It all comes back to the Upton manual, the cavalry were taught to fight as dismounted skirmishers, and while a trooper was allowed to take cover, this was only if it did not interfere with the skirmish line. There are a lot of references to the troopers actually being discouraged from seeking cover.

Photos of the battlefield taken in 1878-79 confirm that there was very few trees, mostly in the ravines and along the LBHR. There was some sage and lots of tall grass. One of the intresting things about the battlefield is the somewhat gentle slopes of some of the key areas. For example, there is a low ridge facing Battle Ridge that is known as Henryville (the Fox dig found over 100 Henry/Winchester casings here). You can walk up the slope to a point where you can still stand erect and be in a position to see the cavalry positions along Battle Ridge. Take another couple of steps and you can whip up your rifle, fire a couple of rounds and then step back into safety. And this is one of four locations within easy rifle shot (150-300 yards) of the cavalry positions.

Dr. Fox has a rather intresting theory of what is called bunching. The tactical manual required the file closers, i.e. the officers and ncos to remain standing in order to better direct fire of the kneeling skirmishers. As the Indian attacks became increasingly heavy, these key people were killed or wounded. The effect on the enlisted men would be to move closer to the remaining command structure. This would lead to gaps in the skirmish line that would be exploited by the Indians, who would take advantage to gett closer, kill more exposed troopers, force the remaining troopers to bunch closer and repeat the process over and over. The good doctor was trying to explain why several of the cavalry graves (the Custer bn was buried were they fell) are grouped together in rather small areas (Keogh and Custer areas). Its an intresting theory.

To help visualize
 

I thought it might help to see where BLBH took place and the best know movements of the pricipals involved.

http://www.nps.gov/libi/planyourvisi...d/LIBImap1.pdf

Hope this helps.

Mike

The Nativity of the Seventh
 

Of the men of the Seventh, about 57% were born in the United States, remember those old classic John Ford cavalry movies with the old First Sergeant with a thick Irish accent?

Canada = 14
Denmark = 3
England = 40
France = 8
Germany =126
Ireland = 128
Italy = 6
Scotland = 12
Switzerland = 13
Other = 17

Connecticut = 8
Illinois = 17
Indiana = 23
Kentucky = 20
Maine = 13
Maryland = 15
Mass. = 45
Michigan = 8
Missouri = 8
New Hampshire = 7
New Jersey = 11
New York = 101
Ohio = 61
Penn. = 81
Other = 59

Immigrants were not confined to the lower ranks:

Captain Myles Keogh: Ireland
1st Ly Henry Nowlan: Corfu
1st Lt Charles DeRudio: Italy
1st Lt W.W. Cooke: Canada
1st Lt Donald McIntosh: Canada
1st Lt Henry Jackson: England
1st Lt Edward Mathey: England

Finally, a brief of mention of race. The Army of this period has a segregated one until the Korean War. The Seventh was a white regiment. Only two members were of other races. Civilian Interpreter Isaiah Dorman was African-American and married to a Santee Sioux woman, he was killed in the rout from the valley fight. First Lieutenant Donald McIntosh was of mixed ancestry, Scottish-Indian, he was a member of an old Canadian trading family.

The Frontier Army
 

"There was Sergeant John McCaffery and Captain Donahue,They made us march and toe the mark, in gallant Company Q. Oh the drums would roll upon my soul, this is the style we'd go. Forty miles a day on beans and hay, in the Regular Army O."

Two New York vaudevillians sang this song in 1876, popularizing a song to which the Regulars themselves would add verses. But often public irreverence was a less pleasant affair. With the end of the Civil War, the beloved Boys in Blue had, once again, became hated mercenaries---an army that was dismissed by the New York Sun as "composed of bummers, loafers, and foreign paupers."

The Regular of 1876 was paid $13.00 a month in federal greenbacks that was often not accepted in the various frontier towns, to add insult to injury, the soldier would often have to "redeem" his paper money with coinage, and often had to pay a fee to do this. From his pay, the soldier would have deductions for such things as drawing too much clothing (especially if the issue boots wore out before they were due to be replaced) as well as the requirement to pay the company tailor at least once every three months, Charges for this service could range from $6.00 for altering a dress coat, $1.00 for alterations to the service blouse and $3.00 for letting out or taking in the seams of his pants. Ten dollars every three months was a high price when the soldier only earned $39.00 and many soldiers bitterly complained about why they had to pay the company tailor for work that the government had already paid the contractor for.

Typically, the soldier would receive very rudimentary training (little more than close-order drill) and his first issue of clothing at one of the recruit barracks and then was transferred to his post. Where he often shared a straw-filled mattress with his "bunkie". If he had enlisted in the infantry, he would serve three years, five years as a cavalryman, unless, of course, he deserted (about one third of those enlisted inbetween 1867 and 1891 deserted). If the trooper stayed, he faced isolation, wretched food, shoddy clothing and sometimes ferocious discipline. Enterainment might include bad whiskey and fornication with laundresses, Indian women or prostitutes.

The Regular's best hope of overcoming the Indian's superiority as a fighter lay in his steadiness and discipline. But his training in marksmanship, horsemanship and the other skills needed by a soldier was often neglected, mostly due to soldiers being kept busy as manual labor to build or sustain their posts.

The soldier might never see a hostile Indian, but when he did, he was always outnumbered. Congress limited the strength of the Army at 25,000 in 1874 and the Army usually numbered under 19,000. Much of this force was still serving on Resonstruction duty in the South. A German immigrant, a former Prussian military officer, had this to say about his fellow soldiers: "The handsome, finely organized cavalries of Europe know nothing of real hard cavalry work. For the work I have seen a squadron of United States Cavalry perform on the plains, German would send two regiment, and deem it hard service."

In spite of the fighting of the Indian Wars, Congress provided no moral support, in 1877, barely a year after the Little Big Horn, a appropriations dispute left the Army payless from June until November, even as soldiers died fighting in the Nez Perce War.

If the solder proved himself brave, he might receive the nation's only military decoration, the Medal of Honor (Thomas Custer, brother of George, was one of only a handful of men to win the Medal of Honor, twice). The only other acknowledgement of valor was the seldom adwarded Certificate of Merit. The Certificate was rarely adwarded because money was often tight and its recipients were paid an extra two dollars a month.

