active-defense anti-ATGM systems and 200-knot torpedos - that catch NATO off guard, and NATO's vaunted high technology is shown lacking when the stockpiles of the latest generation munitions run low. (It turns out that the major reason that development of 105mm gun armed light AFVs was dropped in the mid-80s was the discovery that most 105mm NATO tank gun ammo couldn't penetrate a T-72 frontally, based on secret tests of T-72s captured in 1982 in Lebanon. Ever wonder why there was the big push to upgrade all the US tank units in Saudi Arabia to M1A1 in 1990-1? And this was for Iraqi model T-72s!) Like Grae said, every shot has to be a kill shot (or at least I think that's what he meant), when you're outnumbered 3 to 1, even more so when you're attacking. The Eastern European transportation system is not nearly as robust as the one in Western Europe, even before Pact troops implement a scorched-earth fighting withdrawal, so the NATO advance is limited due to the difficulty in sustaining logistic support (late summer 1944, anyone?), moreso because so much NATO logisitic planning in the Cold War involved extensive use of Western European civilian transport - barge, rail & road (although NATO troops would not be forced to fight back hordes of panicked friendly civilians!).

I also agree with Raellus on the morale factor. The Soviets (and Poles and Czechs) don't really need a lot of hard-core propaganda for the population to get whipped into a frenzy about German military adventurism - many of the population has first-hand knowledge. On the same time, many NATO troops are going to have a harder time getting fired up about supporting the German effort - sure, they're all for liberating Eastern Europe from Communism, but the commies didn't burn their grandfather's farm like the Germans did to the Polish soldier! (and Dutch and Danish troops also have the same historical memory of German adventurism as the Poles, Soviets and Czechs).

And on to the naval war. Early on, NATO has a rough time getting reinforcements across. There's a MAJOR naval battle going on in the Norwegian Sea. Most civilian shipowners aren't letting their ships leave port, control/reporting measures are still getting started, unknown Soviet Primus raiders and subs are running around worldwide. Thousands of merchant ships with peacetime cargoes are at sea, and the US has six divisions worth of war reserve equipment (the peacetime equipment of the six divisions that flew into POMCUS sites) to move to Europe, get unloaded without use of Belgian or French ports and moved close to the front (but not so close that it's vulnerable to SSM attack, airstrike or Spetsnaz raid). The USN is in a frenzy to get every possible ship to sea - bringing older ships out of reserve, integrating recalled reservists, upgrading ships, training & retraining sailors, hastily finishing vessels under construction and getting them brought into service with vastly curtailed shakedowns of crew and equipment, and trying to integrate the US Coast Guard into its structure. It's not really that the USSR is able to shut down the North Atlantic sea lane, its that the USN isn't sure what it (the USN) or the USSR is capable of doing, or even how to do it.

So these are some of my thoughts! I hope they help explain a little of where I am coming from on the Soviet war effort.

Raellus

06-22-2009, 05:55 PM

So these are some of my thoughts! I hope they help explain a little of where I am coming from on the Soviet war effort.

Excellent! I am almost completely mollified by your revised take on the matter of Soviet military capability, Chico. It seems to be in keeping with the T2K v1.0 canon while allowing for updated equipment and corrected OOBs. If this is the consensus among the DC Working Group, I can definitely live with it.

Jason, thanks for getting back to me. I understand, now, why your argument regarding the limited number of supply arteries between the Russian heartland and the China front. I agree that U.S. airstrikes and conventional cruise missile strikes could seriously disrupt those lines of supply, I'm not sure they could cut them completely. That's some harsh territory deep in rather vast Soviet territory. At least for the roads, you would have to hit them round the clock to shut them down. Train tracks would take longer to repair. However, canon backs you insofar as the collapse of Soviet operations in the Far East after NATO becomes fully involved in the war so I concede here. Your point was germaine. Chico's point about two-way traffic also supports your position.

As to Chinese AAD, your expaned argument seems to contradict the one you make for the relatively easy defeat of Soviet ground-based air defenses. If the extensive Soviet/WTO AD systems are so vulnerable to ARMs and such, why wouldn't the NATO systems introduced piecemeal into China and not fully integrated do so much better against the Soviet AF?

Anyway, after reading your posts over again, I started to doubt my memory of the v1.0 canon timeline so I double checked.

This is what canon has to say about starting Red Army strength in Germany at the time of the Bundeswehr incursion.

---“Despite the initial surprise, the fifteen Soviet divisions remaining in Germany put up a spirited resistance and were soon joined by two more divisions from Poland and three from the garrison of Czechoslovakia. By November 15th, there were also two Czech divisions and four Polish divisions in Germany… “ p. 24

That’s a total of 20 Soviet divisions and six WTO divisions standing up against the Bundeswehr (and select DDR units) only. I can find no mention of the exact makeup of these divisions but it is unreasonable to assume that the Soviets would have left Germany garrisoned almost exclusively by airmobile troops (essentially light mechanized infantry). Canon further supports this viewpoint, “By the end of November, the Bundeswehr was in serious trouble.” Unless you’re presupposing that the W. German military sucked, this strongly suggests that the Soviets had adequate armored and mechanized forces in place prior to the German invasion. Furthermore, by the time the Americans enter the fray, it stands to reason that at least several Soviet/WTO are already on their way back to Europe from the Chinese front.

Even if they're reserve units, with the T-95s, T-90s, and T-80s in service with first-line units, those second-line units would be equiped with T-64s and T-72s. Although not on the same level as the Leopard II, M1A1, or Challenger they'd still be more capable of putting up a stiff fight than the T-62s and T-55s many folks still imagine fielded by most (if not all) Soviet reserve units.

Here’s what canon has to say about the strength and capability of the Soviet AF at the same germinal point in the European theater of the Twilight War.

---“Soviet Frontal Aviation had left their most modern aircraft in the west; these were qualitatively a match for the Luftwaffe and quantitatively more than a match.” p. 24

Even thought the FGR would achieve strategic, operational, and tactical surprisen during the first couple of hours of the reunification-by-force, they could probably only put the Soviet AF in E. Germany out of action for 24-72 hours, and that primarily through damaging airfields as opposed to destroying large numbers of Soviet fighters on the ground. That would allow the FGR AF to support ground ops during that time without fear of Soviet air power. Eventually, however, Soviet airfields would be repaired and fighter assets based further from the border would enter the fray. I imagine MiG-29s and SU-27/35s going up against FGR F-4s and small numbers of FGR Eurofighter Typhoons. I'd say the edge would go to the SAF here. In the meantime, Soviet SAMs and ADA would have started to take its toll on FGR strike and attack aircraft.

Here’s what canon has to say about Soviet interdiction of the sea lanes between the U.S. and Europe.

---“Scattered commerce raiders did break out, however, and by year’s end were wreaking havoc on the NATO convoys bringing ammunition and equipment across the Atlantic.” P. 24

So, any mention of NATO air supremacy and an impotent Soviet navy at the outset/early stages of the European War directly contradicts canon.

Anyway, Jason, my main point is that the Soviet military-industrial complex needs all the help it can get to account for its performance against both China and in Europe. I've tried to come up with some arguments that build it up enough to account for the course of the the pre-nuclear WWIII described by the v1.0 canon. I've tried to be realistic. Immasculating the Red Army with arguments about how it really actually sucked balls and was never a legitimate threat to NATO IRL, doesn't help reconcile what's been established by canon (I'm not saying that you're guilty of this.).

chico20854

06-22-2009, 07:08 PM

We are. Things have been hectic! (But the subway is all fouled up tonight so I'm not getting home anytime soon!)

I'd like to say thanks to all the posters on this thread! I was so busy working on my post that I didn't skip out of the office early (no boss today) and catch an earlier train http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/22/AR2009062202508.html?hpid=topnews. (I go through there twice a day).

natehale1971

06-22-2009, 09:30 PM

I'd like to say thanks to all the posters on this thread! I was so busy working on my post that I didn't skip out of the office early (no boss today) and catch an earlier train http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/22/AR2009062202508.html?hpid=topnews. (I go through there twice a day).

Thank God that he works in mysterious ways... There was an episode of "Crossing Jordon" where Nigel was on mass transit train, and gave his seat to a woman and the moment he left that car, it broke off the train and crashed. killing everyone onboard. He spent the entire episode dealing with survivors guilt.

But once more, thank God that you're okay.

Legbreaker

06-22-2009, 11:44 PM

I agree that U.S. airstrikes and conventional cruise missile strikes could seriously disrupt those lines of supply, I'm not sure they could cut them completely. That's some harsh territory deep in rather vast Soviet territory. At least for the roads, you would have to hit them round the clock to shut them down. Train tracks would take longer to repair.
There are historical precedents (unfortunately none which I can point at from memory) of rail lines cut by air strikes or partisan activity being repaired and back in operation in mere hours.
Also, looking at Vietnam, entire bridges (road, not rail) were often rebuilt to a standard capable of supporting trucks and other cargo vehicles in less than 24 hours.

Something else to consider is the Soviet land routes are usually DEEP within soviet territory so the locations the routes could be cut are actually quite limited (strike aricraft do have some limits on range and refueling tankers are seriously vulnerable). Cruise missiles might do it, but for a result that may only last a day or two, it's a seriously expensive proposition.

As Rae pointed out, it's written in canon that the WP left the top end aircraft in the west AND that they equalled what the Germans had in quality AND outnumbered them by a significant margin. Airpower was significantly in the WP's favour almost from the moment the first shots were fired.

My guess is the Germans miscalculated their offensive, wrongly believing that with the war in the east, they'd really only be facing Polish forces (Poland, particularly western Poland has been part of Germany on and off over the centuries. It is believable that they only intended to "retake" the western half of the country).

As the German offensive ground to a halt and they were threatened with a reversal of fortune, they called upon the rest of NATO. Since the outbreak of hostilities could in some views be seen as German agression, France and (and a few others I think) would have been justified in refusing their assistance. Once Germany received reinforcements (mainly US and British troops) the offensive continued, this time with the larger aim of actually defeating the Soviets (more countries, more national objectives).

And then the Soviets "won" against the Chinese freeing up numerous battle hardened units....

The tides of war turned against NATO, which had obviously struggled somewhat against the units they already been facing. As retreat turned to rout, NATO commanders made the decision to use tactical nukes in a desperate attempt to at least slow the greatly increased strength of the WP forces now swamping them.

The WP did not need to use nukes in the west - they responded in kind after NATO used them and only on a one for one basis.

The above is almost entirely canon. There may be a few small differences (due to me working from memory), but they're only minor. As the WP did not need nukes until after the NATO strikes, it can be assumed they had more than enough strength to at least significantly slow (it took several months to move from NATOs start lines to their limit in western Russia) while at the same time carrying out a large scale and very costly (in manpower and equipment, most of which can be assumed to be less than their best - see aircraft above) war against China.

kato13

06-22-2009, 11:52 PM

The WP did not need to use nukes in the west - they responded in kind after NATO used them and only on a one for one basis.

I remember the first nuke being used when a NATO unit touched Soviet soil. It is possible this was changed for V2

Page 25 referees guide

On July 9th, with advanced elements of the 1st German Army on Soviet soil, the Red Army began using tactical nuclear weapons. In the West, they were used sparingly at first, and for the first week were used only against troop concentrations no further than 50 kilometers from the Soviet border.

Sometimes the eidetic memory I had through my teenage years comes in handy. Of course reading it several dozen times probably helped.

natehale1971

06-22-2009, 11:55 PM

There are historical precedents (unfortunately none which I can point at from memory) of rail lines cut by air strikes or partisan activity being repaired and back in operation in mere hours.
Also, looking at Vietnam, entire bridges (road, not rail) were often rebuilt to a standard capable of supporting trucks and other cargo vehicles in less than 24 hours.

Something else to consider is the Soviet land routes are usually DEEP within soviet territory so the locations the routes could be cut are actually quite limited (strike aricraft do have some limits on range and refueling tankers are seriously vulnerable). Cruise missiles might do it, but for a result that may only last a day or two, it's a seriously expensive proposition.

As Rae pointed out, it's written in canon that the WP left the top end aircraft in the west AND that they equalled what the Germans had in quality AND outnumbered them by a significant margin. Airpower was significantly in the WP's favour almost from the moment the first shots were fired.

My guess is the Germans miscalculated their offensive, wrongly believing that with the war in the east, they'd really only be facing Polish forces (Poland, particularly western Poland has been part of Germany on and off over the centuries. It is believable that they only intended to "retake" the western half of the country).

As the German offensive ground to a halt and they were threatened with a reversal of fortune, they called upon the rest of NATO. Since the outbreak of hostilities could in some views be seen as German agression, France and (and a few others I think) would have been justified in refusing their assistance. Once Germany received reinforcements (mainly US and British troops) the offensive continued, this time with the larger aim of actually defeating the Soviets (more countries, more national objectives).

And then the Soviets "won" against the Chinese freeing up numerous battle hardened units....

The tides of war turned against NATO, which had obviously struggled somewhat against the units they already been facing. As retreat turned to rout, NATO commanders made the decision to use tactical nukes in a desperate attempt to at least slow the greatly increased strength of the WP forces now swamping them.

The WP did not need to use nukes in the west - they responded in kind after NATO used them and only on a one for one basis.

The above is almost entirely canon. There may be a few small differences (due to me working from memory), but they're only minor. As the WP did not need nukes until after the NATO strikes, it can be assumed they had more than enough strength to at least significantly slow (it took several months to move from NATOs start lines to their limit in western Russia) while at the same time carrying out a large scale and very costly (in manpower and equipment, most of which can be assumed to be less than their best - see aircraft above) war against China.

BUT you forget that Nukes didn't get used in the West UNTIL after NATO forces stepped foot on Soviet soil. That's when the first tactical nukes where used, and it was the Soviets that used them first against the First German Army when it was on Soviet Soil. It also stated that the Soviets and Chinese had been using nukes on the Far Eastern Front pretty liberally, while nuke use on the Western Front was pretty conservatively done.

Legbreaker

06-22-2009, 11:57 PM

It's definately in 2.0 and 2.2 that Nato fired first, although nukes had been flying for a while over in the east. Not sure off hand who fired first there, although I believe (and could be wrong) it was the Chinese.

natehale1971

06-23-2009, 12:02 AM

Page 12 of 2.2 Core Rule book that: "On July 9th the advanced elements of the First German Army on Soviet Soil, the Soviets begin using tactical nuclear weapons. In the West, they are used sparingly at first, and for the first week are only against troop concentrations no further than 50 kilometers form the soviet border." Straight from the book. I dont want to sound short or snippy... so i'm adding this. doing three things at once at teh moment. Sorry about that.

kato13

06-23-2009, 12:07 AM

Page 12 of 2.2 Core Rule book that: "On July 9th the advanced elements of the First German Army on Soviet Soil, the Soviets begin using tactical nuclear weapons. In the West, they are used sparingly at first, and for the first week are only against troop concentrations no further than 50 kilometers form the soviet border." Straight from the book.

I was just going to point out the same (aren't searchable PDFs wonderful). However it is quite possible that text somewhere else contradicts this.

There are lots of contradictory pieces of canon unfortunately.

Legbreaker

06-23-2009, 12:12 AM

Ah, I see where I was wrong now.
Yes, the Soviets did use tactical nukes first however it was NATO that escalated to longer ranged strategic weapons.

In the west NATO begins deep nuclear strikes against communication hubs in Czechoslovakia and Byelorussia in an attempt to slow the Pact advance. The Pact forces respond with similar strikes against German industrial targets and major port cities. Throughout October the exchanges escalate but no ICBMÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s are launched due to the fear of starting total global thermonuclear war.
First military targets are hit, then industrial targets vital to the war (including the first strikes against continental USA.) Then economic and support facilities such as oil refineries. Then the facilities of neutral countries are targeted to deny their use by the other side. The civilian command structure is first decimated then destroyed until the exchanges finally peter out in late November.

natehale1971

06-23-2009, 12:16 AM

kato13

06-23-2009, 12:18 AM

Ah, I see where I was wrong now.
Yes, the Soviets did use tactical nukes first however it was NATO that escalated to longer ranged strategic weapons.

Yep.
In the west, NATO air units begin making deep nuclear strikes against communication hubs in Czechoslovakia and Poland in an attempt to slow the Warsaw Pact advance. The Pact responds with similar strikes against German industrial targets and major port cities.

I am actually glad that I am re-reading this as it validates my opinion on the rubble on the T2k maps being nuke strikes.

Legbreaker

06-23-2009, 01:13 AM

If i remember rigth the first use of Strategic nukes was the Thanksgiving Day Massacare surigical strike to decapitate the American leadership. Because the Deep Strikes you're refering to where made by NATO Air Assets, not ICBMs.
Yes, ICBMs were avoided in the beginning, but they had to have been used at some point to reach some of the more distant targets. Sure ballistic subs might reach some targets, but....

There is nothing I can see anywhere in canon that states the early deep strikes were delivered by aircraft. I would think it just as feasible they were missile borne.

Tactical strikes (in my view) are basically anything fired at less than say 100km - artillery shells, missiles and airstrikes. Anything greater than that is definately NOT in the scope of a tactical engagement as even the most widespread division would be thinly stretched and hard pressed to cover that sort of area, especially in the relatively crowded European theatre with strong enemy presence (different matter in wide open deserts against poorly trained and led troops such as in Iraq 1991-2).

As the actual "combat zone" might only be a few kilometres in depth (even though it's location might vary from hour to hour by miles, even tens of miles, depending on current operations) one might even say a divisional, perhaps even brigade rear area could be considered a "strategic" strike.

Just because an individual attack isn't carried out with an ICBM, doesn't mean it's not in the strategic category....

natehale1971

06-23-2009, 01:31 AM

I just read that they did use Theater Missiles, but not strategic ICBMs until the TDM. But the 2.2 timeline said that NATO had used their Air Assets to make the deep strikes, and said that they had used Theater Missiles to hit troop concentrations and other military targets (industrial cities in German as well as the ports).

Legbreaker

06-23-2009, 01:43 AM

kato13

06-23-2009, 01:49 AM

natehale1971

06-23-2009, 01:51 AM

Further on page 12.

The paragraph that starts "In the west, NATO Air Units begin making deep nuclear strikes against communication hubs in Czechoslovakia and Poland in an attempt to slow the Warsaw Pact advance."

Further in the paragraph it states.. "Fearful of a general strategic exchange, neither side targets the land based ICBMs of the other, or launches so many warheads at once as to risk convincing the other side that an all-out attack is in progres. Neither side wishes to cross the threshold to nuclear oblivion in one bold step, and so they inch across it, never quite knowing that they have done so until after the fact."

Then the paragraph after that has what they targeted.

natehale1971

06-23-2009, 01:52 AM

This is a tough one. It depends on what you mean with Strategic vs Tactical. For weapons systems it is pretty clear cut. But strikes are another matter. I would say you could use strategic weapons for tactical strikes and vice versa. A suitcase nuke going off in front of the White House is IMO a strategic strike.

the major powers had treaties where they would't target capitols on the belief that blowing off the head would do nothing but make it impossible for the other side to surrender if they wanted to stop the war.

Targan

06-23-2009, 03:22 AM

Scuds have ranges of hundreds of klicks don't they? I'd consider a nuclear armed Scud to be a tactical weapon.

avantman42

06-23-2009, 04:07 AM

I just finished Red Army by Ralph Peters, a fine novel of WWIII set in Europe. What sets this novel apart from contemporaries like Red Storm Rising and Team Yankee is that it is written entirely from the POV of its Soviet protagonists.
I read that book years ago, and thoroughly enjoyed it. The thing that really stood out for me was that it really did show a different point of view. Some examples that I can remember:

The political officers were respected and liked by the enlisted men (whereas they're generally portrayed as disliked or hated by the officers)

I've often read that Soviet soldiers performed well in WW2 because they were defending their homeland, and their performance in a war of conquest was likely to be less impressive. In Red Army, the soldiers believed that Germany had invaded (again), and so they were fighting to defend their homeland, as far as they knew.

Another thing that has always stuck in my mind was the general fighting to get fuel to the tank force that had broken through the NATO lines. He was much less concerned about ammunition, as long as they got fuel. His rationale was that if you see a tank, you don't know whether it's got 3 or 30 rounds for the main gun, so most people will react as though it's got a full load of ammunition.

Russ

Legbreaker

06-23-2009, 04:13 AM

The first tactical use of nukes was by the Soviets on the 9th of July 1997.

The first Strategic (aka long range) attack was no earlier than the 15th of September 1997 (the date the siege of Warsaw was lifted). Exact date is not mentioned however it is stated "throughout October the exchanges continue, excallating gradually". We could take that to mean the first strike was either very late in September, or sometime in the first days of October.

Therefore, there is a gap of almost three months between the first "small" (aka relatively short ranged) nuke in Europe to the first long range or strategic strike.

The first nuclear airstrike of the war was however carried out by the Soviets against China in July (again, no exact date but it is mentioned in connection to the first tactical nukes in the west on the 9th).

It appears that the war in China was effectively over by mid to late July which allows approximately 3-4 weeks for the first units released from the east to reach the west. China isn't even mentioned again after the July 97 attacks in the timelines of any of the versions.

Scuds could be considered either. Any nuke could be used strategically, however the delivery method would really dictate the category they fall under. Provided they were armed with nukes, I would think any commander possessing them would take advantage of their relatively long range and not fire them at closer targets much more easily attacked with heavy artillery, shorter ranged missiles or aircraft.

As was seen in the attacks against Israel, conventionally armed scuds aren't likely to inflict a while lot of significant, war winning damage. They are however likely to annoy the recipients and provoke them into doing something stupid (exactly what was feared back in 91-92).

chico20854

06-23-2009, 07:52 AM

The Soviets operated on three levels of combat operations: tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical focuses on winning the battle, operational on winning the campaign, and strategic on winning the war. They had formations and weapons for each stage. Armies and smaller operate on a tactical level, fronts & TVDs on the operational level, and nationally on the strategic level.

As far as nuclear weapons, tactical nukes were FROG & SS-21 missiles and artillery-fired munitions, along with gravity bombs from fighter-bombers. Range on these are out to about 100-150km at most.

Operational nuclear weapons are Scuds, Scaleboards and SS-20 SSMs, the Soviet land-based cruise missiles, gravity bombs and ASMs from Su-24 and Badger/Baackfire bombers, and SLBMs from older (Golf and Hotel-class) SSBs and SSBNs.

The strategic nuclear arsenal in the traditional ICBM, SLBM, sub-launched cruise missiles and long-range bombers (maybe Blackjack, plus Bears launching long-range cruise missiles).

Prior to the TDM, the Soviets (and NATO) are using tactical and operational-level nuclear weapons. (NATO called them Theater Nuclear weapons - ground-launched cruise missiles and US & German Pershing missiles).

Jason & I spoke last night about using conventional cruise missiles to cut the Trans-Siberian railroad. I argued that it was unlikely to occur prior to autumn of 97 (or possibly until after the TDM) for a number of reasons having to do with escalation. (And when you start into escalation & nuclear game theory things get a lot hairy and complicated) First, I assume that the Soviets would detect the incoming missile. The only way to tell if it has a conventional or nuclear warhead is to wait for it to reach its target and detonate - not a wise option for any commander. (Assuming too that it can't be intercepted). So a reasonable (here we go again with the game theory) Soviet commander might not want to wait to find out if he's being nuked and instead launch a counterstrike. As a result, the reasonable NATO commander might think real hard before launching a strike deep into the USSR with a nuclear-capable weapon armed with a conventional warhead, such as a cruise missile with a HE warhead against bridges on the TSRR. With Soviet SS-24 rail-mobile ICBMs roaming the rails, any strike on the Soviet rail network might also be seen in the same light as a strike on ICBM fields, which the v1 canon mentions as not occurring initially. (You can also turn this reasoning around to explain why Scuds and other Soviet SSMs with conventional warheads are not used against German airfields until after the beginning of the nuclear exchange, if you desire. On one hand, I'm not sure how credibly the Soviets took/believed all the Western analysis of escalation that occurred in the Cold War; on the other hand the v1 canon reads as if they basically did - else they would have nuked the German forces within hours of crossing the Inter-German Border!).

In the late Fall of 1997, however, the USAF starts flying "Golden Spike" missions over Siberian railroads. Using B-2s based out of Diego Garcia and Thailand and covered part of the way by American fighter aircraft operated by the New American Volunteer Group operating from airfields in Western China, the USAF started roving patrols of the Siberian railroad network. Priority targets are SS-24 ICBM trains (although very few operated in Siberia, preferring the much denser rail network west of the Urals) and troop trains transferring troops to the battlefields of Europe. Bomber crews tried to get "two for one", following a target train until it was on a bridge or emerging from a tunnel so that both the train and the infrastructure was destroyed by the weapon.

Raellus

06-23-2009, 06:04 PM

I read that book years ago, and thoroughly enjoyed it. The thing that really stood out for me was that it really did show a different point of view.

It certainly did, Russ. Another example I appreciated is how some of the junior officers portrayed in the book took it upon themselves to show significant tactical and operational innitiative. Too often, in the West, the Red Army has been portrayed as a blunt instrument which could be neutralized by NATO simply by taking out its general officers and command and control nodes. Junior officers and NCOs were portrayed as having little or no independent command authority. I think that, to some degree, this was wishful thinking and more a critique of the Soviet system in general than of the Soviet military.

On the other hand, the performance of the Russian army in the Chechnyan conflict seems to support detractors of the Soviet officer corps. But, as I've argued before, the Russian Federation military of the mid-'90s was a mere shadow of the Cold War Soviet military. Many within its bloated officer corps had been retired or cashiered as had many experienced junior officers in noncoms. What remained truly was a blunt instrument.

Raellus

06-23-2009, 06:05 PM

As for the tactical/strategic nuclear discussion...

I agree that certain systems were designed and intended for certain purposes. There are definitely nuclear weapons systems that can accurately be termed tactical, operational, or strategic.

I think for the purposes of this debate, though, that the type of target must also be considered in deciding how to classify a particular nuclear strike.

For tactical strikes, I'm thinking about major troop concentrations close to the front, bridgeheads, static defense lines, major crossroads immediately behind the FEB, and, technically, enemy tactical nuclear assets.

For operational strikes: transportation, logistical, and communications hubs, corps and army level HQs, and enemy operational nuclear assets.

For strategic strikes: the enemy's strategic nuclear assets (i.e. ICBM silos and SSBN pens, strategic nuclear strike command and control centers), concentrations of raw materials essential to the war effort, oil refineries, major port facilities, industrial centers, and major population centers.

In canon, it seems that this progression was followed pretty closely.

Anything missing or misplaced?

Legbreaker

06-23-2009, 07:29 PM

Raellus

06-23-2009, 08:25 PM

We made some adjustments to the model Soviets in GDW's Third World War wargame. We made the T-90 (GDW T-90, not IRL upgraded T-72 that is now called T-90) on par with the M1A1.

I was thumbing through the v.1 vehicle guide and I have a little suggestion for you. The T-90 envisioned by GDW in the mid eighties seems to have appeared in some guise IRL as the T-95, a turretless MBT with a massive 152mm main gun (or a 135mm gun- reports differ).

By the time West Germany makes its move, the Soviets could have a regiment or two (or brigade) of these monsters stationed in E. Germany. I doubt they would send them to China when their T-80s and T-64s could handle any tanks the Chinese would be able to throw at them at that point.

GDW also imagined the T-86, an upgrade of the T-72 with an up-armored, slightly more angular turret. This both looks and sounds like the T-90 of our timeline.

Anyway, it's not a major issue or anything but I like to try to slip the newer tech into the v1.0 timeline, where plausible.

TiggerCCW UK

06-24-2009, 02:34 AM

For information on post cold war operations in Chechnya can I again recommend "One soldiers war in Chechnya" by Arkady Babchenko. For him as an individual soldier the bullying in the army seems to have presented a much greater threat than enemy action. Its a hard brutal read, but it explains a lot of why the Russians performed so badly in that war.

chico20854

06-24-2009, 11:59 AM

I was thumbing through the v.1 vehicle guide and I have a little suggestion for you. The T-90 envisioned by GDW in the mid eighties seems to have appeared in some guise IRL as the T-95, a turretless MBT with a massive 152mm main gun (or a 135mm gun- reports differ).

By the time West Germany makes its move, the Soviets could have a regiment or two (or brigade) of these monsters stationed in E. Germany. I doubt they would send them to China when their T-80s and T-64s could handle any tanks the Chinese would be able to throw at them at that point.

GDW also imagined the T-86, an upgrade of the T-72 with an up-armored, slightly more angular turret. This both looks and sounds like the T-90 of our timeline.

Anyway, it's not a major issue or anything but I like to try to slip the newer tech into the v1.0 timeline, where plausible.

I'm not getting too specific on how RL models of tanks translate over. The modeling system we're using (Third World War) basically (very broadly) rates tanks by gun caliber and armor. T-55, T-62, M-48, M-60 & Leo-1 all rate the same, as do T-64/72/80 and Chieftain. M1 and Challenger rate a little higher on defense due to their heavy armor (and in the case of M-1) mobility.

On the orbats, I'm trying to use the v1 tank progression. I'm using GDW's T-74 designation for RL T-72B and later models, T-86 for RL T-80U and BV variants, T-90 for RL T-95 & the enigmatic Black Eagle. As far as the modelling goes, the T-64/72/72/80/86 all come out the same, and the T-90 is equal to the M1A1. I took the RL 1990 tank assignments for Soviet forces and generally upgraded them one generation, as follows:

RL T-80 -> T-90
RL T-64 -> T-86
RL T-72 -> T-74
RL T-62 -> T-64
RL T-55 -> T-72
RL T-54 -> T-62

T-90 ends up mostly in Soviet forces in Germany and Poland. (Historically Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia had T-72 series, those in Hungary used T-64s until the late 80s, when they started getting early-model T-80s).

I prefer to leave it up to the GM as to what the exact RL (or fantasy!) vehicle a T-90 (and on the NATO side, the LAV-75/XM-8/AGS) is, since there are a few options. But I agree, there are some advanced Soviet monster tanks out there that throw NATO for a loop!

chico20854

06-24-2009, 12:36 PM

Is there any real reason why thanksgiving day (a date really only relevant to Americans) is so significant?
Sure it was the first day nuclear strikes were made on North America, but dozens, even hundreds (thousands might be pushing it) of nukes had been fired in the preceeding five months all across the world.
Thanksgiving day, although an important date of it's own, was not the first time long range strategic strikes were made. Neutral countries had already felt the scorching fire of attack by then, fire inflicted upon them by both sides of the conflict.

