In Defense of the Red Army

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Raellus, this may interest you. It's an answer by David Rendahl to the question: - Was the Soviet Union ever superior to the United States in any way during the Cold War (1945-1991)?
David's credentials include British army & British police intelligence and also as a researcher & analyst at Jane's Information Group.

Direct link to David's answer
https://qr.ae/pNJNJN

This is the link for the original page. Many of the other posts on the page are not necessarily relevant or are too biased or too ignorant to be particularly useful.
https://www.quora.com/Was-the-Soviet...-War-1945-1991

[Raellus]

Thanks for sharing that piece, SSC. The author's comparative analysis of weapon ground-based systems is interesting (and I'm not just saying that because much of it supports the thesis of the thread OP), but his strategic analysis is quite illuminating, and particularly germane to the v4 World At War controversy/debate. A particularly eye-opening quote follows:

"Launching a conventional war with limited aims in Northern Europe (Seven Days to the Rhine) with an openly declared promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, would produce such a shock to our system it would have been economically catastrophic.

Recovery from that would have put Russia and the USA on more equal financial terms as much of the Dollar economy is based on confidence and communication, while the Russian economy was captive. It may not be a plan to take over the world, but quite possibly enough coercion to get the world to pay them off - give them Germany, Denmark, Holland and back off from China to stop them slapping us about.

It was unlikely, but many historical pivots only needed a gentle push off the cliff. In August 1991 I sat in a tank shed in Hohne listing to the BBC news tell us about the Soviet coup in Moscow . Gorbachev was rumoured to have been killed, the Tamanskya Guards Division were rolling around the Kremlin, shady generals were in charge and unhappy with the imminent end of Soviet power. There were still millions of WarPac soldiers and tons of equipment within a day’s drive from our position.

It was genuinely the scariest couple of days of my career."

-

[RN7]

Originally Posted by StainlessSteelCynic

Raellus, this may interest you. It's an answer by David Rendahl to the question: - Was the Soviet Union ever superior to the United States in any way during the Cold War (1945-1991)?
David's credentials include British army & British police intelligence and also as a researcher & analyst at Jane's Information Group.

Direct link to David's answer
https://qr.ae/pNJNJN

This is the link for the original page. Many of the other posts on the page are not necessarily relevant or are too biased or too ignorant to be particularly useful.
https://www.quora.com/Was-the-Soviet...-War-1945-1991

That's a good read and very informative about the capabilities and doctrine of NATO and Soviet forces throughout the Cold War.

I've always thought that NATO would have been better equipped to deal with the Soviets in Europe if the Germans or British had led the land forces instead of the Americans. They were more focused on the Soviet threat in Europe and seemed to be able to develop land systems more quickly that were needed to counter the Soviets. This of course would have been impossible as America was the leader of the West and by far the biggest defence spender in NATO.

[rcaf_777]

Originally Posted by RN7

I've always thought that NATO would have been better equipped to deal with the Soviets in Europe if the Germans or British had led the land forces instead of the Americans. They were more focused on the Soviet threat in Europe and seemed to be able to develop land systems more quickly that were needed to counter the Soviets. This of course would have been impossible as America was the leader of the West and by far the biggest defense spender in NATO.

what a thought interesting Idea, yes the us have money but the germans own the land lol

[Raellus]

Posted in the Putin's War in Ukraine thread:

Originally Posted by Mahatatain

Is anyone else surprised by how poor the Russian troops have performed? Don't get me wrong, I'm glad that they are doing badly, but I thought that even without their heavy artillery they would make quicker progress than they have. Has the average Russian infantryman been proved to not be as capable as we expected them to be?

Yes. And it's got me thinking. If the Soviet military at the height of the Cold War performed nearly as poorly as the Russian military in 2022, then Twilight:2000 becomes a fantasy RPG. We can't have that.

One could certainly argue that Russia's poor performance in the first week of its Ukrainian adventure is evidence that the Soviet Army wouldn't have stood a chance against NATO in a large-scale conventional war. Although there is a strong case to be made for that, in the spirit of this thread's foundational premise, I'm going to argue against that conclusion.