Hollywood often characterizes the soldier as little more than a brute, murdering and raping helpless Indians as part of the country's brutal drive westward. The reality was that the soldier often sympathized with the plight of the Indains and often married Indian women. If the trooper stayed in service after 1905, he could wear the Indian Campaigns Medal, forever marking him as a soldier on a vanished frontier.

A Day in the Life of a Cavalryman, in Garrision
 

Each and every day of a trooper's day was carried out in a rigidly organized routine. Here is a typical "training roster".

5:45am Assembly for trumpeters
6:00am Reveille and roll call
6:30am Mess Call (breakfast)
7:30am Fatigue Call (work details)
8:00am Sick Call
8:55am Assembly of trumpeters
9:00am Assembly of Guard Detail
9:45am Recall from Fatigue Duties
10:00am Drill
11:30am Recall from Drill
11:45am First Sergeant's Call (for morning reports)
12:00pm Mess Call (lunch)
1:00pm Drill for target practise (Mon/Weds/Fri);
drill for saber practise (Tue/Thur)
2:00pm Fatigue Call
4:15pm Recall from Fatigue duties
4:30pm Stable Call (care for horses)
5:30pm Recall from stable
6:00pm Mess Call (dinner)
7:00pm Retreat and Roll Call
8:55pm Assembly for trumpeters
9:00pm Last Call
9:30pm Lights Out


You will note that there was daily weapons practise. This did not necessarily mean with ammunition since the Army only issued 90 rounds per man, per year. This would be firing drill, cleaning weapons or close-order drill with weapons.

Cavalry Rations
 

For the enlisted men there was a prescribed daily ration of 12oz of pork or bacon(20oz of salt or fresh beef could be substituted); 22oz of bread (if the post had a bread oven) or 16 ounces of hard bread (often called hard crackers; this was a simple flour and water biscuit measuring 3 1/8" by 2 7/8" by 1/2") substituted when the trooper was on field rations. In addition, the commissary would issue, each day, the following rations for 100 men: 8lbs of ground coffee; 15lbs of beans or peas; 10lbs of rice or hominy; 30lbs of potatoes; 1qt of molasses; 15lbs of sugar; 3lbs 12oz of salt; 4oz of pepper; 1 gallon of vinegar. In addition, each company was required to raise a garden in order to provide fresh vegetables for its men, but in the harsh Plains climate, these gardens often failed.

In garrison, the troopers endured countless rounds of hash, stews and salt meat, with very little variation. In the field, their ration was salt pork or bacon, hard crackers and coffee, sometimes with wild game added to the mix.

Officers, received the same basic ration of salt meat and bread as the troopers, they also received a monthly allowance of foodstuffs: 2 cans of peaches; 1 can of oysters; 1/2 can of jam; 1/2 can of jelly; 4 cans of tomatoes; 2 cans of corn; 1 can of peas; 2 cans of milk; 3lbs of soda crackers; 2 1/2lbs of mackerel; 1 1/2 lbs of dried beef; 2lbs Coffee; 2 1/2lbs of sperm candles; 1/4lb of officer's soap; 1/4 gallon maple syrup; 1 1/2lbs of dried peaches and 2lbs of lard.

Both officers and enlisted could supplement thier rations by purchasing supplies from the post sutler. The sutler enjoyed the sole monopoly for selling goods to the soldiers and often charged exorbitant prices, for example, a sutler could purchase a can of oysters for 29 cents and then retail it for $1.00, fruits in cans were higher priced.

Troopers could purchase items at the sutler on a credit system, to be redeemed on the next pay day. If a trooper was approaching his discharge date and owed the sutler money, the sutler could prevent the discharge from being completed, until the trooper had paid his bill, in full.

The Allowance of Clothing for a Cavalryman
 

Since the cavalryman was enlisted for a term of 5 years, he was entitled to be issued a basic issue of clothing and then yearly issues of clothing until the end of his service. Here is what the Quartermaster pawned of on its helpless victims!

The issue is given in the following format: 1st/2nd/3rd/4th/5th/total

Cap, Complete: 2/1/2/1/1/7
Hat with trimmings: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Fatigue forage caps: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Plume: 1/0/1/0/0/2
Eagle and Ring: 1/0/1/0/0/2
Cover: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Coat: 2/1/2/1/2/8
Trousers: 3/2/3/2/3/13
Flannel Shirt: 3/3/3/3/3/15
Flannel Drawers: 3/2/2/2/2/11
Bootees, pair: 2/2/2/2/2/10
Boots: 1/1/1/1/1/5
Stockings, pair: 4/4/4/4/4/20
Greatcoat: 1/0/0/0/0/1
Stable Frock: 1/0/1/0/0/2
Blanket: 1/0/1/0/0/2

Bootees were made of heavy leather, rough-side out, contained no grommets in the lace holes and had heavy rawhide laces. It was a ankle-high, square toe shoe that was issued to all enlisted men, regardless of branch. Both hand-sewn and pegged bootees were in service and they were disliked due to the clumsy shape of the heel. The heel was both flat and awakened and not very high. When a soldier was issued a pair of booteees he would usually go to a shoemaker, spend 75 cents of his pay and have the heels replaced with a smaller, higher heel.

An infantryman could make a pair of bootees last about two weeks on a march. A soldier who were a pair for more than six weeks was exceptional. A infantryman was issued 4 pairs of bootees a year but usually wore out eight. It was not uncommon for men to wear out their issue, draw another two pairs of bootees and then find themselves charged $6.00 for overdrawing clothing.

A boot ended just under the bend of the knee and behind the leg, arching higher up in front so that the leather protected the knee cap. A boot would typically measure 15 1/2 inches in back and 19 1/2 inches in front. The boot had a 1 1/2-inch cuban-style heel with a heavy arched insole as well as square toes. The tops were made of calf skin while the lowers were made of heavier leather.

Gee not much has change...lol...

LOL, Quartermasters never change.

Of intrest is comparing the qualification rounds fired between then and now (okay 1987!!)