I'm not interested in provoking anyone, but I feel the increasing focus on what happened to, with, by and against the USA and it's forces is clouding the issue and ignoring the fact that many, many other countries have what could be considered to be more important dates on the "Twilight nuke calendar".

I think there are three reasons that the Thanksgiving Strikes are important. First, its the first use of ICBMs and modern SLBMs (older Soviet & NATO SLBMs were tasked with theater strikes). Prior to that point, the nuclear exchange had been carried out with tactical and theater/operational weapons. IMHO, the Soviets had not used silo-based missiles prior to that point.

Second, the Thanksgiving Day strikes were the transition between the operational targets Raellus listed above and strategic targets (with the caveat, again IMHO, that I would consider major ports in Europe to be operational targets). This is a grey area, as there is no clear dividing line for the Soviets between tactical, operational and nuclear strikes when they all land on Soviet territory - but going along the progression of escalation laid out in canon I could see how it could be reasonably argued that NATO would not have struck strategic targets (ICBM fields in Ukraine, the Kharkov tank plant, early warning radars in Western Ukraine) in the USSR prior to the TDM, even though they could have using tactical or operational weapons. Likewise, while the UK may have been struck prior to the TDM (I don't have the Survivor's Guide to the UK with me right now) the strikes on the royal family (a decidely strategic target) occurred on Thanksgiving Day too, again implying that the targets changed from an emphasis to destroying forces in contact (tactical targets) and the means to support and control them (operational targets) to destroying the enemy's ability as a nation to make war (strategic targets).

Third, I disagree with your assertion that the nuclear conflict had spread worldwide, to both nuetral and belligerent nations, prior to the TDM. I think the importance of the TDM is that it is the date at which the conflict does become worldwide. When you look at the list of tactical and operational targets, there are very few of them that nuetrals possess that are useful to beligerants. (And the few are, again IMHO, mostly French - ports, Pluton missiles, transport facilities, all of which it could be reasonably argued France had cut off NATO's access to when they withdrew from NATO). And while canon states that both NATO and the Pact strike nuetral nations once things "go strategic", IMHO most of those strikes are by the Soviets simply because the USSR is essentially surrounded (except for possibly a tenuous supply line across the Mediterranean the Soviets face NATO or NATO-allied troops on the west, south, southeast and east, and the sea lanes from the north lead through NATO controlled waters) so they are unable to receive any war material from nuetral nations - the only beneficiery of nuetral nation's raw materials, energy supplies and export arms are NATO or NATO-allied nations. (Much of the vaunted imported crude oil coming to the US is imported by pipeline from Mexican and Canadian oilfields - so prior to the Mexican invasion the only nation with a reason to nuke Mexico would be the Soviets).

I'm sorry if we give the impression of being US-centric. There are a couple reasons for this. First, all the folks in the DC group are Americans and we prefer to work on things we know best, to avoid making blunders with assumptions about other countries - look at the reception that the Survivors Guide to the UK receives from the Brits here. Rainbow is doing a wonderful job with a more local perspective on things, and we're trying to coordinate our effort with his, and Deacon and Fusilier have provided us valuable input on Canada. Second, the amount of documentation that is available for us to research is greatest about the US, with the USSR a somewhat close second. This allows us to go into much greater detail.

chico20854

06-24-2009, 12:55 PM

A pretty interesting source of info on what the Soviets can do (and what the US feared they could do!) is the declassified CIA national intelligence assessments from the 1980s. They cover much of the ground we have discussed here.

The search site is http://www.foia.cia.gov/search.asp.

Some interesting ones to browse through:

"SOVIET STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES FOR MULTITHEATER WAR"
"TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES, 1985-2000 "
"SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST"
"SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT"
and much more...

kato13

06-24-2009, 01:15 PM

Raellus

06-24-2009, 03:56 PM

Seriously though, once again the more I hear from The DC group the more confident I am in the final product.

I with you there, Kato. Although thay and I have had a couple of spirited (but cordial) debates in the past, I think it really speaks volumes about the DC Group that they are willing to address constructive critisism, accept input from others, and try to incorporate the work of other non-group contributors. Like Paul M., they are putting loads of time and energy into their product for this arcane (but brilliant) '80s-era RPG. Thanks, guys!

Targan

06-24-2009, 10:36 PM

Rainbow is doing a wonderful job with a more local perspective on things, and we're trying to coordinate our effort with his, and Deacon and Fusilier have provided us valuable input on Canada.
What has happened to DeaconR? I miss him. :(

chico20854

06-24-2009, 11:18 PM

What has happened to DeaconR? I miss him. :(

I haven't heard from him since September. His email address is bouncing.

I hope he's ok...

Graebarde

06-25-2009, 10:43 AM

Kill shit? Sounds messy :D

Well it does go splat! :D

Fusilier

06-25-2009, 07:04 PM

I haven't heard from him since September. His email address is bouncing.

I hope he's ok...

He is ok. He plays in my online game. His email has changed a few times in just a couple months, and has been a bit busy.

Targan

06-25-2009, 11:01 PM

He is ok. He plays in my online game. His email has changed a few times in just a couple months, and has been a bit busy.
Could you please let him know from me that I'd love to hear from him again. DeaconR is a good guy and in the past his forum contributions have been intelligent and thoughtful.

Webstral

06-25-2009, 11:41 PM

I have enjoyed reading everyone's thoughts on the real world Soviet Army immensely. I want to offer a few specific items without writing my customary essay.

At the risk of sounding like a pundit for the Quartermaster Corps, modern warfare is an exercise in logistics to a degree that is truly difficult to comprehend. The sheer tonnage of fuel and large caliber ammunition to be moved from place to place is almost beyond imagining. Add in spares, and moving and organizing all of this gear requires an effort that is probably beyond that of any nation on Earth. Yes, even beyond the United States. More so than any other war, World War Three (the Twilight War) would be characterized by relatively brief periods of almost unimaginably intense mechanized combat separated by lengthier periods of moderate activity and near-quiescence. Logistics would drive these cycles.

The Soviet Army doesn't have enough trucks. There is the bottom line. The West doesn't have enough trucks, but the situation is closer to tolerable in the West. At the start of the Twilight War, the Soviets understand their limitations better than the West understands their own, and Soviet doctrine, equipment, and training are designed to operate with Soviet logistical limitations in mind. In 1995, the Soviets understand that they are going to surge ahead 200-300 kilometers, then stall. This is why all supply and support goes to the most successful subordinate formation at any level of command. The Soviets go into the war understanding that they cannot possibly support all of their forces equally; nor can they predict who is going to achieve success. (Obviously, they have a strong interest in trying to do so, but who doesn't?) Given that the offensive is going to stall due to lack of fuel, ammunition, and spares, whatever is available at any given moment must go to support whichever formation is achieving a breakthrough. Ideally, the Soviets will accomplish against the West or China what the Germans accomplished against the Soviets in 1941: the encirclement and annihilation of major commands. The fact that said encirclement and annihilation didn't end the war on favorable terms for the Germans doesn't mean the idea isn't worth trying. The Rhine is much closer to Berlin than Moscow is to Berlin. (I have my doubts that the capture of Moscow by the Wehrmacht would have ended the war in Eastern Europe, anyway.)

The Twilight War puts the Soviets in a bad position. The Soviet Army is set up to deliver a knockout blow. Support for combat formations is spartan by Western standards. This is fine in the short term, but over the long haul there will be real trouble. Granted, Soviet equipment can better tolerate periods of low or no maintenance, but sooner or later the machines with poor maintenance will break down. This is one reason the Soviets have so many tanks. Create a table showing how many tanks will break down over the course of a three-week campaign; see how many are available at the end of that time; adjust the number of tanks available at the start of the campaign to get the desirable number at the end. Basic and brutal math, but this is the thinking of people who used that pattern successfully in World War Two and who planned to upgrade it for the next big show.

The war in China puts the Soviet Union's entire basis for waging war off-balance. The army that has been set up for a lightning offensive finds itself bogged down in extended operations. Becoming bogged down is not merely an inconvenience for the Soviets. Bogging down exposes the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet Army and of the Soviet state.

Getting back to the trucks, the war in China requires more trucks than the Soviets want to commit. As the front line moves further into China, the supply line moves forward. Use of captured rail can help ease the logistical burden, but the rails are quite vulnerable to action by Chinese partisans, etc. The lion's share of stocks must go by truck. Soon, the triple whammy of extending supply lines, breakdowns, and losses to enemy action threatens to strand the Soviet forces in Manchuria on a hostile beach. Trucks must be drawn from elsewhere. The v1 chronology refers to this fact by mentioning that vehicles come out of the civilian pool.

The Soviets have trucks in reserve, true enough. These are going to be drawn upon. The Soviets can make more trucks. However, unfortunately for the Soviets their industry is already heavily committed to war production. It's safe to say that in the 1980's, the Soviet economy is on a war footing. There isn't much slack to take up in terms of war production. Adjustments can be made, of course; the Soviet people can be forced to live with yet less. However, the Soviet military already is consuming the lion's share of manufacturing, metals, fuels, and educated manpower. "Ramping up" production means something completely different to the Soviets vis-a -vis the West.

Consequently, the demand on trucks in the Far East is a tremendous problem for the Soviets. The logistical weaknesses serve to undo much of the maneuverability and firepower of the Soviets. The BMP-3, impressive as it seems, is not useful in its primary role with empty fuel tanks, empty ammo bins, or broken tracks. The Tiger was undone principally by its demands on an already badly weakened German logistical situation. The Soviet Army in China would find itself in much the same position.

As trucks come out of the reserve units to make good losses in the Far East, the Soviet reserve system is going to lose a good deal of its potency. Again, the trucks coming out of the reserve aren't going to be replaced. New trucks are going straight to the front. Therefore, combat formations called up aren't going to have the kind of mobility or logistical staying power called for by Soviet doctrineÃ¢€”itself not exactly a formula for abundance.

As an example of how serious this problem can be, one need look only at the two most recent wars in the Persian Gulf. In Desert Storm, the US Army was on the verge of running out of some key items after four days of intensive operations. The show would have rolled on anyway, but corners would have had to have been cut. Every day of operations thereafter would have exacerbated the problem. And let us never forget the operational pause in the race for Baghdad in 2003.

The Soviets will have certain advantages in Germany when the Bundeswehr commences operations. The Soviets will be fighting defensively, which will give them certain advantages. Also, the GSFG is the most likely of Soviet commands to retain the best part of its trucks. Stocks are close-at-hand. Nevertheless, losses in wheeled transport among the Soviets in Germany are going to be pretty darned serious. Were it not for the fact that the NATO offensive in April 1997 moves through Poland, where the Pact has had plenty of time to lay mines and can use rail to offset the weaknesses in trucks, the Western powers probably would have demolished the defenders. As it is, the West's own logistical problems, combined with what must have been a truly daunting series of obstacle belts running east from the Oder, combine to turn a potential war of maneuver in Poland into a war of moving attrition.

Okay, I said no essays and I meant it. I enjoyed reading all of your posts, gentlemen.

Webstral

Raellus

06-26-2009, 01:08 PM

Interesting post, Webstral. What accounts for the dearth of trucks in the Red Army? Just to clarify, is this a problem that the Soviet army had, IRL (as of the late '80s, when the alternate history of the Twilight World diverges from our own) or is this shortate something that you've established as part of your game world? This strikes me as somewhere where the WTO nations could really help out. I can see Soviet calls for an increase in military truck production from Tatra (Cz) and STAR (Poland) as a way of supporting the war effort in China (before PACT troops were "requested") and thereafter.

I agree that logistics would be a huge problem on both sides. As folks have mentioned, the strain posed by the Soviets' war with China would be great, getting worse, of course, when the second front opens up in Europe.

You've gotten me thinking seriously about NATO's logistics issues. With France uncooperative (and Belgium, to a degree), all war shipping would have to come in through ports in Holland and Germany, which would be incredibly vulnerable to bombing (conventional and later, nuclear) and mining. With only a couple of major ports in operation, supply problems for the NATO armies would become greater and greater as their operations headed closer to the Soviet Union and further from those ports.

There's a direct historical parallel here. Part of the Western Allies' difficulty in advancing across western Europe during WWII was logistical. Before Antwerp was liberated and cleared, supplies could only come in through a couple of damaged ports in France. Since Allied bombing had wrecked most of the rail system in France, most of the supplies had to be trucked. Even with the American's considerable stock of trucks, there was an incredible strain on operations and some Allied armies had to be held back so that vital supplies could be delivered to others. There was a constant struggle between Montgomery and the American generals over whose army/corps would get supply precedence and therefore be able to continue its advance. Ike almost sacked Monty a couple of times because of his incessant and sometimes insubordinate calls for supply precedence.

This problem also existed, to a degree, on the Eastern Front. The Soviets were bound by some of the same limitations. The Soviets were still able to conduct sustained operations across a very broad front and over much greater distances than the Western Allies, though. Of course, there were seasonal limitations on offensive operations and some offensives did have to be stopped due to supply issues but, at least later in the war, the Soviets did a better job, on the whole, managing logistical problems than did the Western Allies. It helped that the Soviet soldier required much less in the way of supply tonage to operate than the British or American soldier did. This is one area in which the Twilight Red Army would have a distinct advantage over NATO armies.

It seems strange that the USSR would have forgotten these lessons from the past.

chico20854

06-26-2009, 02:44 PM

Interesting post, Webstral. What accounts for the dearth of trucks in the Red Army? Is this a a problem that the Soviet army had, IRL (as of the late '80s, when the alternate history of the Twilight World diverges from our own) or is this shortate something that you've created as part of your game world?

I agree that logistics would be a huge problem on both sides. As folks have mentioned, the strain posed by the Soviets' war with China would be great, getting worse, of course, when the second front opens up in Europe.

You've gotten me thinking seriously about NATO's logistics issues. With France uncooperative (and Belgium, to a degree), all war shipping would have to come in through ports in Holland and Germany, which would be incredibly vulnerable to bombing (conventional and later, nuclear) and mining. With only a couple of major ports in operation, supply problems for the NATO armies would become greater and greater as their operations headed closer to the Soviet Union and further from those ports.

There's a direct historical parallel here. Part of the Western Allies' difficulty in advancing across western Europe during WWII was logistical. Before Antwerp was liberated and cleared, supplies could only come in through a couple of damaged ports in France. Since Allied bombing had wrecked most of the rail system in France, most of the supplies had to be trucked. Even with the American's considerable stock of trucks, there was an incredible strain on operations and some Allied armies had to be held back so that vital supplies could be delivered to others. There was a constant struggle between Montgomery and the American generals over whose army/corps would get supply precedence and therefore be able to continue its advance. Ike almost sacked Monty a couple of times because of his incessant and sometimes insubordinate calls for supply precedence.

This problem also existed, to a degree, on the Eastern Front. The Soviets were bound by some of the same limitations. The Soviets were still able to conduct sustained operations across a very broad front and over much greater distances than the Western Allies, though. Of course, there were seasonal limitations on offensive operations and some offensives did have to be stopped due to supply issues but, on the whole, the Soviets did a better job managing logistical problems than did the Western Allies. It helped that the Soviet soldier required much less in the way of supply tonage to operate than the British or American soldier did.

It seems strange that the USSR would have forgotten these lessons from the past.

The dearth of trucks was a problem their entire economy faced, even with the massive KAMAZ and other truck plants. This shortage extended to the army - the mobilization stockpiles of equipment frequently had near-complete equipment sets as far as AFVs, artillery and small arms, with no cargo trucks (they did have communications vans and similar specialized vehicles). Late-mobilizing and low-readiness divisions use trucks rounded up from collective farms and industrial facilities. (However, in the 80s, as a reaction to American 'deep strike' tactics, the Soviet Army in Europe established a number of heavy truck brigades to counteract some of the anticipated NATO interdiction of rail lines across Poland. Many of these were tank transporters to bring forward second and subsequent echelons from the Western USSR). The callup of trucks from the economy furthers the strain on the already struggling Soviet state, reducing crop yields and production of war material.

The Soviets planned to get around these limitations with massively agressive tactics - as Web explained, to win the war before they ran out of supplies. And they, like NATO, stockpiled massive quantities of supplies in theater. (Sometime read up on the disposal problems the Germans faced after unification - something like 300,000 tons of abandoned ammo!)

The logistic issues drive a lot of the campaigning. (And in many ways the analysis I do is focussed on these sort of issues - I'm a former supply sergeant that worked at a variety of levels, I did sealift planning for the U.S. government for a while and still work for the U.S. Department of Transportation in the maritime field). We've been very aware of the ports issues - NATO faces some serious problems by being limited to Dutch, German and Danish ports. (They are for a while able to bring in non-war material through Antwerp and French ports - bulk food, fuel, some raw materials). I've proposed that one of the reasons the Dutch and Danes join the war is as a reaction to Soviet conventional attacks that attempted to interdict the flow of supplies (see my site's document (http://mysite.verizon.net/vzeedox4/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/q_n_a_on_the_early_war_in_northern_europe.doc)). The strategic pauses in operations in the European theater - such as between the ejection of Pact troops from East Germany and the advance across Poland - serve several purposes. First, they offer a new situation on the ground for the diplomats to attempt to work out an end to the war. Second, they give the air forces an opportunity to attrit and interdict enemy ground troops (similar to the U.S. air war in 1991), and finally they give the logisiticians time to allow units to replenish after the last action, build up supply dumps and improve some of the infrastructure that will be needed to support the next advance (repairing rail, strengthening bridges, etc.)

As to the parallels with WWII, I heartily agree! Patton was famous (notorious?) for his disregard for logistics issues - he was extremely upset when the umpires in pre-war manuevers announced that he had "lost" an engagement after his tanks ran out of fuel and ammo. To sustain the advance across France, the US Army stripped units (such as air defense and tank destroyers) of all trucks larger than jeeps to bolster the Red Ball Express. The situation on the Eastern Front was worse than you describe - while the Soviet soldier received less support, the tonnages of artillery ammunition were staggering, and the Red Army frequently had to halt offensive operations due to logistic issues (the failure to link up with the Warsaw uprising was partially due to real logistic issues.

As far as NATO's advance across Poland, it will be difficult to maintain. First, I imagine that the east bank of the Oder will be fortified in multiple layers, similar to the defenses arranged for Kursk in 1943. As Pact forces retreat. the devestation they leave behind will present NATO with significant obstacles. Much of the Polish road network will need extensive reconstruction work (and my post-Cold War experience with Polish roads is that they are pretty damn atrocious, I can't imagine how bad they were in the 80s), and the requisitioned Western European civilian trucks (that bring supplies forward to corps-level depots, where Army tactical trucks pick up the load) will have a lot of maintenance issues (setting aside the issue of finding drivers after former conscripts are called back to military service). There will be little riverine traffic, with most tonnage on the Oder damaged or destroyed during the December-March strategic pause, and the rail network thoroughly destroyed by the Soviets (over the objections of the Poles, who are torn between wanting to slow the NATO advance but also not wanting to destroy their nation's infrastructure).

Webstral

06-26-2009, 03:07 PM

What accounts for the dearth of trucks in the Red Army? Just to clarify, is this a problem that the Soviet army had, IRL (as of the late '80s, when the alternate history of the Twilight World diverges from our own) or is this shortate something that you've established as part of your game world?

In real life (in the 1990's) the Soviets don't have enough trucks to support their existing forces. They have a tremendous number of trucks, but they are insufficient for the task of supporting their enormous forces. No one has enough trucks to keep up with the demands of a mechanized army for very long, although the US Army has as favorable a truck-to-fighting vehicle ratio as any army in the world.

This strikes me as somewhere where the WTO nations could really help out. I can see Soviet calls for an increase in military truck production from Tatra (Cz) and STAR (Poland) as a way of supporting the war effort in China (before PACT troops were "requested") and thereafter.

A keen observation!

You've gotten me thinking seriously about NATO's logistics issues. With France uncooperative (and Belgium, to a degree), all war shipping would have to come in through ports in Holland and Germany, which would be incredibly vulnerable to bombing (conventional and later, nuclear) and mining. With only a couple of major ports in operation, supply problems for the NATO armies would become greater and greater as their operations headed closer to the Soviet Union and further from those ports.

There's a direct historical parallel here. Part of the Western Allies' difficulty in advancing across western Europe during WWII was logistical. Before Antwerp was liberated and cleared, supplies could only come in through a couple of damaged ports in France. Since Allied bombing had wrecked most of the rail system in France, most of the supplies had to be trucked. Even with the American's considerable stock of trucks, there was an incredible strain on operations and some Allied armies had to be held back so that vital supplies could be delivered to others. There was a constant struggle between Montgomery and the American generals over whose army/corps would get supply precedence and therefore be able to continue its advance. Ike almost sacked Monty a couple of times because of his incessant and sometimes insubordinate calls for supply precedence.

The v1 chronology has long pauses in the action which I believe can be explained by the logistical and manpower problems of both sides. Anglo-American forces reach the Oder within a short period of time after crossing the Inter-German Border in early December, 1996. Granted, the offensive doesn't take on the drive-by qualities of Operation Desert Storm, but four fresh Anglo-American mechanized corps slashing across northern East Germany is too great a force for the battle-weary Pact forces to hold back for long. We can explain away the pause from January to April politically: the NATO civilian leadership wanted to give the Soviets a chance to come to their senses and the bargaining table. However, it's quite likely as well that SACEUR and his subordinates were obliged to report to the US President that USAEUR and its corresponding Allied formations were incapable of continuing the offensive into Poland right away.

The NATO offensive into Poland "gains momentum"Â in April. Warsaw isn't surrounded until June. This is not a lightning operation. I believe the combination of logistical pinch and well-prepared Soviet-doctrine obstacles employed in the greatest depth explain the apparent plodding nature of the NATO drive across Poland.

This problem also existed, to a degree, on the Eastern Front. The Soviets were bound by some of the same limitations. The Soviets were still able to conduct sustained operations across a very broad front and over much greater distances than the Western Allies, though. Of course, there were seasonal limitations on offensive operations and some offensives did have to be stopped due to supply issues but, at least later in the war, the Soviets did a better job, on the whole, managing logistical problems than did the Western Allies. It helped that the Soviet soldier required much less in the way of supply tonage to operate than the British or American soldier did. This is one area in which the Twilight Red Army would have a distinct advantage over NATO armies.

It seems strange that the USSR would have forgotten these lessons from the past.

I'm not sure the Soviets have forgotten the lessons of the past as much as they find themselves obliged to work within certain limitations. The degree of mechanization of the Red Army in 1944 is a mere fraction of the level of mechanization of the Soviet Army in 1996. At every level of the fighting, the ability of the troops to consume ammunition, fuel, and spare parts has grown geometrically in fifty years. Even in a command economy, it's hard to sell the purchase/manufacture of trucks versus tanks, artillery, and APC to civilian leaders. Soviet doctrine has acknowledgement of this problem built into it: all available support goes to the most successful command. Everyone else goes hungry.

Webstral

natehale1971

06-26-2009, 03:13 PM

chico20854

06-26-2009, 04:35 PM

I think I had read somewhere that the East Germans had the smallest military forces in the Warsaw Pact, but where seen as the most professional military personnel... And they had seemed to be the most loyal to the Socialist / Communist ideals and where the strongest allies behind the Iron Curtain that the Soviets had. Or did i get that mixed up?

The East Germans were considered to have the best trained troops in the Pact, and one of the best equipped.

The Bulgarians take the cake for being the most loyal. When things started to fall apart in the late 80s Bulgaria was the one that the USSR had to pressure to liberalize. Their KGB was also even more out of control - its widely beelieved that they were behind the plot to assasinate the Pope. (I'm also aware of some attempted assasinations they tried to pull in the US).

Fully mobilized strength of Pact armies:

East Germany: 11 divisions
Bulgaria: 12 divisions + 5 tank brigades
Hungary: 3 corps, each slightly larger than a division (5 combat brigades each)
Czechoslovakia: 15 divisions
Poland: 20 divisions

So Hungary by far had the smallest army.

natehale1971

06-26-2009, 04:57 PM

Wow.. I didn't know that Hungry has such a small military. I thought the soviets inate distrust for the Germans would have kept them the smallest armed force... I guess it kind of works for my idea that the Soviets allowing the East Germans to create two air assault brigades patterned on the Soviet model... (one of these brigades was part of the DDR Army that went to the Far East Front in my alternate timeline concept....

Raellus

06-26-2009, 05:23 PM

Abbott Shaull

06-27-2009, 04:34 PM

Abbott Shaull

06-27-2009, 04:52 PM

I've also heard that the Cold War Polish military was considered pretty capable, in terms of both the quality of its troops and equipment. Given Chico's numbers (thanks, Chico), it was also the largest of the Pact armies.

Currently, they have quite an impressive little arms industry of their own and, by most reports, their GROM SF built up a pretty good rep while operating with other Coallition SF in Iraq.

I think Hungary also produced its own line of military trucks during the Cold War but I could be remembering incorrectly. I'll have to do a little research.
Yes, the Poles were pretty loyal, due to the Soviet reinforced the fear of another Germany Army coming to take over. Notice Poland was didn't have Group of Soviet Force, even though they played host to Air Force and various other unit. One of the main reason for this is due to the unique situation of Poland being sold out by England and US. With the fact that there were Polish units made Poland unique. It was one of the first countries of the pact to be armed, with unit that former fought with the Soviet who already had Soviet General in command.

Like many of the other Pact nation the Defense Minister for many year longer than others were Soviet General, or those loyal to the Soviet. This is one of the reason why the Warsaw Pact was only formalized after NATO was create. To the Soviet High Command why would they have defense treaty with nations that already answer to them to begin with.

Again by the 1980s the Soviets had regretted not keeping a large force in Poland since the Polish Army seem unwillingly to move against the Solidarity as fast as the Soviet felt it should of been dealt with. Only when did they take action, they did so to keep the large part of the Soviet Army and units of allies out. Not that the Soviets were in any shape to invade like they had with Hungary and Czechoslavakia in the 50s and 60s. Both of these nations had paid a price of hosting much large Group of Soviet Force in their countries afterwards.

And quite frankly the Soviets were once before whipped by the Polish back in 1921, and they were quite capable of give them a bloody nose that they didn't want the west to witness. Along with using the best equipment that had been position to be used against the US and NATO, not a nation that was for all purposes still a client state.

JHart

07-11-2009, 06:54 PM

I game across this article http://www.alternatewars.com/WW3/the_war_that_never_was.htm today and offers some insight into Soviet thinking.

Raellus

07-11-2009, 11:20 PM

Good article. Thanks for the link, JHart.

I think that we all agree that the Red Army of the later Cold War years had several severe limitations but I still don't think that any of them would have been crippling. The author's assertion that late '80s Soviet doctrine advocating the use of battlefield nukes was a direct result of the Soviet high command's realization/admition of its technological inferiority vis-a-vis NATO is speculative, as the author himself admits. He may be right, but we must remember the temporal divergence that occurs around 1990 in the timeline. More on that a little later.

NATO had a clear qualitative edge by the late '80s, of that there can be little doubt. However, Soviet military science and technology were catching up, rather than falling further behind. As I pointed out in a couple of previous posts, the Soviets were in the process of rolling out several major land, sea, and air weapon systems that were comparable qualitatively, if not superior (e.g. the SU-27) to their NATO counterparts. In reality, the deployment of many of these systems was radically slowed (if not stopped altogether) by the faltering Russian economy.

This is where the divergence in the timelines comes in. In reality, the Soviet Union dissolved in '91, its economy in a tailspin, its political and social structure falling apart. Consequently, the Russian Federation (formerly the core of the Soviet military) suffered greatly as funding was all but cut off. The sorry state of the Russian military in the early to mid nineties only reinforces the idea that its predecessor was likewise a paper tiger. I've already debunked this logical fallicy earlier in this thread. What I'd like to focus on now is the way that history would have differed had the Soviet Union remained united, solvent, and fearful of NATO.

I would postulate that the Soviet Union of the v1.0 timeline would have recognized the limitations of its conventional forces in the early nineties- largely as a result of the Red Army's relatively poor performance in the Afghanistan war- and set about correcting them via a comprehensive reform program. The reversion to the strategic battle plan relying on tac-nuclear weapons described in the article was, in this scenario, merely a stopgap measure while the USSR initiated their military reform program. This program would focus on improving the training of its soldiers, especially its NCOs and junior officers. It would also address NATOs technical superiority by not only accelerating the roll out of more modern systems, but by upgrading existing systems (retrofitting combat aircraft with air-to-air refuelling equipment, older model tanks with thermal imaging systems, etc.). Instead of holding them in reserve, much older systems (e.g. T-54/55/63; Mig-21/23/35, etc.) would be sold off to the USSR's various client states (not WTO countries) to help offset modernization costs and create a leaner, meaner military.

Since the Soviets WTO allies were never fully trusted by them and given only a secondary role in Soviet strategic and operational military doctrine, they would be directed to support the Red Army's modernization program by increasing the production of military trucks, thereby ameliorating the Red Army's logistical weaknesses. Where possible, the other WTO armies would undertake their own modernization programs but their roles would be remain secondary.

The Red Army of T2K c. '95 would still win as far as the "correlation of forces" goes but it would also have made great leaps towards in catching up to NATO in terms of troop and hardware quality. In would still lag behing overall, but the gap would not nearly be as great as it was in '88 (IRL).

TiggerCCW UK

07-12-2009, 04:14 AM

A friend has just found and loaned me his copy of Red Army. I'm looking forward to reading it. I always felt the red army was given a raw deal by authors so it'll be interesting to read from another perspective.

Benjamin

07-12-2009, 01:37 PM

Raellus

07-12-2009, 03:32 PM

@Raellus: That is all well and good, but remember this will not happen in a vacuum. If the Soviets begin a comprehensive effort to upgrade their weapon systems in the late 80s/early 90s, than surely NATO will respond likewise. The V.1 timeline could up seeing far earlier deployments of a number of weapon systems...F-22, A-12, RAH-66, Crusader artillery and an improved Abrams Block III.

Yes, I've never argued that this would not happen. I think you overstate the impact those systems would have, though. All of them are so expensive, they were either cancelled outright (Crusader, RAH-66) or only fielded in very limited numbers (Raptor). Even the relatively robust and powerful, market-driven economy of the U.S. would be severely strained by the continued development, purchase, and deployment of these systems in significant numbers. They would likely exist in the Twilight World, but in relatively small numbers.

