As mentioned earlier, its not the concept of the stryker brigade that I think is a bit silly. It's light, which means in a conventional conflict it has issues. This isn't a bad thing: provided all it is is a few units in a RDF role. When it's the bulk of the army on the other hand, its a different story. Assuming that in a few years that we even have any heavy forces left, it means our army will erode like snow under a fire hose. It is sad that the Iraqi army has more tanks - including well over a hundred brand new M1A1SA's - than it looks like we will in three years at this rate.

But let's look at the concept of a RDF. At heart it is an air transportable unit, high in firepower, meant to be something along the lines of an ablative speedbump, with more staying power than the 82nd airborne. So, it needs armour, it needs firepower, but it needs to be light. Now, off hand the Stryker is all that, and even better -and it is truelly a good thing- all the Strykers have immense parts commonality. They also have to have as light of a logistical tail as possible, as well as the unit on the whole has to have everything it needs, arty, air, intel, engineering, air defense, and MPs.

Sounds a lot like the current organisation of a heavy cavalry regiment, save that while it could be transported by air with some effort, there was plans for this, and that the logistical tail because of the threethousand and one (OK, some exaggeration there) different vehicle types. This, if the Stryker brigade was built on the ACR format would fix that.

But the stryker has flaws, and serious ones in my opinion. For some reason politics got involved and coupled with various pet projects caused it to become immensely complex, with about every bell and whistle they could tuck in. And all that has a weight that could have been used for armour, and reduce the maintenance level (I think in T2K terms it would be at least a 12 if not 16). Not to mention wheels. In a force designed as an offensive, rapid, strike force, this isn't a bad thing. For an RDF designed to hold the line, or to engaged in sustained combat operations it is.

So, what is the right answer?

Stay tuned...

Part two:

So, what's the Stryker- and its Brigade- good for? Well, to be fair, it would be a great National Guard formation. Its cheap - relatively. Its light so the guard units can train freely on civilian streets without ripping them out. And should the crap it the fan, they can be rapidly sent overseas easily, or stood up, if time is available for retraining, on other equipment while maintaining a basic knowledge of armoured fighting.

But if not the Stryker, then what do we use for light (ok, lightish) units, especially in a RDF role?

What a RDF needs has been already mentioned, as well as why the Stryker isn't it, though it comes close.

For starters, it needs tracks - they might lose out on road speed, but that's not important enough to cut down its combat durability in exchange by going wheeled. It needs to have vehicles that share as many components between -all- its armoured vehicles as possible, likewise for its un armoured wheeled support vehicles. And it needs to have all the components it needs to operate on its own so it can operate without needing to have another unit helping out. A lone wolf regiment you might say. Replace the CFV's with IFV's and the ACR is perfect formation wise. Just needs a vehicle.

So, an armoured, tracked platform with a max weight of around 30 metric tons. It needs a variant for every use, from heavy gun platform, IFV, TOC, SPM, SPAAG, SPG, and so on and so forth.

Nothing out there meets that, but the CV90 does come very close - all but the SPG is in, or has been in, production- and so did the FCS program the army was forced to drop.

Given that we are stuck with the Stryker, and we seem dead set to trash every heavy combat unit we have - after all, no one out there has hordes of tanks and wants to start a war with anyone right? *cough North Korea - Iran - and I'm sure you all can name more...*

So we absolutely need an RDF that can fight - and survive for a while- that the Stryker and its brigade can't.

We won't, or can't, afford to develop a whole new platform, nor do we really have time. There is a turnkey, in production, with development costs already paid for, in the CV90. Maybe the US Army needs to get over its "Not Invented Here" problem and take a serious look at what's going on. We are, as the saying goes, training and equipping for the last war, or at least the one we are in, and already finding out that wheels are not it - as other nations have found out in afghanistan and have started to ship over tracked vehicles, and heavier and heavier at that.

So- what do you all think of all my blithering?

Well for a 3ACR man...not bad! ;)

I think we both agree that Stryker was a waste of time. I personally feel that if we had to go with wheeled, a modified LAV-25 would have been a better choice. Reequiping the NG infantry battalions to a medium config would have made a lot more sense then deactivating heavy divisions.

Soooo whats the best answer?

I feel that the new division concept lacks the capability that the older divisions had for sustained combat. The platoons are smaller, the companies are fewer. There is a lot of talk about the force multiplier of the new electronic systems...but these are new systems that haven't had the time to be fully developed and tested. A lot of the new combat systems have shown serious problems in Afghanistan and Iraq, and yet major changes are being made based on what these systems are supposed to be capable of. I sometimes wonder just how great these new toys will perform in a nuclear environment.

Thanks- I think... ;)

Its fairly obvious I think that over the years, from a maintenance viewpoint, that the army of today finds itself in the position the German army of 1944 found itself in: their supply chain was still intact yet they had never ending problems because they focused on have the most cutting edge, untested, most mechanically complex, and worse, the most varied stable of armoured vehicles they could have. Sounds like us and we all know how well it worked out for them: the moment the supply chain had issues they had a near impossible time fielding any large amounts of armour on regular basis.

And the sad thing is, the Stryker is based off of the LAV-25. Sure, heavily modified, but they are both MOWAG Piranhas built up in Canada eh? And here is the kicker: the Canadians was going to go heavy on the Stryker, until they got to Afghanistan and noted that it wasn't going to fly, so what are they doing? Moving heavy tracked vehicles and looking very hard at a new IFV- the CV90.