90 rounds a year back then...and 125 rounds in 1987.

The Army Marches on its Stomach, Right?
 

Compared to the Indians, a column of Regulars was a cumbersome and slow-moving thing. A typical Indian war party would consider a move of 40 miles to be, well, taking their time. The Indians would ride at a fast trot, switching from horse to horse so that their mounts didn't become fatigued.

While the cavalry was considered to the arm most likely to finally close with the Indians, having infantry included in the column was not considered to be a serious handicap; men could survive hardships better than horses and over long periods of time, the foot soldiers could outmarch the mounted solders at a respectable rate of 20 miles a day.

The largest handicap in bring large forces against the Indians was the sheer difficulty of keeping them adequately supplied. Traveling light and fast, was a strictly short-term measure, an officer once compared the usual expedition to a chained dog, "within the length of the chain irresistible, beyond it powerless. The chain was its wagon train and supplies."

Troop and supplies could be moved by railroads, where they existed. Steamers could move supplies up rivers to where the troops were, but only if the rivers and creeks were navigable. Normally, wagon trains or steamers, usually owned by civilians, stockpiled supplies. Wagons then shuttled between these depots and the field forces.

The supplies consumed were impressive. The daily ration for the soldier, weighed about 5lbs per man with its normal packing. Horses required 12lbs of grain daily. Reserve carbine ammunition weighed 105lbs per 1,000 round box. Terry's column alone required some eight tons of supplies each day. And although the Terry column only carried enough supplies to last until resupply by steamer, the supply train consisted of 1,604 horses and mules; even with the wagons rolling four abreast, it stretched out over a half mile.

While an infantry company needed one six-mule wagon to haul its supplies, each cavalry troop required three such wagons due to the forage needs since the cavalry mounts could not exist on grass, even when grass existed. Wagons were more fuel efficient than pack mules; a 6-mule wagon could carry a practical load of roughly a ton, the same 6 mules could carry only 1,200lbs when used as pack mules. Since a pack mule required 10lbs of grain for its own needs, it could eat all of its load in 20 days.

But Indians could go were the wagons could not and only be using pack mules could the Army have any hope of following them. Mule trains did not use the "Hollywood" mode of attaching the mule to the one in front, with a cursing trooper leading the whole string. A pack mule train consisted of 14 men assigned to every 50 mules, this included a pack master, his assistants, a blacksmith, and a cook. The mules were trained to graze within earshot of their bell horse, they simply followed the sound of the bell as they moved at a speed of about 5 miles an hour.

But this was a professional organized and experienced train. Terry later complained that since no such train had ever been organized in his department, the he was "necessarily dependent upon wagons." though he did take some 250 pack saddles along along with 95 pack mules, to be reinforced with mules from his wagons.

Once separated from the Terry Column, Custer's supply train number some 175 mules; including 12 per company; 12 carrying the reserve ammunition, 4 for the regimental headquarters staff, 2 for medical supplies, 2 to carry tools and camp gear and 11 for the use of the Indian Scouts, packers and civilians. So bad was the straggling of the mules, due to the speed of the march, that Custer finally detailed 1 NCO and 6 enlisted from every company to expedite their progress.

I posted earlier a copy of General Terry's famous written order to Colonel Custer on the day that the Seventh broke off from the column and started its march to the Little Big Horn. I was hoping for some debate on the order and if Custer had really disobeyed orders when he launched his attack.

In the years since 1876, the Terry order has been argued, since the Officer's Call on June 21, Custer was already well awareof how the campaign was to progress, this order was simply written to confirm this. right?

Colonel William Pond (ret) conducted an analysis which is intresting on many points: "No matter what Custer does, Terry is protected. If Custer does everything that Terry thinks, and wins, Terry told him to, and the credit is his. If Custer does and is defeated, Terry told him to use his discretion and the blame is Custer's. On the other hand if Custer disregards what Terry thinks and wins, Terry gave him the discretion to do it, and credit is due Terry. If he loses, he disobeyed orders and again the blame is his alone."

Other historians regard the Terry order as so vague that Custer could not have disobeyed them, unless he disobeyed his own opinion as to his best course of action. Others argue that Custer's determination to strike the Indians on his own simply made him indifferent to his orders, especially since he had supposedly told a friend of his determination to "cut loose" from Terry and operate independently.

Another factor is the question of whether Terry verbally modify these orders prior on the morning of the 22nd. In 1896, General Nelson Miles cited an affidavit which had Terry, tell Custer: "Use your own judgement, and do what you think best if you strike the trail; and whatever you do, hold on to your wounded." Miles thought this "a most reasonable conversation." Others questioned the likelihood of such a conversation, citing Terry's caution against Custer abandoning the wounded as most unlikely. Miles later identified his eyewitness only as "Custer's servant." Libby Custer possessed a copy of the affidavit but never defended its authenticity. The affidavit was not published until 1953 were it was revealed that the affiant was Mary Adams, Custer's negro servant. Statements made by three surviving Seventh Cavalry officers, taken in 1924 stated that no servant had accompanied the Dakota Column and another witness had "Maria", Libby Custer's housemaid at Ft Lincoln. At this point, the affidavit was regardless as useless.

However, in 1983, historian John Manion produced evidence which establised the presence of Mary Adams with the column, but also explain "Maria" as Mary's sister, both women being employed as house servants by the Custers. But even this evidence does not confirm the affidavit's contents as to the real nature of Terry's verbal orders to Custer.

The Reno Court of Inquiry
 

Marcus A. Reno.

A lot of debate surrounds Custer's second-in-command and his (mis)conduct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. His conduct after the battle also leads to questions about Reno's capability as an officer.

Reno graduated West Point in 1857, after taking six years to complete the five year program. He served as a brevet 2nd Lieutenant with the 1st Dragoons on the Washington and Oregon frontiers. He was promoted to 2nd Lieutenant in 1858, to 1st Lieutenant in April of 1861 and to Captain in November of 1862. He commanded a troop in the renamed 1st Cavalry in the 1862 Maryland campaign. He was injured in 1863 and served for a time on recruiting and staff duty and on the Army's Cavalry Bureau. He rejoined the Army of the Potomac in May 1864 and served as chief of staff of Sheridan's Cavalry Division, and later as colonel of the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry and then as commander of a cavalry brigade. By the end of the Civil War, his brevets included colonel of Regulars and brigadier general of volunteers.