As for technology in general, it can be a significant force multiplier to be sure, but I tend to discount the "Wonder Weapon" mentality somewhat. A lot of hi-tech systems don't operate as advertised operationally, or break down relatively easily under harsh battlefield conditions. It's probably not a fair comparison since there are other causal factors at play as well, but Hitler's high-tech weapons were unable to stem the Allied tide in WWII. His faith that relatively small production runs of technically superior tanks (Panther, Tigers, etc.) would offset the Soviet's numerical advantage in armor (and almost everything else for that matter) proved to have been seriously misplaced. He made the same mistake believing the jet-powered ME-262 would be able to tip the balance in the air against the numerically superior western Allies' air forces. I think Western armies are still a little too in love with their technology. Vietnam and Afghanistan prove that technological superiority alone does not win wars.

The cornerstone of my proposed Soviet military reforms of T2K '89-'95 is the improvement in the training of NCOs and junior officers. Upgrading existing weapon systems is also part of these reforms, but plays only a secondary role in improving the capabilities of the Red Army.

The Soviet Union needs full fledged market reforms along the lines of China, but I don't see that happening. I see the Soviet invasion of China as the last gasp of a failed system. West Germany realized this and gambled. Unfortunately, the fears of a united and militaristic Germany held the Warsaw Pact together while simultaneously destroying NATO. The US and its allies did not win handily because of two factors...Italy and Greece's betrayals and nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was long past its prime but refused to go quietly into this dark night.

I agree with you, to a point. I've conceded that reforms, especially technological ones, would further strain the already stressed Soviet economy. I'm also of the opinion that this strain motivated, in part, the Soviet invasion of China. I just don't see the Soviet military- its political and economic systems, maybe- of T2K '95-2000 as "long past its prime."

Hitler said something along the lines of "kick in the door and the whole rotten house will fall down" about the Soviet Union. He could not have been more wrong. I am simply asserting that it is the height of folly to grossly underestimate any enemy, especially one with the combat history of the Soviet Union.

Webstral

07-12-2009, 08:59 PM

Ironically, the Pact probably plays a role in Poland quite similar to the role China plays in Manchuria and northwest of Beijing. In the same fashion that the Chinese probably counter Soviet superiority in firepower, mobility, and technology with extensive fixed defenses involving minefields, water obstacles, reinforced concrete fighting positions, and even underground galleries, the Soviets probably use the January-April break in fighting along the Oder to prepare very dense defenses making the most of AT guns, ATGM carriers, and T-55s firing from keyhole positions on the flanks of the most obvious (or most practical) avenues of advance. The front-line divisions of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany probably would be held back for the purpose of counterattack. Under these circumstances, the Soviet pattern of using standardized battle drills would be more effective in defense than the same patterns would be in defensive war of maneuver. AT guns and ATGM that might not be able to defeat the front slopes of the M1 series would have much better results when firing from prepared positions on the flank.

Webstral

Raellus

07-12-2009, 09:22 PM

chico20854

07-12-2009, 09:41 PM

I agree, Web. In the v1.0 scenario, the Soviet's would have the relative luxury of being able to trade space (i.e. the GDR and Poland) for time. Fixed defenses manned by lower readiness divisions would slow and grind down the NATO forces enough to ready the Red Army's better quality manuever formations for an eventual counteroffensive.

You speak the truth, brother! (The only issue is how many of those lower readiness units do they have... Soviet Vehicle Guide outlines a strangely extended mobilization period! But the Polish Army has one reserve and one mobilization-only army, plus numerous internal paramilitary troops, which are more than capable of digging in to defend their homeland!)

Losses to NATO's high-tech weaponry would be extremely difficult to replace in a timely manner. This scenario is pretty much what happened during WWII at Kursk, with devastating results for the German military.

The main source of replacement high-tech weaponry for US forces is the equipment left stateside by deploying POMCUS troops, mostly III Corps. The issue is getting it moved across the North Atlantic in winter during and after the Battle of the Norwegian Sea, with Soviet subs and raiders on the loose (or, more accurately, widespread fear of Soviet subs & raiders) and demand for shipping to deploy forces to the Persian Gulf, Korea and National Guard units to Europe (including such questionables as sending the 40th ID from California to Europe, likely via the Panama Canal).

By the time the losses from Advent Crown start mounting, US industrial production is able to make up most of the losses. (The US enjoys the benefit of a pre-war buildup of industrial capability - production is ramped up for export sales to China much in the way that US production in 1940 and 1941 was increased to meet demand from France and Britain). US tank numbers at the front don't start dropping until the start of the tactical nuclear exchange. (Send me a PM if you want the spreadsheet where we ran the AFV loss model.)

Webstral

07-13-2009, 12:32 AM

US tank numbers at the front don't start dropping until the start of the tactical nuclear exchange. (Send me a PM if you want the spreadsheet where we ran the AFV loss model.)

Without agreeing or disagreeing on losses v replacements for M1s, I'm quite curious whether you have run numbers for tank crews. Also, did you devise formulae for APC and IFV losses. I believe this is where NATO is going to suffer the greatest losses, although some smart fellows may decide that the only way to get through Pact defenses is with dismounted attacks. Then the question becomes one of infantry replacements. I'd hate to be a rifleman slogging it out through Poland's defensive belts. Talk about earning you CIB!

Webstral

Benjamin

07-13-2009, 01:51 PM

I'm not one to overly praise the Red Army, but I'm not dissing it much either. In the three month long drive across Poland, NATO will be in for a very rough time. BUT man-for-man and vehicle-for-vehicle NATO will have the advantage and prove to be the superior fighting force. If not, than why did the Soviet Union have to resort to tactical nuclear warfare on July 9, 1997?

Sure Poland would be a meat grinder, but modern wars such as the Falklands, Iraq (1991), Israel versus Arabs and others have shown that technological superiority (and crew training/experience) is paramount. NATO advances over 600 kilometers in about 90 days (4/2/1997 - 7/9/1997). This is an advance of about 7 km/day. Not exactly blitzkrieg, but not too bad given that the WP has had 4 months to prepare for the NATO offensive.

If anything the V.1 timeline severely under estimates the economic and political strain being felt in the Soviet Union. And while the Soviet military may have been very tough, history has shown us that the USSR itself was rater fragile. In the end the Red Army is unable to protect the Motherland and the Russian leadership is forced to use nukes. This action is the surest sign of defeat.

Benjamin

Raellus

07-13-2009, 05:09 PM

I'd like to see your AFV loss model, Chico. I really admire how scientific you guys are being in your assessments.

I'm a huge fan of the M1A1 and Challenger tanks but I'm not sure that they would fare as well against the Red Army as they have against the Iraqi Army. They steamrolled the Iraqis in '91 and '03 but the Iraqis- even their "elite" (LOL) Republican Guards divisions- were never as capable as the front-line units of the Red Army. Against masses of top-of-the-line Soviet tanks (not the cheap export versions), ground and air launched ATGMs, unguided AT weapons, AT mines, artillery, etc., I think NATO tank losses would mount fairly quickly.

I didn't used to think this way. Based on the M1's combat record in the First Gulf War, I had concluded that it was pretty much invulnerable (if used properly) to anything the Soviet Bloc could throw at it. It was the Israeli's experience in Lebanon a few years ago that convinced me that the modern battlefield is becoming increasingly dangerous for even the most modern MBTs. Hezbollah guerillas firing Soviet-made ATGMs (AT-13 & AT-14) manufactured during the early and mid-90s* were able to knock out and/or destroy the Israeli's Merkava Mk. IVs, arguably the world's most advanced and heavily armored operational MBT in the world today.

*These would, therefore, be available to Soviet troops in the Twilight War.

Benjamin, you have a fair point. It's hard to argue with the canonical rate of NATO's advance or the Soviet's first use of battlefield nukes. I do believe that the surprise of the West German's attack coupled with the strains of fighting a full scale war against the PRC go farther in explaining both the Soviet's loss of ground (which may have been somewhat deliberate) and their decision to make the battlefied nuclear than any inherent inferiority in the Soviet armed forced, though.

I respectfully disagree with you regarding the overall superiority of the Israeli and British weapons during the campaigns you mentioned. For just one example, during the '73 Yom Kippur war, Soviet-made Syrian tanks had infrared spotlights while the Israelis' western made Centurions, M-48s, M-60s, and Super Shermans did not, putting the Israelis at a distinct disadvantage during night engagements. The Egyptian's integrated AAD network of Soviet SA-2 and SA-3 SAMs and ZU-23-2 SPAAGs took a significant toll against the vaunted IAFs American Phantoms and Skyhawks. In the Falklands, the RN couldn't counter the Argentinians' Exocet missiles and many British troops swapped their semi-auto FN SLRs for the Argentinian's full-auto FN FALs. IMPO, it was the superior training and experience of the Israelis and Brits that allowed them to triumph, not their technological superiority.

I guess, from a purely gaming standpoint, there seems little point in playing against the remnants of a sucky enemy. On that basis alone, I feel the need to defend the equipment and fighting men of the Red Army.

avantman42

07-13-2009, 08:05 PM

In the Falklands, the RN couldn't counter the Argentinians' Exocet missiles and many British troops swapped their semi-auto FN SLRs for the Argentinian's full-auto FN FALs. IMPO, it was the superior training and experience of the Israelis and Brits that allowed them to triumph, not their technological superiority.
I'd have to agree that, in the Falklands at least (I don't know much about the Arab-Israeli wars) the deciding factor was morale and training, not equipment. The only difference between the British SLR and the Argentinian FAL, as you've mentioned, is that the SLR didn't do full-auto. At least, not officially: I've heard from several ex-soldiers that inserting a match in the correct place made it fire full-auto. I seem to recall that many of the British attacks were night attacks because the British thought they had more night-vision equipment, when in fact the Argentinians had more.

As for the Exocets, the Royal Navy was lucky that Argentina hadn't taken delivery of it's full order, and France refused to deliver the remainder, so the Argentinian navy only had relatively few, and had to use iron bombs when the missiles ran out.

fightingflamingo

07-13-2009, 10:22 PM

Targan

07-13-2009, 10:56 PM

The only difference between the British SLR and the Argentinian FAL, as you've mentioned, is that the SLR didn't do full-auto. At least, not officially: I've heard from several ex-soldiers that inserting a match in the correct place made it fire full-auto.
I was shown how to do that when I was in the ARES and that was what we were armed with. I wouldn't be at all surprised if Legbreaker knows that trick too.

Legbreaker

07-13-2009, 11:43 PM

There's a couple of different methods actually, all officially frowned upon (and attracting a charge).
The problem with the methods I know is that unless judicious application of a file is involved (or a replacement part installed), the weapon is only capable of automatic fire and looses the abilty to be placed on "safe" (at least quickly).
The better option, if possible, is to lay your hands on the automatic support version (DAMN RARE!) known as the AR (Automatic Rifle), the L2A1 I think. Equipped with heavier barrel and bipod it uses larger 30 round magazines (instead of the standard 20) which unfortunately empty far, far too quickly.

Give me something belt fed anyday. Yes, they're almost always heavier, but you don't need to reload as often and recoil is much less of a factor.

Regarding the FAL and SLR, there are a few differences, but mainly in the fact that one is build to metric and the other imperial (millimetres and inches). They are still basically the same weapon although don't try swapping parts, or even magazines from one to the other and expect it to work properly!

Raellus

07-14-2009, 03:51 PM

I worked on the vehicle losses for the DC Group, in consultation with my compatriots... We did not use the current Iraq War, or the 1990 Persian Gulf War... the loss model was developed from statistical experience during world war II (although admittedly we had to make some judgement calls), additionally, we figured in recovery rates (from the Arab Israel Wars in 1967 and 1973), new vehicle delivery (based on the industrial mobilization chico mentioned above, and doctrinal industrial mobilization schedules), as well as field & depot battlefield vehicle recovery rates... in the previous mobilization for war document we touch on how crews would be replaced as that document details the number of recruits turned out on an annual basis (again based upon coldwar era mobilization doctrine), and specifies the armor training sites.

It may not be perfect, and grad school has interfered with my completing the other vehicle types and losses listed on the first page, but it's a start...

It's good to hear from you again, FF. I'm reassured that you're not using the Gulf Wars. The '73 Yom Kippur is probably a much better model, due to the various AT weapons fielded and the large tank v. tank engagements on the Golan Heights. It's like you've covered all of the salient factors in your modelling.

Thanks for posting your work for us to look at.

EDIT: Unfortunately, when I open the file, most of what I see is odd, scrambled characters. Darn it!

kato13

07-14-2009, 04:22 PM

EDIT: Unfortunately, when I open the file, most of what I see is odd, scrambled characters. Darn it!

Right click the link -> "save link as" (or "save target as" or something similar)
then open.

That usually works. Again the DC group has impressed me with their thoroughness.

fightingflamingo

07-14-2009, 10:16 PM

my main problem with using 1973 as a complete model is that the terrain even in the Golan (where at least it was hilly) was relatively open. Western Poland, and Germany have dense foliage which would interfere with wireguided systems, also the weather is generally crappier. I think the general physicality of the region (North Central Europe), has much closer engagement ranges (MBT vs MBT, as well as ATGM vs MBT).

Also of note NATO sent a team to Israel following the 1973 war to assess how the IDF handled battlefield recovery and return to service, as they really did an exceptional job, returning high numbers to knocked out tanks to service very, very quickly. But then that's why we've got ARV's right...

Thanks for the input...

Raellus

07-15-2009, 12:19 AM

I've done a lot of reading on the Golan Heights tank battles c. '73. There were indeed some open areas with wide and long vistas, but a lot of the area's broken terrain (hills, ramps, draws, wadis, etc.) created very close engagement distances. The Sinai... now that was some wide open terrain (in general).

Anyway, I know what you're saying and I'm not trying to quibble.

I agree with your assessment that central Europe's terrain would create generally closer engagement ranges than found during the Yom Kippur War but in some ways that would favor the defender, creating more ambush opportunities and flank/rear shots. Also, rough terrain would, in some cases, dictate likely avenues of approach for AFVs, in effect channeling them into heavy defensive fires. These two factors would undoubtedly increase AFV attrition.

Mohoender

07-15-2009, 06:55 AM

I'm coming late in that debate and everyone knows that I'm often defending the Russians. In fact, I don't really. However, I have a tendancy to distrust the western habit to underestimate Russia.

I have seen a lot of interesting thing but there are too things I wanted to say:

- Kato stated that the soviet economy was too weak and I think he is right. However, I would argue the same about our western societies and I'm not convinced that we could support a long war with a large ennemy.

- O'borg, talking of the IDF stated that their conscripts are highly motivated and, again, he is right. However, motivation is equally true for the Russians (and can compare to that of the IDF) as it only depends on how you present them the war. In 1812, Napoleon I was defeated by Russian peasants fighting for Mother Russia. In 1917, the Russian army was defeated by the Germans as they were fighting for the Czar. Four years later (after 2 years of fighting) these same soldiers (underequipped and outnumbered at least until late 1920) were defeating the largest world coalition of the time (White Russians, US, Japan, German, Czech, Poles, French, British..., all WW1 veterans) while attacked on four fronts (North, Poland, Ukraine and Siberia). They were fighting for Mother Russia and not for an obscure concept. In WW2, the Russians (losing 23 million soldiers, an amazing number) defeated Germany. Again Stalin was smart enough to call them in the defense of Mother Russia (not a word about communism). No people can accept so many dead without a true motivation. Then, my point is simple. When the Russians are fighting for Mother Russia they are highly motivated and very hard to defeat. Otherwise they are leasy and unreliable. In the case of T2K, they are indeed fighting again for Mother Russia as it is Germany which is the aggressor.

fightingflamingo

07-15-2009, 09:04 AM

I've done terrain walks in both Sinai, and Golan when I was in Egypt as part of the MFO.
Regarding Sinai, the terrain in the immediate vicinity of the canal and the eastern shore, as well as the north coastal road are relatively open and good country for mounted warfare. However, the central and southern portions of the penninsula are very rugged, and not where I'd want to be riding... not that I prefer walking there as it's hot as hell, but it'd be safer.

Regarding Golan, I think we were on the same page as I wasn't as good as describing my opinion as I intended. In some spaces, the engagement ranges would be very close, and key avenues of approach are relatively easily covered there by the Wadi's, and draws, that allow you to drive into Irsrael proper of off the heights. I intended to infer that the reduced foliage cover, and the terrain (as apposed to the Northern European Plain), would change the character of any combat.

Regarding Poland, and defense, I believe that defense will pretty much always be in a more favorable position than an attacker, and we have discussed at length the fortified defensive belt on the eastern bank of the Oder. However, the terrain in Poland (wife's from Poland so I've travelled extensively there also), which is generally mixed cultivated farms, divided up by thin woodlines, with some deciduous forest, will be a mixed bag. IMHO the foliage there will allow aggressive dismounted infantry anti-armor hunter killer teams a great advantage (both offensively and defensively), which will also affect the outcome of armor engagements. I also think that the battlefield in europe will be come significantly more cluttered with debris generally, since the terrain is more cluttered to begin with (without taking into consideration the fact that the building density is way higher than either if the Arab-Israeli battlefields thus discussed. I think this clutter could significantly hamper the performance of older wireguided antiarmor systems employed at ground level by both sides.
Ultimately I think that the offensive in to Poland, is going to come down to two things. 1) the air situation over the battlefront, and the ability of NATO fixed and rotary wing CAS to support the offensive. 2) the abilty of NATO artillery to suppress WP ATGM systems and dismounted infantry.
We have some idea's regarding how this will be accomplished, but that is another thread, and I for one, would like to wargame the Oder Crossing before I comment on that at length.

Raellus

07-16-2009, 01:43 PM

That's awesome that you've been able to walk parts of those battlefields.

Ultimately I think that the offensive in to Poland, is going to come down to two things. 1) the air situation over the battlefront, and the ability of NATO fixed and rotary wing CAS to support the offensive. 2) the abilty of NATO artillery to suppress WP ATGM systems and dismounted infantry.
We have some idea's regarding how this will be accomplished, but that is another thread, and I for one, would like to wargame the Oder Crossing before I comment on that at length.

Fair point.

It is sort of a topic for a new thread but I'd like to share my thoughts anyway.

1.) I think the European battlefield would be even deadlier for aircraft than it would be for AFVs. MANPADs and SPAAA would take a heavy toll of helicopter gunships. The Soviet's extensive and multilayered AAD network would give NATO fits. Sure, NATO was able to take out the Iraqi's AAD networks relatively easilty, and the Serbian's somewhat less so (although, IIRC, the Serbs were able to shoot down an F-117 with a Soviet made SAM), but those networks were poor imitations of what the Soviet' s would have had. A better model would be the Egyptian's network during the Yom Kippur war.

The popular media and the companies that manufacture combat aircraft and their weapon systems tend to portray modern air warfare as neat and tidy. NATO, especially, seems to put a lot of faith in BVR first kill ability. Yes, NATO has a technological edge in AWACs, combat aircraft, and missile systems, but only just a slight one. With hundred of aircraft in the air at once, AWAC would quickly break down. Contrary to popular belief, radars are neither all seeing nor all knowing. As recently as the '91 Gulf War, a flight of F-15s had trouble differentiating between a low flying MiG-25 and another flight of F-15s. They had to radio each other to waggle their wings to finally make a visual determination. At that point, any BVR edge is out the window. In a huge furball, a lot of NATOs technological advantages would dissappear. In fact, Soviet helmet mounted sights and aircraft-mounted IR seekers on the MiG-29 and SU-27 (the Soviets fielded these technologies first) would actually give a slight edge to the Soviet fighter pilots.

I think NATO's pilot training was clearly superior to the Soviets', though, so I still think NATO would have an overall advantage in air combat. The Soviet's numbers advantage would somewhat negate that, though. Overall, I think that the skies over central Europe would be particularly deadly for everyone involved, well before the TDM. This is one thing, IMO, that canon got dead on.

2.) IMPO, the Soviet's one clear cut edge, numbers notwithstanding, is artillery. I think NATO would lose a lot of its guns to Soviet counterbattery fire. The Red Army in the '80s still fielded artillery divisions and had gun and rocket systems dedicated exclusively to counterbattery fire.

This is one area where I think NATO's philosophy of technology trumping numbers is the most flawed. MLRS is awesome, but their simply aren't enough of them to negate the Soviet's massive fleets of BM-21s and BM-27s. The respective counter battery radars aren't that different in terms of their capabilities. The Soviet's venerable D30 howitzers are just as capable as the american's M117. The Soviets fielded a lot more large calibre guns (and mortars) than NATO and most of their guns (of all calibres) had a range advantage.

I think NATO counted on taking out Soviet batteries from the air, assuming the establishment of air superiority. I believe this was wishful thinking, on at least two counts. First, I don't think NATO could have achieved anything more than brief, local air superiority. Second, I think Soviet AAD systems would make hitting artillery positions a deady mission for NATO pilots.

I guess all of this reflects my skepticism regarding the ability of technology (as the primary causal factor) to win modern wars.

Mo, I think you're right on concerning the Soviet soldier. They may not be as educated or technologically astute as their western counterparts but, if properly motivated, they are tough, resourceful fighters. By most accounts, the average Soviet citizen is better suited to the privations of life on the battlefied than the average western soldier.

chico20854

07-16-2009, 05:10 PM

1.) I think the European battlefield would be even deadlier for aircraft than it would be for AFVs. MANPADs and SPAAA would take a heavy toll of helicopter gunships. The Soviet's extensive and multilayered AAD network would give NATO fits. Sure, NATO was able to take out the Iraqi's AAD networks relatively easilty, and the Serbian's somewhat less so (although, IIRC, the Serbs were able to shoot down an F-117 with a Soviet made SAM), but those networks were poor imitations of what the Soviet' s would have had. A better model would be the Egyptian's network during the Yom Kippur war.

The popular media and the companies that manufacture combat aircraft and their weapon systems tend to portray modern air warfare as neat and tidy. NATO, especially, seems to put a lot of faith in BVR first kill ability. Yes, NATO has a technological edge in AWACs, combat aircraft, and missile systems, but only just a slight one. With hundred of aircraft in the air at once, AWAC would quickly break down. Contrary to popular belief, radars are neither all seeing nor all knowing. As recently as the '91 Gulf War, a flight of F-15s had trouble differentiating between a low flying MiG-25 and another flight of F-15s. They had to radio each other to waggle their wings to finally make a visual determination. At that point, any BVR edge is out the window. In a huge furball, a lot of NATOs technological advantages would dissappear. In fact, Soviet helmet mounted sights and aircraft-mounted IR seekers on the MiG-29 and SU-27 (the Soviets fielded these technologies first) would actually give a slight edge to the Soviet fighter pilots.

I think NATO's pilot training was clearly superior to the Soviets', though, so I still think NATO would have an overall advantage in air combat. The Soviet's numbers advantage would somewhat negate that, though. Overall, I think that the skies over central Europe would be particularly deadly for everyone involved, well before the TDM. This is one thing, IMO, that canon got dead on.

A few thoughts on the situation in the air. First, the Pact had an integrated air defense system. That means, for example, that the Polish PVO was concentrated along the Baltic coast, especially in the west, and then in depth as area defenses around industrial and politically important cities. When East Germany leaves the Pact and turns its radars & SAMs east (or at least off, either by design or because the crews are defending their sites on the ground) the integrated system is left with a massive hole. The Pact is forced to quickly throw up an alternative system, which they can do but will be less effective than the pre-existing fixed system, and the assets that are used to do so will not be available to perform their intended role defending forces in the field or some other portion of the Fatherland.

One thing to keep in mind is the distinction between development of Soviet high-tech weapons and their widespread fielding throughout the Pact. There are only four regiments of Su-27 in the west - most of the Su-27s are assigned to the PVO, defending the USSR's borders. The Pact allies had limited SPAA (even a Soviet division has only 16 Shilkas), with most of the Polish army having ZU-23-2s without radars on trucks and SA-7s in limited numbers as their sole air defense.

As to historical examples, I think the 1990s IRL are fairly indicative. The F-117 that the Serbs downed was a hangar queen whose bomb-bay doors were stuck open after its bombing run and it ran the same egress route for 3 nights in a row, giving the Serbs plenty of time to move several SA-3 batteries under its flight path and firing volleys almost blind. The greatest losses in 1973 were due to the fielding of a new, previously unknown system - the SA-6 - which dropped off quite quickly once effective countermeasures were developed.

As far as AWACS and the possible outcomes of large numbers of aircraft in action, I don't see it as that likely. Having hundreds of aircraft on the orbat and launching hundreds of aircraft at the same time are vastly different. In Central Europe air operations will be 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for months on end. At this point other issues begin to trump things like performance of AAMs and radars. Logistics rears its ugly head once again. What are the stockpiles of modern AAMs like? How many missions a day can ground crew maintain for weeks on end? How many spare parts are there? Are replacement pilots forthcoming? How rapidly can replacement ground radars be produced and emplaced? I see both sides having serious issues with these problems - the Pact, for example, has most of its aviation maintenance performed by junior officers, and has been in combat for over a year by the time war breaks out in the west (which has depleted stockpiles of parts and munitions but also allowed some industrial mobilization). On the other hand, the Luftwaffe is probably in pretty bad shape after fighting unassisted for 2 months.

The real decider of the war in the air very well might turn out to be the battle of the airfields. The Soviets would likely start to throw Scuds or their more modern replacements, probably with persistent chemical agents, at NATO's airfields at some point prior to the start of the tactical nuclear exchange. At the same time, NATO deep penetrator fighter-bombers - F-15E, F-111 and Tornado - would be gunning for Pact airfields, especially in Poland and Czechoslovakia (the MiG-29 having really short legs). Rough field and highway operations are hard to sustain long term - there's only so much complex maintenance that can be performed in a tent, and the autobahns are desperately needed to move supplies forward to the troops in contact.

I agree, the end result is likely to be that the air over Poland is pretty clear by the early summer of 1997. LOTS of aircraft losses.

2.) IMPO, the Soviet's one clear cut edge, numbers notwithstanding, is artillery. I think NATO would lose a lot of its guns to Soviet counterbattery fire. The Red Army in the '80s still fielded artillery divisions and had gun and rocket systems dedicated exclusively to counterbattery fire.

This is one area where I think NATO's philosophy of technology trumping numbers is the most flawed. MLRS is awesome, but their simply aren't enough of them to negate the Soviet's massive fleets of BM-21s and BM-27s. The respective counter battery radars aren't that different in terms of their capabilities. The Soviet's venerable D30 howitzers are just as capable as the american's M117. The Soviets fielded a lot more large calibre guns (and mortars) than NATO and most of their guns (of all calibres) had a range advantage.

I think NATO counted on taking out Soviet batteries from the air, assuming the establishment of air superiority. I believe this was wishful thinking, on at least two counts. First, I don't think NATO could have achieved anything more than brief, local air superiority. Second, I think Soviet AAD systems would make hitting artillery positions a deady mission for NATO pilots.

I guess all of this reflects my skepticism regarding the ability of technology (as the primary causal factor) to win modern wars.

The Soviets have a truly massive artillery park. Each Front has an artillery division, each army has at least one artillery and one MRL brigade. During the pause before Advent Crown this artillery park will get dug in and targets pre-registered, with mountains of ammo dumped next to each piece. Some NATO corps have almost comparable levels of artillery assigned, although there is no NATO counterpart to the front-level divisions.

NATO's biggest hope has to be the technology - more ICM and FASCAM rounds, better counterbattery radar, fewer towed guns in Central Europe (at least in comparison to the Soviets as a proportion of guns). Shoot-n-skoot gets real tiring real fast (I "jumped" 8+ times a day for a week on exercises when I was in a SP artillery battalion - and that was the service battery, the guns moved much more - and it gets old quick!). Most importantly, though, is the digital fire control systems that allow NATO to get the guns on target faster and move before the Soviets can react. (The aerial equivalent is KAL flight 007, when the 747 overflew the Kamchakta peninsula unhindered and was only intercepted over Sakhalin). I don't think the US army ever put a whole lot of faith into tactical aviation as a counterbattery tool - the development of the helicopter gunship was essentially a reaction to the perceived failure of (and lack of interest in) the USAF in providing adequate CAS in Vietnam. The emphasis on CAS seems to have been on massed armor, with counterbattery performed by artillery (and in mobile operations reaction time matters more than range - if you can deploy a battery of M-109s 10 km from a D-30 battery who cares if the D-30 can outrange you if the M-109s fire first!) As far as Pact AAA defending individual batteries, the force structure isn't there, with 5 batteries of SAMs in a division and a regiment/brigade at army and Front level. In the west its unlikely to see the masses of small-medium caliber AAA that the North Koreans or Iraqis were able to mass - those nations received the guns cast off by the Pact armies when they upgraded to SAMs.

Fundamentally, I agree on the limitations of technology to win wars. I believe that the limitations of logistics (supply, transportation, maintenance, infrastructure and industrial capacity) and the nexus of force structure with technology, morale/organization/training and mass are the prime factors that determine the outcome. And in Europe in 1996-7 those factors are greatly tested on both sides.

Raellus

07-17-2009, 06:20 PM

I guess I need to find some articles on Soviet AAD doctrine. Maybe I've been too focused on the dizzying array of SAM systems that the Soviets were fielding during the late '80s instead of how they were to be used operationally. The fact that each Soviet division, corps, army, front, etc. had their own subordinate AAD assets lends to the picture that the Soviet AAD network would be both deep and comprehensive. Perhaps this is misleading.

Whereas the U.S. army basically fielded just a few SAM systems- Stinger/Avenger, Vulcan (retired in the early '90s), Hawk (ditto), and Patriot- the Soviets had nearly a dozen operational SAM and AAA systems. To some degree, this was a reaction to the limitations (perceived or real) of some of those systems but, to my understanding, it was also an attempt to cover all of the bases (low, medium, high altitude, various ranges, various types of homing, etc.). I don't think U.S. army divisions had any organic AA other than Stinger/Avenger and Vulcan. Given Patriot's somewhat blotchy combat record (including shooting down a few coalition aircraft in the First Gulf War)*, it just seems that the Red Army placed a much greater emphasis on ground-based air defense systems and operations. Heck, WTO armies still trained their infantry in engaging low flying aircraft with their personal small arms.