The Soviet military performs best when there is an existential threat to the Motherland. It did not perform well in the largely unprovoked Winter War against Finland, or the 1939 joint invasion of Poland. The Soviet Army excelled when it's back was against the wall (Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk), then turned successful defense into devastating offense. After almost collapsing under the weight of Barbarossa '41, the Red Army staged an epic come-back and went on to smash the Wehrmacht decisively, time and again.

In the v1 T2k timeline, the USSR is once again under existential threat. It really only starts kicking ass in central Europe when NATO forces are on the doorstep of the Soviet frontier.

Also, the Soviet military was designed to be wielded like a sledgehammer, not a precision scalpel. Russia's clumsy attempts to ape the successful strategy and tactics of the US invasion of Iraq has revealed its ill-suitedness for such focused operations. In T2k, the Soviets start having success when they begin employing massed artillery fires, Army-level attacks, and waves of AFVs. And then, of course, there's its use of battlefield tactical nukes.

Lastly, say what you will about the clunkiness of Soviet-era Red Army organization, logistics, and CnC, but its virtue lay in its simplicity, redundency, and sheer scale. Russia's attempt at a lean, mean military machine has revealed systematic flaws and shortcomings resulting from the last decade's attempts at "streamlining".

-

[unipus]

Part of the confusion, I think, is that Putin has tried to paint this conflict (to the West) as an existential threat. NATO on the doorstep of Russia itself!

Yet judging from the confusion and awful morale of the Russian troops (which could be less than the full truth but seems too widespread to be made up) along with the substantial internal protest, it seems that Russians themselves don't believe this, at all.

(the same thing could be said to some degree about Iraq in 2004, but the coalition troops themselves were pretty gung-ho about it at least, for the most part)

[swaghauler]

Originally Posted by unipus

Part of the confusion, I think, is that Putin has tried to paint this conflict (to the West) as an existential threat. NATO on the doorstep of Russia itself!

Yet judging from the confusion and awful morale of the Russian troops (which could be less than the full truth but seems too widespread to be made up) along with the substantial internal protest, it seems that Russians themselves don't believe this, at all.

(the same thing could be said to some degree about Iraq in 2004, but the coalition troops themselves were pretty gung-ho about it at least, for the most part)

With US troops in Iraq, I think they still were running on the wave of anger over 911. Combine that with US Iraqi relations and it was enough "motivation" to take the fight to the Iraqis.

[swaghauler]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Posted in the Putin's War in Ukraine thread:



Yes. And it's got me thinking. If the Soviet military at the height of the Cold War performed nearly as poorly as the Russian military in 2022, then Twilight:2000 becomes a fantasy RPG. We can't have that.

One could certainly argue that Russia's poor performance in the first week of its Ukrainian adventure is evidence that the Soviet Army wouldn't have stood a chance against NATO in a large-scale conventional war. Although there is a strong case to be made for that, in the spirit of this thread's foundational premise, I'm going to argue against that conclusion.

The Soviet military performs best when there is an existential threat to the Motherland. It did not perform well in the largely unprovoked Winter War against Finland, or the 1939 joint invasion of Poland. The Soviet Army excelled when it's back was against the wall (Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk), then turned successful defense into devastating offense. After almost collapsing under the weight of Barbarossa '41, the Red Army staged an epic come-back and went on to smash the Wehrmacht decisively, time and again.

In the v1 T2k timeline, the USSR is once again under existential threat. It really only starts kicking ass in central Europe when NATO forces are on the doorstep of the Soviet frontier.

Also, the Soviet military was designed to be wielded like a sledgehammer, not a precision scalpel. Russia's clumsy attempts to ape the successful strategy and tactics of the US invasion of Iraq has revealed its ill-suitedness for such focused operations. In T2k, the Soviets start having success when they begin employing massed artillery fires, Army-level attacks, and waves of AFVs. And then, of course, there's its use of battlefield tactical nukes.

Lastly, say what you will about the clunkiness of Soviet-era Red Army organization, logistics, and CnC, but its virtue lay in its simplicity, redundency, and sheer scale. Russia's attempt at a lean, mean military machine has revealed systematic flaws and shortcomings resulting from the last decade's attempts at "streamlining".