He was promoted to major in the Seventh in December of 1868. Following the Battle of the Little Big Horn, His behavior as the acting commander of the Seventh became so bizarrely officious and obnoxious that on July 24, 1876, he was placed under arrest after a dispute with Colonel Gibbon. General Terry apparently considered relieving Reno as well, noting in his journey that "Reno's self important rudeness makes him unbearable." Considering Reno's performance and the outcome of the battle, it seems like this would be an odd time for self-important airs.

Reno was courts-martialed in 1877 for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentlemen," including taking "improper and insulting liberties with a fellow officer's wife." Reno was found guilty and President Hayes commuted his sentence of dismissal from the service to two years suspension without pay.

During this period of suspension, Reno came under increasing attack by Libby Custer and several newspapers for his conduct at LBH. This led to him requesting a Court of Inquiry to clear his name just two days before the statutes of limitations on any possible charges expired. Five months later, a relucant War Department finally ordered the court convened.

The CoI was held at Chicago's Palmer House Hotel and was unable to subpoena the man who might have provided the most damaging testimony. Captain Thomas Weir had died less than six months after the battle "terribly used up with liquor". But the court did hear most of the surviving officers as well as a few enlisted men and civilians.

The three man panel, chaired by Colonel Wesley Merritt, concluded after four weeks of testimony that "While subordinates in some circumstances did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires animadversion from this Court." While it was not quite a verdict of "Not Proven", it was a decidely halfhearted "clearing" of Reno's name. Merritt was quoted as privately remarking; "Well, the officers wouldn't tell us anything, and we could do no more than damn Reno with faint praise."

Even Colonel Graham, relictant to believe that officers would deliberately perjure themselves, believed some had been "evasive" and all had been "more or less reluctant," answering only when specifally asked and volunteering no information. Yet the impression that the court was merely a white-wash was based not merely on the suspicions that the officers had closed ranks, but also on the reluctance of the Court to probe for the truth with questions. Furthermore, even the evidence actually heard could have justified a harsher verdict, given Reno's rout-like "charge" to the bluffs and his loss of command control during the Weir Point episode.

Certainly the Army, which never sought to try Reno on any charges related to the battle, had nothing to gain by reopening the wounds of LBH, especially since Reno, even if a court confirmed the worst suspicions of incompentence and cowardice, was due to rise to a colonelcy through seniority. There was also the honr of the Seventh to consider, as well as the reputations of its surviving officers. Captain Benteen, in spite of his lack of respect for Reno, later confessed that the court; "knew there was something kept back by me, but they didn't know how to dig it out by questioning, as I gave them no chance to do so."

One civilian witness, Fred Gerard, later claimed that the officers knew that anyone making himself obnoxious to the defense would incur the wraith of superiors.

Later in 1879, Reno was again courts-martialed for "conduct unbecoming," on charges including peeping through the window of his commanding officer's daughter and attempting to brain a lieutenant with a billiard cue. THis time President Hayes failed to interced and Reno was dismissed from the service. Still striving for reinstatement, he died of complications due to tongue cancer in 1889.

Reno won a posthumous victory of sorts in 1967 when the Army Board for Correction of Military Records met in response to an appeal from Reno's great-grand nephew. For no apparent reason, the board simply jettisioned the considered opinions of Reno's colleagues and President Hayes, termed his dismissial "unjust" and ordered his records "corrected" to indicate an honorable discharge. One historian would later term it "a very silly procedure." But it did entitle Reno to be reburied in a military cemetery and he was duly interred with the pomp and honors due a military officer....at Little Big Horn National Military Cemetery.

1988 and 1989 weren't much better...lol I believe fired more rounds during the 3 months of Basic/AIT than I did in who year usually.

The orders as written show clearly that General Terry was covering all bases, another thing that hasn't change much since their time. The orders appear to direct Custer to follow one course of action while in the next breath he gets told to use his best judgement. In either direction if Custer luck held out, it would be Terry taking the credit. If it failed Custer was the only to blame.

As you have state, you have drawn same conclusion from the orders and I think many of us drew from the same conclusion.

I am concern that General Terry would go through the express effort to write out the last part for Custer to use his best Judgement. That part is usually the unspoken part of one written orders. We have to remember back in time period they didn't have the ability to call back to HQs and ask for permission. It where it was better to do something first and then ask for forgiveness, than do nothing and fail attitude came from.

The only time I know of orders being written in such way, were back in the Civil War. Where many of the top players during this time had fought. The purpose was to give the subordinate freedom to act as they felt they should since they were Johny on the spot. With the clear intention of any failures would rest with the subordinate and keep the commander clear of the matter coming through the fan of fallout.

Of course hearing the conversation where General Terry may have verbally modify the orders does on one hand surprise me. First off during the Civil War, the only time verbals orders were issued at this level were in time of distress. In many cases, when said orders were later disputed due to the fact they were rarely recorded, and infrequently were passed along by some aid. While at others the Chief of Staff were known to issue verbal orders in the name of their Commander too. Again when disputed there was general no record. In almost every case where things went badly, especially for the Union side the commanding officer would find themselves relief of duty.

Especially in the East during the Civil War there were times when due to verbal orders a senior Commander had been removed from command to be replace by the same people who units had failed, but due to lack of documentation that they failed in executing their supposed orders were allow to raise to Corps and Army Commanders. In fact even Major General Meade, Major General Sherman, and Lt. General Grant all been accused of various forms of misconduct before and during their various command stints.

Now back to George A. Custer, one of the things that many Regular Army Officers would keep noting during his military career was that Custer was only Regular Army Captain and was Brevet to Major General during the Civil War. Most of the jumps of rank from Captain to that Major General was due to fact that he served as aid to Major General McCleallan and then after he removed from command of the army he came to the attention of Major General Pheasonton who happen to command a Division of Cavalry. It was Pheasonton who promoted Custer from Captain of Regular Army to Brigadier General of Volunteers and assigned him to command a Brigade before the Battle of Gettysburg. From this point on Custer star would raise.