As always, please correct me if I'm wrong on any counts. I'm always open to learn!

*This is another case in point regarding the limits of military technology and the deadliness of the modern aerial battlefields.

fightingflamingo

07-17-2009, 08:42 PM

FYI - when I went to Basic in the early 1990's here in the US, we were still trained to engage low flying aircraft with massed small arms...

Webstral

07-17-2009, 08:57 PM

FYI - when I went to Basic in the early 1990's here in the US, we were still trained to engage low flying aircraft with massed small arms...

Small arms can do the trick. They just have to get some hits. Technically, the roof-mounted MG on most MBT is for air defense. Whether trying to hit a fast-mover with small arms is a good use of ammunition is another question entirely.

Webstral

avantman42

07-18-2009, 03:24 AM

Small arms can do the trick. They just have to get some hits. Technically, the roof-mounted MG on most MBT is for air defense. Whether trying to hit a fast-mover with small arms is a good use of ammunition is another question entirely.

A friend of mine was in the Falklands, on an unarmed RFA ship. Apparently when the Argentinian aircraft came over, the helicopter flight deck would be full of marines and sailors firing SLRs, and anything else they could get their hands on, at the aircraft. They were credited with a single kill. Can't remember which ship it was, but I think it may have been the Fort Austin.

Raellus

09-07-2009, 10:18 PM

I've been reading a lot lately about the Red Army of WWII and it's gotten me thinking about the Red Army of T2K again.

War Economy and Armaments Production

I'm not an economist so I admit that I don't fully understand the economic factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late '80s/early '90s. My understanding is that the proximal cause of the collapse was attempts to at implementing reforms to "Westernize" the Soviet economy. Perhaps if this had not occured, or had been quickly reversed, the Soviet command economy could have held on.

In WWII Soviet Union's command economy enabled them to increase armaments production steadily throughout the war, even when they were forced to rellocate armaments factories out of the path of the advancing German army in 1941 and '42. The overall Soviet economy was by no means very healthy in 1941. By most accounts, Stalin's Five Year Plans almost led to the entire system's collapse. However, centralized party control of the war industries allowed their rapid mobilization and incredible production rates.

The modern West's privately owned, dispersed, decentralized armaments industries, with dozens of subcontractors producing various components, seems more like the WWII German system which simply couldn't keep up.

One could argue that the T2K Soviet Union's war industries would have been well underway in ramping up production by the time the Germans reunified by force in order to support the war in China. Could the Soviet's afford it?

Tank Design

By all accounts, the T-34 was a fairly crude tank design when compared to the overly sophisticated Panther or Tiger designs employed by Germany. However, their simplicity and reliability allowed them to be produced and employed in far greater numbers than the more complex, expensive German tanks. I see a direct parallel here between the T-34 and the modern Soviet MBTs based on the T-72 design. It is not as sophisticated or effective as modern western MBTs but it is easier, cheaper, and faster to produce than a Leopard II, Challenger 2, or M1A1. Even before the outset of the war in Europe, the Soviets enjoyed a favorable correlation of forces. One could argue that this correlation of forces would become even more favorable to the Soviets as time wore on.

The historical parallel extends to the Soviet AF as well. In WWII, the Soviet AF was nearly wiped out on the ground in the first few days of Operation Barbarossa. The Germans had complete or local air superiority through the winter of '42 and, sometimes, even after. But, once again, the Soviets proved that they could replace their lost aircraft while the Germans could not.

Operational Experience

The Red Army of '41 was largely incompetent, in almost every aspect of modern (at that time) warfare. Yet, it was able to take advantage of Germany's logistical difficulties, trading space (and lives) for time, while gaining valuable operational experience.

Regardless of whether your T2K timeline includes a Gulf War or not, the Soviet Army of Twilight '97 would have nearly a year's experience in large-scale mechanized manouver warfare in China, in addition to experience gained so painfully in Afghanistan throughout the '80s. They would also have gained experience in all facets of air warfare.

Furthermore, when Germany unifies and, with U.S. support, drives into Eastern Europe, the Soviets could trade its buffer states' soil for time to build up significant operational reserves (new production, newly mobilized units, and veteran mechanized formations transferred from China) in order to mount a strategic counteroffensive against worn-down, encroaching NATO armies nearing the end of their logistically umbilical cords.

In WWII, the Soviets became experts in soaking up German offensive, attriting their best, attacking divisions, and then launching devastating operational and strategic counteroffensives. This could be seen as early as Moscow in the winter of '41-'42, then more spectacularly at Stalingrad a year later and Kursk, the summer after.

Canon describes NATO as able to meet and defeat early Soviet counter offensives in Europe, prompting the Soviets to use tactical nuclear weapons for the first time in the West. This implies that the Soviets were simply not good enough to meet NATO on a conventional footing. I believe there is an alternative to this explanation.

Soviet Strategy

Having already used tactical nuclear weapons to great effect in the East, and having suffered little in the way of retaliation in kind, the Soviets would be greatly tempted to use tac-nukes again in the west. Repeating their previous success would be argument enough for those more hawkish members of the Soviet political and military high command.

I'd like to add a second, political motivation as well. I believe it stands to reason that the Soviets wanted to send a message to its E. European client states. In the wake of E. Germany's treachery, the Soviets may be worred about the loyalty of the rest of the WTO. Using nukes on E. German and Polish soil would send a powerful message that disloyalty could be punished by total destruction. On the other hand, NATO retaliation in kind could be used as a powerful propaganda tool in a sort of carrot and stick approach. To the average Pole or Czech whose city was destroyed by NATO nukes, it would matter very little who "started it". If the Soviet's intelligence apparati detected/suspected other allies were preparing to follow in E. Germany's footsteps, a nuclear option could quickly squash such treason.

So perhaps the Soviet's first use nukes in Europe has less to do with NATO's conventional military superiority and more to do with broader strategic and political considerations.

Mohoender

09-08-2009, 10:04 AM

Raellus you have put up here (IMO) some great ideas and some very accurate ones. My comments are, therefore, nothing like critics but they are only inteded to reinforce a point I think well made. Anyone, there is no politics behind it.

War Economy and Armaments Production
I'm not an economist so I admit that I don't fully understand the economic factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late '80s/early '90s. My understanding is that the proximal cause of the collapse was attempts to at implementing reforms to "Westernize" the Soviet economy. Perhaps if this had not occured, or had been quickly reversed, the Soviet command economy could have held on.

It might be very true and it is more than possible that Reagan/Bush policies (1982-1991) tricked them into it.

The overall Soviet economy was by no means very healthy in 1941. By most accounts, Stalin's Five Year Plans almost led to the entire system's collapse. However, centralized party control of the war industries allowed their rapid mobilization and incredible production rates.

This is even an understatement. Stalin's political/military purges (more than the Plan itself which was not implemented) weakened the soviet union as never before. Technical teams had been disbanded, leading strategist (Toukhatchevski) was killed, 2 Field Marshall remained out of at least 50, Stalin delayed the mechanization/motorization programs that were well underway to refocus on the artillery (Stalin was an artillery officer). His purge had virtually destroyed the animal care system that existed and the red army was lacking in horses (millions of horses had been killed or let to die because of unproper care in the late 1930's and because of the purge: collateral casualties).

Tank Design
By all accounts, the T-34 was a fairly crude tank design when compared to the overly sophisticated Panther or Tiger designs employed by Germany. However, their simplicity and reliability allowed them to be produced and employed in far greater numbers than the more complex, expensive German tanks. I see a direct parallel here between the T-34 and the modern Soviet MBTs based on the T-72 design. It is not as sophisticated or effective as modern western MBTs but it is easier, cheaper, and faster to produce than a Leopard II, Challenger 2, or M1A1. Even before the outset of the war in Europe, the Soviets enjoyed a favorable correlation of forces. One could argue that this correlation of forces would become even more favorable to the Soviets as time wore on.

True but the T-34 was not so much a crude tank (It was also well in advanced to any world production in 1941 and was matched by no one). It will take two years for Germany to compete. In addition the simple design allowed for easy cheap upgrade going from T-34m41 to T-34m43 to T-34m44 (85mm Gun). A main difference in T2K would be that the west would already have competing designs.

The historical parallel extends to the Soviet AF as well. In WWII, the Soviet AF was nearly wiped out on the ground in the first few days of Operation Barbarossa. The Germans had complete or local air superiority through the winter of '42 and, sometimes, even after. But, once again, the Soviets proved that they could replace their lost aircraft while the Germans could not.

I'll contradict you partly on that one. What you say is true but the problem was not that of the aircraft. Many were indeed out of dates and outmatched but they also met with the most success. However, for a time the newer models proved no matched because of their week points and crew inexperience. Converting from one aircraft to another need time and work investments. The other problem came from the taking over of eastern Poland. Before that events, the RKKA had several airfield well located and well supplied close to the front. When the Red army moved to Poland in early 1940 the frontal aviation couldn't compete anymore. The building of new fields was underway but it was only in its infancy when Germany attacked. That is a problem Russia wouldn't have in T2K (as actually stated in Canon).

Operational Experience
The Red Army of '41 was largely incompetent, in almost every aspect of modern (at that time) warfare. Yet, it was able to take advantage of Germany's logistical difficulties, trading space (and lives) for time, while gaining valuable operational experience.

I'll be more hard on that one because it is a western world legend that has no solid ground to it. Actually, the Red Army of 1941 was full of largely competent officers. The problem was that Stalin Purges had killed tens of thousand of high ranking officers (including almost all field marshall but the two least competent, most army commanders and corps commanders). The younger officers were very good (almost as good as the German ones but they lacked the knowledge to conduct large field operation: this is that field of experience that they had to learn). However, they were highly innovative and the Red army had developped strategies that were soon brought back to life (Parachutist by 1936, Mechanized corps, Cavalry/Army collaboration...). Likewise, while German soldiers were not equipped for the winter of 1941, the soviet trooper was not dying from the cold (Probably thanks to the Finnish war a year earlier). Another problem for the Red army was that of the too influencial political officers who could disrupt proper field command (by early 1942, as he did between 1919-1921, Stalin had understood it and they were loosing ground).

Soviet Strategy
I'd like to add a second, political motivation as well. I believe it stands to reason that the Soviets wanted to send a message to its E. European client states. In the wake of E. Germany's treachery, the Soviets may be worred about the loyalty of the rest of the WTO.

I don't want to criticize your reasoning here (nothing to critic in fact) but E.German treachery is a v1.0 canon assesment which (IMO) is their worse misunderstanding of the Warsaw Pact at the time (also it makes perfect sense in a game and they certainly didn't have the information available to us 20 years later). In fact (IRL) and up to 1989, The E.German army was and remained the most faithful component of the Warsaw Pact. The treachery was not on the side of E.Germany but on the side of Russia (Gorbatchev). When events started in Germany prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the E.German army asked for Russian backing in crushing the protesters. Basically, Moscow refused and told them they were on their own. It's only when they had lost faith in their Russian ally that the E.German turned to the West.

On the other hand, a real treachery came from the Czech Republics and Hungary who had allowed earlier east german citizens to cross to the west through their borders (fairly logical when you remember the 1956 and 1968 events). Earlier, several treacheries had been done by Poland (Polish communists sending classified information to the West from time to time) but that was not the case in 1989. An important point to Poland would and remained for long its fear of Germany (They feared the Russians a little less).

Bulgaria was the other faithfull ally and could have remain so even to these days if history had taken another path.

Romania is entirely different matter which would deserve more thinking nad more knowledge than I have.

Internaly, outside of the Baltic Republics everything could have stayed in place if Gorbatchev (or anyone else) had been able to come up with some true politics (IMO of course).

Raellus

02-06-2010, 05:46 PM

This debate's kind of flared up again in the Iraq thread and so I'd like to un-hijack that thread and revive the debate over here (if anyone's interested).

In order for the v1.0 alternative history to work, one must reconcile the collapse of the Soviet system/Union IRL with its survival in the v1.0 timeline.

I believe that an adequate explanation is a [hypothetical] discovery of large oil and natural gas deposits in the eastern USSR, along the frontier with the PRC, in the mid-to-late '80s. This would both allow the Soviet command economy to remain solvent (and perhaps add an influx of hard currency from exports) and create a causus belli for the canonical war with the PRC. An economic revival would also allow the Soviet military to modernize its major platforms and improve the training of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen. This would make the Red Army a more formidable force, more in line with what the v1.0 timeline describes.

John Farson

02-06-2010, 06:50 PM

Adm.Lee

02-06-2010, 07:15 PM

I believe that an adequate explanation is a [hypothetical] discovery of large oil and natural gas deposits in the eastern USSR, along the frontier with the PRC, in the mid-to-late '80s. This would both allow the Soviet command economy to remain solvent (and perhaps add an influx of hard currency from exports) and create a causus belli for the canonical war with the PRC. An economic revival would also allow the Soviet military to modernize its major platforms and improve the training of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen. This would make the Red Army a more formidable force, more in line with what the v1.0 timeline describes.

I forget, did we address Tom Clancy's scenario start from "The bear and the dragon"? That had not just oil & gas, but a gold strike appearing in Siberia, which drew the attention of the Chinese (and their Japanese investors). No comment on the rest of the book, just this element.

GDWFan

02-07-2010, 12:00 AM

This thread makes me wish I was gaming out the twilight war with the DC group haha.

Third World War was the first board game I ever bought and played myself.
Wish they made a modern Advanced Third Reich.

sglancy12

02-07-2010, 05:10 AM

Well, anyone who's been reading my Finnish Sourcebook translation knows that the guys who did the Finnish version solved the issue by putting the POD in late 1993, after the Duma rebellion against Yeltsin (which is when the book was published). After that, things get worse and worse in Russia until the nationalists and militarists seize power in a coup d'etat, resulting in one Vladimir Zhirinovsky becoming president.

While Russia under Zhirinovsky could have threatened the former states of the USSR and even Finland, such as state would have existed during the same period of economic catastrophe that characterized the Yeltsin era. Such as state could instigate a doomed program of conquest, but they'd flounder. Even if the anemic Russian armed forced of the mid-1990s manage to over-run a few former Soviet republics, the international forces arraigned against them would be so great that the desperate Zhirinovsky government would quickly turn to nuclear weapons in an attempt to avoid defeat.

And what would that get us?

A nuclear war? Yep.

An end of modern civilization? Yep.

A post war environment conducive to role playing? MMMMmmaybe? Depends on the size of the nuclear exchange.

But it wouldn't give us Twilight 2000.

When it comes to preserving things about TW2K, the main thing I want to preserve is the character of the war. The Twilight War is a conventional war of attrition where victory seems so tantalizingly close that no one is willing to risk total annihilation by using nuclear weapons. Instead, as desperation rises, we start small, nuclear war becomes the "Death of 1,000 Cuts" rather than the extinction of humanity you'd get from a full commitment of nuclear forces. Zhirinovsky was the kind of guy who would have unrealistic goals far beyond Russia's ability to achieve, and then would petulantly opt to destroy the world rather than fail. I just don't think a Zhirinovsky taking the reigns in 1993 would create a playable rpg universe. I think he'd create a radioactive graveyard.

A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing

sglancy12

02-07-2010, 06:23 AM

In order for the v1.0 alternative history to work, one must reconcile the collapse of the Soviet system/Union IRL with its survival in the v1.0 timeline.

I believe that an adequate explanation is a [hypothetical] discovery of large oil and natural gas deposits in the eastern USSR, along the frontier with the PRC, in the mid-to-late '80s. This would both allow the Soviet command economy to remain solvent (and perhaps add an influx of hard currency from exports) and create a causus belli for the canonical war with the PRC. An economic revival would also allow the Soviet military to modernize its major platforms and improve the training of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen. This would make the Red Army a more formidable force, more in line with what the v1.0 timeline describes.

For that to work two other things would have to happen:

First the economic boom would have to happen fairly early.. you suggest as early as the mid 1980s. That way there would be enough time for the newly discovered minerals and fossil fuels to be discovered, exploited and brought to market. But, if the newly discovered resources are the casus belli for the Sino-Soviet war, wouldn't that mean the war would happen earlier than the canon? Would ten years really pass before the situation came to a head?

Second, for the casus belli to hold off for 7-10 years the resources must be located somewhere in dispute between the USSR and the PRC. The conflict must escalate for years, finally breaking into a full-scale war in 1995.

That leaves two areas as likely locations for the new resources. One is the area of the Soviet Far East south of the Amur River and north of Vladivostok. That area was taken from China in 1858. For a country as old as China, that's a tick of the clock. If the resources are there, and China is in desperate economic straits, China could start claiming that land as theirs. Of course that means that when the Sino-Soviet War starts, it is the Chinese who are forcing the situation, even if the Soviets strike preemptively they are still doing so to preserve the territorial integrity of the USSR in the face of Chinese aggression. Makes things a bit more morally ambiguous if the US is supporting the Chinese efforts to steal a chunk of the Soviet Far East.

The other, more interesting area would be Mongolia. Now, Mongolia is beyond the borders of the USSR, but the government there is the USSR's oldest client state. If the resources were found there, the USSR would be able to put great pressure on the Mongolian communists to allow the Soviets to reap the greatest percentage of the rewards from any joint exploitation of the resources. Mongolia was only lost to China in 1911 (and briefly brought back under Chinese rule before it was lost permanently in 1920). That's only 75 years ago. When China sees all the mineralogical treasures under Mongolia, the may start meddling in Mongol politics, trying to woo the Mongolian government over to China, promising a fairer division of the spoils.

As Mongolia starts to favor China perhaps the Soviet Group of Forces in Mongolia are used to overthrow the government and install a puppet regime. China declares it's commitment to defend Mongolian sovereignty (while secretly planning to annex the place). Tensions mount, forces are built up at the borders, and in 1995 the Soviets launch a preemptive attack to destroy China's ability to take control of Mongolia...

... and you're back on track for ver1 canon.

The only other thing that needs to be considered is whether Mikael Gorbachev is going to be around during this. If he is, it's going to get the ver 1 canon off track again. Gorbachev allowed the WTO members states to go their own ways. That non-interference in the late 80s means no German Reunification crisis. Without that crisis there's no war in Europe without making more changes to the time-line. Now you're off track again.

For the "New Resource" fix of ver1 canon to work, Glasnost, Peristroika and the Gorbachev agenda can never have reached the Kremlin. It's fairly easy to imagine that either Gorbachev never makes it into the Politburo, or never becomes the Secretary General of the CPSU.

... and you're back on track again for ver1 canon.

A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing

kato13

02-07-2010, 06:39 AM

First the economic boom would have to happen fairly early.. you suggest as early as the mid 1980s. That way there would be enough time for the newly discovered minerals and fossil fuels to be discovered, exploited and brought to market. But, if the newly discovered resources are the casus belli for the Sino-Soviet war, wouldn't that mean the war would happen earlier than the canon? Would ten years really pass before the situation came to a head?

I have the oil/gold discovered in - 1982

First profits from Gold in - 1984

First Sale of oil to Japan in - 1988

Economy fully stabilizes and expand rapidly - 1989

Japan expands Chinese investment by threefold 1993 (this happened in real life)

Japanese/Chinese Oil Exploration teams discover equivalent/larger oil fields on the Chinese side of a disputed border -1994

Faced with the reduction of their much needed profits in oil sales to Japan "disputed" borders become "conflicted" - 1995

I honestly never spent the time working out a location but given the 6 years to build a pipeline, that would probably be the limiting factor. The Alaskan Pipeline (800 miles / 1,287 km) was built in 4 years.

Legbreaker

02-07-2010, 06:58 AM

Would discovery of a large amount of oil cause problems for the post nuke period?

kato13

02-07-2010, 07:05 AM

Would discovery of a large amount of oil cause problems for the post nuke period?

Might have to add a few nukes to the canon list, however the 150kt ones are missing already. I also expect the reserves to be in very remote and inhospitable areas given they had not found it before 1982.

Legbreaker

02-07-2010, 07:13 AM

Do we need the oil or is ore enough?
I'm leaning towards the latter.

sglancy12

02-07-2010, 07:41 AM

So... in the Iraq Thread I tossed out some ideas about my homebrew TW2K timeline, which diverges with a 1988 assassination of Gorbachev and his key reformist allies by hard line Soviet Communists with the connivance of reactionary members of the Chinese Communist Party. Gorbachev's plane is bombed (much like Pakistan President Zia's) on his way to Beijing just prior to the Tienamen Square Massacre. The Soviet and PRC conspirators use the false crisis to crack down on reformers at home and in the WTO, ultimately placing the blame on Muslim fundamentalists getting revenge for Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

I just beg to differ on several key points.

I would like to point out that the PRC fought the U.S.-led U.N. force in Korea to a stalemate. <SNIP> Anyway, that was, by and large, a conventional war and one that the U.S. could not win outright. I imagine the results may have been different if the U.S. was also simultaneously fighting the Soviets in Europe.

And I am not suggesting that the US is going to win that war... or that they are doing it alone. In my homebrew timeline the Pacific Theatre of the War is going to line up the USSR, the PRC and North Korea against the USA, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the UK (Hong Kong), and Portugal (Macao). The war is confined to the Kurile Island chain, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. Macao and Hong Kong having been quickly abandoned as the British and Portugese "Dunkirk" out to Taiwan.

I imagine Vietnam is sitting this one out with the exception of Soviet Naval assets using Cam Rahn Bay.

Combine the power of the US Fleet with the choke point of the Korean Peninsula and the "moats" of the Taiwan strait and the Sea of Japan, I believe that the USSR/PRC/PRNK alliance can be held at bay, but not defeated outright... held at bay until the nukes start flying. And in my homebrew timeline the conventional war in the east would only last from mid 1996 (when the German Reunification Crisis lead to a shooting war in Europe) until Thanksgiving 1997 when the war advances to the level of limited nuclear strikes. After that, with both sides ability to wage war will be severely degraded, and the Chinese and Soviet armies will unable to press the Americans, South Koreans, Japanese and Taiwanese very hard. And the Americans and their allies only have to be on the defensive. They "win" by not losing, not by conquering enemy territory.

I think it's a tad unreasonable to place so much stock in the U.S.' historical success in fighting a two-front war.

But it is reasonable to place stock in a belief in the USSR's ability to fight a two-front war, when no historical record exists to support that belief?

I like Kato's explanation for the survival and resurgence of the Soviet Union: the U.S.S.R. finds sizeable oil and natural gas deposits near the border with China in the late eighties.

I comment on that in another post on this thread... While the idea has merit, the one thing I forgot to mention is that the problems of the Soviet system were so deep and systemic that I seriously doubt that any mineralogical treasure house would be sufficient to allow the Soviets to get buff enough in seven to ten years to be able to fight a conventional war on three Fronts for nearly two and a half years. Very few economies could handle that strain. The US economy in the mid to late 1990s was, however, one such economy.

A. Scott Glancy, President TCCorp, dba Pagan Publishing

kato13

02-07-2010, 07:55 AM

Do we need the oil or is ore enough?
I'm leaning towards the latter.

Of course it is your call, but I don't think the revenue would be enough.

Total gold production in 1985 was ~1500 metric tons.
http://goldnews.bullionvault.com/gold_mining_output_2008_china_south_africa_0206200 82

Lets say the Russians could add 30% of top of that (much more and they depress the price too much). Given 1985 Gold prices that comes out to about 3.8 billion dollars (450tones X 2200 lbs X 12 Troy Oz X 317 dollars per ounce).

Oil on the other hand had 22 billion barrels consumed (in 1985) at an average price of 20 dollars per barrel in 1988 (when they can start selling). If the soviets could get even 10% of the world market they get 44 billion dollars.

I kinda use the gold for the quick dough to build the infrastructure but the real income comes from oil.

Edit.
Just wanted to note that the above numbers reflect gross numbers and moving 450 tons of gold would incur no where near the expense of moving 2.2 billion barrels of oil. Net profits would not show the full disparity listed above.

Edit:
Just discovered that IRL in 1986 the USSR hard currency debt was around 30 billion dollars.
http://countrystudies.us/russia/67.htm

That actually makes me feel even better about my timeline with a full payoff being completed in mid 1989
1984 1.2 billion
1985 1.8 billion
1986 2.0 billion
1987 2.2 billion
1988 10.2 billion
1989 16.5 billion

chico20854

02-11-2010, 07:14 PM

Another, related question on the Soviet Army:

How fast do you see the USSR being able to mobilize divisions?

I've seen declassified, post-Cold War discussions as to the planning norms for the Pact. Category A divisions could realistically enter the field in 3 days (the 30-minute rush the units out of garrison drills usually resulted in the units making it out of the garrison, but with limited combat capabilities - soldiers left most of their field gear in the barracks, no time to fuel and arm the tanks, etc.). Category B units in a week or two, Category C in a month or so, Mobilization-only units in 2-4 months.

Iâ€™ve also seen accounts of the actual experience in the late 20th century, most notably Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979-80. In both cases it took a few months to call up Category B and C units and, looking at things in perspective, they performed (barely) adequately although not looking pretty doing so. :)

As to the key military indicators: personnel and equipment. First, the personnel. In peacetime, the Soviet Army rotated nearly half of its enlisted force (since their NCO corps was overwhelmingly conscript). By recalling all those that had been discharged in the previous two years (20-22 year olds) the enlisted force would double in size. If you expand the callups to those under 30, you get another 200% of the enlisted strength, 250% in total. That should be sufficient enlisted men to both replace combat losses in China and bring the understrength divisions up to full strength. In addition, every year the draft brings in 18 year olds equal to 50% of the peacetime enlisted force. Officers are going to be more problematic; although the Category B and C units were usually set up so that all the units had most command and NCO positions full. (Example â€“ if the tank regiment in a Category C division was at one third strength, it would have all the subunits established and understrength, so that a tank platoon would have a platoon leader and three tank commanders with no drivers and gunners (although the commanders would be able to act as drivers or gunners). The idea was that reservists would be recalled to fill the lower skill positions, and that someone who had trained as a commander 2 years before would fill the gunners position and someone who had been out for 4 years would drive). There were reserve officers too â€“ it seems that regular male university students would undergo some training similar to US ROTC and be eligible for callup in time of war.

Ok, now to equipment. The mobilization-only divisions IRL were stocked with equipment sets from units that upgraded. For example, when the T-72 was fielded in Mongolia, the troops that had been operating the T-62 brought the T-62s to depots in Siberia for use by mobilization-only units. In the late 80s and 90s some truly ancient equipment, long thought retired, was pulled out of depots for scrapping. (The 1990 Victory Day parade in Red Square featured several battalions of T-34s, and T-10s from a tank division in Ukraine were scrapped in 1988). On the small arms side, US gun shows over the past years have been overrun at times with quantities of Nagant revolvers, SVT, SKS, Mosin Nagant and captured German Mauser rifles, not touching the mountains of early model AKs that couldnâ€™t be imported. Some of the older equipment might have been exported to allies, such as the T-34s that were sent to Somalia and Ethiopia in the late 70s, but IMHO there seems to be ample combat equipment to equip the entirety of the Soviet Army on day one. Trucks obviously would be an issue, Iâ€™ll get to that. (Iâ€™m also not touching the issue of production â€“ losses vs production, presumably at some point production could exceed losses, allowing divisions arriving at the front to field some equipment that wasnâ€™t 40 years old! Taking a pessimistic view, Iâ€™ll discount that possibility, even given that the USSR maintained a considerable mobilization industrial infrastructure such that every heavy industrial plant had some sort of mobilization military production capability and the USSR had been at war for almost 18 months by the time the US enters the war)

That raises the issue of timing. To meet the demands of the war in China, by late 1996 mobilization-only units are drilling. The war expands rapidly in intensity and scale from there. What Iâ€™m having a hard time grasping is why, given the strategic situation, does the USSR not mobilize the rest of its units simultaneously? In fact, it continues to call up divisions long after the nuclear exchange â€“ the 117th MRD, according to the Soviet Vehicle Guide, is called up from the Kiev Military District in the Spring of 1999. Why wasnâ€™t this division called up and sent to the front in the desperate days of July 1997, when NATO tank brigades so threatened Brest-Litovsk that the Soviet commander was forced to use tactical nuclear weapons to halt them?

A few ideas as to why. First, maybe the divisionâ€™s allocated personnel and equipment were taken away to replace losses in other units. Second, maybe the output of the Ukraineâ€™s war economy â€“ providing masses of grain, ore, coal, steel, tanks (from Kharkov) and aircraft (from Kiev) would have been seriously hurt by calling up 10,000 men in their 20s.

But that raises the issue of why in 1999, and a secondary question of how. In 1999 the situation in Ukraine is much worse (from all perspectives), so the 10,000 men (likely far fewer would show up, and likely a bit younger or older and in worse health) would be an even greater burden. It also raises the question of how, over 18 months after a (limited) nuclear exchange, the Soviet central government is able to (no matter how poorly) organize, train and equip a division in one of its rebellious provinces.

Iâ€™d like to hear your thoughts as to the hows and whyâ€™s. For my T2k universe, Iâ€™m inclined to go with a more rapid mobilization in most theaters than that outlined in the Soviet Vehicle Guide, but Iâ€™d like your thoughts on it too.

Raellus

02-11-2010, 08:15 PM

I admit that this is a somewhat simplistic and incomplete answer, but I think that Soviet military mobilization would speed up as the war progressed. I base this on the Red Army's performance in this aspect during WWII. The Red Army was incredibly adept at churning out massive numbers of poorly trained but relatively well equipped infantry and tankers.

I agree that moblilization would start off at a slower and more deliberate pace, likely producing, on the whole, fairly competent units. As the war began in Europe, a lot of the gears would already be turning and mobilization could likely be ramped up with only modestly negative effects on quality. As time passed- and especially after the nuclear exchanges began- the quality of newly mobilized and replacement units would probably drop off rather significantly.

As for trucks, I've posted before that I think that the Soviets would push the automotive industries in the WTO nations to support the war effort in China first with increased production of military trucks for the Soviet Military. IIRC, there already were STAR in Poland, TATRA in Czechoslovakia, and another company whose name escapes me in Hungary that were producing fairly good quality military trucks during the Cold War. It also stands to reason that military truck production in the USSR could also be sped up relatively easily (compared to say, AFV or combat aircraft production).

GDWFan

02-11-2010, 10:50 PM

Well this argument has really picked up steam lately, I have studied this subject a bit myself and heres my 2 cents.