What's it say for the pentagons pet project when not even a year passed before they found out its no good protection wise, and they invalidated the prime reason they picked it (C130 transportable) by adding more and more armour on the thing?

On the subject of a nuclear battlefield: the answer is not well at all. One of those little things that has gone un-noticed is that the EMP protection standards are not as stringent as they used to be. Since the military in the 90's started trying to save a buck in procurement (not that I mind really) one of the first things they got onto was a commercial components kick, and it just got worse over the last decade. A lot of the electronics is based off of stuff bought off the shelf, and while that was supposed to save money, it hasn't and and more to the point, commercial stuff isn't shielded at all. When they was installing FBCB2 in our tank I asked about that, the contractors said, "oh sure, some, but we figure it isn't needed anymore so we just let the vehicle provide most of the shielding nowdays."

Gee doesn't surprise me, these are the same people who thought up-armoring HMMWVs would be good stop-gap measure.

Wow... Just remember our tax dollars paying for the lowest bid contractor hard at work...

am i the only rider here that considers the stryker a worthy mount. granted its not tracked. well it can get places a track can't. so its got lighter armor and when has that ever stopped us? so what that its light REAL CAVALRY IS LIGHT! give me one good reason why the stryker is less worthy a mount than a brad. i say light and mobile beats heavy and stuck to roads in any cavalry fight. not to mention tracks CANNOT run silent the stryker can. granted i've had to walk into every fight i've been in. but being able to move in before the bad guys know im there is what cavalry does. its not about tanks its about mobility. and the ability to fight on your terms not the other guys. GSP would disown the 2ACR if he heard half of this.

The late 80s had the drive to only support a handful of key systems, this is what led to the retirement of the M-110 203mm SP how, the decision to kill the M-8 MGS, the AH-66, etc....

Glad to see that they have made the decision to go with the multiple approaches to solve the same problem! :rolleyes:

Don't get me wrong, I do feel there is a place for a medium organization, even a medium wheeled organization. But the army went too far, way too far.

And that means that, once again, the Pentagon has dropped the ball. One would think that our gold and silver plated leadership would realize that their friking games are costing lives!

Okay...lets try it this way...nobody has argued that heavy armor is the way to go for the recon role. Rather the arguement has been about replacing heavy armor with Stryker. But consider this, the US has offered the Stryker to Canada, turned down; it was offered to the UK, turned down; its been looked over by the Germans, turned down....hmmmm thats 0 for 3. Could this be a trend? Is it possible that three separate militaries perhaps see something wrong with the design?

Now, I don't know about what the modern Army is teaching, but I was always able to sneak in a M-1. That's a 65-ton tank, going cross-country, on the roads and getting within 150 meters of dismounted infantry before they picked up on me...and it wasn't a one time only. The Canadians called the M-1 "Whispering Death" because you couldn't hear that turbine until it was too late. The Bradleys that were issued to the 2ACR were almost as good. Sneaking with a vehicle is easy, as long as you have an experienced crew. It may surprise you to learn that I happen to belive that a light vehicle for the cavalry role is needed...but is the Stryker that vehicle? I do not feel that it is...my opinion, my viewpoint and presented on this forum for logical, reasonable discussion.

I have had the chance to take a Stryker down range, it didn't impress me. The 105mm version, I am afraid to fire over the side due to the tendency of the vehicle to roll...maybe it's me, but if you put a big frikin gun on a souped up armored car and it rolls over when you fire...there is something seriously wrong with the design!

Watching the Strykers at Fort Irwin was also an exercise in entertainment. The brigade I was observing had the flaming vehicle for a year, and the sheer number of Strykers that were broken down due to them trying a high speed run over the washboard was amazing...one company left 9 Strykers with broken axles...and 1 stuck in between a pair of outcroppings that were just that that much too tight.

And then there are the electronics....what kind of brain-dead idiot decided to save money by using off-the-shelf CIVILIAN electronics? Perhaps the same one that decided the 105mm cannon was suitable for mounting on the Stryker?

Now you are probably wondering how a old tanker such as myself could possible have access to Strykers and be able to see what a "wonderful" vehicle this thang is? Well I work as an auditor for the DoD, so I get the chance to travel and examine these wonderful programs...

And finally, there is this...my brother has finished his third tour in Iraq with Stryker...I have seven cousins and two nephews serving with the Army and Marines. My next door neighbor is active-duty NG in Afghanistan...so I tend to hear quite about about the shortcomings of a certain vehicle. The Stryker is either loved or hated...and the really funny thing is that when the troops have to take the Stryker into heavy combat, the more the opinion is against the vehicle.

And finally, I frankly have never cared what other people's opinion of me and my opinions, after all I proudly served to defend the very right to do so and you are certainly entitled to your opinion...but for you to pop a comment such as how GSP would have disowned the 2ACR for hearing half of this...I can only say that if you are so petty as to blame an outstanding regiment for the opinions of a few former members.....well, thats a pretty poor frikin stand to make.

Happy New Year, Bobcat, and if you have another tour in Iraq/Afghanistan, please come home safe.

I would of thought a combination of 2 LAV-25 type vehicle and 2 Stryker type vehicle for a platoon. Giving the Platoon at least two rifle squads and supporting teams that would be needed. Also giving the platoon added firepower.

The lack of LAV-25 not being C-130 air transportable help in the decision not to buy them in the 1980's.