Then fast forward to the end of the war. Custer was still listed as Captain in the Regular Army, but again jumped to Lt. Colonel due to his successes he had during the Civil War and 2nd in command of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. A unit for most part until his death he held, most of the time as 'acting' Commander, but due the actual commander of the Regiment being sent of to fill some other duty.

The facts are that many Officers in the US Army didn't care for one Lt. Colonel George A. Custer. Many felt he hadn't proven himself, and felt he was under qualified for his position in his command. General Terry was one of those officers who felt this way, hence is why he issued the orders in this way. It was common practice for senior Officers who felt they had limit control over subordinates or wanted to find a reason to relieve someone.

Then again if IIRC, some of the orders from even the War Department and directly from President Lincoln were similarly worded. Again this is due to the direct fact of life at the time. The Officer who was conducting the operation was to Johny on the spot and was to act as they felt was required, and yes they would be second guess later if they failed. This was general unwritten rule for any written orders, the only times it seems to be include when the Commander who issued the order felt it important enough to express, said unwritten part to remind the subordinate that they could use their better judgement because they were trusted when the subordinate had shown they wouldn't always use the initiative. Or as the case seem here invite the subordinate to use their initiative in hopes they second guess themselves long enough to give the commander to catch up and claim any victory to their credit, while leaving failures to be the subordinate fault solely.

And that is the problem with the orders. Have to agree that Custer was possibly one of the most hated regimental commanders in the army....and then you have how Benteen felt about Custer!

As long as Custer came up with the vistories, he was the darling, but when he was defeated.......

Yes that is how it always is. If Commander can win he is well liked, when they lose they are out in the dog house. Officers in the Civil War were made by having lucky days, and the days they were so lucky, well they were soon out of job. It was mentality that stayed with the regular Army for a long time...

It was Custer was liked by Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and others who were still in high places that help keep Custer in command of the 7th Cavalry and reason why the Colonel who was the actual Commander in postings in Washington to keep him out of Custer hair. I am guessing that he wasn't a Custer fan either. *shrug*

Like I said he was court martial for being AWOL and suspended but somehow retained the rank of Lt Col and 'acting' Commander/field commander depending on what accounts you read. General Sheridan seems to be the driving force behind this and the fact that the actual Colonel of the Regiment was detailed elsewhere.

General Grant was known to wear a uniform that were the same issued to Private. While Custer fell in the group that highly modify their uniform to their taste. All other Colonels and General of all ranks fell somewhere between the two.

So much for uniforms actually being, well, uniform.... :confused:

Too be brutally honest, even Custer admited that his Civil War tastes in uniform were "above and beyond"....but as Custer proved on day 3 of Gettysburg, he was highly visible to his troops, and since he led at least three charges against Stuart's cavalry and was seen by one of his Michigan troopers "running his saber into the belly of a Rebel cavalryman, as you can imagine, the men fight well for such a general!"

Call it what him what you want, Custer may have been a vain, glory-hungry, undiscplined jackass...but when the time came to fight, he did better than most of his peers.

Yes and it is reason why Cavalry Colonels and Generals would have the most outlandish uniforms. So when they were in the mist of the fight, their troopers who happen to be watching would notice and fight harder or so the theory goes...

A note of interest in my opinion.

Grant and Sherman wore what amounted to the normal wear of a private with only the insignia on their shoulders denoting their rank.

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-g...rant-field.htm

http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-g...n-portrait.htm

And yet, these were the two generals credited with the victory of the North over the South.

I'm sure that's what Patton thought, too, re: uniform modifications. Note, that was back in his days as a brigade/division commander.

If he had lost any of his battles, I'm sure he would have been remembered only as the "goggle-eyed maniac" that the 1970 movie almost portrayed him.

Yeah already pointed that out and Grant had nasty habit of being drunk too.

He was known to lose a battle or two, the fact was much like Grant and Sherman and other Generals who keep their job for the most part, they have to win most of the times. Where as many of the Generals that the Union went through during the Civil War would at best have one or two victories and the have one or more lost battles that would doom them...

And then there was Hooker and Burnside and what a pair of horses' arses they were!

Hooker and Burnside... One sad thing after they both failed as Army Commanders, their superiors were going to allow them back as Corps Commanders. Burnside took up the offer and his former Corps was turned over to him and they were sent to occupational duty away from the Army of the Potomac. Hooker on the other hand didn't want to be put in position where one of his subordinates may one day find themselves his commander was released from the Army.

Many of the failed commanders of the forces of the Union in the East were in general with the exception of McClellan were offered to re-take their place in Corps commands, but many refused. Strangely enough McClellan was allowed to do so command twice. Some were transferred from various Department to others after being relieved.

McDowell is the only commander of an Army that I know where he went to Division after the First Battle of Bull Run, then became Corps Commander and like many he had an independent command that wasn't part of the much larger Army operating in Virginia. Then when three independent Corps had been formed into the Army of Virgina under General Pope due to defeat of the at Second Battle of Bull Run was strip of his command and was no longer allowed to hold command position even though it wasn't his fault for that that lose.

Being a Union General was no treat. You had three career paths of death, force retirement, or success. Then add to the fact that many of them had very little military experience or had been out of the military for years, while others had none. It not surprising that so many Brigadier and Major Generals on both side lost their lives and/or captured during the war. Why for the first couple year the Union went through so many who were forced out.

While on the Confederate side not many Generals were forced to retired for failures. Many would lose their position to be place back into similar position again. General Bragg and General Hood remind me of two generals that probably would of done better as Corps commanders but made it to Army Commander and they for a while with several other cast of Generals rotated through the various variation of Armies that fought first along the Mississippi, then what was called the West, and finally in Georgia and the Carolinas.

It was funny that the Confederates did have several Lt Generals and I am not sure if they had two full Generals, I think General Johnston who commanded the Army that would become the Army of Northern Virginia before Robert E. Lee took command. After being wounded in rotated between assignment in Richmond, VA and various postings to the West as they continue to fight a losing battle out there.