The soviets are underestimated in every area I believe by most fiction this is basically true as they are the evil empire enemy in most works.

As far as a fully funded and equipped army is concerned I believe even with inferior equipment the sheer numbers could force NATO into submission.
However none of that means anything if the canon or personal story of your game history cant deliver a major shift in the way the soviet economy worked during the mid 70's thru the late 80's. I do not believe there is anyway the soviets of this real era could have operated a sustained war of any kind with success.

The posters here keep refering back to the massive soviet war machine of WW2, without a charasmatic leader or extremly brutal leader there would be no repeat of WW2 more likely the early surrender of WW1. The Enron like book-keeping of the Soviets and the general lack of transparency of the USSR led many Def Anylysts to some assumptions that seemed plausible that thanks to unclassified documents were fantastical at best.

Selling huge stocks of those hoarded weapons systems could provide some stimulus, Gold and Oil could also have an effect if introduced early enough.
But the income isn't the major issue its the planned economy and culture of the management in the state run industry that are the true heart of the matter here. I think a slightly capitalist yet hardline nationalist is needed to emerge from the eastern europe crisis, Hawkish enough to slap the politboro and ministers in line yet savvy enough to allow Russia to step onto the global market with force. If started early enough this leader could provide emphesis to

Build gas lines into europe proper
This would take economic pressure off of the Pact nations with discount fuel as well as tempt other nations of europe to suck this teat

Use the ore and Oil strikes to become vital to the WORLD Economy
If other nations besides the Pact rely on commodities from Russia there is incentive to work with and tolerate that nations transgressions. Look at the ChiComs.

Exert its influence on the world again
This has always been a big one for me, Give the Soviets a real voice at the start of the war. Let the new leader be boisterous and aggresive. Take it back to an era when the soviets really were a threat to communize parts of the world. The Soviets always seem week because they are without a doubt starting from a weak position.

Raise the standard of living in the bloc a level
Let this relieve a small part of the pressure on the state, lull the pop into false security before reinstituting a new collectivization, full conscription or a crackdown on rights throughout the pact.

I think these reforms or others like them would ass incentive for Italy and greeces defection. Maybe as they slightly liberalize France begins trade of high tech info and schematics for oil or gas. My main point however is that without massive economic reforms and additional income and some new tech the soviets are really a joke til they pull the nuclear trigger. The Soviets watched there empire dissapear as the policy makers watched there power vanish and they could do nothing of use. The house of cards would not or could not stand up to the stress of a true world war

chico20854

03-08-2010, 08:37 PM

I guess I need to find some articles on Soviet AAD doctrine. Maybe I've been too focused on the dizzying array of SAM systems that the Soviets were fielding during the late '80s instead of how they were to be used operationally. The fact that each Soviet division, corps, army, front, etc. had their own subordinate AAD assets lends to the picture that the Soviet AAD network would be both deep and comprehensive. Perhaps this is misleading.

I found a quartet of really nice analytical pieces on the Pact strategic (defensive) SAM network on the Central Front:

Poland: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2009/10/polish-strategic-air-defense-cold-war.html
DDR: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/08/ddr-air-defense-cold-war-case-study.html
Czechoslovakia: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/09/czechoslovakian-strategic-air-defense.html
Hungary: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/10/hungarian-strategic-air-defense-cold.html

He notes that in at least the cases of Czechoslovakia and Hungary that there were large gaps in coverage and a reliance on obsolete systems that NATO had developed counters for. When the DDR network goes down the situation for NATO in the air gets better, although as you properly noted the army fields local and area air defense assets.

Cdnwolf

03-08-2010, 09:09 PM

Although flawed... Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising still offers a lot of insight into fighting a war in Central Europe and the beginning of the book gives details on how long it would take to get oil and gas production back on line following a major disaster...

It also looks at the effect on the FEBA and modern aircraft...

StainlessSteelCynic

11-15-2010, 10:08 PM

Some call it thread necromancy, I call it "revisiting the topic" :p

After reading through dragoon500ly's post about Soviet equipment (http://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.php?t=2553) and then going back here to reread his thoughts, I am in full agreement with Raellus. Many people too easily dismiss the Soviet Union and the Red Army.

With the benefit of the internet it's easy to find better information about Soviet equipment and better still, with online translation programmes, we can now view a number of Russian sites that give details previously unavailable in the West. One such site has three items of interest, two in particular that could have given NATO something of a surprise.
The following are Google Translate links so be prepared for some weird English.

The ZSU-37-2 This was a contemporary to the ZSU-23-4 with a longer engagement range and meant to support tank regiments. Discontinued from development for unspecified reasons (but probably because the ZSU-23-4 performed better on high-speed targets at lower altitudes)
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http://dogswar.ru/oryjeinaia-ekzotika/bronetehnika/2142-zenitnaia-samohodnai.html&rurl=translate.google.com

The T-74 A proposal for a small-turret tank mounting an external gun. Development ceased due to technical complexity driving up the price of development and production.
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http://dogswar.ru/oryjeinaia-ekzotika/bronetehnika/618-proekt-tanka-t-74-lizdelie-45.html&rurl=translate.google.com

The VAG-73 caseless ammunition pistol
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerasimenko_VAG-73
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdogswar.ru%2F

There's also the series of 9x39mm silent weapons developed in the late 1980s (VSS Vintorez (http://world.guns.ru/sniper/sn20-e.htm), AS Val (http://world.guns.ru/assault/as10-e.htm)), various weapons for combat divers (ASM-DT (http://world.guns.ru/assault/as95-e.htm), ADS (http://world.guns.ru/assault/as100-e.htm)), the very well developed work on variable geometry afterburner nozzles (along with the supersonic VTOL Yak-41M (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yakovlev_Yak-141) AKA Yak-141), other rifles to replace the AK/AKM series (such as the TKB-0146 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TKB-0146) bullpup or the AO-38 (http://guns.wikia.com/wiki/AO-38) rifle, the first to use the 'Balanced Automatic Recoil System, other link here (http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdogswar.ru%2F) or the Soviet equivalent to Project SALVO such as the TKB-059 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TKB-059), the Kamov V-100 (http://www.aviastar.org/helicopters_eng/kamov_v-100.php) project for a high-speed attack helicopter, the Mil Mi-30 (http://www.aviastar.org/helicopters_eng/mi-30.php) tilt-rotor project, the 80.002 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/80.002) combination assault rifle & grenade launcher and so on.

I hope that what's illustrated here is that the Soviets were not simply sitting back and constantly improving old designs to try and hold out against the West, but that they too indulged in a varied R&D programme to explore other ideas in an effort to compete and maybe beat, the West.
I'm not saying that the Soviets would have easily beaten NATO or even that they could have beaten NATO at all but I am saying that measuring the Soviet Union by the standards of the Gorbachev era leads to an easy dismissal of their abilities.

Legbreaker

11-15-2010, 10:25 PM

I 100% agree. It would be interesting if we had a similar amount of input from 1970-80 era ex Soviet soliders as we do from western forces (mainly US). On the other hand, national pride might end up with numerous flame wars...

Raellus

11-16-2010, 06:48 PM

I think another reason it's tempting to underestimate the Soviet military is that, for a time in the early '90s, their military org/tech/training etc. was "frozen in time" while the West was making strides forward in the wake of the wildly successful Desert Shield/Storm campaign. In fact, if anything, the Russian military in the early '90s was regressing as military funding dried up and new strategic realities started sinking in. It's easy to remember the beaten MRDs withdrawing across that last bridge between Afghanistan and the soon-to-ex-Soviet republics in '89, or the loyalist Russian tanks shelling the rebellious troops in the high-rise ministry, or the rusting hulks of ex-Soviet navy ships and submarines stuck in port. Those last images are pathetic and really don't do the Soviet military justice.

It's easy to forget that a v1.0 Soviet military would have been moving forward during the '90s, if not keeping pace with the West, then at least trying their damnedest to do so.

This is why I prefer to remember the Soviet Military as they seemed during my childhood (the '80s)- a huge, somewhat mysterious entity that posed a clear and present danger to the NATO countries.

pmulcahy11b

11-16-2010, 07:25 PM

If nothing else, one should never underestimate their opponents.

pmulcahy11b

11-17-2010, 12:29 AM

@Cynic:

Ooohhh, new stuff for the "Best Stuff That Never Was" pages! It'll take more research than on those pages, however. It's a good start, though.

Raellus

03-02-2011, 05:42 PM

I can't remember if it has been previously pointed out in this thread, but the Soviet-made T-72s that were spanked by American M1 Abrams and British Challengers in both Iraq wars were bare-bones export models that had down-graded optics and manual-only turret traverses. Soviet T-72s, although inferior in nearly every aspect to contemporary NATO MBTs, would have been significantly more capable than the Republican Guards' T-72s. I really wonder how the battle of 73 Easting would have gone down if it had been Soviet Guards tankers that the American ACRs were going up against. I doubt that they would have won that fight, but they sure as hell would have made it a lot costlier in terms of men and material for the Americans.

Extensively upgraded T-55s, T-62s, T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s (and these surely would have been rolled out during the '90s had the Cold War continued) are fairly capable MBTs and they would have been thrown at the West in numbers that NATO simply couldn't match.

Legbreaker

03-02-2011, 06:01 PM

Absolutely agree with that.
As has been stated time and time again, the Iraqi's simply cannot be compared to what would have been faced by Nato in Europe. In 1991 and again a decade later, Iraq was all alone, equipped with second grade vehicles and weapons, and their training standard can only be described as laughable. Add in that they'd only just finished fighting Iran and the vast bulk of their best units had been destroyed....

Obviously the Iraqi commanders made some fatal mistakes in 91, and the willingness of the troops to fight was, on the whole, rather lacking. If they'd been competantly led, properly trained and organised, it may well have been a different matter.

Granted the Pact forces at the time have proven to be fairly poorly prepared, however that state of affairs is not what the game is based upon. In the T2K universe, the Pact were a strong and credible force, ready, able and willing to do serious damage.

raketenjagdpanzer

03-02-2011, 06:51 PM

This is why I prefer to remember the Soviet Military as they seemed during my childhood (the '80s)- a huge, somewhat mysterious entity that posed a clear and present danger to the NATO countries.

"clear and present danger"? Holy crap, man, by your estimation we should've just surrendered outright since not only were they numerically superior they were up to par in every other way as well.

I mean, if they really had the drop on us that bad, why didn't they just send the balloon up? Surely they had a vastly more cavalier attitude vis-a-vis "getting our hair mussed" in "toe-to-toe nuclear combat". I mean, they had everything the Walkers had leaked to them, they obviously had the numbers and they apparently had the tactics and troop quality to beat us at every turn. Why no statue of Lenin in Antwerp, then?

(Erm...that sounds ill-tempered but it's not meant to be, I promise.)

Legbreaker

03-02-2011, 07:23 PM

:wall:

Nobody is saying that man for man, tank to tank, aircraft to aircraft the Pact were an equal match. Their entire doctrine wasn't about being equal on that level, but swamping the west with masses of barely adequate men and machines. As it turns out, they didn't even manage the "barely" part, especially once the Communist countries started to crumble.

Remember though that T2K is a game. It's not supposed to reflect reality, but rather the perception of what was reality - in other words, the west thought the east had the ability to steamroll their forces, and reacted accordingly. The game is built from the ground up on these assumptions, guesses, fabrications and downright lies with a little reality thrown in for flavour.

The game is a product of the early 1980s and the general hysteria that went with it. There's no way that it could be made today looking back, knowing the true capabilities and economics of the period. Applying modern knowledge in my opinion radically alters the basic premise of the game, unbalancing the situation and essentially making it unplayable as a believable post apocalyptic setting.

Raellus

03-02-2011, 07:30 PM

"clear and present danger"? Holy crap, man, by your estimation we should've just surrendered outright since not only were they numerically superior they were up to par in every other way as well.

I mean, if they really had the drop on us that bad, why didn't they just send the balloon up? Surely they had a vastly more cavalier attitude vis-a-vis "getting our hair mussed" in "toe-to-toe nuclear combat". I mean, they had everything the Walkers had leaked to them, they obviously had the numbers and they apparently had the tactics and troop quality to beat us at every turn. Why no statue of Lenin in Antwerp, then?

(Erm...that sounds ill-tempered but it's not meant to be, I promise.)

Yeah, a little ill-tempered. I'll try to keep the snark to a minimum.

Clearly, you misunderstand my thesis. I've never argued that the Soviets/WTO were qualitatively superior in any way (save numbers) to NATO. My point is that some folks here and elsewhere seriously underestimate what they could have done in their prime, or had the Cold War continued through the 1990s. They were not the push-overs many claim them to have been. 20-20 hindsight in this matter is a myth. Just because they lost in Afghanistan (are we "winning" there now?) and the gear they sold to Iraq was crap doesn't mean NATO would have walked over them like some folks seem to imagine. I stick by that thesis.

My essay is an apologetic for the T2K v1.0 history, that's all. If the Soviet military as a whole sucked as bad as some folks out there (and here) believe, the T2K scenario simply wouldn't happen.

If you disagree- and apparently you do- and what I've posted in this thread doesn't sway you, then clearly nothing will. I just wonder how you justify a T2K scenario. I'm not comparing you to Hitler, but didn't the French in 1812 and the Germans in 1941 make the same mistake Soviet-bashers are now? Was it Santayana who wrote "those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it"? I just don't see the logic or fun in a T2K'er arguing strongly against the Soviet military.

HorseSoldier

03-02-2011, 08:09 PM

I can't remember if it has been previously pointed out in this thread, but the Soviet-made T-72s that were spanked by American M1 Abrams and British Challengers in both Iraq wars were bare-bones export models that had down-graded optics and manual-only turret traverses. Soviet T-72s, although inferior in nearly every aspect to contemporary NATO MBTs, would have been significantly more capable than the Republican Guards' T-72s. I really wonder how the battle of 73 Easting would have gone down if it had been Soviet Guards tankers that the American ACRs were going up against. I doubt that they would have won that fight, but they sure as hell would have made it a lot costlier in terms of men and material for the Americans.

The Russians have been saying that since about the moment US forces made it through to 74 Easting . . . I'm not sure how much I buy the claims, to be honest (and I'm definitely not part of the US or NATO uber alles crowd) -- that information seems to have been loudly distributed by the Russians after their market share took a huge hit after 91, not from technical intelligence analysis, though I may be wrong on that.

Raellus

03-02-2011, 08:57 PM

raketenjagdpanzer

03-02-2011, 09:01 PM

Yeah, a little ill-tempered. I'll try to keep the snark to a minimum.

Clearly, you misunderstand my thesis.

I did, I see that and I apologize if I was perceived as having brought the snark first. I didn't intend to, trust me.

I've never argued that the Soviets/WTO were qualitatively superior in any way (save numbers) to NATO. My point is that some folks here and elsewhere seriously underestimate what they could have done in their prime, or had the Cold War continued through the 1990s. They were not the push-overs many claim them to have been. 20-20 hindsight in this matter is a myth. Just because they lost in Afghanistan (are we "winning" there now?) and the gear they sold to Iraq was crap doesn't mean NATO would have walked over them like some folks seem to imagine. I stick by that thesis.
[/quote]

Oh no, no, I don't think that was the case at all and you certainly make the point clearly.

My essay is an apologetic for the T2K v1.0 history, that's all. If the Soviet military as a whole sucked as bad as some folks out there (and here) believe, the T2K scenario simply wouldn't happen.

I see that now and I hope you don't think I was one questioning the plausibility of the scenario. I apologize for not reading further.

If you disagree- and apparently you do- and what I've posted in this thread doesn't sway you, then clearly nothing will.

No no, it was just misunderstanding on my part.

I just wonder how you justify a T2K scenario. I'm not comparing you to Hitler, but didn't the French in 1812 and the Germans in 1941 make the same mistake Soviet-bashers are now? Was it Santayana who wrote "those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it"? I just don't see the logic or fun in a T2K'er arguing strongly against the Soviet military.

Hey, I'm in agreement with you. Without a roundhouse kick to the ass for the remnants of NATO in the summer of 2000, the game becomes Red Dawn!

So, again, I misunderstood and again I wasn't upset at your assertions, and I hope we can put this behind - because I'm in agreement with you.

raketenjagdpanzer

03-02-2011, 09:02 PM

Panther Al

03-02-2011, 09:31 PM

The Russians have been saying that since about the moment US forces made it through to 74 Easting . . . I'm not sure how much I buy the claims, to be honest (and I'm definitely not part of the US or NATO uber alles crowd) -- that information seems to have been loudly distributed by the Russians after their market share took a huge hit after 91, not from technical intelligence analysis, though I may be wrong on that.

Indeed, until 74 Easting, the T72 was the hottest seller the Russians had, post 74 Easting, they had hard times giving them away. Now, to be fair, the Russians have a point: The ones the Iraqi's had was really second class versions of them: The later T72's, with all the bells and whistles, are in fairness decent tanks. Equal to first line western tanks? No, but more than adequate for most uses. Especially since they are cheap. When you get right to it, the T90 is the Russian response to that battle. The T90 is nothing more than an very upgraded T72 - some things I have read is that more than a few of the T90's floating about are rebuilt 72's.

If I was a country that needed a tank arm, one that had a fair chance of facing down modern western tanks, I wouldn't hesitate to pick up the T72 if I couldn't afford western tanks myself. Of course, part of the savings would go towards quantity, but most would go to training. I really do think, that a topflight T72/90, with a crew that has trained as hard and as well as a topflight western tank crew, can give a good accounting of themselves - within reason of course.

Abbott Shaull

03-02-2011, 11:19 PM

Indeed, until 74 Easting, the T72 was the hottest seller the Russians had, post 74 Easting, they had hard times giving them away. Now, to be fair, the Russians have a point: The ones the Iraqi's had was really second class versions of them: The later T72's, with all the bells and whistles, are in fairness decent tanks. Equal to first line western tanks? No, but more than adequate for most uses. Especially since they are cheap. When you get right to it, the T90 is the Russian response to that battle. The T90 is nothing more than an very upgraded T72 - some things I have read is that more than a few of the T90's floating about are rebuilt 72's.

If I was a country that needed a tank arm, one that had a fair chance of facing down modern western tanks, I wouldn't hesitate to pick up the T72 if I couldn't afford western tanks myself. Of course, part of the savings would go towards quantity, but most would go to training. I really do think, that a topflight T72/90, with a crew that has trained as hard and as well as a topflight western tank crew, can give a good accounting of themselves - within reason of course.

That is one of the things that Soviets and later Russian did understand. Up until the US fielded the M1 and the Germans, French, and UK generation of tanks came online. They had enjoyed for the most part having tanks that were Superior if not equal to the various NATO Counterparts.

With the introduction of the generation of tanks in the 80s by NATO had even the playing field for the units that would be doing the fighting in the early stages. At this time as the Soviets had watch in the late 1960s and 1970s were being tested and the fielded had placed their latest tanks into units based in Ukraine and Western military districts in the Soviet Union knowing these units would be third string. Most of these new tanks were in Tank Armies and Group of Tank Armies. One of the reasonings was to keep NATO from knowing of the best, and not really give them clear view. Kinda like the shock the Germans units had when they came up against unknown T-34 equipped unit in the early days of of Operations against the Soviet Union. While the Motorized Rifle units would get equipment handed down from soviet units to west.

One of the thing I do wonder is how friendly the Russia and China are now. I know for all practical purpose they seem to be real friendly. Then again in the 1960s they appeared friendly, but had some nasty fight along the Amur River.

Panther Al

03-03-2011, 05:35 AM

Not very these days- most of the large increase in spending the russians are doing is earmarked for the far east. The official line is that japan is giving trouble over the disputed islands, yet all the military hardware that is or has been sent by by both nations are pionted at China - not each other.

dragoon500ly

03-03-2011, 10:06 AM

[QUOTE=StainlessSteelCynic;27375]Some call it thread necromancy, I call it "revisiting the topic" :p

After reading through dragoon500ly's post about Soviet equipment (http://forum.juhlin.com/showthread.php?t=2553) and then going back here to reread his thoughts, I am in full agreement with Raellus. Many people too easily dismiss the Soviet Union and the Red Army.[\QUOTE]

LOL

And to think I was always getting my tail end chewed off for showing the Soviets as "Supermen" in the OPFOR classes!

The two things that have always impressed me about the Soviets is the quantity and simplicty of their equipment and the workmanlike approach that they follow as far as tactics go.

Legbreaker

03-03-2011, 04:42 PM

The Soveits really knew how to boil it all down to the KISS principle...

Tackleberry

03-03-2011, 04:56 PM

Quantity does have its own quality though.

Even with the Challengers, M1's and Leopards the North German plain would have been a very interesting punch up.

If you consider that in every exercise I took part in in the 80's Royal Air Force in Germany, we went "Chemical" straight away and "Nuclear" after 3 days.

IF the Russians had come over the border in either August (summer holidays) or at Xmas time, with everyone at skeleton manning. And without the time to reinforce I think the Red army would have made it to the Rhine, in the perfect Tank country of North Germany.

Once their supply lines got that extended it would have stopped them, but it would certainly have been close.

Legbreaker

03-03-2011, 08:03 PM

IF the Russians had come over the border in either August (summer holidays) or at Xmas time, with everyone at skeleton manning. And without the time to reinforce I think the Red army would have made it to the Rhine, in the perfect Tank country of North Germany.

And with most of the personnel elsewhere, much of the prepositioned vehicles and supplies would have to be left behind as those few troops on the ground were forced back. Could have been absolutely crippling for NATO. Give the Soviets a few weeks for their logisitics to sort themselves out and they'd have been ready to push over the Rhine, through France and potentially take out Europe entirely.

NATO may have been able to fly in troops quickly enough during that pause, but with most of their equipment already behind enemy lines, more bodies on the ground wouldn't mean very much.

Panther Al

03-03-2011, 08:46 PM

The only problem with the "Holiday Blitz" is that it takes a little while to go from sitting around in the motorpool to ready to kick ass and take names. This will get spotted, and while it might not be enough to warn that they are about to roll west, it is enough that leaves and such will be cancelled. So, there won't be a situation such as that.

However:

There is always a catch. In Red Storm Rising, Clancy used a surprise attack- with the surprise being on both NATO, and most of the Russian Troops as well. Going from Motorpool to combat ops with no getting ready for it is sure to be a shocking surprise, and one that would let the Russians fall on units that are not there because they are off skiing in the alps. Of course, you had better hope that you can back the play, as you won't have much in logistics built up.

Targan

03-04-2011, 12:39 AM

I've never argued that the Soviets/WTO were qualitatively superior in any way (save numbers) to NATO. My point is that some folks here and elsewhere seriously underestimate what they could have done in their prime, or had the Cold War continued through the 1990s. They were not the push-overs many claim them to have been. 20-20 hindsight in this matter is a myth. Just because they lost in Afghanistan (are we "winning" there now?) and the gear they sold to Iraq was crap doesn't mean NATO would have walked over them like some folks seem to imagine. I stick by that thesis.

My essay is an apologetic for the T2K v1.0 history, that's all. If the Soviet military as a whole sucked as bad as some folks out there (and here) believe, the T2K scenario simply wouldn't happen.

If you disagree- and apparently you do- and what I've posted in this thread doesn't sway you, then clearly nothing will. I just wonder how you justify a T2K scenario. I'm not comparing you to Hitler, but didn't the French in 1812 and the Germans in 1941 make the same mistake Soviet-bashers are now? Was it Santayana who wrote "those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it"? I just don't see the logic or fun in a T2K'er arguing strongly against the Soviet military.

Once again Raellus you've put things exactly as I see them but in a better way than I could have. Agree with all of the above.

Webstral

03-04-2011, 01:19 AM

The â€œstanding startâ€ model of Soviet offensive received a lot of attention back in the day, partially because it was the option that scared the West the most. What scares us the most isnâ€™t necessarily the most likely. The Soviets were terrified of a third invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany, but NATO had no real plans for invading the USSR. By the same token, a standing start invasion by the Pact may have looked awfully scary, but the whole package didnâ€™t fit with Soviet thinking.

Webstral

HorseSoldier

03-04-2011, 09:55 AM

Abbott Shaull

03-04-2011, 11:10 AM

I seem to recall that once the walls came down there was a realization that the Soviets had no non-nuclear plans for an offensive into western Europe. Had the balloon gone up they planned to use tac nukes early and often to break up NATO ground and air forces. I would take this to suggest the Soviets had some serious questions about their abilities versus NATO -- at least insofar as if their forces could deliver a knock out blow fast enough to prevent a war turning into a matter of industrial output and attrition, which they don't seem to have thought they could win.

The Soviets knew if they initiated the war, they would have to conclude very quickly. If you look at how if they were able to move things forward without giving us warning, it would still take week or more for their second and third echelon units make their way forward. The major hurdle is that their second echelon was made up of mostly Cat 2 and Cat 3 Pact forces that would take that long if not longer to mobilized.

These units would have to be mobilized and on the move before the third echelon units moved forward, or else an option would of been to move the third echelon forces up, before mobilizing the Pact forces and then mobilizing them and moving them forward to help consolidate any gains.

In the end the Soviets knew if they started a war first off, they would have use their forces in East Germany and Czech. These Groups of Forces were so large due to the fact that if Moscow started the war, these were most likely be the only troops to see most of the action. They also realized if they had done this, their second echelon would have to wait to be mobilized until their ready to move third echelon had moved through.

If the Second Echelon units had made it to the war as the 2nd Echelon, they would making it to the battle in little better state than Soviet Tank and Mechanized Corps of WWII era. Especially considering many of the tanks in this Echelon included T-55s and T-62s.

So in this case the use of Nuclear and Chemical would be needed in the eyes of the Soviet to eliminate such things as staging areas for reinforcements from the UK and US. As well as taking out command and control centers. Just some thoughts.

Adm.Lee

03-04-2011, 11:27 AM

Funny this should come up this week. I am in a PBEM game of GDW's "Third World War," and I kicked off the standing-start offensive yesterday. In that game, nukes aren't allowed on the first turn (I suppose we could have house-ruled that), and the Pact allies' forces are frozen on "Turn 0."

So far, the surprise air attack was no Pearl Harbor or Clark Field, I lost more planes than I grounded.

Tackleberry

03-04-2011, 11:29 AM

[QUOTE=avantman42;10797The only difference between the British SLR and the Argentinian FAL, as you've mentioned, is that the SLR didn't do full-auto. At least, not officially: I've heard from several ex-soldiers that inserting a match in the correct place made it fire full-auto.[/QUOTE]

It fired full auto until the magazine ran out, 1 shot hit not much.

The safety catch on the SLR could be "adapted" by removing the bent of metal that was put there to stop the selector switching to the full auto setting. Or at a push the FAL catch could fit, but why would anyone want to do it, unless firing blanks, is the question. The SLR barrel was not as heavy as the FN barrel, so it wouldn't take too many 20 round bursts, before accuracy would suffer. Plus the gas system would foul very quickly.

There is a reason for the GPMG being in service, almost the personal weapon of the Paras in the Falklands. In my opinion, the best General purpose 7.62x51mm machine gun.................................In the world.:D

perardua

03-04-2011, 11:58 AM

There is a reason for the GPMG being in service, almost the personal weapon of the Paras in the Falklands. In my opinion, the best General purpose 7.62x51mm machine gun.................................In the world.:D

If there was a 'Like' button on this forum, I would be using it here. Spent most of my last Afghan tour behind a GPMG - it was the place to be.

StainlessSteelCynic

03-04-2011, 05:47 PM

It fired full auto until the magazine ran out, 1 shot hit not much.

The safety catch on the SLR could be "adapted" by removing the bent of metal that was put there to stop the selector switching to the full auto setting. Or at a push the FAL catch could fit, but why would anyone want to do it, unless firing blanks, is the question. The SLR barrel was not as heavy as the FN barrel, so it wouldn't take too many 20 round bursts, before accuracy would suffer. Plus the gas system would foul very quickly.

There is a reason for the GPMG being in service, almost the personal weapon of the Paras in the Falklands. In my opinion, the best General purpose 7.62x51mm machine gun.................................In the world.:D

There was a particular trick to it, if you placed the match in just the right spot, you could get it to fire only when you pulled the trigger. Otherwise it would work just as you said - full auto until you got to 'empty'.
Having said that though, I completely agree with you, automatic fire from a 7.62mmN rifle is not particularly good for anything except making noise and hitting passing birds.
As for the MAG58 being the best 7.62x51mm GPMG in the world, when you have countries even now converting from their own designs to the MAG* which is a design now 50 years old - then those Belgians must have done something right!

*On 10 December 2010 The French Direction GÃ©nÃ©ral de l'Armament (DGA) announced that after an international competition it had selected the MAG 58 to replace its aging fleet of AAT Mle F1 7.62 mm general purpose machine guns. Although primarily intended for use mounted on vehicles in service with the French army, kits to convert the vehicle mounted guns into guns for use in the dismounted role would also be supplied. In excess of 10,000 guns are to be supplied over the next few years with an initial order for 500 guns due for delivery in 2011
Snippet taken from here (http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Infantry-Weapons/FN-Herstal-MAG-58-7-62-mm-general-purpose-machine-gun-Belgium.html)

Abbott Shaull

03-09-2011, 07:57 PM

Yeah well it seems the Belgiums usually get it right when it comes to making firearms...

Legbreaker

03-09-2011, 09:32 PM

Shame their cousins over the border in France can't seem to get it together though - there's the St. Etienne 07/16, AAT-52, and Chauchat. :(

bobcat

03-09-2011, 09:32 PM

Panther Al

03-09-2011, 10:01 PM

Actually, with mechanised forces is rather easy to spot - provided the force in question has someone in charge that has a working brain. Fuel trucks you might think, but no, for tanks use craptastic amounts of fuel, even if they sit in the motor pool 3 days out of 4. Services? Nope, tanks by their very nature are maintenance hogs: the good ones are simply well stressed, the bad ones over-stressed, but they are all stressed to the point where maintenance has to be done all the time. Nope, the number one reason why its easy to spot a armoured unit getting ready to roll someplace, with little to no down time expected is tracks.

Tracks.

They don't last that long, even the all steel ones (usually no more than 1000 to 1500 miles in peacetime, half that at best in war - with the soviet style ones being even less durable), and they are a bitch to swap out. When you are getting ready to pick a fight, the last thing you want your tanks to do is throw track, so you pull the old ones, use them as spares, armour, what have you, and put new ones on - even if they are expensive. So, if you are some photo guy, and you see 90% of the tanks in the bad guys motor pool lining up to swap track, you know they are getting ready to go someplace where they don't expect to have the time nor freedom to do when, not if, they break unexpectedly. Even when we went to Iraq for the invasion, almost all our tanks, even the ones that had less than a 150km on them, got new track for that very reason.