One look at back of the military of the late 1980's before they started to cuts after the fall of the Berlin Wall. One of the plans was to give 6th, 7th, 25th Light, and 10th Mountain Division a Medium force Brigade based what came out of the 9th Motorized Division, but the plug was pulled on the 9th so these Divisions were left various attempt to motorizing the designated Brigade with HMMWVs and other vehicles.

With the set up in the 1980's and if the 9th had been funded and allowed to find the correct systems for medium force Brigade, assuming that the 9th would still have round-out brigade. This would of left two Brigades with the 9th Motorized Division and one Brigade in the 4 Light Divisions. For a total 6 Medium brigades.

On the other hand having a Medium force for certain Reserve and National Guard would of made sense too.

Yes off the shelf electronic... Makes my head hurt to think about it... Again use the cheapest parts and you get what you pay for...

Heh. Well...

About sneaking about in vehicles, speaking from personal experience in the 3d, says something quite the opposite: the M1A2 is a great recce vehicle compared to the Brad, quieter by a long shot, lower profile, and much better optics. When we rolled north from Kuwait it was the Abrams sniffing and the Brads in overwatch with the TOWs. No problems there and when we pulled the trick on sister units before Iraq it always worked out quite well against other 1st line units. And that was using us as we was intended to: force on force recce at a divisional/corp level which is a lot different than an infantry brigade's scout platoon doing double duty as a in house ersatz "special op" detachment. That's not cavalry.

As to light/medium/heavy, in my mind light is a mix of light trucks supported by armoured cars in the vein of the LAV/Stryker. Medium in the vein I mentioned with common family of 30 tonnes or so to maintain a balance of armour and portability. Heavy is what the 3d is now. You know, the regiment GSP was the regimental Colonel of.

And since when was tracks confined to roads?!? The role of Cavalry is yes, sneak about, but the primary reason for its existence is to find the other guy's main force or forward screen, and when screens find each other little things like cannon fire tend to spoil any chance of being unheard. But once bumped up the Cav has to fix them in place: make the other guy slow his roll and shake out to engage the hasty defence that the Cav is forming, if our guys are on the ball, the real heavy units will arrive and do a battle handoff with us to take over the fight while we get back to finding other units.

Yeah that is one of the thing I never understood when people talk about M1 being noisy. They can be very quiet with the correct training.

As for them being used for recon, well I think that is part of the reason why the 1st Cavalry, 1st Armor, 1st Mech, 3rd Mech, and 4th Mech all had slightly different Divisional Cavalry Squadron at their troop level. One had M1 in the Cavalry Squadron while another was using HMMWVs, while another had M3 still listed, and the other two had mixture of the the three!

As for the Armored Cavalry Regiments one wouldn't get no argument with that they should be retained in their original format. It is a shame that the 2nd Cavalry was converted to a light unit under the guise to provide the XVIII Airborne Corps with a Corps asset. Then to convert it into Stryker Brigade was insult in my opinion. While leaving the XVIII Airborne Corps without a Corps level asset. I always thought the Corps asset should of been freshly raised units instead of going through the re-flag shell game. I can understand keeping certain HQ alive for heritage sake, but then again there seemed to be enough room with one ACR left in Germany, one in the states assigned to the III Corps and the final one left in the Middle East as part of the force that was left after Operation Desert Storm to protect Kuwait.

Damn shame they re-flagged the 177th Armored Brigade to the 11th Armor Cavalry Regiment too. I hope the Pentagon isn't looking at changing the 3rd ACR. If anything the last decade should of taught the US Military is that, any serious shooting war will likely move too quickly for any one side to build the military they had needed to begin with. With modern aircraft and subs, we don't have the luxury of fighting them at arms length distance either...

Pardon the intrusion, but I'm surprised to hear this about the Strykers. Is it the machine itself, or the organization, or the deployment that is the problem? I'm hearing some of each.

As for the vehicle, I am surprised to hear that it is having mechanical trouble, as I had heard high praise for the testing procedures (back when I had friends on active duty). Also, since it was based on an existing (and presumable de-bugged) chassis, that seems extraordinary that it would be failing as described.

I also have difficulty with the newer brigade of 2 line battalions, but that's a different issue right now. Fighting guerrillas needs lots of well-trained troops, not lots of HQs without the capability to cover ground.

As for the medium-weight, wheeled-mobile, air-portable unit, well, that sounds like cavalry to me, at least in terms of mobility. Not for shock action on a "high-intensity" battlefield, but in my mind, Armor took over for Heavy Cavalry some time ago. Would it be less of an issue if the "Stryker brigade labelled a cavalry regiment" had a different, heavier, TO&E, rather than being "just another" motorized infantry brigade? Something to give anti-mech. capability to the airborne/light guys?

Um, all of the above?

In my view here is how it breaks down:

The Stryker: taken by itself, its not a horrible vehicle. Its based on a good one, and it addresses one of the biggest faults that I see in the way the army builds units as wide a selection of a hodge podge of vehicles, with the stryker family, you get away from that. The Stryker was supposed to be much cheaper and much more airportable than an IFV. In this, its failed. By the time we finished making "small tweaks" to an already established and proven design it grew costwise to the point where it wasn't all that cheaper than a brad. The original stryker meet the goal of being air transportable - provided the tank was all but empty - but as soon as it was fielded they found that it didn't meet operational standards, so the weight started adding up, and still is. The already approved gen 2 stryker is set to weigh, combat loaded, 25 to 30 tons. Hence, you can't load it on a herc unless you spend a day stripping it of equipment, move it, and spend a day putting it all back in. If we have to use a C17, we might as well use a vehicle that takes advantage of it. Worse however is that all those tweaks made it perhaps the most complex vehicle in army history, which doesn't make it the most reliable machine around.