-

You are making a significant mistake here. Not in assuming that the PACT forces would be as ill-prepared logistically, but in assuming that the effect would be the same as this modern-day conflict with Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine have roughly the same number of ground combatants with all of the Ukrainian people defending their soil. The Ukrainians have compact logistics tails (they are literally fighting in their own front yards) and short lines of communication. Russia's Command and Control as well as her logistics tail are at the very end of their "reach" in range. Training is roughly equal as the Russians have very little money to train their conscripts. This is a 1v1 scenario. The outcome is uncertain because Russia can only supply around 150K troops with her current logistics tail. This is obviously stretching her command and control to the limits as well. Victory is not certain due to Russia's limited economy (10th in the World) potentially collapsing and leaving her army starved of supplies and munitions. The Russians may have a majority conscript army, but there are several elite volunteer units too. Those units are fighting in the Crimea and Donetsk regions and have done FAR BETTER than the conscripts from Belarus.

The PACT, however, was an economic beast (because of the number of countries Russia could exploit). They also outnumbered NATO between 3 to 1 in troops and tanks, and up to 5 to 1 in APCs. They also held a 3 to 1 advantage in artillery. Even IF half the PACT forces turned tail to run, it was STILL a 1v1 fight for NATO. In addition, NATO really didn't hold a technological superiority in equipment until the late 80s. An M60 with a 105mm is technically just a match for a T62. Thus nothing could be guaranteed for certain given the numbers NATO was facing. Even if the first waves panicked and fled in terror, how do you [NATO] resupply when the next wave is rolling over the hill? Numbers DO MATTER, just not as much as they used to. Additionally, the Soviets had the ability to resupply from a number of countries so they could build multiple logistics tails coming in from many directions, whereas the Russians in Ukraine do not.

[chico20854]

I have recently read this analysis by RUSI, a high-quality British think tank (and the longer document that this page is a summary of).

It summarizes many of the tactical changes the Russian Army has udnergone since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. A big picture summary is that they have been forced to abandon their elaborate combined arms-deep strike doctrine and revert to a much more typically Russian form of warfare - throwing hordes of low quality troops at enemy defensive lines, supported by massive amounts of artillery fire. (The report notes that the artillery fire is slacking off this year in comparison to last year as supplies run low, and that the anture of fire support has shifted, with much heavier use of 120mm mortars and much less use of MRLs and 152mm howitzers.) Tanks have in many cases been relegated to heavily protected mobile artillery (better able to withstand Ukrainian counterbattery fire than towed guns or mortars) or long-range standoff fire support; the armored thrust into gaps in enemy lines has once again proved suicidal when the enemy closes the gap and surrounds the cut-off armored force. The document also details other changes in infantry organization, engineer operations and electronic warfare.

I think that many of these changes would be mirrored in the in-game 1998 and (in some parts 1997) campaigns. (Some, such as the extensive use of low-cost drones for reconnaissance and artillery spotting, would not). On ground human tactical and operational reconnaissance by Spetsnaz teams has largely ceased as the highly trained operators are used as assault infantry, lavish artillery fire is curtailed by low stockpiles, and tanks are used as fire support rather than to create breakthroughs. Mobilization-only divisions from the interior are used as cannon fodder infantry to hold ground and create opportunities for better formations to attack through. Mortars replace tube artillery as ammunition becomes scarce. I think current Russian engineer and EW operations are better than their Soviet counterparts would be, since the Russian economy produces more and better construction materiel that can be used by engineers and export control failures have enabled the Russians to field much more sophisticated electronic warfare equipment than the Soviets could.

What are your thoughts folks????

[Adm.Lee]

Originally Posted by chico20854

I think that many of these changes would be mirrored in the in-game 1998 and (in some parts 1997) campaigns. (Some, such as the extensive use of low-cost drones for reconnaissance and artillery spotting, would not). On ground human tactical and operational reconnaissance by Spetsnaz teams has largely ceased as the highly trained operators are used as assault infantry, lavish artillery fire is curtailed by low stockpiles, and tanks are used as fire support rather than to create breakthroughs. Mobilization-only divisions from the interior are used as cannon fodder infantry to hold ground and create opportunities for better formations to attack through. Mortars replace tube artillery as ammunition becomes scarce. I think current Russian engineer and EW operations are better than their Soviet counterparts would be, since the Russian economy produces more and better construction materiel that can be used by engineers and export control failures have enabled the Russians to field much more sophisticated electronic warfare equipment than the Soviets could.