Its always the little things that really tell the tale if a threat is real or not.

Its one of the reasons I always had a separate wear value for track in the games I run. The PC's spend almost as much time looking for track as they do for ammo for the Beast.

Abbott Shaull

03-09-2011, 11:19 PM

Yeah it is the small details that people don't think about. It one of those things I like about these boards is that when you get people who had experience they tend to point out things that a great GM will take and incorporate into their game. Or ideas how to manage their game without going overboard....

dragoon500ly

03-10-2011, 05:49 AM

Another key indicator would be batteries. A lot of people don't realize just how dependent modern militaries are on the ole dry-cell. Everything thing from NVGs, to handheld lasers, chemical alarms, all the way up to batteries for the starting carts for jets, and even the batteries on diesel-electric submarines. Fresh batteries are easier to recharge and last longer than ones that have been in use. A spike in production of batteries or military equipment replacing batteries in its larger items would alert a sharp intell analyst.

Didn't Clancy use this in one of his books?

atiff

03-10-2011, 07:40 AM

Another key indicator would be batteries.

Didn't Clancy use this in one of his books?

"Red Storm Rising" if I remember correctly; the analyst spotting the subs all getting battery replacements in port.

Abbott Shaull

03-10-2011, 10:21 AM

Adm.Lee

03-10-2011, 02:33 PM

raketenjagdpanzer

03-10-2011, 02:38 PM

Did anyone read Viktor Suvorov's "Icebreaker"? It was his attempt to claim that the Soviets were getting ready to jump the Nazis in July 1941, but they got pre-empted by Barbarossa.

He did have the interesting tidbit that the Soviet military intelligence chief in June 1941 was *not* shot, like his predecessors. The chief's defense was to present some bits of evidence to Stalin.
1) Soviet agents were shadowing German encampments, digging up their trash piles. The rifle-cleaning cloths only had summer-weight oil on them.
2) Soviet agents were monitoring the price of mutton. If the price fell, that would mean that the Germans were slaughtering sheep to make sheepskin coats for winter fighting.
3) His men were buying German-made stoves, and analyzing the heating fuel within. If winter fuel was being held off the market, it would show up in the civilian economy.
Since none of these things indicated the Germans were going to attack in June 1941, he got to keep his neck, and Stalin got to work on planning for a winter attack.

I have no idea if all of the above is true, but it makes an interesting case for how to perform long-term intelligence gathering.

BTW, if you play large East Front WW2 wargames like me, try experimenting with a Soviet offensive instead of a German one in 1941. It's a lot of fun.

That's a VERY interesting case indeed. I knew Sururov had written on the subject but I haven't read the book and didn't know those details.

With that said, I did just finish Rise and Fall of the Third Reich and it seems that Hitler tipped his hand a bit with the invasion of Yugoslavia and the (costly) delay in Barbarossa it caused; if they (the Soviets) were going to get the jump on 'em, why not then when the Nazis' pants were around their ankles as they pissed on the Balkans?

I'm not doubting you (or Sururov) just adding more speculation to an already interesting scenario!

HorseSoldier

03-10-2011, 03:18 PM

Did anyone read Viktor Suvorov's "Icebreaker"? It was his attempt to claim that the Soviets were getting ready to jump the Nazis in July 1941, but they got pre-empted by Barbarossa.

I haven't read it, but that's interesting. I can believe the Soviets were thinking about it, at least to some extent. I don't think they were being overly realistic in their thinking, if they were, given how poorly Soviet forces performed in the Winter War and on the defense in the early days of Barbarossa.

dragoon500ly

03-10-2011, 05:01 PM

Yeah well the slow down during that sandstorm in 2003 wasn't due to because the supply of Kool Menthol 100s had dropped too low.

They were using batteries faster at much faster rate with almost everyone having NVGs, all the radios. Yet, I am sure if any of the troop with minimags and walkman sure packed enough for their use during the 3 week journey....*shrug*

Knowing some of the characters I served with, the shortage of Kools played a larger role than the shortage of batteries! Now if the coffee had run out!!!!!

:D

dragoon500ly

03-10-2011, 05:04 PM

BTW, if you play large East Front WW2 wargames like me, try experimenting with a Soviet offensive instead of a German one in 1941. It's a lot of fun.

I've done this twice and its an intresting donnybrook all over Poland...

Panther Al

03-10-2011, 05:23 PM

Knowing some of the characters I served with, the shortage of Kools played a larger role than the shortage of batteries! Now if the coffee had run out!!!!!

:D

*hehs*

Yeah, no coffee is a true emergency that requires immediate action.

When we went over, I knew coffee was going to be scarce - especially good coffee. So, locked up in a box, set aside for a month, was a nice krupp expresso machine, and 10 pounds of really really good coffee. The *looks* I got when I had my morning cups - once the month was past and all anyone else had was MRE coffee - was always amusing.. surprised I didn't get shot though.

Abbott Shaull

03-10-2011, 09:12 PM

*hehs*

Yeah, no coffee is a true emergency that requires immediate action.

When we went over, I knew coffee was going to be scarce - especially good coffee. So, locked up in a box, set aside for a month, was a nice krupp expresso machine, and 10 pounds of really really good coffee. The *looks* I got when I had my morning cups - once the month was past and all anyone else had was MRE coffee - was always amusing.. surprised I didn't get shot though.

Yeah the military runs on coffee...and none of that decaf stuff...

Abbott Shaull

03-10-2011, 09:14 PM

You know by 2003 they had determined that smoking was bad for one's health...lol

Webstral

03-10-2011, 09:45 PM

raketenjagdpanzer

03-10-2011, 11:36 PM

Perhaps Stalin felt that it was better to hold the strategic initiative, regardless of what was going on with the Red Army. It certainly would have been interesting to see what would have happened if Hitler had concluded that the adventure in the Balkans imposed such a delay on BARBAROSSA as to put completion out of the question in 1941, leaving the Soviets free to invade Eastern Europe during the winter. Oh my, the possibilities...!

Webstral

Twilight:1942 anyone? :)

Abbott Shaull

03-11-2011, 08:24 AM

I haven't read it, but that's interesting. I can believe the Soviets were thinking about it, at least to some extent. I don't think they were being overly realistic in their thinking, if they were, given how poorly Soviet forces performed in the Winter War and on the defense in the early days of Barbarossa.

Read some the reviews of the book and some of the more than interesting points of views from the airchair "experts" and from within Russia. The most telling thing is the sources from with Russia exclaim to article there was no way Stalin would go back on his word of the Pact between Berlin and Moscow at the time. Most of the "experts" were split.

One of the telling things that strike me as odd, is that at the same time while the German were building up their forces forward, the Soviets were at the same time building up their forces in forward areas. As has been pointed out time and again, it was Stalin purges that had direct linked to why when the Soviets did attack say Finland, Poland, and then attack by the Germans later why they were successful. Yeah I know they were comparatively successful in Poland, but they were already heavily engage against the Germans.

Yet, due to Soviet/Russia military doctrine, one of the problem has always been where units readiness has always been over stated. At the time Soviets were actively also training their units in the fields and the Soviet High Command were evaluating the performance of units down to Regimental level. The one thing they were starting to realize how crippling the system of having their Commander having to strapped with a counterparts from the Party who would have to countersign their orders too. Also the fact the State Secret Police, (depending on time frame with it initials) also had spies at all levels with in all units.

The one intriguing thing is that Soviets could of caught the Germans with their pants down during the time with their conquest of Yugoslavia and other regions of the Balkans. Reality was the Soviets would have done little more than cross the starting lines when everything would of failed because Regimental, Divisional, Corps, and Army Commanders would of been left paralysis due to the system that Lenin and Stalin had impose onto the Red Army.

It was only after many of the Party Officers had been removed an active part of the chain command and many of them given their commands (that another story) that the Soviet military seem to get it act together. Of course, at this time they were forming new units with new weapons and lend-lease equipment were trickling in too.

Just some thoughts.

dragoon500ly

03-11-2011, 08:31 AM

You know by 2003 they had determined that smoking was bad for one's health...lol

That's because the Surgeon General never ran into a gen-u-wine Lifer!!!! Food is optional, coffee and cigs are not!

There was seen that was cut out of the movie "We were Soldiers" that had the Sergeant Major walking to headquarters with two canteen cups of coffee...I cant count the number of times that I have seen that same sequence of NCOs reporting to work with a canteen cup or two of ole mess hall lifer juice!

Abbott Shaull

03-11-2011, 08:56 AM

That's because the Surgeon General never ran into a gen-u-wine Lifer!!!! Food is optional, coffee and cigs are not!

There was seen that was cut out of the movie "We were Soldiers" that had the Sergeant Major walking to headquarters with two canteen cups of coffee...I cant count the number of times that I have seen that same sequence of NCOs reporting to work with a canteen cup or two of ole mess hall lifer juice!

Yeah, but what brand did the mess hall used...lol

dragoon500ly

03-11-2011, 09:09 AM

Yeah, but what brand did the mess hall used...lol

Not really sure...but it was certainly packed with extra caffine...nothing could wake you up faster than Lifer Juice! And it was such a shame to add sugar or creamer to it the mix!

Never could drink the stuff before a gunnery though, the caffine overload would leave you shaking. Red Bull and the rest of these energy drinks just don't have the same punch....

I remember one Reforger, we stopped at an Air Base during the admin break, just for the chance to hit someplace with hot showers. Eating lunch in the "dining facility" was an experience! First mess hall that I ever saw with carpeting and wooden booths for the people to eat in. The chow was great, hard to believe that the Air Force and Army cooks train at the same location, but the coffee was as weak as the slush served in McDonalds...and the zoomies....armored cavalry troopers, straight off of a week straight of maneuvers, and ever man carrying his NBC mask and personel weapon and showing that thang called discipline....LMAO!!!!

Abbott Shaull

03-11-2011, 09:32 AM

Not really sure...but it was certainly packed with extra caffine...nothing could wake you up faster than Lifer Juice! And it was such a shame to add sugar or creamer to it the mix!

Never could drink the stuff before a gunnery though, the caffine overload would leave you shaking. Red Bull and the rest of these energy drinks just don't have the same punch....

I remember one Reforger, we stopped at an Air Base during the admin break, just for the chance to hit someplace with hot showers. Eating lunch in the "dining facility" was an experience! First mess hall that I ever saw with carpeting and wooden booths for the people to eat in. The chow was great, hard to believe that the Air Force and Army cooks train at the same location, but the coffee was as weak as the slush served in McDonalds...and the zoomies....armored cavalry troopers, straight off of a week straight of maneuvers, and ever man carrying his NBC mask and personel weapon and showing that thang called discipline....LMAO!!!!
Yeah I remember it. You are right it has nothing on the so called energy drinks that out today. The same thing with Mountain Dew that used to be on the market back in the 1980s and 1990s. It pack way more wake up punch than the version they are trying to sell now.

Sanjuro

03-11-2011, 12:25 PM

raketenjagdpanzer

03-11-2011, 12:41 PM

Did the export version of the T80 have the same gun as the Soviet's own equipment? I remember talking to a tanker after GW1; he described vividly the loud clang as a main armament round from a T80 (Manually traversed or not, they traversed fast enough) bounced off the front of his Challenger I; the T80 was then taken out by the first shot they fired in return.

Although Armored Cav by Tom Clancy is liberally sprinkled with apocrypha and fervor, one statement he made in the book I've heard corroborated elsewhere by a guy I worked with who was in GW1: the Iraqi long rod penetrator rounds were made from local tungsten, not imported. While the guns were likely entirely identical to what was in Russian/Soviet tanks of the day, the ammo was most definitely not.

I also seem to recall a story about a guy who received a silver star (or may have even been a DSC) after the M2 he was in took a direct hit front from a T55's main gun. The vehicle was an immediate loss and the driver and gunner (I believe) were killed instantly, the rest of the crew survived with injuries. As he was the only ambulatory passenger he was able to get everyone out of the track and away, and go back in and get TOW and gun rounds out to prevent an ammo explosion from killing them all due to their proximity. Now, the T55 mounts a 115mm main gun; I'm not sure if the Brad was sporting reactive armor or not, but if not a direct hit should have blown it off the face of the earth - unless perhaps it was an inferior locally manufactured round.

HorseSoldier

03-11-2011, 03:34 PM

I don't believe any Brads in GW1 were sent into Iraq/Kuwait with reactive armor fitted, but may be wrong.

A direct hit from a T-55 isn't a guaranteed kill on a Bradley, however. A friend of mine was in close proximity to a Bradley that took a hit from a T-72 in Baghdad where it rolled away under its own power. (Longer story -- the T-72 took a shot and missed at her NBC recon vehicle, the Bradley roared up to cover their getting out of there, took a hit, and then a passing M1, that was towing another disabled M1, popped the T-72 without slowing down and kept on going . . .)

Raellus

03-11-2011, 04:53 PM

dragoon500ly

03-12-2011, 08:41 AM

Although Armored Cav by Tom Clancy is liberally sprinkled with apocrypha and fervor, one statement he made in the book I've heard corroborated elsewhere by a guy I worked with who was in GW1: the Iraqi long rod penetrator rounds were made from local tungsten, not imported. While the guns were likely entirely identical to what was in Russian/Soviet tanks of the day, the ammo was most definitely not.

For the non tankers on the list, a bit of background. There are two types of AT rounds, chemical and kinetic. An example of a chemical round is a HEAT warhead, this is a charge of explosive with a funnel imprinted into one end and usually lined with copper. Typically has a long tube pointing from the business end holding a stand off fuse. When the fuse hits the armor, the explosive is denotated forcing the copper from a metal and straight into a plasma state...this blast of molten hot metal burns through armor and spalls the interior of the vehicle with white hot fragments of armor...with the amount of ammo, fuel and other flammables stored inside a tank you almost always get a secondary explosion. Advantages is that with a direct strike, you almost always get a penetration, its easy to make, armor penetration is not affected by range. Disadvantages, its a heavy, slow round so the chance to hit at long range is badly degraded, its affected by cross-winds and it has to strike the armor at the right angle or you get a wonderful roman candle effect.

Kenetic rounds depend on the speed of the round. A AP round is simply a solid block of steel, this is the WWI/WWII primary AT round. You get penetration but thicker armor is more resistant. The Germans tried to get around this with the APHE round, penetration then a light explosive charge, but face-hardened armor stopped this. Then along comes the APCR, or taper-bore round, tungsten steel penetrator with a outer shell of aluminum, the force of firing squeezes the round into a smaller caliber, thus getting more speed. But shortages of tungsten (and the complicated manufacture process) caused this to be dropped by the Nazis. The British designed the first real advance in 1945 with the APDS. A tungsten steel penetrator with, at first a wooden shoe or "sabot" (later replaced with aluminum) that allowed the advantages of APCR without the manufacture issues.

The Soviets designed the first APDSFS with the introduction of the T-62 and its 115mm smooth-bore cannon. Fin Stabilized took care of a problem with APDS, that of the spin causing the round to drift a few mils to the right during long range engagements. This was the first kenetic round to be used out to 2,000 meters. Still used the tungsten steel penetrator. Sometime around 1978-79, the US started deploying the APDSDU round, replacing tungsten steel with depleted uranimum. DU seemed to be the perfect combination of light weight and high tensile strength. Armor penetration was several times greater than that of tungsten steel. Shortly afterwards the US started deployment of the APDSFSDU rounds. Since the M-60A1/A3 tanks used rifled cannons, there was a counter-rotating feature to allow for the full advantage of FS. This is also the main reason why the decision to go with the German 120mm came about. Yes it was poltical decision, but the lack of a native smoothbore design also played a major role. This allowed the APDSFSDU to be made more cheaply by getting ride of the counter-rotating device.

What Saddam chose to go with was native manufacture of his tank rounds, he didn't have the technology to make DU rounds, and he lacked enough tungsten to make penetrators (since tungsten is also used in tools, he was faced with the same choice as the Nazis....being able to make tools, or make ammunition). He was forced to use stainless steel to make his armor penetrators and since his quality control was for shit, he wasn't able to make good quality stainless steel....this is why you hear so many stories of Iraqi AT rounds shattering on impact or just penetrating armor. The Iraqi Army depended on HEAT rounds to a great extant, but thus doomed them to except an engagement range well short of what the Allies could do.

During Desert Storm, M-1s and Challengers were able to engage with APFSDSDU to 4,500+ meters, the longest range shot was by an M-1 of the 1st Armored Division that hit a T-55 at 5,250 meters. When you consider that the Iraqis did not engage anything over 1,200 meters, you begin to understand just how demoralizing it was to go up against M-1s. The lethality of the APFSDSDU round was shown when a 2nd ACR M-1 nailed a T-72 at 2,100 meters, shooting through a protective berm 15 meters thick and still penetrating the turret ring.

There is also a confirmed story of an M-1 that was stuck in a bog and left behind for maintenance to recover. While waiting, the M-1 was attacked by three T-62 tanks. In the engagement that followed, the M-1 killed all three T-62s, for the expediture of four rounds of main gun ammo, and was hit by five 115mm APDSFS rounds. There was no penetration of the M-1's armor, one sponson box on the turret was damaged and the M-1 was fully operational and rejoined its platoon later that day.

There is also a lot of BS about how the Iraqi tanks where not of the same quaility as those used by the Russians. This has already been noted by a couple of other users and I repeat, this is nothing more than utter hogwash! The Iraqi's did not then, and do not now have the heavy industry to make their own tanks. They purchased directly from the builder, in other words, these tanks were taken directly from the Red Army's own production lines, this was Russian front line equipment. Where the Iraqi's dropped the ball was in the purchase of those little extras, like tank ammunition. In addition, the Soviets did not sell their latest ballistic computers and laser rangefinders, thus dooming the Iraqi Army to a fight that they couldn't win.

Raellus

03-12-2011, 07:44 PM

There is also a lot of BS about how the Iraqi tanks where not of the same quaility as those used by the Russians. This has already been noted by a couple of other users and I repeat, this is nothing more than utter hogwash! The Iraqi's did not then, and do not now have the heavy industry to make their own tanks. They purchased directly from the builder, in other words, these tanks were taken directly from the Red Army's own production lines, this was Russian front line equipment. Where the Iraqi's dropped the ball was in the purchase of those little extras, like tank ammunition. In addition, the Soviets did not sell their latest ballistic computers and laser rangefinders, thus dooming the Iraqi Army to a fight that they couldn't win.

You are flat out wrong. No one here has suggested that the Iraqis made their own T-72s.

We have noted that the T-72s sold to Iraq were export versions. This means that they did not have all the bells and whistles that came standard on tanks retained for Soviet/Russian use- things like powered turret traverse, night sights, etc.

If you can provide reliable documentation that refutes this, please feel free to do so. Posting that something is "utter hogwash" does not make the poster an authority on the topic.

Targan

03-12-2011, 08:29 PM

We have noted that the T-72s sold to Iraq were export versions. This means that they did not have all the bells and whistles that came standard on tanks retained for Soviet/Russian use- things like powered turret traverse, night sights, etc.

Correct.

Abbott Shaull

03-12-2011, 08:35 PM

You are flat out wrong. No one here has suggested that the Iraqis made their own T-72s.

We have noted that the T-72s sold to Iraq were export versions. This means that they did not have all the bells and whistles that came standard on tanks retained for Soviet/Russian use- things like powered turret traverse, night sights, etc.

If you can provide reliable documentation that refutes this, please feel free to do so. Posting that something is "utter hogwash" does not make the poster an authority on the topic.

I don't recall anyone claiming that these tanks weren't made in Soviet Union/Russia, but the export models always had less features that only the units going to the Soviet Union military units would get. Even today Russia keeps up the same standard when they sell their old equipment.

Much like the U. S. Army did with the equipment that they have sold to Isreal and other Middle East countries since the PG1 War.

Raellus

03-12-2011, 08:40 PM

The following is from Osprey's M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural- Operation Desert Storm by Steven J. Zaloga.

"As a result of the USSR’s export policy, clients such as Iraq did not receive tanks comparable in quality to the best Soviet tanks. In 1990 the best Iraqi version of theT-72 was the T-72M1 – roughly equivalent to the Soviet T-72A, which was already a decade old and not as well armored as the newer T-72B or the preferred T-80B series. Just as importantly, the Soviet Union did not export its best tank ammunition: the Iraqi army relied primarily on second-rate ammunition for its T-72 tanks." (p.24)

In Defense of the Red Army, I would also like to refer to the following excerpt:

"Despite the vehicles’ relative technical merits and flaws, the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Storm hinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as onthe machines themselves." (p. 7)

These are just a couple of snippets but they sum up my main points quite nicely. It looks like the entire book can be broused on this site:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/48201782/M1A1-Vs-T-72

Apparently, some of Iraq's T-72s were kit-built in Iraq and they were building a factory for local manufacture of T-72Ms in '91 (but it was destroyed by Coalition airstrikes before it could begin production).

dragoon500ly

03-13-2011, 10:52 AM

The following is from Osprey's M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural- Operation Desert Storm by Steven J. Zaloga.

"As a result of the USSRâ€™s export policy, clients such as Iraq did not receive tanks comparable in quality to the best Soviet tanks. In 1990 the best Iraqi version of theT-72 was the T-72M1 â€“ roughly equivalent to the Soviet T-72A, which was already a decade old and not as well armored as the newer T-72B or the preferred T-80B series. Just as importantly, the Soviet Union did not export its best tank ammunition: the Iraqi army relied primarily on second-rate ammunition for its T-72 tanks." (p.24)

In Defense of the Red Army, I would also like to refer to the following excerpt:

"Despite the vehiclesâ€™ relative technical merits and flaws, the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Storm hinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as onthe machines themselves." (p. 7)

These are just a couple of snippets but they sum up my main points quite nicely. It looks like the entire book can be broused on this site:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/48201782/M1A1-Vs-T-72

Apparently, some of Iraq's T-72s were kit-built in Iraq and they were building a factory for local manufacture of T-72Ms in '91 (but it was destroyed by Coalition airstrikes before it could begin production).

When there is any discussion of the selling of arms in between countries, there is one major misconception. What is sold is NOT the latest hardware with the latest bells and whistles. What is normally sold is earlier versions that carry non-classified equipment. The M-1 that is sold to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt is not the same beast as that used by the AUS/USMC.

The Sovs were perfectly within their rights to refuse to sell their version of Chobham armor, as well as the latest fire control gear. What happened, however, was that tanks on the current production lines were pulled off, outfitted with older fire control equipment and then shipped on to Iraq. These tanks were not manufactured with substandard armor, they simply lacked the Special Armor, although they were fitted and many did carry reactive armor blocks. According to the Congressional Record, an examination of Iraqi T-72s captured in the KTO confirmed that they were fitted with "simple telescopic sights" these sights "being engraved with ballistic data and steroscopic rangefinders". These are the same sights and rangefinders as fitted to the T-55/T-62 series tanks. And Zaloga confirms this same information in his books.

The point that I call utter hogwash was the opinon that the Soviets deliberately produced a run of T-72s with substandard armor. Nowhere, in the Congressional Records, Zaloga's books, the Armor Journel and several other mainstream publiciations is this idea confirmed.

Webstral

03-13-2011, 02:04 PM

I donâ€™t think anybody is claiming that Soviets deliberately cheated the Iraqis. The Soviets went with their established policy of exporting less-capable versions of the state-of-the-art equipment. The Iraqis were unable to make good on the shortfall in capabilities with domestic industry, and the Republican Guard paid the price. In a way, itâ€™s too bad. Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitlerâ€™s interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.

Webstral

raketenjagdpanzer

03-13-2011, 02:08 PM

Sururov goes over Soviet exporting methods quite a bit in Inside the Red Army; there's definitely a "home standard" and an "export standard".

Sometimes, at least in the west, quality stuff winds up in the hands of allies before it gets used at home: the South Korean military fielded ASEA radar for F15s before it was equipped in US models!

dragoon500ly

03-13-2011, 02:33 PM

Raellus

03-13-2011, 04:33 PM

The point that I call utter hogwash was the opinon that the Soviets deliberately produced a run of T-72s with substandard armor. Nowhere, in the Congressional Records, Zaloga's books, the Armor Journel and several other mainstream publiciations is this idea confirmed.

Perhaps I missed it, but I don't recall anyone here making the claim that you are refuting. I guess we can chalk this little debate up to simple miscommunication.

dragoon500ly

03-13-2011, 05:40 PM

Perhaps I missed it, but I don't recall anyone here making the claim that you are refuting. I guess we can chalk this little debate up to simple miscommunication.

It is I who must apoligize, I was in the midst of a rather heated exchange of private messages and that one went out in error.

What can I say, I type faster than my brain can react!

Raellus

03-13-2011, 05:51 PM

Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitlerâ€™s interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.

+1

raketenjagdpanzer

03-13-2011, 07:37 PM

I don’t think anybody is claiming that Soviets deliberately cheated the Iraqis. The Soviets went with their established policy of exporting less-capable versions of the state-of-the-art equipment. The Iraqis were unable to make good on the shortfall in capabilities with domestic industry, and the Republican Guard paid the price. In a way, it’s too bad. Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitler’s interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.

Webstral

It's interesting that you bring up operation Barbarossa, Webstral; there's a theory put forth by Shirer in Rise and Fall of the Third Reich that it was Hitler's interference - at one key moment - that was precisely what saved the Army in Russia. His own "not one step back" order that kept units on the front line through the winter of 1941 rather than letting them trade time for distance probably spared the Army a total crushing rout. The Russians had not yet perfected a "cut off and bypass" strategem yet, and the strong-points and lines of defense the Red Army ran into as they counterattacked through the winter kept them from becoming too agile, and kept supply lines and rear areas from being overcome.

Had Hitler allowed the high command to permit a general retreat, the victory for the Soviets might have come much, much sooner.

(With that said I think that was more happenstance than any brilliance on Corporal Shicklegruber's part...)

Oh...edit...I feel kind of weird saying this but I feel weird NOT saying it, but I feel regardless like I should, especially given my user-handle: I'm not a skinhead, neo-Nazi, white supremacist or anything. That post above up there was not some "yeah the Nazis totally kicked ass but got some bad breaks!" type post. :o

Raellus

03-13-2011, 08:11 PM

Had Hitler allowed the high command to permit a general retreat, the victory for the Soviets might have come much, much sooner.

(With that said I think that was more happenstance than any brilliance on Corporal Shicklegruber's part...)

It should be noted that this early success of Hitler's more "intuitive" style of military leadership simply reinforced Hitler's belief in his own infalibility and led to a long litany of operational and strategic blunders that utimately led to the annihilation of his Third Reich. Stalingrad is probably the best and most widely known example of the kind of military disaster that resulted from Hitler's antiquated understanding of warfare and his belief that willpower- not logistics or the correlation of forces- was the definitive key to wresting victory from the jaws of defeat.

raketenjagdpanzer

03-13-2011, 10:16 PM

It should be noted that this early success of Hitler's more "intuitive" style of military leadership simply reinforced Hitler's belief in his own infalibility and led to a long litany of operational and strategic blunders that utimately led to the annihilation of his Third Reich. Stalingrad is probably the best and most widely known example of the kind of military disaster that resulted from Hitler's antiquated understanding of warfare and his belief that willpower- not logistics or the correlation of forces- was the definitive key to wresting victory from the jaws of defeat.

Oh I'm completely in agreement with you (and I should have mentioned that was Shirer's thesis, too).

Sanjuro

03-15-2011, 08:12 AM

Raellus pointed out: AFAIK, T-80s were not sold to Iraq. Ever. It was probably a misidentified T-72E that your aquaintance saw.

In fact, I was trying to remember a conversation from the summer of 1991; I couldn't remember whether he said T-72 or T-80 and went online to find what tanks the Iraqis had on the front line: fancy the internet giving the wrong answer!
The mistake is mine; even at second hand, the clang! is the thing that sticks in the mind!

Webstral

03-16-2011, 12:12 AM

Shirer's assertion that Hitler saved the Eastern Front by refusing to countenance retreat has some merit. The Army would have lost huge amounts of equipment that couldn't be moved. Who knows how many men would have been left behind for lack of transport. There were no established positions to fall back on, so the retreat could have gone right back to Poland.
We'll never know, of course; however, there is good reason to believe that a retreat would have finished the German Army on the Eastern Front during the winter.

On the other hand, it was Hitler's decision to keep the campaign going despite the onset of a winter for which the Wehrmacht was not prepared. If he saved the Eastern Front, he saved it from a blunder he made himself. I've never bought off on the idea that turning the panzers aside from Moscow to destroy Soviet forces in the Ukraine was a bad idea. However, I do believe that the rasputitsa should have marked the end of the campaign season on the Eastern Front. Small-scale offensives in lieu of Operation Typhoon could have continued to inflict losses on the Soviets west of Moscow while good winter positions were prepared. Of course, for me to say this flies in the face of Prussia military thinking and the lessons Hitler and his generation of Germans learned from WW1--namely, that only offensive warfare brings victory. Nonetheless, if Hitler saved the Eastern Front during that first terrible winter, he saved it from his own mindless adherence to the strategic offensive and his slavish devotion to the idea that the Russians, being inferior peoples, were just about finished from July, 1941 onward.

Webstral

Abbott Shaull

03-16-2011, 12:40 AM

95th Rifleman

03-16-2011, 05:28 AM

PG 1 isn't a good example if you are trying to compare NATO/WP equipment.

The Iraqi's fell into the old trap of fighting the last war. They set up fixed, entrenched defensive positions in a similar fashion to how they fought the Iranians in the late 80's. Having a major armoured force drive around your flank tends to cause a few problems with such a defense.

In the late 90's the gap between Western and Russian kit was not as great as many are led to assume, also the tactics devised for fighting in Europe where designed to maximise advantage and minimise weakness of the Russian kit. The game winning card in iraq was total air superiority, this would be MUCH harder to achieve facing frontline Russian air defence systems.

The Russians where (and arguably still are) the world leaders in battlefield air defence, they had to be considering the NATO air threat. the Russians would of formed concentrations of Armour and spearheaded into NATO lines putting massive local superiorityin numbers to overwhelm NATO defensive positions.
Unless you could knock out these concentrations from the air the would just roll over a position and keep going before NATO forces cold respond in numbers sufficient to blunt the spearhead.