The Stryker Brigade: A better way to equip, and to form, reserve units I have never seen. Its honestly a decent org for some regular units even with the stryker. Moreover, you are right, its not a bad idea from a cavalry viewpoint. If it wasn't for its fragility. Given say, a common 30 ton tracked chassis supporting all the variants instead of an originally spec 11 tons, I wouldn't bat a eye. But we seem to have decided to re-equip the majority of the army with the things. And as is being discovered in Afghanistan, wheeled vehicles are not doing the job: a job the Stryker was supposed to excel at.

In the whole, a failure, organisational, about even with the Stryker getting high marks for concept and total failure in practice. We could have, and should have, done better.

Based on what I've seen of the vehicle so far, I would have to say its the usual new vehicle working the kinks out more than anything else, that is for the BASIC Stryker! The Stryker variants are their own special headache.

Compared to previous programs, pioneered by the M-1 program, the testing for Stryker was moving about as expected until the decision to starting throwing Stryker Brigade Combat Teams into Iraq, there was a lot of teething problems. I do understand the desire to replace the up-armored HMMWV, and Stryker seemed to do well in low-to-moderate intensity engagements, its when the heavy stuff came out that Stryker started showing problems. Based on what I am reading and hearing, there is the possibility of the Strykers being thrown into areas that should have been hit with heavy brigades, complete with arty and air support. I thing I have noticed in talking to GIs, is that the viewpoint towards Stryker depends on if the soldier was taking heavy fire. One story that I heard from several different eyewitnesses was one Stryker taking 14.5mm machinegun fire that penetrated the side and had at least several rounds that penetrated both sides....and the vehicle is supposed to be proof against such fire. I've also been assured by at least two officers that this never happened. Hmmmmm

No arguement from me...

The medium/heavy arguement has been going since 1945. The US didn't have much luck with armored cars and never really wanted them. When Vietnam kicked off, there was a need for medium weight armor once again, instead of going with armored cars, the decision was to modify the M-113 into something called the Armored Cavalry Combat Vehicle. This the M-113 with the circular shield for the .50 and the gun shield on either side for a M-60 for those who have never seen a ACCV. The problem is that the M-113 wasn't very good for that role. Mobility was decent, but the firepower/armor mix was weak.

As the 70s/80s rolled on, the US Army started to see just how good armored cars could be by watching the French, Germans and Brits. Now personally, I think the French had some very good ideas with the AMX-10RC and the Lynx. Even the German Luchs and the British Scimitar/Scorpion/Spartan series caught a lot of attention. In an environment such as Europe, with an extensive hard and soft-surfaced road network, wheeled vehicles actually have an advantage over tracked vehicles. At one point there was a lot of discussion about purchasing Scimitar/Spartans and equipping at least the divisional cavalry squadrons with them...needless to say, not-invented-here struck and that idea crashed and burned.

The issue with the army deploying Stryker is that the force mix is moving from light/heavy to medium. Not a bad idea from a budget standpoint...right? The problem with how it is being implentmented, we are destroying our heavy capability in favor of medium with little regard as to who we may be fighting in a decade. I, for one, would hate to see a Stryker Brigade taking on a Iranian armored division...I know that there is a lot of claims that the IVIS system makes up for the difference...call me hard-headed and old fashioned...but crossing barrels with a T-72 is a hell of a lot cheaper when you are using a M-1.

From what I've read, I like Scorpion, etc., but aren't those tracked, and thus not armored cars?

So, point me to a source: how many "medium" brigades are we talking about, and how many heavy and light? The pre-2002, 10-division Army used to have 6 heavy divisions and 4 separate heavy brigades/regiments, right? That makes 22 heavy brigade-equivalents, leaving out divisional cavalry squadrons, 21 after we subtract the light brigade from the 2nd ID. And there were 4 light divisions* (10th with only 2 brigades?), a short airborne "task force" and a motorized cavalry regiment, so 13 light and 1 medium, let's say. Yes, I know the new brigades are 2+ battalions, vice 3, but let's leave that out for the moment.

BTW, I'm fully in agreement that heavy stuff is needed, and that medium forces, as we are talking, probably won't cut it on a mechanized battlefield. I'm just looking for numbers.

Don't misunderstand: I too think there is a place for the wheeled armoured combat vehicle, any where there is a large, well developed road net wheels do hold enough of a mobility advantage to make up for the lessor armour/firepower balance. We should have taken more time to take a good hard look at the stryker. The armoured cars that do have a good track record, such as the ones mentioned benefited from working on a solid road net, but in addition are larger vehicles. A 25 ton Stryker, with the increase in armour and potentially greater firepower just may be what it takes to change the public view of the vehicle. Good news is that plans are already in action to bring us the Stryker III is in the works, and the II (both are what I call them) is being field tested now, the II is really a better mine protected version of the Stryker but otherwise the same as the I.