The Union Army in contrast until Grant was made Lt General and moving out of the field to Washington. The one thing is everyone remember Lt General Grant and Major General Sherman as the major two commanders. In fact, Major General Meade on paper was still the Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac. I say on paper since most of the time Grant established a field HQ almost near by to make sure the AoP and the various other independent commands working to take Richmond would cooperate and Meade only had true command at the times when Grant had to be in Washington attending to business that the Chief of the Army had to conduct with the War Department, Department of the Army, and with the President. Even though it wasn't unheard of for the President of the United States to visit the field HQs too. One of the few times in history when sitting President would visit field HQs.

Just How Ready Were to Fight Was the Seventh?
 

One of the many questions about LBH is just how ready were the troopers to fight effectively on 25 June, 1876? This was first brought out in the Reno Court of Inquiry and debated by historians ever since.

One of the stories brought out at the CoI was the presence of a number of untrained raw recruits as well as the fact that the regiment, as a whole, was exhausted by the time it reached the battlefield, thus resulting in the poor showing of the Seventh.

The first portion of this argument holds that raw recruits lack sufficient training to fight alongside seasoned veterans. The ability to fight effectively depends upon the foundations of discipline and skills in weaponary and marksmanship. This, of course, requires careful training over a period of time.

The records shows that about 150 recruits joined the Seventh in 1875, with about 60 of them having had prior service. Another 62 are claimed to have joined prior to the LBH Campaign, but only 54 can be verified by the records. Most likely these men were untrained as cavalrymen; theor daily activities consisting of guard duty, fatigue duty, and the monotonous garrison routine. The lack of training for these new recruits can be placed onto the failure of Major Reno, who commanded the Seventh during Custer's absence in Washington DC during the preparations for the campaign. Reno neglected to schedule target practise or the rudiments of cavalry tactics. To be sure, the Springfield and Colt designs did not require a rocket scientist to figure out how to load, aim and fire. But the Springfield carbine required a technique of loading and extracting that required proper learning and practise in order to acheive its maximum rate of fire. Training in the basic of horsemanship, other than mucking out stalls, was lacking as well.

Upon first examination, the presence of these recruits are a detriment to the ability of the Seventh against the Indians as was stated in the Reno Court of Inquiry. In an article in 1936, 2nd Lieutenant Charles Varnum, a LBH participant stated that the number of recruits who took part in the battle was greatly exaggerated at the CoI in order to aid in Reno's defense. Varnum claimed that most of the recruits had been left at the Powder River base camp and that no company had more than two recruits present on the final march.

A search of the regimental records confirms Varnum's statement. At the time of the battle, a total of 37 recruits (those who signed up in 1876) were on detached duty at Powder River. One was at Ft Abraham Lincoln, another was in confinement at the post stockade and two were in route to the fort. Nine were detailed with the pack train escort and only four remained with the companies assigned to Reno's Battalion. No recruits were assigned to the Custer Battalion.

Another problem that plagued cavalry units throughout the Indian Wars is the number of "green" horses experiencing combat for the first time. It has been estimated that as many as 50% of the Seventh's mounts were newly acquired. And the reactions of these new mounts tothe sounds, smells and chaos of a battlefield would have had an effect on the ability of the Seventh to fight effectively.

The second of Reno's allegations concerned that the troopers were too exhausted to fight effectively. The regiment had traveled 113 miles, with little sleep or nourishment between June 22 and June 25. A long, hard march such as this would certainly create a state of tiredness that would have prevented anyone from operating at peak effectiveness. Field rations of hard bread, bacon and coffee, supplemented with some wild game and mile malnourishment would unquestionably sap the spirit and result in a breakdown of discipline and morale.

The troopers of Seventh were Regulars, however, experienced in Indian fighting and could be expected to perform under the worst of conditions. And a number of these troopers had brazed freezing temperatures and a blizzard to successfully attack Black Kettle's village at the battle of the Washita in November 1868.

There is another factor to consider when judging combect effectiveness is the one factor that can overcome fatigue and hunger. As any combat veteran knows, adrenaline-fueled engery can play a major role in quickly readying the mind and body for battle. Senses and concentration is heightened and while fatigue may become a factor during a prolonged battle, men trained to fight usually respond quite well in the short term. Whether the Custer Battalion could have faired better had they enjoyed a good night's sleep and a full belly, is a matter of conjecture.

The Little Big Horn's Medals of Honor
 

For the troopers pinned down at the Reno-Benteen Defense Site, by June 26, the lack of water was becoming a serious problem. While the troopers had started out with mostly full canteens when the seige began, much of that water had been delpeted and the men were reduced to drinking the juice from a handful of fruit cans or sucking on potatoes, but many of the wounded were now suffering under the hot Montana sun.

It is believed that heat was one reason that the Indians chose not to launch any serious attackes on the hill. Not only would such an assault caost many Indian lives, but it was evident that soonner or later, the troopers would need to move down a 600 yard long ravine in order to procure water, and that ravine was held by the Indians.

Captain Benteen, acting on his own, made the decision to drive the Indians from the ravine. He led a dismounted charge toward the surprised Indians, killing several of them and chasing away the others, without the loss of a man until the return to the line when one trooper was shot and killed. While this cleared the ravine, anyone attempting to reach the river at the mouth would have to cross about 30 feet of open ground, with Indian sharpshooters firing from the opposite bank.

Benteen declined to order any man to make the attempt, instead he called for volunteers. After the volunteers had collected every possible container that could hold water, four of the best shots available, George Geiger, Henry Meckling, Otto Voit and Charles Windolph were deployed as a skirmish line and ordered to lay down fire across the river. The initial mission was a success, although one man was killed and seven were wounded. Later water carriers acted on their own until about noon, when the Indian firing decreased and additional troopers were sent to fill canteens and other receptacles.

For their bravery, twenty-four Seventh Cavalry troopers were adwarded the Medal of Honor, the largest number ever cited in any single engagement in U.S. history. These men are:

Company A: Sergeant Stanislas Roy, Privates Neil Bancroft and David Harris

Company B: Sergeants Rufus Hutchinson, Benjamin Criswell and Thomas Murray, Privates Thomas Callan, Charles Cunningham and James Pym.