What are your thoughts folks????

No arguments from me.

[Ursus Maior]

I concur with the RUSI analysis being a good blueprint for T2K with some caveats: First of all, I think the Soviet Army (and, depending on the timeline/edtion used: its allies) would have to fare a lot better in initial attacks on Western forces than the Russian Armed Forces did during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Eventually, however, Soviet forces would be depleted as much as Russian forces are and when this bough breaks, Soviet solutions to the operational situation will look similar to Russian ones. I also think, the authors of the game have anticipated some of these solutions fairly well.

First, force generation will resort to mobilization, but it probably would not be full or even total mobilization in the beginning, because that would tank the industry. With no Western allies providing food, ammunition and transport vehicles via lend & lease, the USSR needs to come up with these resources on its own. That limits how many men it can take out of the labor force. But mobilization will creep up eventually, partially because it's bound to happen and partially because alternate sources will run dry. These alternate sources are international volunteers, a limited resource, given that many parts of the world are aflame at the same time, and prison populations.

Generation of war materiel will fare similarly, I presume. We all know of the hodgepodge of vehicles in T2K, the constant downgrading of planned inventories for a unit given. One just has to look at the development of Wehrmacht divisions from 1939 to 1945: the final waves of deployment were hardly recognizable from an early war point of view. What is also likely is that local workshops near the front would set up production, delivering much needed support weapons and mobility solutions. While a local shop cannot produce field guns, cannons or howitzers, let alone ATGMs, mortars and recoilless rifles are much easier to manufacture with primitive tools, as are first generation assault/battle rifles and submachine guns. For mobility, carts - both hand and animal drawn - are easily constructed as are bicycles.

All in all, Soviet solutions might look similar to Russia solutions today on the tactical level, because operational and strategic possibilities and solutions will dictate certain developments. However, with key components of today's Ukrainian solutions and developments missing, counter batter radar, artillery outranging Russian guns and drones aka tactical and operational real time aerial reconnaissance missing, some developments will not take place. The Soviet army of 1997-2000 will not have to worry (or at least far less) loosing troops and assets in its rear area to long range strikes. This will enable the Soviets (but also the Western allies) to set up cantonments for regiments/brigades upwards and dispatch individual (augmented) companies to the frontline (i. e. into artillery ranges) with the cantonments in villages or towns no more than 30 km from the respective FLOT. This makes transits to and from the front possible without motorization, i. e. per bicycle, horse, cart or even on foot. Between FLOT and division cantonment a battalion HQ will provide C² in the assembly area, about 5-15 km from FLOT.

Also, with aerial reconnaissance playing almost no roll, the ratio of indirect rounds fired and infantry killed (especially in massed attacks) will look very different. Additionally, scouting ahead of small unit assaults and raids will have a more conventional look with LRRP becoming an important asset for all units battalion size and up. Often lacking radios, information will flow extremely slowly, with no reinforcements or "cavalry to the rescue" available if a patrol comes under fire. The former will mean that along static front lines infantry can move unprotected, but once in sight and range of the enemy, these troops will fare the same as in World War One: water cooled machine guns and mortars being available en masse. The difficulty of generating reliable intelligence on the enemy, especially behind FLET will maximize the fog of war, making all assets of aerial reconnaissance (IMINT) as well as HUMINT and SIGINT forms extremely valuable. To be clear on that: The front lines in Poland might be as static as the Western front in parts, but commanders will have less reconnaissance available to themselves than their counterparts in France in Belgium 80 years earlier.

This would a) make offensives much more riskier to conduct and b) would necessitate reconnaissance by force much more often, depleting relevant and highly specialized units much more quickly than previously. This might be the most important reason, why we only get about one offensive per side per year: Readying personnel, materiel, logistics and especially one's intelligence picture would be too much a task to conduct more than once, especially after the nuclear attacks devastating most industries, population centers and critical infrastructure.

The NATO attack of Operation Reset probably had a fairly good picture of the next 100-200 km of enemy positions, but had the misfortune of running into a Soviet offensive force just having finished preparations for their own offensive.