I think what has left several ex-troopers with concern is that for the most part, the reduction of the Combat Brigade from three down to two Battalion. Granted we have reduced the Heavy Brigades by one overall when you take the one Brigade of the 2nd Infantry that was converted. Yet the overall effected even if you take these troops and the Mechanized Battalion from the 2-2nd Infantry and use the Mechanized and Armor Battalions/Companies and discarded Artillery Batteries that have been meshed together into 1st Armor, 1st Mech, 1st Cavalry, 3rd Mech, and the 4th Mech to 4 Brigades. Some of these have one Heavy Task Force (either labeled Mech or Armor) and the other battalion is something of mix light/medium task force. With the wording the way the military had worded how the Cavalry Squadrons for these Brigades were stood up, would lead you believe that they extra troop of the 3rd Battalion of these Brigades were just simply re-tasked as Cavalry Squadron end of story. In many cases these Brigades used the former Engineer Brigade HQs or Field Artillery Brigade HQ to start the new Brigade while stripping Paul to cloth Mary...

Now lets look at the Airborne/Air Assault/Light Divisions before. They included the 10th Mountain of 2 Brigades at Fort Drum and 172nd in Alaska. The 25th Light of 2 or 3 Brigades depending on who you talk too. Then their was the 82nd and 101st of 3 Brigades. So with these troops there were 10 or 11 Light Brigades with 3 Infantry Battalions each. Then we had the 173rd Airborne Brigade which was being activated out of the Airborne Task Force in Italy. Itself was still incomplete Brigade but still sent to Northern Iraq to help keep Turkey out of the action. In these new brigade the former Artillery Brigade HQ were re-tasked and again stripping other units to make other units. One unique thing to point out here the of the two Brigade raised for the 10th Mountain Division, they were basically formed from 2nd ACR and the Artillery Brigade HQ after the 2nd ACR based in Fort Polk was deactivated and reactivated at Fort Lewis in one of the Stryker Brigades there that was getting ready to deploy overseas. Thus is where many of the former 2nd Cavalry members who spread through-out the army in attempt to help prop up new 33 Cavalry Squadrons.

So we had up to 11 and 2/3 Infantry Brigades before 2003. After wards total of 5 Brigades were raised, in order to raise these new brigade the 173rd was converted to new Brigade outlook with some reorganization of the Brigade with some addition to bring it up to speed. Of the other Brigades, the 8 that made up the Brigade of the 10th Mountain based at Fort Drum and the 82nd and 101st Division Brigades suffer the same fate that the Mechanized and Armor Brigades had in Heavy Divisions. On paper one would assumed the 3rd Infantry was simply re-tasked as Cavalry Squadron and their Artillery Battalions were reduced a battery. This leave us 13 of the 14 Light Brigades, one more was organized while they blending units for the Stryker units...

While 2 new Light Infantry Brigades, 1 Air Assault, and 1 Airborne Brigades under the new organization were raised to bring the 10th, 82nd, and 101st up to 4 Brigades. Amazing since many Light Division still have their Division Cavalry Squadron intact. While the Armor/Mechanized/Cavalry Division lost them.

The 25th Infantry wasn't mention for a reason nor was the 172nd Infantry Brigade. While we are here we talk about 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division and the 2nd Armor Cavalry Regiment (or whatever it was going by in 2003). The 3-2nd Infantry had been sent to Fort Lewis to convert from Mechanized Brigade to Stryker Brigade. After it arrived it Armor Battalion was re-flagged as Infantry Battalion. This new brigade had 3 Stryker Battalions, 1 Cavalry Squadron, 1 Artillery Battalion, and 1 Support Battalion. The main difference since the reorganization with troop was it got Special Troop Battalion. Shortly before the 2003 it was decided that the 172nd, two Brigades of the 25th Light, and even the 2nd ACR would all be converted to this organization. So we took 3 Light Infantry Brigades, 1 Mechanized Brigade, 1 ACR, and 1 Air Assault/Mechanized Brigade and turn them into 7 Stryker Brigades. 3 for the 2nd Infantry, 3 for the 25th Infantry (dropping Light), and 1 Cavalry Regiment. Also somewhere in this mass confusion another Airborne Brigade was raised. The 3 Stryker Brigades of the 2nd based in Fort Lewis. Then 1 Stryker and 1 Airborne in Alaska and 2 Stryker in Hawaii for the 25th. While the 2nd Cavalry Regiment was destined for Germany.

IIRC they went so far to debating if the 6th Stryker Brigade would be new Brigade or to outfit a National Guard Brigade, namely one of the 28th Infantry Division PA-NG. After some time to think about the 2-2nd Infantry was transferred back to the US instead of to Korea after a tour to Iraq. It was to be temporary re-flag as a Brigade of the 4th Division before it was sent to Fort Lewis and re-flagged as part of the 2nd Division.

So before 2003 we had 12 Light Brigades, 1 Medium Brigade (Cavalry Regiment), 1 ACR, and 12 Mechanized/Armor Brigades. Now we have 1 ACR, 21 Heavy Brigades (5 Division with 4 Brigades and the 1-2nd Infantry), 14 Light Brigades, and 7 Stryker Brigades. All in 10 Divisions, 2 independent Brigades, and 1 ACR. Or that is the way current call for once everyone gets sorted out...

Last I looked the army is up to 48 brigades, which is significantly more than there was in 2002, yet our manpower strength, while increased, hasn't increased that much. Which lends me to believe that these new brigades are, on the whole, weaker.

