The canon material does state specifically that most of the 124th's forward supply vehicles have been destroyed. They had to be destroyed at some point between the opening of the road ambush (to give it a name) and the end of the active phase of the breakout.

After re-reading the material created by GDW and play tested by GDW all of those years ago, either the designers missed some things (other than seemingly endless grammatical errors and typos), or intentionally left it open for interpretation. My opinion is that it was partially unintentional, mostly intentional.

The only way to definitively answer that is to talk to living members of the original GDW team.

The way I see it is that if anyone wants to adhere to the strict letter of what was written by the folks at GDW, that's fine. Buth I believe we all can and should accept that there is some room for interpretation, some times more than a little, due to intentional or unintentional inconsistencies and sometimes downright poorly executed product.

Thanks to all for their input.

My alternative breakout basically centered on the timely capture of some official disposition/location/planning documents, access to the 4th GTA radio net, some captured fuel, and the chance to delay the 21st MRD and 10th TD (Pol) for between 12 to 24 hours.

It is perfectly reasonable for all to have differences with any and all of it if you wish. I take no offence at all to that.

I've tried to base the probability of what could happen "if" on my studies of the cold war WP military over the years, as well as extensive study of the Western European Campaign in 1944-1945. It never ceases to amaze me how blunders, poor calls, bad communication, and poor luck have influenced warfare since 1914, and from 1939-1945 in particular.

Once I get the chance to update/modify my material (which will take some time due to 2 kids and migraines), I'll post it for you all to read, critique, and hopefully enjoy.

Thanks!
Dave

Exactly, it's up to the individual GM to use the materials presented however they wish. My only argument is, and always has been, changes should not be made to the published material with the expectation by the writer that it be adopted by everyone.

In other words, post any ideas you want, just don't ram it down other peoples throats and demand they adopt it.

Now, getting back on topic, the combat elements of the 124th are definitely toast, at least for the period following the "ambush". Give them a week or two to reorganise and bring up replacement equipment and perhaps a few warm bodies from Divisional HQ and supplies back in Piotrkow and they may be back in the game.

Although it's possible some supplies could be scrounged by the Americans from the wreckage of the 124th, there was roughly 2,000 metres between their immobilised tanks and other vehicles and the kill zone of the roadway. That's a lot of distance to haul jerry cans on foot. Also, it's likely that the Soviet fuel tanks were only about 1/4 full at the time, given the distance they had travelled. Given that, and the fact many of the soviet vehicles went up in flames, and it's likely that only enough fuel could be recovered for a few hours operation, at best. Much better I think to consolidate into a handful of vehicles for the breakout, ensuring sufficient fuel was available for several days of movement. This would certainly mean the loss of all the M1s and probably M2s as well rendering the "Armoured" brigade effectively toothless.

You and me both (but I'd say it's been that way ever since we started fighting wars).
If you don't already have it, I think you'll enjoy 'The Hinge Factor: How Chance and Stupidity Have Changed History'. Amazon have a good write-up of the book here
I had a few problems with the author's assumptions in a few cases but overall, it was an interesting and sometimes educational read.
Some details for those looking to order it: -
Paperback: 394 pages
Author: Erik Durschmied
Publisher: Arcade Publishing; 1st Edition edition (April 2, 2001)
ISBN-10: 1559705728
ISBN-13: 978-1559705721

There's a sort of companion book as well called 'The Weather Factor: How Nature Has Changed History' although I haven't read that one.
Again Amazon has a write-up about the book

Like they say no Operational Plan survives intact after the first shot is fired. From there until either the Operation succeeds or fails depends on too factors for anyone to really have much control. You can only hope for the other side to have much worse luck that day.

-Absolutely....I couldn't agree more. There is no expectation on my part whatsoever that anyone should adopt anything. I'm just soliciting feedback/discourse in the hope that I can make a scenario/narrative developed by me better. If anyone else of a like viewpoint likes it, that's great.