Company C: Sergeant Richard Hanley and Private Peter Thompson

Company D: Privates Abram Brant, Frederick Deetline, William Harris, Henry Holden, George Scott, Thomas Stivers, Frank Tolan, and Charles Welch

Company G: Private Theodore Goldin

Company H: Sergeant George Geiger, Privates Henry Mechlin, Otto Voit and Charles Windolph

The Mutilation of the Dead Cavalrymen
 

After the last of the Custer Battalion had fallen, the Sioux and Cheyenne women and a number of children and older men descended on the field of battle to help their warriors loot and mutilate the bodies in every conceivable manner, many beyond all recognition. The actual extent of the mutilation has always been a subject of debate with many eyewitnesses claiming that there was very little and an equal number claiming that it was widespread. The difference of the testmony can be explained due to the assignment of various troops to bury the dead, and certain postions may have received more postdeath mutilation than others.

The acts of mutilation that can be documented include dismemberment of amrs, legs, hands, fingers and penises; decapitation; scalping, lacrations and slashes from knives, tomahawks and axes; skulls crushed with stone mallets, and multiple gunshots and arrows fired from close range. The battlefield was said to have been littered with hands, heads, feet and legs that had been removed.

Those troopers lying facedown were likely killed by a Cheyenne, who were known to believe that it was bad luck to leave an enemy facing the sky. The Sioux traditionally marked a dead enemy with a slashed thigh. The Indians even went so far as to mutilate some of the dead horses. For unknown reasons, the names of the dead had been cut out of the few items of clothing (an undershirt or a pair of socks) not stripped from the bodies. Everything of value, money, watches, rings, and so on was stripped from the bodies.

Captain Thomas Custer was singled out for perhaps the worst treatment and he was only identified by tattoos on one arm. First Lieutenant Edward Godfrey described his body: "It was lying face down, all the scalp was removed, leaving only tufts of his fair hair on the nape of his neck. The skull was smashed in and a number of arrows had been shot into the back of the head and in the body. The features where they had touched the ground were pressed out of shape and were somewhat depressed. In turning the body, one arm which had been shot and broken, remained under the body; this was pulled out and on it we saw 'T.W.C.' and the goddess of liberty and the flag. His belly had been cut open and his entrails protruded."

The extent of Tom Custer's abuse has caused some to believe that the Sioux warrior Rain-in-the-Face had made good on his threat to cut out Custer's heart and eat it as revenge for his arrest in 1875. Captain Benteen, however, stated that Custer's heart had not been cut out.

The naked body of George Custer, from all accounts, was not mutilated. He was found in a sitting position leaning against and between two troopers, his face was said to be wearing the expression of a man who "had fallen asleep and enjoyed peaceful dreams". Custer was found with two wounds, a bullet in front of the left temple and another in the left breast.

Chief Gall said in 1886 that GAC had not been scalped "because he was a big chief and we respected him," which is very unlikely because the Indians did not know that they were fighting Custer. Cheyenne Kate Bighead stated that Custer was not mutilated out of respect for their tribal sister Mo-nah-se-tah, who was believed to have gained Custer's affection while working as his translator in 1868. Kate also stated that the women had thrust a sewing awl into Custer's ears to "improve his hearing" because he had not heard the Indians when he smoked the peace pipe with them in 1867. Many historians belive that GAC's body was mutilated, but the truth was deliberately withheld out of respect for the feelings of Libbie Custer.

The Burial of the Dead
 

By the time that the Terry-Gibbon Column and the survivors of the Reno-Beteen Battalions marched the four miles north to view Custer's slaughtered command, the more than 200 bodies, along with numerous hourse carcasses, had been decomposing in the summer heat for two days. First Lieutenant Edward Godrey described the scene as the column approached: "We saw a large number of objects that looked liked white boulders scattered over the field and it was announced that these objects were the dead bodies." Captain Thomas Weir exclaimed: "Oh, how white the look! How white!." First Lieutenant Francis Gibson sadly said: "It was the most horrible sight my eyes rested on." Captain Frederick Benteen look down at Custer's body and said, with emotion: "There he is, God damn him, he will never fight anymore!"

The gruesome task of burying the dead began soon after and continued at until the evening of June 28, when the regiment marched away with the wounded on litters to the mouth of the Little Big Horn River.

The soldiers on the burial detail, many of whom were quickly overcome with nausea and vomiting, did not possess proper digging implements. Only a dozen or so spades, shovels and picks, found in the debris of the Indian villages, were available, so they used anything that could scoop away the dirt to hasten the job. The soil was described as dry and porous, resembling sugar, so burial was at best a token gesture. The dead were buried where they fell and they were covered over with sagebrush and dirt or rolled into shallow trenches. The officers were identified by writing thier names on slips of paper, which was then stuffed into cartridge cases and hammered into the crude cedar stakes placed near the gravesites.

The bodies at the various locations were counted, 42 on Custer Hill, 28 in Deep Ravine and 208 or 210 along Battle Ridge and an approximate total of 263 when all the officers, enlisted, civilians and scouts had been tallied.

On June 25, 1877, one year to the day, Captain Henry Nowlan and Company I of the Seventh arrived at the battlefield with the mission of colecting the remains of the officers who had fallen. Nowlan was accompanied by First Lieutenant Hugh Scott, Colonel Michael Sheridan (brother of Phil Sheridan) and all of the Crow scouts that had been with Custer the year before. Fortunately, there would be no need for guesswork to identify the dead officer's, Nowlan had been provided with a map that showed where each officer was buried.

Only one officer was reburied on the field. The father of 2nd Lieutenant John Crittenden, an infantry colonel, had said, "Let my boy lie where he fell." Crittenden's body was placed in a coffin and reburied where he fell. In September, 1931, his remains were moved to the nearby National Military Cemetery.

The remains of the other officers from both the Reno and Custer battlefields were gathered up and transferred to pine boxes for transport to cemeteries designated by the next of kin. At this time, many of the enlisted men were either reburied individually where they fell or gathered together in mass graves. The group of 28 bodies that were buried in Deep Ravine have never been located.