Abbott Shaull

03-16-2011, 07:48 AM

dragoon500ly

03-16-2011, 08:57 AM

95th Rifleman

03-16-2011, 09:49 AM

I think everyone here pretty much agrees that any NATO/WP fight would have seen bloodletting on a never before seen scale....and that would be prior to any nukes.

PG1 gave just a taste of just how deadly modern weapons can be. And that was, for the most part, directed against military targets. A free fire zone like Europe would become....

As soon as nations break out the FASCAM to block armoured assaults we can expect to see huge areas of Eastern and central Europe turned into dead zones that would probably exist for decades.

Abbott Shaull

03-16-2011, 10:29 AM

No matter who starts it and where. The end will not be good.

Webstral

03-17-2011, 12:16 AM

I don't remember my specifications for Soviet scatterable mines, but US FASCAM has a short shelf life. In a fast-moving war, most standard mines are surface-laid and covered by fire to prevent the enemy's vehicles from getting through by driving carefully. The goal with FASCAM and surface-laid mines is canalization, not blocking. It's a fine distinction, but as a result the mines used in highly mobile warfare either commit suicide or are fairly easily handled once the frnt moves away.

In Twilight: 2000 terms, though, we would have seen fantastic stretches of territory invested with complex minefields with mostly buried mines. The Pact would have put tens of millions or hundred of millions into the ground in western Poland. Other nations at war would have done the same in their respective areas. Once the war slowed down in late 1997, buried mines would have gone in around every base camp.

Still, I'd be less concerned about the mines putting large areas off-limits than the rads and chemicals. If it came down to it, I'd put chemicals at the top of the list. During the run-up to nuclear use, I'd expect to see chemical warfare running at full tilt (though obviously there would be pattterns that can be discussed at another time). The use of persistent agents for counter-mobility purposes would leave large areas of Poland, Germany, Austria, the former Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey, and other locations badly contaminated. Chemicals washing into the rivers would end up in the Baltic, the North Sea, the Aegean, the Black Sea, etc. Lethal concentrations might persist for years anywhere the rain didn't wash the chemicals away. Mines tend not to migrate, but chemicals go where they please. In a water-rich environment like Europe... yikes.

Webstral

Legbreaker

03-17-2011, 01:02 AM

Good point re the FASCAM and chemicals.
A well planned minefield should however be designed to channel an attacker right onto the covering guns of the defending force. Fire needs to be available all over the field to prevent unopposed lifting, but any obstacle belt should send send the attacker unconsciously right in front of the machineguns and expose vehicle flanks to AT weapons.

For example, a barbed wire entanglement is not placed parallel to the defenders positions, but is on an angle. The attacker will naturally drift towards the end furthest from their start line, probably bunching up in the process and giving the machineguns an easy target.

As minefields must be marked (with at least a single strand of wire on the enemy side with mine signs every so often) they too have the ability to channel. Note that the wire surrounding a field does not have to be of the same shape as the field - it can be much larger and mislead the enemy regarding the true extent of the danger area.

Anti vehicular obstacles such as dragons teeth could be positioned so that the only clear route requires the vehicle to take a right angle turn and expose their side the the defenders.

95th Rifleman

03-17-2011, 04:54 AM

Abbott Shaull

03-17-2011, 07:22 AM

Very true there are quite a few things that everyone seems to "forget" once the shooting starts...

Legbreaker

03-17-2011, 07:48 AM

95th Rifleman

03-17-2011, 08:30 AM

Depends on how well trained the troops are. Nobody wants to stand in front of a court answering charges of war crimes because they "forgot" to mark a minefield and some civilians blundered their way into it....

That idea might fade away post nuke, but I'm fairly sure those with more than just a few months training will stick to their old habits and do the right thing.

In an ideal world I'd agree with you, but the problem is things are not ideal. You only really get charged with warcrimes if you lose and many nations today just ignore international law relying on either thier status as superpowers or the backing of such to bail tem out.

Israel is a classic example, many of their tactics break international law but nobody can get past the security council in the UN to bring them to book. Examles include unmarkd mindfields and using AAA weapons against civilian buildings (that caused quite a stir back in the 80's).

"The right thing" doesn't really hold meaning in major conflicts, history has proven this. In a major world war III situation I think we'd find all sides playing fast and loose with international law, especialy if things where going bad.

Legbreaker

03-17-2011, 08:49 AM

95th Rifleman

03-17-2011, 09:51 AM

For my part I don't see civilisation, or at least attempts at organisation slipping away all that easily. Yes there will certainly be instances of barbarism and chaos, but humans as a whole prefer order.

Where there is a working command structure, whether that be civilian or military, Division sized or platoon, you'll see attempts to follow pre-war rules. In fact I see an increase in discipline being vital to survival. If you have individuals doing their own thing, breaking the laws, traditions, habits, etc then the whole unit is weakened. A good commander/politician will see that right from the beginning and take the necessary steps.

This may be the implementation of a democratic system where everyone gets a say and vote thereby instilling a sense of community and individual worth, or raising of a brutal police force with no qualms about beating the populace down and into line, or something in between. In military units I can see MPs being very busy, and senior NCOs having a number of "quiet talks around back" with the less cooperative soldiers in their unit.

Without discipline and order a unit is sure to fall apart and become either marauders of their prey. Without unit cohesion that unit is in serious danger of being wiped out by other units with perhaps less resources, but better command and control.

The same ideas apply to such things as marking minefields. If a unit fails to mark them, especially around their cantonment, or located within their area of support (ie the farmland that feeds them), they'll very quickly find themselves at odds with the civilian population. Without that population chances are the unit will starve, have great difficulty acquiring necessary raw materials, parts etc and suffer continuous sabotage attempts from the disaffected locals.

The cantonment system wouldn't go into effect till the later half of the conflict. Before that you would see some pretty desperate battles before lack of resources and broken chains of command mean that units have to base themselves around a wider community. Sldiers would still be expecting ultimate victory before being sent back home so nobody would care too much about the piece of foreighn turf they are fighting over, I would imagine Russian, American and British soldiers would care the least while Plish, Czech and German soldiers would probably be more mindful.

I'm sure many would come to regret their actions in seeding vast areas of central and eastern Europe with munitions and when the cantonment system goes into effect everyone would be VERY careful to police their areas of control and mark mine fields.

We need to remember that the Twilight conflict has 3 very distincy stages. First it would be a convetional, fluid campaign. Secondly things would become more desperate, nukes and chemical weapons start flying and the focus is on destroying or blunting enemy capabilities. only in the last phase of the war when soldiers begin to realise they are stuck in theatre for the long haul and require the co-operation of locals will hey be more area of the need to mark thins properly and use caution with area denial munitions.

Webstral

03-17-2011, 07:08 PM

I agree completely that some minefields are going to go unmarked and forgotten. However, mines tend to reveal themselves fairly quickly. Some will go undiscovered for extended periods, but the mines laid in places used habitually will be discovered and marked promptly.

We should expect a deliberate use of mines to defend base camp areas in Europe beginning in 1997â€”perhaps earlier. The pre-war minefields may be hash by late 1997, but once the pace of war starts to slow the emplacement of permanent fields will accelerate. The Summer 1998 fighting will demonstrate to the European commands that peace is still some way off; whatever local and temporary arrangements that were made up to that point will be expanded into a series of measures to create safe base areas for all units. Also, the use of mines to canalize the next enemyâ€™s offensive will gain importance. These mines will be marked for more practical reasons than the Geneva Convention; friendly casualties and losses among local civilians are to be avoided. Even the Soviets in Poland will realize that maintaining the good will and cooperation of the locals is a combat multiplier.

Webstral

P.S. Of course, not everybody is going to think in such rational terms. There is plenty of room for soldiers to treat the locals like hosts for uniformed parasites.

Raellus

05-24-2012, 07:21 PM

I'm currently finishing up Max Hastings' single-volume history of WWII, Inferno (it was published first in the UK under a different title) and, in his analysis of the war, he brings up a couple of points about the WWII Red Army that I would like to reiterate here.

WWII-era Soviet troops, many of them illiterate peasants, were able to withstand sustained hardships that most troops from the Western Allies (henceforth WA) did not experience often or for long periods of time. Whereas WA troops often had the "luxury" of stopping and calling in massive artillery barrages and airstrikes when they met strong enemy resistance, Soviet troops were often forced to attack again and again without the benefit of strong supporting fires. Wehrmacht troops who fought on both fronts often noted this contrast. They generally stood in awe of WA fire support while simultaneously being fairly contemptuous of WA reliance on said. On the other hand, Wehrmacht troops learned to cede a grudging respect for the Red Army soldier who they considered simple-minded but incredibly tough and determined. In other words, the Red Army often did more with less than the WA.

Soviet units, although well supplied with lend-lease trucks, were able to live off the land much better than WA or even Wermacht units, reducing their need for the long logistical chains that WA armies could not operate without. One of these days I'll track down the stats that back this up, but the Red Army in WWII was able to field and supply a larger combat force than the WA with fewer supporting units and trucks. Even so, the Red Army during Operation Bagration was able to advance over 450 miles along a broad front in a matter of a few weeks before logistical difficulties slowed them to a halt.

I know that the Red Army of the late Cold War was not the same force as that fielded in '43-45, and that the WA, later NATO, armies also changed (mostly for the better), but it's hard to contend that young men raised during consumer goods shortages in the authoritarian U.S.S.R. were not tougher, in many ways, than those young men raised in the West on Pac-Man, MTV, and Big Macs (insert your prefered equivalent Western cultural equivalents here).

Also, the Red Army's leadership and operational doctrine steadily improved over the course of the Great Patriotic War. I know that some detractors here have pointed out as proof of their inherent inferiority to the West how poorly led, and chained to outdated military dogma, the Soviet Army was in Afghanistan and, later, as the Russian Federation, in Chechnya. I contend that the Red Army of the Twilight War, much like that of WWII, would have identified and elevated talented generals and weeded out the incompetent ones as the war progressed. Some of this would have happened during the China campaign. More would occur as NATO pushed the Soviets east towards their own border. In the case of the latter, you can be sure the entire Soviet economy, monolithic as it may have been, would have been operating at full capacity in support of the war.

All of this suggests to me that, after the tech advantages of the West were rendered null by time and attrition, the Soviets would be in a better condition/position to continue the war on a stronger footing than NATO would.

There's one more point that I would like to make based on a recent viewing of Soviet War Scare 1983 (a History Channel documentary on Able Archer and the near nuclear war that occured as a result), and that is, as a result of their historical collective experience, the Cold War Soviets had an almost atavistic fear of invasion and war. If attacked, I have no doubt that they would have fought with a patriotic furor that would have surprised the West. In the v1.0 timeline, it is the German Army who strikes first (again!).

95th Rifleman

05-24-2012, 07:53 PM

The problem is western attitudes tend to be a bit blind. The west consider themselves to be the "victors" of the cold war, citing the collapse of the soviet union and the defeat of soviet-equipped militaries in the 90's.

I must agree with Raellus that the realities are very different. One of my pet hates is how people consistently ignore Soviet air defence in their comparisons. Sure, soviet aircraft where inferior to western counterparts but the soviets whee far more advanced in the area of air defence, the Tunguska system is a prime example. The soviets knew that western helicopters and aircraft where superior so created systems to negate that superiority on the ground rather than in the air.

Another key factor is te more advanced anti-missle systems devised by the soviets in the mid 90's to deprive the west of their main anti-tank advantage, the ATGM.

raketenjagdpanzer

05-24-2012, 09:28 PM

Targan

05-24-2012, 09:54 PM

Soviet units, although well supplied with lend-lease trucks, were able to live off the land much better than WA or even Wermacht units, reducing their need for the long logistical chains that WA armies could not operate without. One of these days I'll track down the stats that back this up, but the Red Army in WWII was able to field and supply a larger combat force than the WA with fewer supporting units and trucks. Even so, the Red Army during Operation Bagration was able to advance over 450 miles along a broad front in a matter of a few weeks before logistical difficulties slowed them to a halt.

Fair points but where we use the term "living off the land" we really mean moving across the landscape like a plague of locusts. It's bad enough for rural civilians during times of war but it would be orders of magnitudes worse if the army moving through your area was relying on what they could "find" in the local area to supply themselves.

By late in the Twilight War NATO forces would be forced to operate in much the same way but I still suspect that Soviet soldiers would be more hated by European peasantry than their NATO equivalents for the above reasons.

Webstral

05-25-2012, 12:10 AM

The West invested in airframes because the West had the money and the psychological framework to put into practice the philosophy that air superiority is achieved by aircraft, not ground-based systems. The Soviets put into practice a philosophy that point and area denial with dense and capable ground-based anti-aircraft systems was a cost-effective means of supporting the Army. The West expected that their huge investment in aircraft would enable them to take the initiative in the air and concentrate massive combat power on selected objectives. The Soviets expected that their robust point and area denial capability would enable their ground-based air defenses to keep the Western air forces from intervening decisively wherever the Soviets made their main effort on the ground. The West expected to use its air power to alleviate pressure on its ground forces. The Soviets expected to use their ground-based air defenses to keep the Western air forces from doing exactly that.

Obviously, this is an oversimplification. The Soviets would have entered a Red Storm Rising scenario with a major superiority in numbers of aircraft. The West would have had some effective point and area denial systems. However, where each side chose to make its major investment is telling.

I’ve seen some numbers for how much sustenance the Red Army could get from land the Germans considered scorched. If true, these numbers suggest that the Reds ought to have started with a SCR score of at least 50 (v1). However, I agree with Targan. It would have been hard for the locals that hadn’t been machine gunned to get by with the soft inner bark gnawed off all the trees in the forest, every tuber in a ten square mile area dug up and eaten, and every small mammal and bird in the same area put into “varmint surprise-ski”. Obviously, large numbers of civilians did survive. I can’t help but wonder, though, if survival didn’t mean come down to supplies rolling in behind the Red Army advance.

The degree to which US Army infantry is reliant upon close and consistent fire support is dismaying. It’s a major weakness. Once again, I feel the irresistible urge to advance my personal campaign for supplementing the traditional light/mechanized distinction in the US Army with a dragoon/grenadier distinction. Like typical mechanized infantry, the dragoons would be expected to move operationally and tactically in organic transport and to fight dismounted with close support from organic fighting vehicles as well as artillery and CAS. Dragoons could come in a variety of configurations while meeting the above conditions.

Grenadiers, on the other hand, would move tactically and operationally in vehicles belonging to a higher echelon. They would fight dismounted without close support from fighting vehicles. Support from corps-level artillery and CAS would be worked into the doctrine, but grenadiers would be expected to execute their missions without heavy fire support. I would add, though, that they should have some vehicles that could carry packs, ammunition, and other consumables over short distances so that the light fighters themselves could move and fight carrying the minimum additional mass. Every pound counts.

Dragoons probably would fight during the day, and they would never get very far from their fighting vehicles. Grenadiers probably would operate at night. Dragoons would go into the crucible of combat with the principle role of defending the tanks against the enemy’s infantry and dismounted anti-tank fires. Grenadiers would avoid combat as much as possible, preferring offensive or defensive ambushes. Dragoons could operate in any terrain, being all combined arms and junk. Grenadiers would operate in restricted terrain where the enemy’s dragoons would be forced to fight dismounted and with limited assistance from fighting vehicles. Dragoons could be produced relatively quickly. Grenadiers would take some training. Grenadiers would be junior Rangers, in effect, with a healthy dose of WW2 Japanese light fighter thrown in for good measure. Infiltration, camouflage, deception, superior leadership, superior training, superior marksmanship, superior conditioning, superior unit cohesion, superior leadership (‘cuz it needs to be mentioned twice), superior perks in the rear, and superior leadership (‘cuz it really does need to be mentioned three times) would distinguish grenadiers from dragoons. I’d have never been an NCO in a grenadier unit, though I might have done okay as a private.

Whenever the logistical situation demanded a down shifting of the tempo of mechanized operations, the grenadiers would go in to keep the front from stabilizing. They also would go in behind the lines, like the Chindits. Well-trained troops with effective light weapons can be extraordinarily effective under many conditions. Also, the grenadiers would be available to play the same game as enemy guerillas in the hinterlands, only with the advantage of aerial resupply and regular rotation out for rest and refit. Obviously, the US would need several brigades of these guys. The 82nd Airborne might qualify. I’m not up-to-speed on what the 10th Mountain has been doing since OEF started, so they may or may not count as grenadiers. I can say with certainty that 29th Infantry Brigade does not count. Not even close.

avantman42

05-25-2012, 01:27 AM

There's one more point that I would like to make based on a recent viewing of Soviet War Scare 1983 (a History Channel documentary on Able Archer and the near nuclear war that occured as a result), and that is, as a result of their historical collective experience, the Cold War Soviets had an almost atavistic fear of invasion and war. If attacked, I have no doubt that they would have fought with a patriotic furor that would have surprised the West. In the v1.0 timeline, it is the German Army who strikes first (again!).
That's very true, and it's also worth bearing in mind that the Soviet government had total control over the news etc that the people got. Whoever actually struck first, chances are the Soviet people and soldiers would believe it was the Germans.

95th Rifleman

05-25-2012, 04:24 AM

I remember playing plenty of flight sims in the 80s (F19/F117, Gunship, etc.) and being constantly frustrated by the clouds of SAMs so thick they'd blot the frigging sun out. :P

Always wondered why we never tried to maintain developmental parity - no offense but the M163 and Chaparral were jokes compared to some of the gear the Soviets fielded. Yeah some of it was pretty bad (the SA9, for example, had a very poor showing in S. Lebanon), but the Israelis were rightly afraid of the Shilka and SA11.

It seems like every time we got something comparable it would get shitcanned. Roland: Not Built Here (neither is a lot of gear we use and used so why was that singled out). ADATS: Same thing.

Patriot is kick-ass...but about as mobile as my house (which is to say: not). So Patriot is about like the SA-2.

Sigh.

(I still think the west won the Cold War :P )

It was a case of arrogance and over-reliance on air technology on the part of the US. Germany and Britain tried hard to keep up with the German Roland and Gepard and the British Rapier and Javelin (later we adopted the starstreak).

American thinking got a bit blinded by the success of the stinger in Afghanitan and their belief that their aircraft would be ble to avoid such air defence systems, they over relied on their stealth and SEAD aircraft.

Legbreaker

05-25-2012, 04:32 AM

Grenadiers would be junior Rangers, in effect, with a healthy dose of WW2 Japanese light fighter thrown in for good measure. Infiltration, camouflage, deception, superior leadership, superior training, superior marksmanship, superior conditioning, superior unit cohesion...

So what you're really saying is Grenadiers would be just like Australian reserve infantry? :p

Targan

05-25-2012, 05:00 AM

So what you're really saying is Grenadiers would be just like Australian reserve infantry? :p

:cool:

Panther Al

05-25-2012, 05:10 AM

So what you're really saying is Grenadiers would be just like Australian reserve infantry? :p

Or better yet, only half as good as a US Cav trooper?

After all, as any would admit - We are not the greatest thing since sliced bread. We can't be - we invented it.

;)

95th Rifleman

05-25-2012, 07:07 AM

I've alwys worried about how much we rely on shiny toys and artillery, the west has a great pyschological hang up regarding casualties. Our tactics are based around the use of massed artillery and air power to eliminate the enemy on the ground so that the actualy ground combat becomes little more than a mopping up exercise.

In the first Gulf war this strategy was amazingly effective against poorly disciplined, mostly static Iraqi positions.

In a situation where the enemy has effective air defence and artillery reserves for counter-battery fire, I do wonder about the west's capability to engage effectively.

We must remember that the only reason the cold war stayed cold was because both sides did not feel they could win quickly enough or decisvely enough before nukes created th MAD scenario. If either side, for one minute, thought they could pull it off, they would of gone in hard and fast.

The proxy wars of the 80's and 90's gave the west an unreal sense of superiority as they made short work of poor quality soviet export designs. We conveniantly forget the times when more advanced soviet tech came into play (such as the Israeli merkava losses to advanced soviet ATGMs).

Panther Al

05-25-2012, 07:35 AM

And here is something fun the think about:

The western doctrine was pretty much a mash of soviet/wehrmacht doctrines. So in a way, we was planning on fighting with ideas that was stolen from those two sources. Any way you look at it, the Soviets was no dummies when it came to military thinking. A lot of folks said that jeeps with a TOW missile could hold up all sorts of units. While true to a degree, the Soviets already had a plan for this: after all, they pushed the development of ATGM's before most other folks, and they put as much thought into countermeasures as much as uses of the technology. And there was a huge playbook that was to be used. Encounter situation A? Turn to page three of the plan. So on and so forth. A Soviet drive towards the Channel would be stopped: I don't think the Red Army was that good. But it wouldn't be fun, and it would be a *lot* harder than anyone seems to think.

Legbreaker

05-25-2012, 10:54 AM

I've always worried about how much we rely on shiny toys and artillery, the west has a great psychological hang up regarding casualties. Our tactics are based around the use of massed artillery and air power to eliminate the enemy on the ground so that the actually ground combat becomes little more than a mopping up exercise.

Unless you're Australian. We don't get the shiny toys the US and even British get to play with. Our usual fire support (if we're lucky) is the Section GMPG and if we're REALLY lucky, a few 40mm HEDP.
Once in a blue moon we might get a little 81mm HE from the battalion mortar platoon, and maybe once a lifetime we might see a couple of M113s giving fire support from their next hill with their .30 and .50 cals.

Try telling the youth of today that though. Think they'll believe you? :cool:

James Langham

05-25-2012, 11:20 AM

Try telling the youth of today that though. Think they'll believe you? :cool:

Luxury! :-)

Try being in the cadet forces, 5.56 is regarded as a luxury item.

Legbreaker

05-25-2012, 11:32 AM

REAL ROUNDS!? :eek:
I did a 2 week exercise once where we only had 11 blank rounds issued per person for the entire duration! Even the M60 only had a belt of a few dozen!
Try putting in ambushes and assaults with just that - and no bayonet!

And the food situation wasn't much better either! Somebody in the kitchens screwed up the meat order. There was only 20 pounds of meat between 400+ starving soldiers to last a week!

And then, if it couldn't get any worse, they sent us salad for lunch in the middle of winter while it was bucketing down with rain so hard there was water three inches deep on top of the hills!

You want more? Try the porridge they sent us one morning as an attempt to apologise for the meat snafu (we were supposed to be on rations during that phase of the exercise) - absolutely riddled with weevils! On a positive note, I suppose we did get our allotment of protein that day....

Webstral

05-25-2012, 12:32 PM

So what you're really saying is Grenadiers would be just like Australian reserve infantry? :p

Less beer—at least in the field. And also a greater variety of first names. It does no good for the platoon to yell in the heat of combat “Bruce, get down there and put some fire on their flank!” and have the whole platoon up and move. Or “Bruce, give us a tinny!” and get hit in the head with 30 cans of whatever Aussie infantry really drink instead of Fosters.

Or better yet, only half as good as a US Cav trooper?

Less of an unwholesome fixation on horses.

Webstral

05-25-2012, 12:38 PM

Try the porridge they sent us one morning as an attempt to apologise for the meat snafu - absolutely riddled with weevils!

Weevils? You were lucky!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xe1a1wHxTyo

raketenjagdpanzer

05-25-2012, 01:09 PM

I think it's appropriate to this thread to bring up an old joke:

Right at the end of the second world war, three generals, a British General, an American General and a Soviet General are meeting in Berlin and discussing the hows and whys of their successes in the field, and the adage that "an army marches on its stomach" comes up. Soviet general proclaims that the Red Army did so well because its men were well fed - a thousand calories a day! The British general chuckles a bit and says sorry old man, we gave our lads fifteen hundred calories a day. The Soviet is flabbergasted but before he can speak, the American general chimes in and lets it be known that the US Combat soldier received three thousand calories per day, even under battle conditions. At this point the Soviet general cries foul and says "Impossible! No man can eat three sacks of potatoes in a single day!"

Raellus

05-26-2012, 01:56 PM

As I see it, the West's main advantage over the ComBloc was technology. This advantage became more pronounced over time. I sometimes wonder how well NATO would have been able to deal with a conventional Soviet attack before the advent of the Western armored triumvarent- Leopard II, M1, & Challenger I.

In my view, that Western faith in, and reliance on, technology can also be considered a weakness. Superior technology allowed us to route Saddam's army not once but twice, and that only reinforced this belief that Western technology would have been the decisive war winner we hoped it would be during the Cold War. We tend to ingore historical examples that contradict that deeply-held belief. For example, it's easy to ignore the fact that the WWII-era German's belief that a complex, expensive, and technically superior Panther or Tiger was worth five or ten crude, relatively inexpensive T-34s still resulted in their eventual defeat (it should be noted that the T-34 was muchbetter than some Germans gave it credit for- some historians rate it the best overall tank of the war, in spite of some fairly glaring technical shortcomings).

We also seem to ignore or discount the fact that Western technological superiority failed to win the wars in Korea and Vietnam and, more recently, the war in Afghanistan. Yes, those are different types of wars, but GWI and II were not really comparable to a WWIII in Europe scenario either. It's not fair to say that the lessons of Korea and 'Nam don't apply to WWIII whereas the "lessons" of GWI somehow do.

Therefore, I think it's fair to say that the west clearly had a technological advantage over the ComBloc, but that this advantage was not a decisive one.

95th Rifleman

05-26-2012, 05:27 PM

As I see it, the West's main advantage over the ComBloc was technology. This advantage became more pronounced over time. I sometimes wonder how well NATO would have been able to deal with a conventional Soviet attack before the advent of the Western armored triumvarent- Leopard II, M1, & Challenger I.

In my view, that Western faith in, and reliance on, technology can also be considered a weakness. Superior technology allowed us to route Saddam's army not once but twice, and that only reinforced this belief that Western technology would have been the decisive war winner we hoped it would be during the Cold War. We tend to ingore historical examples that contradict that deeply-held belief. For example, it's easy to ignore the fact that the WWII-era German's belief that a complex, expensive, and technically superior Panther or Tiger was worth five or ten crude, relatively inexpensive T-34s still resulted in their eventual defeat (it should be noted that the T-34 was muchbetter than some Germans gave it credit for- some historians rate it the best overall tank of the war, despite some fairly glaring technical shortcomings).

We also seem to ignore or discount the fact that Western technological superiority failed to win the wars in Korea and Vietnam and, more recently, the war in Afghanistan. Yes, those are different types of wars, but GWI and II were not really comparable to a WWIII in Europe scenario either. It's not fair to say that the lessons of Korea and 'Nam don't apply to WWIII whereas the "lessons" of GWI somehow do.

Therefore, I think it's fair to say that the west clearly had a technological advantage over the ComBloc, but that this advantage was not a decisive one.

WW2 is a good point.

Every allied nation was behind Germany in terms of tech and yet Germany still lost.

Compare the M4 Sherman to the later model Panzer IV's let alone the Panther and Tiger. The German Panzerfaust and Panzerschrek where superior to both the Bazooka and the joke (sorry, by joke I mean the british PIAT). The Germans had the jet aircraft which where superior in every way to the allied fighters.

The problem Germany had was numbers and fuel. In a WW3 scenario the Russians have a massive numerical advantage and this could prove as telling as it was in WW2.

If it takes ten T72's to kill an Abrams and the Russians have those tanks to spare, the Abrams will die. It;s how the American shermans killed Tigers.

B.T.

05-27-2012, 05:40 AM

Once again, a very educated ans very inspiring thread, Thank you all for sharing your thoughts.
I would like, to add some of my own:
The degree to which US Army infantry is reliant upon close and consistent fire support is dismaying. It’s a major weakness. Once again, I feel the irresistible urge to advance my personal campaign for supplementing the traditional light/mechanized distinction in the US Army with a dragoon/grenadier distinction. Like typical mechanized infantry, the dragoons would be expected to move operationally and tactically in organic transport and to fight dismounted with close support from organic fighting vehicles as well as artillery and CAS. Dragoons could come in a variety of configurations while meeting the above conditions.

Grenadiers, on the other hand, would move tactically and operationally in vehicles belonging to a higher echelon. They would fight dismounted without close support from fighting vehicles. Support from corps-level artillery and CAS would be worked into the doctrine, but grenadiers would be expected to execute their missions without heavy fire support. I would add, though, that they should have some vehicles that could carry packs, ammunition, and other consumables over short distances so that the light fighters themselves could move and fight carrying the minimum additional mass. Every pound counts.

Dragoons probably would fight during the day, and they would never get very far from their fighting vehicles. Grenadiers probably would operate at night. Dragoons would go into the crucible of combat with the principle role of defending the tanks against the enemy’s infantry and dismounted anti-tank fires. Grenadiers would avoid combat as much as possible, preferring offensive or defensive ambushes. Dragoons could operate in any terrain, being all combined arms and junk. Grenadiers would operate in restricted terrain where the enemy’s dragoons would be forced to fight dismounted and with limited assistance from fighting vehicles. Dragoons could be produced relatively quickly. Grenadiers would take some training. Grenadiers would be junior Rangers, in effect, with a healthy dose of WW2 Japanese light fighter thrown in for good measure. Infiltration, camouflage, deception, superior leadership, superior training, superior marksmanship, superior conditioning, superior unit cohesion, superior leadership (‘cuz it needs to be mentioned twice), superior perks in the rear, and superior leadership (‘cuz it really does need to be mentioned three times) would distinguish grenadiers from dragoons. I’d have never been an NCO in a grenadier unit, though I might have done okay as a private.

I agree. As I see it, this was the reason behind the German (=West Germany in the Cold War) decision, to field the Panzergrenadier-units (mech. Inf with the Marder IFV) and the Jäger-units (Kind of "light Infantry", equipped with trucks or the M113.) Every PzGren-Btl in the Bundeswehr of the 80ies had one integrated Jäger company. Those would have been asked to support the Panzergrenadiers in FIBUA situations and in fighting in wooded areas. The Jägers were better trained. Every single soldier in my unit was trained with rifle, MP, Pistol, handgrenades, MGs, and the le. Panzerfaust. Everyone had seen the Milan and was instructed, to use it (although not everyone visited the 6 week training course).
We were trained in lying minefields and in improving booby traps with grenades.
The Panzergrenadiers, on the other hand, were not trained with the Uzi. At a time, when the Marder still had the firing ports for the Uzi!