And to be fair, a good bit of the screaming has an element of sour grapes to it. A lot of divisions- as well as the two ACR's, have a lot of traditions, and while the powers that be say the traditions of these units will be intact, its not looking that way to the average joe because, for the most part the divisions will take the field with whatever brigades that happen to be available regardless of what division they officially belong to. Its worse with the ACR's. No unit in my view is more bound to its history and traditions as a cavalry regiment, and changeover to Strykers means to the mind of the troopers that they no longer are a unique, special unit, they have become just another infantry unit no different than the rest. This might not be true, I don't know if the two regiments maintained a cavalry organisation or switched to and infantry one, but the perception is there none the less.

I think this is the part that make troops complain the loudest. It was always intended that a Division trains together to fight together. Yet, even before Operation Desert Storm it has been completely the opposite, with the exception of the 82nd and 101st during that war. Every other Division was made up mix brigades from units that were hand pick for the Armor and Mechanized Divisions.

After the initial invasion, and then the immediate occupation force after that, a Division HQ would be sent over and they would have if lucky one or two of their own brigades under their command, while other Brigades even the Aviation would be form elsewhere. Even the Brigade and Battalions and Companies would be far mix than what they had trained to go over with. Then throw in the new attitude that regardless if the Division was 82nd or 101st it should be expected to support and operate Heavy Brigades within it command and the Armor and Mechanized Divisions were expected to learn how to operate with light units, and with unit that were use to being in M1s and M2 riding around the area in HMMWVs.

You are quite correct the Army on paper has increased the number of Brigades from 30-33 neighborhood to something of 48 was the goal, I think it like 51 or 52 when all added up... Of course it is difficult to really get a tally since some Brigades are still supposedly in transit. While other sites states some Division are here, but other parts are there. Including two Infantry Brigades that what left of the 1st Armor and Mechanized Divisions from their withdraw from Germany.

In the number of combat troops there has been only slight increase of men/women. In reality if one looks at the number of Companies/Batteries/Troops and Battalions/Squadrons the numbers haven't really moved up as much as one would expect of force that was increase by 16 or so Brigades. This seems to be a major concern too.

It is combination that Divisions have lost their sense of accomplishment. Even Brigades and Battalions loose sense since now the battle streamers and worse yet the unit citation become a nightmare. The book keeping as platoons are splinter and composite companies are sent on missions that they were never quite trained for. Armor and Mechanized units using HMMWVs, Artillery units conducting infantry foot patrols. The hard fact in this war is that everyone in the combat zone is expected to act as 11B unless you were medic, even then you better know your stuff just in case.

Even during WWII when each Division had been drown down from 4 Infantry Regiment to 3 Regiment they usually took to the field with addition resource that would gradually equal to a 4th Regiment. Even the Armor Division that originally had two Combat Command had a third one added by the end of the war and wasn't unusually to find Infantry Regiment assigned to them. Even in Vietnam the 23rd Infantry Division was collection of Separate Brigades that were grouped together under a common HQ in theater.

Then you add to the fact that units were told they would go over for only 12-15 months depending on when they were to go over spending up to 18 months there because of this emergency or another. Supposedly staying at home station for 18 months for training which rarely happen. I guess there are reason for the sour grape complaints...

Not that the troop have much room to complain because they did signed up, but after people keep telling you one thing and making promises that they know they can't keep. Well I would expect anyone to cry foul.

One of the things was the pride that units use to have and the amount of time NCOs and Officers would go to instill what the unit had done over the years. Lot of that was thrown out of window when the 3rd Mechanized Division was carved up and later units kept going through rotation after rotation. I think at last count most of the regular Army was working on 5th over and some Guard units were working on their 3rd rotation over in the Middle East. All the while many of the troops knowing they can press their luck only so many times.

Or the fact that their are plenty of 20-24 year old E-5s and E-6s milling around, take this into consideration that many O-1 out of West Point are only 22-24. Back in 1989 there was talk amongst the senior NCOs in my company because E-6 who had less then 8 years had just made E-6. many of these people had been 10-12 years before they made it to E-6.

So it in general there are lot of things that people are grumbling about. It always will be there and lot of it due to lost of traditions. Which to keep is just silly...but it does happen.

Its always been this way, at least since WWII, units were stripped to provide cadre for a new formed division. Korea was no better, except that units were stripped stateside to provide replacements for the Far East. In Vietnam, the one year and your out policy destroyed a division's cohesion faster than enemy action did. In Persian Gulf I, what a lot of people forget is that after the fall of the old Soviet Union, Bush I started drawing down troops to save money, a lot of brigades were deactivated and this is one of the reasons that you found 3MID units in the 1AD to name one example.

You hear a lot of talk about "training together and fighting together" but when a moment of crisis happens, it's throw whatever is available into the pot and hope for the best. Face it, the US Military as a whole has never been adequate to protect the intrests of the USA. There was a plan once to move divisions down to the Mexican border to help stem the flow of drugs and illegals crossing the border, had a good chance of working too, until Congress discovered that to seal the border completely would require the commitment of 130 divisions....and please remember, that at the height of WWII, the US only fielded 90 divisions.

The thinking behind this is that any division commander can command any mix of units...completely disregards that heavy and light units have different capabilities, different tactics and different logistical needs. But HAY! What do I know, I'm just a glorified bean counter nowdays...