GAC had told his wife that when the time came, he wanted to be buried at the US Military Academy at West Point and she was determined to honor his wishes. Libby was advised to wait until the fall to hold the funeral as West Point was relatively vacant during the summer. Custer's remains were stored at a valult in Poughkeepsie, New York.

On October 10, 1877, crowds lined the Hudson River as the bunting-draped Mary Powell, her flags flying at half mast brought Custer's remains to the south dock of the academy. The casket was escorted by a cavalry detachment to the chapel.

Shortly after 2pm, Major General John Schofield, commandant of the Military Academy, escorted Libbie into the chapel. Classes had been suspended and the cadets crowded into the chapel to witness the event. The West Point chaplain, Doctor John Forsyth, conducted an Episcopal service, concluding with the 19th Psalm. Afterward, cadets carried the casket to a caisson, which bore it to the cemetery. A lone horse, displaying a pair of cavalry boots with spurs, with the toes pointed to the rear, followed the caisson. The procession halted at the cemetery, the chaplain spoke again, three volleys were fired and George Armstrong Custer was laid to rest. In 1933, Libbie Custer was buried beside her husband.

In 1881, the remains of the enlisted men were removed from the scattered graves on the battlefield and reinterred in a mass grave under the base of the imposing granite monument that was erected on Custer Hill. The names of the dead, a number of which are spelled incorrecly, were inscribed on the monument. Marble headstones were placed around the battlefield to provide a rough guide as to where the soldiers had been killed.

The final resting places of the officers who were killed on June 25, 1876 are as follows:

1st Lt James Calhoun: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

1st Lt William W. Cooke: Hamilton Cemetery, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

2nd Lt John J. Crittendon: Custer National Military Cemetery

LTC George A. Custer: US Military Academy at West Point Cemetery

Capt Thomas W. Custer: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

Dr. James M. DeWolf: Woodlawn Cemetery, Norwalk, Ohio

2nd Lt Henry M. Harrington: body never found

2nd Lt Benjamin H. Hodgson: Laurel Hill Cemetery, Philadelphia, PA

Capt Myles W. Keogh: Fort Hill Cemetery, Auburn, NY

Dr. George E. Lord: Custer National Military Cemetery

1st Lt Donald McIntosh: Arlington National Cemetery, Washington DC

1st Lt James E. Porter: body never found

2nd Lt William V.W. Reilly: Mount Olivert Cemetery, Washington DC

1st Lt Algernon E. Smith: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

2nd Lt James G. Sturgis: body never found

Capt George W.M. Yates: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery

So their bodies weren't found, or were they unable confirm their bodies from the rest of troops?

More like they were unable to confirm their bodies from the rest of the troops. The body of one of the intererperters, Mitch Boyer, was only discovered in 1987. They were able to ID it due to skull/facial reconstruction

As it stands right now, there are still 28 bodies missing, the men who died in Deep Ravine.

I think you are making all of this up. They didn't have CSI in the civil war.

That is what I figured. Shame they couldn't use modern stuff to id them all. Yeah, it understandable that they could lose the position for the 28 buried. Probably they believed they were in one place and actually in another place completely.

The body he referenced identified in this manner was found in 1987 (see the previous sentence in his port). They did have CSI then. I am assuming they had a photograph to compare the reconstruction to.

There is an interesting side note to GAC's wounds. There are several accounts by Native Americans that GAC was at least wounded early in the BLBH. THese accounts were recorded in the late 1910's to 1930's.

As the part of the 7th under Custer attacked the village, the soldiers suddenly stopped and retreated after a period of confusion. This activity was confirmed by the archeology of LBH battlefield.

Was Custer already dead?
Seriously wounded, then moved to top of Last Stand Hill?
Could this be why the Doctor with GAC's Companies set up in the Last Stand Hill area?

Unknown, but the sudden incapacitation of GAC could explain why the 5 companies with GAC seemed to loose agressive action after the attempt on the village.

Something else to consider, General Terry stated that the wound to the head was "blackened".

Self inflicted?
Shot by some last member of the 7th to make sure GAC was dead before the over run by the Indians?

Mike

Brandon,

Or, Stitch2.0 lives in an alternative timeline where the US Civil war lasted until 1876/1877 or indeed, 1987 and forensic science therefore remains underdeveloped. Obviously some quantum internet error!

Regarding the blackening that Mike mentions, it could have been a coup-de-grace administered post-mortem by the Indians.

Tony

Sigh.....you really should stay current on recent events. What happened is that they recovered the skull on the bank of the Little Big Horn River. The skull was turned over to a facial reconstruction artist, you know, the people who take measurements on the thickness of muscle and fat and then scuplt a face to match the skull? The only person that matched the result was Mitch Boyer, who was killed with the Custer Battalion.

They have also used this technique to sculpt seven faces of troopers who were found in the recent digs, to date, the remains of Sergeant Miles O'Hara; Sergeant Edward Botzer; Corporal George Lell and Private Vincent Charley have been identified by this method.

Another technique that is being used is one developed by the FBI. They take a photo of the skull and then run known photos of troopers to find a match. This software was developed to ID missing persons when human remains were found.

As for me making this up....may I take the time to refer you to a most excellent resource, the book "They Died With Custer" by Douglas D. Scott, P.Willey and Melissa A. Connor. Its an excellent examination of the Seventh Cavalry and goes into this process in much greater detail.

And next time, when you decide to call someone down who has taken the time to research the subject, please, take the time to research it for yourself. It will save you the embrassment.

Have a Nice Day!

Its more a matter of where the bodies were buried. The 28 men were buried in Deep Ravine, most accounts state that a wall of the ravine was undermined and collapsed on them. The years of runoff from the rains this area is known for most likely washed them down the Little Big Hirn River.

Dr. Fox has conducted at least three digs around the location indicated on the burial map and only bone fragments have been recovered.

This is also a distinct possibility!

When Captain Weir led the abortive move of Company D from the Reno-Benteen position to what is now called Weir Point, it was observed that there were a large group of Indians still firing towards Last Stand Hill. Weir and his party assumed that Custer was still fighting. This is a possibility, but more likely, this was the Indians making sure that any one on LSH was dead.

Just offered the "blackening" as a discussion point.

Mike