I haven't had the blessing of hauling full jerrycans of fuel, but can relate from experience that haulling jerrycans full of water any real distance can get downright exhausting.

Were I the commander on the spot, I would have called for whatever support Brigade/Division could send me in the way of reinforcements, fuel, and supplies, especially after seeing the main body of an enemy division before me. Once the shooting had tapered off I would push across the road to secure it with whatever infantry I could spare from 3-10, plus whatever reinforcements I could get from 3-143 Infantry and 3-77 Armor. If you could drop some mortar and artillery rounds in a light (to conserve ammo) walking barrage for 200-400 yards or so past the road. The goal would be to scare off any members of the 124th that are trying to set up positions and/or reconstitute a skirmish line. Really, the goal is to scare off anyone that hasn't fled already. From there, you could start picking the column's remnants clean.

Thanks-
Dave

Well there's the problem I think. There are no reinforcements, fuel or supplies available from Brigade, Division or anywhere else for that matter. Everyone else is already occupied.

As for a walking barrage, by the last day or so of the 5th, it seems that they were almost out of everything. The artillery is likely to be otherwise occupied also, supporting other units in contact with the enemy. Mortars may be available, but after the long fight with the 124th, are likely to be very low on ammo.

If you take the pressure off other units it might be possible to support the 3-70th etc, but that may change the entire dynamic of the scenario and enable a breakout in another direction.

It is listed that 3-10 Infantry arrives at some point shortly after 1200 hours and assists in defeating several conterattacks by the 124th.

Elements of 4-12 cavalry must have been on scene as well, after all, they spotted the 124th on the road in the first place.

Six howitzers from 2-21 FA are stated to be to the rear of 3-10 and 3-70.

If they did not have ammo, why would they set up? Let's be realistic, there are no endless piles of ammo, but surely there must be a couple dozen shells you could use to scare off some shattered formations on the other side of the column.

I would push across the road with every warm body I could use to secure the road and cut it. With a battalion of infantry on hand...even by the standards of T2K year 2000, I would assume that would mean 200, perhaps 300 infantry. 100 would be a weak skirmish line, but given the situation, it would probably work.

Scream for every body and vehicle you can get...this may be your only shot.

It is stated that there is still an emergency fuel reserve and that the supply-maintenance echelon is to the rear of 3-10/3-70. The remaining fuel and supplies would be distributed and the breakout would kick off. 3-77A, 3-143I, and 3-19FA were just North of Kalisz and would be brought down during the night.

Thanks-
Dave

Anything is possible.

Re the artillery, I'm thinking that the ready supply of ammo was expended during the battle leaving very little for defensive fires should there have bene a counterattack. In that light firing just to create a screen at targets that may, or may not be there or even be a threat seems a little wasteful.

There may well have been the manpower available to conduct a cursory scrounging of the wreckage. I don't believe though that enough would have been recovered quickly enough to resupply the US units in the area.

Given the scenario parameters, it seems likely that the writers considered any PC groups that escaped to have probably come from one of these units . Taking a bit of a leap, it seems probable the horseborne cavalry were effectively wiped out, given that animals aren't an option when equiping beginning characters with transportation.

Actually, Horse are an option. Instead of rolling 1D6 per three characters for a vehicle, you get 1D6 horses/mules. I was seriously thinking of going with that in my game. (Page 26, V2.2 BYB)

You know that is one thing that hasn't been discussed much that I can remember. Sure month or so well forward of the IX Corps and limited amount of round for the AFV's. The battles with various units during the break through and pursue Polish and then major battle would of drawn down the number of main gun rounds for the tank, but I don't recall much about like Mortar and Artillery rounds.

Again the 5th could carry so much of everything and they already been in running battle more less for at least the last month. Could it be that part of the reason why the 5th was so easy to pick off was due to the fact that ammo for Mortars and Artillery as well the MRLS units of the Battery were at running short and no one was able to get the calls of fires they would of liked.

So throw this into the mix...