I agree....if you cut 40 riflemen from your company, it just means that the remaining 80 rifleman have to work harder. And if your unit suffers losses, well then the 60 remaining riflemen have to work even harder. Its a nasty sprial that never ends. There was a lot of flak over the Marines keeping the 13-man rifle squad, vs the 7-man Army rifle squad...hmmmm, more firepower, better able to take losses and remain effective, better command and control...Marines were right.

If even half of what I'm hearing from return soldiers is true, the Army is suffering major problems with morale and discipline. Fragmenting units has been proven to be unworkable through the last three major wars (or is that a war, a police action and whateverthehell Vietnam was supposed to be?). But here we are, in the longest whateverthehell Iraq/Afghanistan are supposed to be, fragmenting units because some think-tank on the Beltway is convienced that it can work.

Please, as a favor, don't get me started on that diaster known as Tricare!

There are good reasons behind the traditions. Its corny, its silly, its outdated, but it helps the soldier belong to something greater than himself.

Dragoon, you're not closing your quotes (it should look like [/QUOTE]) at the end of the quote. That slash is important.

) at the end of the quote. That slash is important.[/QUOTE]

Sorry, I'm multitasking today, feeding my daughter and having my mind shut down from too much Dora the Explorer!

Pampers melt in a Maytag dryer
Crayons go up one drawer higher
Rewind Barney for the fifteenth time
Breakfast, six naps at nine
There's bubble gum in the baby's hair
Sweet potatoes in my lazy chair
Been crazy all day long and it's only Monday
Mr. Mom

I didn't mean that the ")" was part of the quote code; I was simply closing my own parentheses for grammar.

LOL

Nothing like a three-year old to show you what is really important in the world!

dragoons
 

there are a couple more dragoons in here as well - FmDecorba and yours truly both donned the black beret of the armoured cav in our day.(Royal Norwegian Armoured Cavalry , eskadrons 4 and 6 respectivly)

Was in just before the switch from M113 and Nm135 to Cv-90.

Tried my hand at Sisu XA 180 and 185s .

Have to say- if I had to equip a fighting force the CV 90 would be my choice.

While I do like the though as nail simplicity of the m113 series, the CV 90 also have a rugged design with not to many frills but still carry good thermal suite,stabilized ordinance (Bushmaster 30 mm autocannon) and firing computer that means it is going to pack a punch.

Sitting in our m113 and seeing the cv 90s flash by us was like sitting in a rowing boat being overtaken by something out of the opening credits of Miami vice.

Sorry, I'm multitasking today, feeding my daughter and having my mind shut down from too much Dora the Explorer![/QUOTE]

Dora you are getting off light...LOL

Try 1 and half of Barney 18 hours a day...

Yes the Original Bush started to draw down the Army at a time when the Cold War was 'Officially' over. Also at this times many more units were left understrength. Don't get me started on that...lol

Yeah well the wet dream was to field something like close to 150 Division or more, with several more Armor Division, but there was lend-lease and combat loses seemed to deem those dreams ineffective... So yeah the closing of the border of that border will never happen...

You forgetting the minor invasion of Gernada (sp) and Panama where at each the 2/3 of the 82nd Division made it. Of course the two Brigade Commands were mixed with 2 of the regularly schedule Battalions and the Brigade that HQ that sat home sent two of three battalions to the first action. Lessons were learned and during Panama none of that foolishness was entertained.

I agree the Marines have it right. Not that they have got it entirely correct. There were plenty of Marine Platoons operated with 2 Marine Rifle Squad instead of the 3 Squads so to keep full squads instead of reducing the Squads. Since 9-11 things have improved some in filling out the staffing.

Please! I'm still trying to forget Grenada!!!! There is nothing like trying to plan a military operation from a tourist guide book map of the island!

"And I want 3rd platoon to hook through Henry's Bar & Grill and then advance on the Hilton, watch out for that miniature golf course on your left, S2 thinks that the Cubans have set up around the windmill!"

Yeah I know, it was entirely a cluster from what I heard of the troops and NCOs who had the misfortune of being on that operation. Again it was one of those operation where it was better left to Marine Expeditionary Unit or the logical argument could of seen a MEB being used.

Sending 2/3 of the the 82nd with a unhealthy mix of Special Forces, Rangers and SEAL was a grand recipe of more deaths and wounded than their needed to be... Oh well.

Panama was just as bad. Everyone wanted piece of the action. As a result again more people lost their lives than if they kept the entire thing KISS. Especially since literally we had forces in place. It was the movement of troops Bragg that finally gave up that the operation was underway since they were looking at the same flight information as we were...*shrug*...

Sometimes this Joint Service stuff is a real pain in the a**!! The only good to come out was the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command...an act which has reduced numerous general and flag officers into foaming fits!!! IMAGINE, giving Rangers, SEALs and Green Berets equal fooring with the traditional branches!!!!

ROFLMA!

Yeah well the sad thing is that most of the members who were the one who could best explain their capabilities rarely rose high enough with-in their separate commands. Granted there were people in all of the branches Special Operation Commands before they joined by the Joint Special Operations Command that would sneak under the radar to become Brigadier General, Major General, or Rear Admiral. Yet, these promotions were rare and far to find. Also there were senior officers who look upon Special Operation troops as if they are provide nothing to of value to their forces.

Granted by this time I know in the Army Special Operation Command top job was Lt General. Outside of the the individual Services Special Operation Commands there were few jobs outside of these Commands for people to get promotions. In general if they did make it to Flag rank they were placed back in staff positions or in other none relate Special Operations type Commands. For most of the time they would make back to their respective Special Operation Commands or staff position for planning at the Pentagon or the various other Joint Commands.