We also seem to ignore or discount the fact that Western technological superiority failed to win the wars in Korea and Vietnam and, more recently, the war in Afghanistan. Yes, those are different types of wars, but GWI and II were not really comparable to a WWIII in Europe scenario either. It's not fair to say that the lessons of Korea and 'Nam don't apply to WWIII whereas the "lessons" of GWI somehow do.

Therefore, I think it's fair to say that the west clearly had a technological advantage over the ComBloc, but that this advantage was not a decisive one.

Very true. Technical superiority does not win wars. The more advanced technical weapons would help in warfare, but what counts, are the single soldiers. You know: "(More) Boots on the ground!"

Every allied nation was behind Germany in terms of tech and yet Germany still lost.

Compare the M4 Sherman to the later model Panzer IV's let alone the Panther and Tiger. The German Panzerfaust and Panzerschrek where superior to both the Bazooka and the joke (sorry, by joke I mean the british PIAT). The Germans had the jet aircraft which where superior in every way to the allied fighters.

The problem Germany had was numbers and fuel. In a WW3 scenario the Russians have a massive numerical advantage and this could prove as telling as it was in WW2.

One should not forget, that the German society was in a constant state of paranoia. Even in the developement of weapons, several agencies tried, to convince all others, that their approach would be the best. And that led to a situaton, where different groups worked on the development of certain items, but a central "power" was lacking. Look at the development of a modern infantry rifle, as an example: Fallschirmjägergewehr and Sturmgewehr both were interesting designs, both were really influential. But in the end, a lot of labour and intellectual manpower were wasted. Because everyone tried his thing, ignoring the work of others. (As an aside: This seems to be repeated in the current US: SOCOM, Marines and Army all search for a specific new rifle. But every force uses a different approach. Or look at the developement of helmets: Marines and Army both replaced the PASGT helmet, but both forces developed their own design!)
The majority of the German units in WWII were still equipped with an old rifle (Kar 98), even in the end of the war. And most soldiers did not ride in fancy halftracks, they moved on foot.

Raellus

07-01-2012, 09:33 PM

I'm currently reading Ivan's War) (Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945) by Catherine Merridale. It's an excellent book and it has me thinking, once again, about the Red Army of the Twilight War/WWIII (v1.0).

It's truly an amazing story how the Soviet Union weathered Barbarrosa in the summer of '41 and not only just survived, but eventually stormed back to take a leading and underappreciated (at least, in the West) role in defeating Nazi Germany. Even before the German invasion in the summer of '41, the Red Army was already decimated and enervated by purges of its officer corps, a crisis of confidence precipitated by the failure of its Finnish adventure, widespread resentment in the ranks caused by Stalin's collectivization program, major military supply deficiencies, and doctrinal confusion (no viable plans for fighting any kind of defensive war since planning for defense was perceived to be "defeatist"). Yet, despite all of these self-imposed disadvantages, and truly staggering losses (nearly 5 million killed or captured by February of '42), the Soviets were able to rally and, eventually, strike back with overwhelming force.

The Soviet military of v1.0 would have been in a much better starting position than the Red Army of 1941. Yes, a few of its top units would have already been bled white fighting in China, and yes, many among its ranks would likely have been questioning the sanctity and efficacy of the Soviet system, and yes, it would be contending with shortages of certain items like military trucking. But, overall, it would be on a much firmer footing than its WWII predecessor, when the Bundeswehr launched its coup-de-main into the DDR. Another German attack on "Soviet" territory would be a huge "we told you so" moment and a massive propaganda victory for the Soviet government. Furthermore, the Red Army of 1997 would surely have learned from its experiences on the China front. Mobilization of the military and industry would have already been underway, if not quite complete, by the time of the German action. Yes, the Soviet military would be on the back foot in Europe, but it would be in a much better position to fight back than the Red Army of WWII. Considering how well the Red Army bounced back a year into the Great Patriotic War, I imagine that they would give NATO a rather hard time of it almost from the get-go (at least relatively speaking).

Anyway, I know that I'm badly beating a thoroughly dead horse now. It's just a topic that I'm rather passionate about. I really, strongly believe that in order for T2K to work on pretty much any level, you really need a good, strong Soviet military. Otherwise, there's not much there. Combine that belief with a fascination about the Red Army of WWII and I have become quite the late Cold War Soviet Military apologist.

bobcat

07-04-2012, 06:44 AM

wait you guys had weapons? when i reported to my old cav unit we had a guidon and four guys wearing stetsons.:D

and i still insist that guidon was the theif.

Tegyrius

07-04-2012, 09:57 AM

Anyway, I know that I'm badly beating a thoroughly dead horse now. It's just a topic that I'm rather passionate about. I really, strongly believe that in order for T2K to work on pretty much any level, you really need a good, strong Soviet military. Otherwise, there's not much there.

Agreed. However we get there, the setting at the time of play (mid-2000 through early 2001) needs to be pretty well blown up or you don't get "post-apocalyptic" so much as "lightly used." If you want that end result, your setting design needs to start there and work backward, which means creating a set of preconditions that logically yield your desired world.

(Getting there, then, is one of the biggest problems in designing T2013 or any other mid-2010s post-WWIII world. With what we know today through open sources, it's really hard to engineer a plausible drawn-out land war in Europe with a resurgent Warsaw Pact on one side and NATO or the EU on the other. My best bet these days involves a combination of an expansionist and nationalistic Eurasian Union under the demagoguery of a Putin protege, American preoccupation with an explosively destabilizing Mexico, Iranian aggression in the Middle East, and a Sino-Indian war triggered by the shenanigans of a Chinese-backed Pakistan.)

- C.

Raellus

08-13-2012, 09:46 PM

If this stuff is even half as effective as the article claims (I can't find much to coroborate it, except for some Russian defense industry blurbs which probably shouldn't be considered objective), NATO would have had a harder time with Soviet MBTs than some folks seem to imagine they would.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kontakt-5

I'd always assumed that kinetic energy penetrators wouldn't have much (if any) trouble against ERV-equipped tanks. It appears that I was wrong.

dragoon500ly

08-15-2012, 08:00 PM

Isby quotes a stat in "Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army" that is of intrest:

"There is an average of 3.285 logistics, service, communications and support personnel for every US fighting soldier. The comparable Soviet figure is surprising, they average 0.68 support personnel per every fighting soldier."

"The reason why is the different missions of the two armies. While the Soviets are prepared to fight a lengthy war, their main emphasis is on a short, intense conflict. They also lack the large training base and overseas commitments which dramatically increase the US Army's support requirements."

"The Soviets also enjoy a higher readiness in equipment. Soviet weapons are simple, rugged and have lower maintenance requirements than their Western counterparts. In WWII, in spite of their shortage of trained personnel, the Soviets were able to repair between 75-80% of their disabled vehicles, 80-90% of these within two days, a performance that is currently matched only by the Israeli Army."

I remember a demonstration that a Vietnam veteran Sergeant taught his platoon on a rifle range at Graf, he took an AK-47 and an M-16, blew four magazines through each on full auto, then threw the weapons into a mud puddle, submerging both weapons. He ran a cleaning rod through the barrel of each weapon, hand cycled the action twice and then proceed to load and fire another magazine on full auto, the M-16 fired some eight or nine rounds and then jammed. The AK-47 went through another three mags before the sarge ended his demo.

HorseSoldier

08-15-2012, 08:21 PM

I know that the Red Army of the late Cold War was not the same force as that fielded in '43-45, and that the WA, later NATO, armies also changed (mostly for the better), but it's hard to contend that young men raised during consumer goods shortages in the authoritarian U.S.S.R. were not tougher, in many ways, than those young men raised in the West on Pac-Man, MTV, and Big Macs (insert your prefered equivalent Western cultural equivalents here).

An interesting footnote I read in Murray Feschback's pretty bleak Ecocide in the USSR: Health And Nature Under Siege is that polution and environmental contamination was so severe in the USSR that by the 1980s a huge percentage of potential conscripts to the Red Army were being turned away because they were medically unfit. This was mostly related to asthma and other respiratory problems caused by air pollution in industrialized cities, but there were various other problems all related to environmental mess the Soviets made of Mother Russia. It's been a long time since I read the book, but I think the reject rate was quoted as something like 45% -- but regardless, it was bad enough that there are various reports and documents reporting that this was considered a critical threat to national security by senior military leadership by the mid-late 1980s.

Now, obviously, one of the first things the Soviet government would do on the outbreak of a general conventional war would be to reassess their recruiting standards and criteria. However, I have to suspect that a lot of those guys who would have otherwise been rejected for service wouldn't have held up well on the battlefield.

I would guess that, with recruiting standards loosened for the Sino-Soviet War once the war starts in Europe at any given point in time, the Soviets would have much higher rates of duty-limiting illness and deaths from disease. (At some point after the nukes this probably flattens out more towards parity as everyone who is at increased risk of death from disease on both sides doesn't make it through short rations and cold winters, etc.)

Feschback's book deals almost exclusively with the USSR but environmental conditions were pretty much as bad, or maybe worse, in the other Warsaw Pact nations, so this was likely also a problem for the East Germans, Poles, and others.

How this interacts with growing up in a comparatively austere environment is an interesting question. I agree that Russian recruits in the 1980s/90s may have been better prepared mentally for privation, but it's likely that this was offset on the NATO side by better nutrition, medicine, and healthier environments personnel grew up in to maybe produce something of a wash at a big picture statistical level.

Webstral

08-16-2012, 12:21 AM

I would argue that we’re not prepared to fight a lengthy war successfully. If we meant business, we would have flooded Afghanistan with troops from the beginning. We don’t have enough trained manpower to do that, nor do we have the political will to have the reserves called up long enough to make up the difference. We have fought for years under the assumption that it was all going to get better any day now, relieving us of the effort of making an appropriate commitment. We’re fighting the Rhodesian War in Central Asia and no closer to winning than the Rhodesians were. This makes me sad, because I know guys like Law have put real effort into getting victory over there.

pmulcahy11b

08-16-2012, 10:05 AM

At the risk of becoming political on this board...

Afghanistan began right, but then Bush pulled away most of the troops to fight a war in Iraq that was designed for Cheney and Bush to make tons of money through Halliburton, the defense industry, and Blackwater, while simultaneously shoring up Bush's poll ratings.

Yep, I said it. Iraq was an opportunity for them and a few others to make money. We had no other reason to be there.

Afghanistan -- we're supposed to be there to scatter Al-Qaida to the winds. For the most part, we've done that. We're never going to build a viable, reliable allied country there, because the Afghanis aren't ready for it, let alone a democracy. It's time to leave.

And the usual cast of characters are making boatloads of money from Afghanistan. While our troops die for a cause that is unachievable.

HorseSoldier

08-16-2012, 12:09 PM

Afghanistan -- we're supposed to be there to scatter Al-Qaida to the winds. For the most part, we've done that. We're never going to build a viable, reliable allied country there, because the Afghanis aren't ready for it, let alone a democracy. It's time to leave.

That's the problem with Afghanistan, regardless of take on other aspects of it. We went in and smashed up the bad guys, but ended up with a 90% solution, and the remaining 10% of the win is elusive because it just isn't going to happen unless Afghanistan becomes a much more functional country than it is. And I agree -- that's not likely to happen.

Where I was over there, the average Afghan on the street wants things to be better but they also have a culture where you take care of yourself and yours first, others very second. (Which makes sense if you live in an environment where all resources have to be triaged because of scarcity and precariousness.) It's an adaptive strategy for life in Afghanistan as it is now, and as it was under the Taliban, but it isn't a great strategy for Afghanistan to develop into a more stable nation. Unfortunately, it's an ingrained cultural thing -- getting people to step away from it is probably on par with convincing people in cultures coming out of western European sort of cultural backgrounds that democracy is a bad idea. Could be done, but there is a huge amount of inertia to overcome.

Webstral

08-16-2012, 01:48 PM

Calling a spade a spade is only political when you have a vested interest in having a spade called something else. Then it's vicious slander and muckraking.

Raellus

01-11-2017, 01:30 PM

RN7

01-11-2017, 11:17 PM

Here's an interesting article on the Soviet's nuclear-powered supercarrier that never was.

https://warisboring.com/ulyanovsk-would-have-been-the-soviets-supercarrier-f4bee789e5af#.be8mvmv7u

I think that the rapid decline of the post-Soviet Russian Federation navy has clouded our perceptions of what the Red Fleet was capable of at the height of its powers. Similarly, I think that many westerners have overestimated the capabilities of NATO navies, especially the USN. That's been discussed here at length, earlier in the thread, but it bears repeating.

I think the Soviets planned to build two Ulyanovsk Class nuclear powered aircraft carriers before the Cold War ended. How effective they would have been against NATO naval power is I think open to debate. From what we know about the current Russian Kuznetsov carrier it is riddled with engine and other reliability problems and is always accompanied by a deep sea tug because it breaks down so much. The Kuznetsov is also inferior in capabilities to all of the US Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers.

Would a slightly larger nuclear powered Soviet aircraft carrier be any more reliable or capable? I don't think so and I don't think their reliability would be enhanced by the fact that they would be powered by four KN-3 nuclear reactors which were designed for the Kirov Class missile battlecruisers, which would have been a maintenance nightmare and have taken up a lot of internal space. The larger US Navy Nimitz and Ford class carriers have two reactors. Also the Soviet had no experience in steam catapult operations at this time and their naval combat aircraft were not as good as US Navy aircraft.

Certainly the Soviet fleet was impressive and was more powerful than any European member of NATO. But I don't think they had anything to match a US Navy carrier battle group or an Iowa Class battleship. In wartime if we are talking about the Soviets in the Atlantic and its littoral regions then no Soviet carriers will be going toe to toe with US Navy carrier groups as they will lose. They will also avoid getting to close to NATO dominated coastlines as they will come into contact with NATO land based airpower which is (depending on the individual airforce) superior to Soviet naval aircraft. Also no Soviet warship is going to make it south of NATO's GIUK Gap in the North Atlantic, in fact most Soviet submarines probably wont breech it either.

Much has also been made by critics of the inferiority the Red Air Force, in terms of technological capibilites and doctrine. The following article shows how a Soviet-made plane, using Soviet-made AAMs, and operating under Soviet doctrine (ground-based fighter direction) could be successful when flown by a competent pilot.

https://warisboring.com/who-shot-down-u-s-navy-pilot-scott-speicher-6455bb966df5#.j4nq0qmbv

Granted, I firmly believe that both NATO navies and air forces were superior in pretty much all but numbers (at least in air power) to their Soviet equivalents during most (if not all) of the Cold War, but I think the gap is not as wide as some have made it out to be.

Certainly the Soviet Airforce was impressive although I think in air superiority its true strength lay in defending its own territory. I don't think the Soviets would have been too successful in establishing air superiority over NATO in Central Europe or anywhere to far outside of their home territory for a whole load of reasons; tactics, doctrine, pilot experience, command and control, technology etc. Remember that article was a one off incident were the Iraqis were defending their own airspace and got one US aircraft, not on the offensive over hostile territory. During the First Gulf War Iraq was considered to have the most advanced Soviet equipped air defence network outside of the Warsaw Pact, and US and Allied airforces overwhelmed it and shot the Iraqi Airforce out of the sky very quickly. Against NATO in Europe the Soviets would be on the offensive.

rcaf_777

01-12-2017, 08:43 AM

I think that the rapid decline of the post-Soviet Russian Federation navy has clouded our perceptions of what the Red Fleet was capable of at the height of its powers. Similarly, I think that many westerners have overestimated the capabilities of NATO navies, especially the USN. That's been discussed here at length, earlier in the thread, but it bears repeating.

I think an overlooked aspect of Soviet vs NATO naval warfare is the ability of the surface fleet to get to sea (IE the open water) at the height of the Soviet Navy had fleets in the Baltic (Atlantic), Pacific, Black Sea(Med) and Arctic waters. All with the exception of the arctic have to pass through choke points where NATO could make hard for surface fleets to break out. This could also make it difficult for Soviet fleets to resupplied at sea and or returning to port for resupply.

Raellus

01-12-2017, 01:44 PM

Fair point re defensive v. defensive aerial warfare. During an invasion of Western Europe, the Soviet air force, as the attacking force, would face some daunting challenges. On the other hand, aside from long-range interdiction strikes, really the SAF would only have to defend the forward edge of battle in order to prevent NATO aircraft from stopping the advance of Red Army armor.

Relating this back to T2K (v1.0, at least) though, the Soviets are initially on the defensive. Their AF would have been operating much as the Iraqi MiG-25 did in the article.

Regarding the Red [surface] Fleet, one must consider it's intended role in a conventional war with NATO. Soviet naval doctrine was different than that of the West. The Soviets liked to send their fleet elements on long-range cruises during peacetime as a way of showing off but, during a war, the surface fleets were to be kept close to home, to defend the Motherland. They would have had the advantages of the defender- air cover from land-based aircraft, interior lines of supply, etc. Granted, the Japanese enjoyed those advantages during WWII and it still didn't turn out so well for them.

A Soviet surface fleet sortie into the Atlantic would likely have been very costly, and the Soviets knew that. They had the capability to try, but their war plans did not envision their surface elements straying far from territorial waters.

Submarines, on the other hand- many would sortie prior to the commencement of hostilities. They would already be roaming the open seas- that was the plan, at least. I've said it before, but one thing I think many western analysts have grossly overestimated, is NATO's ability to quickly locate and eliminate these submarine commerce hunters. There's reams of anecdotal evidence about U.S. carrier groups being stalked and killed by "obsolete" submarines during exercises. NATO subs have collided with NATO ships, Soviet subs and ships, and even land. I think pundits focus too much on the theory of ASW tech/doctrine and forget about the messiness of reality.

adimar

01-12-2017, 05:37 PM

It is true that the soviets didn't have aircraft carriers but truth be tolled is that they didn't need them as much as the US.
US aircraft are delicate flowers that require pristine airfields from which to operate. When operating you aircraft has such extreme requirements it makes sense to bring your airfield along with you where ever you operate. (i.e. an aircraft carrier)
Soviet planes could be operated from rough barely packed dirt roads. They don't need elaborate infrastructure or complex maintenance and as such can operate from anywhere. a small crew to refuel and rearm the plane which will depart farmer1's field go on it's mission and return to farmer2's field (support crew would drive by truck). A fixed airfield is not needed and thus the soviet air force is far less vulnerable to having it's runways taken out.
And as a result this makes the lack of Aircraft carriers less of a limitation.

Adi

Draq

01-12-2017, 06:47 PM

And given the land available to the Soviets, they typically aren't very far from anywhere

The Dark

01-12-2017, 07:57 PM

I think the Soviets planned to build two Ulyanovsk Class nuclear powered aircraft carriers before the Cold War ended. How effective they would have been against NATO naval power is I think open to debate. From what we know about the current Russian Kuznetsov carrier it is riddled with engine and other reliability problems and is always accompanied by a deep sea tug because it breaks down so much. The Kuznetsov is also inferior in capabilities to all of the US Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers.

Would a slightly larger nuclear powered Soviet aircraft carrier be any more reliable or capable? I don't think so and I don't think their reliability would be enhanced by the fact that they would be powered by four KN-3 nuclear reactors which were designed for the Kirov Class missile battlecruisers, which would have been a maintenance nightmare and have taken up a lot of internal space. The larger US Navy Nimitz and Ford class carriers have two reactors. Also the Soviet had no experience in steam catapult operations at this time and their naval combat aircraft were not as good as US Navy aircraft.A large part of the problems with the Kirovs were because the Soviet Navy never built land bases with proper support equipment for the KN-3 reactors, so the reactors had to be shut down in port. This perversely increased wear on components, because the shut-down/start-up cycle was more stressful than running the reactor at minimal levels. If they had a pair of Uylanovsks plus the Kirovs, increasing reactor numbers from 8 to 16, they might build in the necessary support equipment to allow the vessels to run at minimal power in port.

Four reactors sounds problematic, but recall that the Enterprise used eight. The Kirovs were also excessively complicated (in my opinion) due to their odd nuclear-and-oil combination, where the Ulyas would be nuclear-only. The Ulyas would have only slightly more power than a Nimitz (1200 MW to 1100 MW for the pair of A4Ws). Lack of electrical power might actually be an issue, like it is now on the Nimitz-class. The reactors were third-generation (with block cooling systems and improved control rods), but tended to run hot, so cooling would also be an issue, particularly as energy demands rose at high speeds.

Certainly the Soviet fleet was impressive and was more powerful than any European member of NATO. But I don't think they had anything to match a US Navy carrier battle group or an Iowa Class battleship. In wartime if we are talking about the Soviets in the Atlantic and its littoral regions then no Soviet carriers will be going toe to toe with US Navy carrier groups as they will lose. They will also avoid getting to close to NATO dominated coastlines as they will come into contact with NATO land based airpower which is (depending on the individual airforce) superior to Soviet naval aircraft. Also no Soviet warship is going to make it south of NATO's GIUK Gap in the North Atlantic, in fact most Soviet submarines probably wont breech it either.I'm not sure the Soviets ever planned going toe-to-toe with an American carrier group. The surface fleet was primarily intended to keep enemy carriers out of range of the mainland with the threat of surface-to-surface missiles (at some point, advancing to using helicopters to provide over-the-horizon targeting), while the submarine fleet was a strike arm (ballistic missile subs) and a defensive arm that would be divided between striking at enemy carriers and protecting the boomers (attack subs). Honestly, even the "blue belt" theory espoused in the article doesn't make much sense, since a combination of hunter-killers, land-based aircraft, and missile-armed surface craft should be able to generate the same sort of bubble for boomers to vanish in.

Interesting, the Ulyas are mentioned in a book I have, Norman Polmar's Guide to the Soviet Navy of 1986. The expectation at the time was that the lead ship would be either Sovetskiy Soyuz or Kremlin, that it would use a combined nuclear and steam power plant like Kirov, that it would be complete by 1990, and that it would carry 65-70 fixed-wing aircraft from the Su-27 Flanker, MiG-29 Fulcrum, Su-25 Frogfoot, and possibly Yak-38 Forger families. However, even that would leave the Navy with a large majority of its aircraft being land-based. As of mid-1986, estimates were that the Soviet Navy had 155 carrier-based aircraft and 1,485 land-based aircraft, with 400 strike aircraft, 335 patrol/ASW aircraft, and 750 other aircraft.

I'm less sold on the utility of the Iowas against a Soviet carrier, since the only air defense on the BBs were the four Block 0/Block 1 Phalanx and five Stinger launch positions, since Sea Sparrow couldn't be carried due to the overpressure from the 16" cannon. The Iowa would need assistance from escorts for air defense. The Arleigh Burkes didn't start service until '91, so the best anti-air escorts would be the four dead admirals (the Kidd-class) with a pair of Standard launchers and a pair of Phalanx or the Ticonderogas (5 with the Mark 26 weapon system, 10 or 11 with the Mark 41 in 1990 [Monterey commissioned in June 1990]) with similar armament but with the Aegis radar. The main utility of an Iowa by the 80s will lie in its Tomahawk VLCs, and the Mark 41 Ticonderogas are Tomahawk-capable (but with almost four times as many launch cells as an Iowa has Tomahawk launchers). The composition of their battle groups tacitly acknowledged this, since they always had a Ticonderoga and a Kidd as part of their escort (along with a Spruance and three Perrys for ASW work). The ASW ships do have some anti-air capability, but it's limited.

An interesting what-if would be the pair of "battlecarrier" proposals from the 80s for the Iowas. Martin Marietta suggested replacing the aft turret with hangars and launch/recovery areas for 12 Harriers. Naval Institute Proceedings was more ambitious, and wanted to put an angled flight deck in the rear to operate F/A-18s from. They still wouldn't make the Iowas incredibly useful, but they'd open up the possibility of an Iowa being deployed somewhere that needed the potential for air cover, but didn't justify a full fleet carrier.

RN7

01-12-2017, 11:35 PM

A large part of the problems with the Kirovs were because the Soviet Navy never built land bases with proper support equipment for the KN-3 reactors, so the reactors had to be shut down in port. This perversely increased wear on components, because the shut-down/start-up cycle was more stressful than running the reactor at minimal levels.

The ambitions of the Soviet Navy were not matched by enough thought into how to support and supply such ambitions. The Soviet Navy was also largely manned by conscripts unlike the volunteer US Navy, maintenance must have been a nightmare for them.

If they had a pair of Uylanovsks plus the Kirovs, increasing reactor numbers from 8 to 16, they might build in the necessary support equipment to allow the vessels to run at minimal power in port.

They might have, but probably might not have.

Four reactors sounds problematic, but recall that the Enterprise used eight. The Kirovs were also excessively complicated (in my opinion) due to their odd nuclear-and-oil combination, where the Ulyas would be nuclear-only. The Ulyas would have only slightly more power than a Nimitz (1200 MW to 1100 MW for the pair of A4Ws). Lack of electrical power might actually be an issue, like it is now on the Nimitz-class. The reactors were third-generation (with block cooling systems and improved control rods), but tended to run hot, so cooling would also be an issue, particularly as energy demands rose at high speeds.

Only one Enterprise was built between 1958 and 1961. The US Navy had originally planned to build five Enterprise Class carriers but wisely waited until the twin A4W nuclear reactors were ready to be fitted into the Nimitz.

I'm not sure the Soviets ever planned going toe-to-toe with an American carrier group.

They would have eventually had too as the US Navy espoused an offensive minded and controversial approach to dealing with the threat of Soviet submarines to NATO shipping from the 1980's, by deploying US aircraft carriers groups across the GIUK Gap into the Norwegian Sea to strike against northern Soviet bases. The Soviets may not have ever planned to have gone toe-to-toe with American carriers but they would have had to, or retreat!

The surface fleet was primarily intended to keep enemy carriers out of range of the mainland with the threat of surface-to-surface missiles (at some point, advancing to using helicopters to provide over-the-horizon targeting), while the submarine fleet was a strike arm (ballistic missile subs) and a defensive arm that would be divided between striking at enemy carriers and protecting the boomers (attack subs). Honestly, even the "blue belt" theory espoused in the article doesn't make much sense, since a combination of hunter-killers, land-based aircraft, and missile-armed surface craft should be able to generate the same sort of bubble for boomers to vanish in.

In my mind the Soviet surface navy was designed to protect their boomers in regards to conflict with the US Navy. The only effective offensive capability they had against the US Navy were submarines and land based Tu-22M Backfire bombers with AS-4 (Kh-22) long ranged anti-ship missiles. Once NATO put up the GIUK Gap across the North Atlantic Soviet submarines and ships could not break out into the Atlantic undetected. Land based NATO AWAC's and long ranged fighter squadrons in Iceland and the UK also increased NATO's ability to detect and intercept Soviet Backfire bombers. Its effectiveness forced the Soviet's to develop longer ranged missiles for their boomers, with sufficient range to launch from the Barents Sea.

Interesting, the Ulyas are mentioned in a book I have, Norman Polmar's Guide to the Soviet Navy of 1986. The expectation at the time was that the lead ship would be either Sovetskiy Soyuz or Kremlin, that it would use a combined nuclear and steam power plant like Kirov, that it would be complete by 1990, and that it would carry 65-70 fixed-wing aircraft from the Su-27 Flanker, MiG-29 Fulcrum, Su-25 Frogfoot, and possibly Yak-38 Forger families.

I think its original name was Kremlin, but was changed to Ulyanovsk as Vladimir Lenin was born there. The air group of the Ulyanovsk would probably have been 68 aircraft (44 Su-33 (Su-27K)/Mig-29K, 6 Ka-27 ASW helicopters, 2x Ka-27P rescue helicopters).

However, even that would leave the Navy with a large majority of its aircraft being land-based. As of mid-1986, estimates were that the Soviet Navy had 155 carrier-based aircraft and 1,485 land-based aircraft, with 400 strike aircraft, 335 patrol/ASW aircraft, and 750 other aircraft.

In 1990/91 the Soviet Navy had 186 carrier based aircraft including 74 helicopters. The total Soviet Naval Aviation fleet included 1,469 fixed wing aircraft and 545 combat helicopters excluding transport and training aircraft.

Long Ranged Bombers: 356 (160 Tu-22M bombers, 6 Tu-22, 190 Tu-16 bombers)
Fighter Ground Attack Aircraft: 645 (80 Yak-38, 350 Su-17, 110 Su-24, 75 Su-25, 30 Mig-27)
Fighter Aircraft: 155 (85 Mig-23, 70 Mig-29)
ASW Aircraft: 198 (53 Tu-142, 53 IL-38, 92 Be-12)
ASW Helicopters: 287 (79 Mi-14, 93 Ka-25, 115 Ka-27)
Maritime Patrol & EW Aircraft: 105 (35 Tu-95, 40 Tu-16, 5 Tu-22, 10 Su-24, 15 An-12)
Maritime Patrol Helicopters: 20 (20 Ka-25)
Mine-Countermeasure Helicopters: 15 (15 Mi-14)
Assault Helicopters: 25 (20 Ka-27, 5 Ka-29)
Tanker Aircraft: 10 (10 Tu-16)
Transport & Training Aircraft: 445

I'm less sold on the utility of the Iowas against a Soviet carrier

The Iowa's would likely be never deployed against a Soviet carrier as they are battleships, unless the Soviet carrier was stupid enough to come within range of its main guns or substantial battery of Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles.

since the only air defense on the BBs were the four Block 0/Block 1 Phalanx and five Stinger launch positions, since Sea Sparrow couldn't be carried due to the overpressure from the 16" cannon. The Iowa would need assistance from escorts for air defense.

Yes and the Iowa would always be accompanied by air defence escorts, and would probably be also protected by the CAP of carrier based aircraft and submarines.

The Arleigh Burkes didn't start service until '91....

The Twilight War starts in 1996/1997.

Also other than using a nuclear weapon it would take an awful lot of Soviet hits to even disable an Iowa.

An interesting what-if would be the pair of "battlecarrier" proposals from the 80s for the Iowas. Martin Marietta suggested replacing the aft turret with hangars and launch/recovery areas for 12 Harriers. Naval Institute Proceedings was more ambitious, and wanted to put an angled flight deck in the rear to operate F/A-18s from. They still wouldn't make the Iowas incredibly useful, but they'd open up the possibility of an Iowa being deployed somewhere that needed the potential for air cover, but didn't justify a full fleet carrier.

I think that would be a waste of a perfectly good gun turret.