On serious note it more like elevation of Marine Corps Commandant to a Full voting member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When the Marine Corps is suppose to be branch of the Navy.

Ah the Green Machine! The day it ever makes sense is the day I will fall over from sheer heart failure!

The Light Tank Concept, at least the US view
 

Mulling over things, in between coffee breaks, I got to thinking about the light tank. Now in the US Army, we like our tanks to be big and heavy and equipped with large caliber guns and all kinds of electronic doo-dads. But I keep coming back to the light tank. It offers all kinds of advantages when you sit down and think about it. To be sure, it doesn't have heavy armor, but it can be more strategically portable than a M-1. Prior to the intro of the 120mm smoothbore, the US was developing a series of improved 105mm shells that were as capable as the 120mm, and in at least two cases, bloody well out performed the 120mm!

Now a bit of background...the first "official" light tank other than the WWI French FT would be the M-3 Stuart, now before anyone bursts a bubble, the M-2 series of combat cars were never considered to be light tanks, simply because they were the only tanks that we had in the pre-World War II era. The Stuart is the best example of a light tank, well armored for its weight, a lovely horsepower to weight ratio and for its period, adequate armament. Too bad that it was thrown into combat against vehicles that were a generation ahead of its design. Its 37mm main armament quickly proved to be lacking in fire power.

The M-3 Stuart was replaced with the M-5 Stuart; this improvement used a newly designed hull to delete some of the numerous shot traps of the M-3s design, but kept pretty much the same turret and armament. The designers of the M-5 ignored reports coming back from the front about how inadequate the 37mm cannon had become. This was the developmental end of the Stuart.

Next out of factory was the first true advance, the M-24 Chaffee light tank. For its weight, it was adequately armored, horsepower-to-weight ratio was not as high as it could have been, but the main gun was now the 75mm cannon (it was the same cannon mounted in the B-25J medium bomber). The problem with the armament was that by the introduction of the M-24 (1945), the 75mm had pretty much lived out its developmental lifespan. The Korean War proved to be the undoing of the M-24, although I believe that this was due more to the tank being thrown up against the T-34/85 tank than any design flaw. Norway upgunned its M-24s with a 90mm and by all reports are still quite happy with the design.

The next and last US light tank was the M-41 Walker Bulldog. Lightly armored for its weight, it had excellent horsepower-to-weight and was armed with the 76mm cannon. The Bulldog didn't last long in US service as the decision was being made to go with the Main Battle Tank concept. The Bulldog served in several armies, but its moment of fame came in the Vietnam War where it equipped several companies of the ARVN. It proved to be a reliable, nimble design and several PT-76s and T-54/55s of the PAVN were destroyed prior to the fall of South Vietnam.

A few years ago, a design for a light tank was pushed. Called the M-8 Buford Mobile Gun System, it was an intresting concept. It was air-portable. Its armor could be beefed up by adding additional armor panels to met three basic threat levels. It had an excellent horsepower-to-weight ratio and was equipped with the 105mm rifled cannon. The initial tests of the M-8 showed it to be a capable design, but alas! It fell prey to the next round of budget cutbacks. Something about a Congressman needing a bridge in Alaska.

GDW also pushed something they called the LAV-75, didn't exist, even as a design concept, but its armament was in development. The 75mm gun was coupled to an autoloader that allowed the weapon to fire 10 rounds in the time it took you to read this sentence. Impressive, no? The drawback to the 75mm gun was the same one that doomed the older 75mm in WWII, armor penetration was for shit. What good did it do to hit a T-62 ten times if none of the rounds penetrated? That was pretty much the end of the 75mm gun concept.

A light tank in the US Army...nowdays we have a Stryker with a 105mm gun that the service is trying to fix (recoil is such a b***h!). A light tank battalion could be attached to the airborne/air assault/light infantry divisions and give them some badly needed firepower. The divisional cavalry squadrons could also use a light tank design. Just some random musings!

It was a little better than that. One of the staffies somewhere had actually visited, and written his Staff College paper on how to invade it. I agree, though, the execution was sub-par.

Are you sure it's the same 75mm? I figured it was the same 75mm statted from the Scorpion and/or AMX. The Sherman's 75mm was a low-velocity thing, designed by an artillery-experienced ordnance team. According to "Steel coffins", they wanted a barrel that could last 2,000 shots before wearing out, but experience showed that tanks didn't last that long.

A couple of things, back in the day Armour Magazine had a bit about the M41's true claim to fame: the ARVN army wound up with a company actually pulling off an true air assault. From what I recall, a coup was being run in Siagon, and per policy the US did nothing. But the word was slow in reaching Cahm Ram Bay, where a ARVN company did get word and asked the Air Force for lift for an "purely administrative" move. They said yes, and the moment the tanks arrived they started lighting up those that was backing the coup located on the airbase before rolling into the city.

The second is one (and yes, I do sound like a broken record at times ;) ) is back way earlier I mentioned the CV90 series as a potential replacement for all the armoured vehicles in a cav regiment, one of the options is either a 105 or a 120 nato gun armed light tank version. Not a bad thing in my view. :)

The LAV75 did actually exist - it was known as the Ares Light Tank.

I am actually working on this and I've put my draft thoughts on. Sorry it's not as polished as usual.