In Defense of the Red Army

[Targan]

Originally Posted by Raellus

We have noted that the T-72s sold to Iraq were export versions. This means that they did not have all the bells and whistles that came standard on tanks retained for Soviet/Russian use- things like powered turret traverse, night sights, etc.

Correct.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Raellus

You are flat out wrong. No one here has suggested that the Iraqis made their own T-72s.

We have noted that the T-72s sold to Iraq were export versions. This means that they did not have all the bells and whistles that came standard on tanks retained for Soviet/Russian use- things like powered turret traverse, night sights, etc.

If you can provide reliable documentation that refutes this, please feel free to do so. Posting that something is "utter hogwash" does not make the poster an authority on the topic.

I don't recall anyone claiming that these tanks weren't made in Soviet Union/Russia, but the export models always had less features that only the units going to the Soviet Union military units would get. Even today Russia keeps up the same standard when they sell their old equipment.

Much like the U. S. Army did with the equipment that they have sold to Isreal and other Middle East countries since the PG1 War.

[Raellus]

The following is from Osprey's M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural- Operation Desert Storm by Steven J. Zaloga.

"As a result of the USSR’s export policy, clients such as Iraq did not receive tanks comparable in quality to the best Soviet tanks. In 1990 the best Iraqi version of theT-72 was the T-72M1 – roughly equivalent to the Soviet T-72A, which was already a decade old and not as well armored as the newer T-72B or the preferred T-80B series. Just as importantly, the Soviet Union did not export its best tank ammunition: the Iraqi army relied primarily on second-rate ammunition for its T-72 tanks." (p.24)

In Defense of the Red Army, I would also like to refer to the following excerpt:

"Despite the vehicles’ relative technical merits and flaws, the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Storm hinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as onthe machines themselves." (p. 7)

These are just a couple of snippets but they sum up my main points quite nicely. It looks like the entire book can be broused on this site:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/48201782/M1A1-Vs-T-72

Apparently, some of Iraq's T-72s were kit-built in Iraq and they were building a factory for local manufacture of T-72Ms in '91 (but it was destroyed by Coalition airstrikes before it could begin production).

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Raellus

The following is from Osprey's M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural- Operation Desert Storm by Steven J. Zaloga.

"As a result of the USSR’s export policy, clients such as Iraq did not receive tanks comparable in quality to the best Soviet tanks. In 1990 the best Iraqi version of theT-72 was the T-72M1 – roughly equivalent to the Soviet T-72A, which was already a decade old and not as well armored as the newer T-72B or the preferred T-80B series. Just as importantly, the Soviet Union did not export its best tank ammunition: the Iraqi army relied primarily on second-rate ammunition for its T-72 tanks." (p.24)

In Defense of the Red Army, I would also like to refer to the following excerpt:

"Despite the vehicles’ relative technical merits and flaws, the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Storm hinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as onthe machines themselves." (p. 7)

These are just a couple of snippets but they sum up my main points quite nicely. It looks like the entire book can be broused on this site:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/48201782/M1A1-Vs-T-72

Apparently, some of Iraq's T-72s were kit-built in Iraq and they were building a factory for local manufacture of T-72Ms in '91 (but it was destroyed by Coalition airstrikes before it could begin production).

When there is any discussion of the selling of arms in between countries, there is one major misconception. What is sold is NOT the latest hardware with the latest bells and whistles. What is normally sold is earlier versions that carry non-classified equipment. The M-1 that is sold to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt is not the same beast as that used by the AUS/USMC.

The Sovs were perfectly within their rights to refuse to sell their version of Chobham armor, as well as the latest fire control gear. What happened, however, was that tanks on the current production lines were pulled off, outfitted with older fire control equipment and then shipped on to Iraq. These tanks were not manufactured with substandard armor, they simply lacked the Special Armor, although they were fitted and many did carry reactive armor blocks. According to the Congressional Record, an examination of Iraqi T-72s captured in the KTO confirmed that they were fitted with "simple telescopic sights" these sights "being engraved with ballistic data and steroscopic rangefinders". These are the same sights and rangefinders as fitted to the T-55/T-62 series tanks. And Zaloga confirms this same information in his books.

The point that I call utter hogwash was the opinon that the Soviets deliberately produced a run of T-72s with substandard armor. Nowhere, in the Congressional Records, Zaloga's books, the Armor Journel and several other mainstream publiciations is this idea confirmed.

[Webstral]

I don’t think anybody is claiming that Soviets deliberately cheated the Iraqis. The Soviets went with their established policy of exporting less-capable versions of the state-of-the-art equipment. The Iraqis were unable to make good on the shortfall in capabilities with domestic industry, and the Republican Guard paid the price. In a way, it’s too bad. Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitler’s interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.


Webstral

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Sururov goes over Soviet exporting methods quite a bit in Inside the Red Army; there's definitely a "home standard" and an "export standard".

Sometimes, at least in the west, quality stuff winds up in the hands of allies before it gets used at home: the South Korean military fielded ASEA radar for F15s before it was equipped in US models!

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by raketenjagdpanzer

Sururov goes over Soviet exporting methods quite a bit in Inside the Red Army; there's definitely a "home standard" and an "export standard".

Sometimes, at least in the west, quality stuff winds up in the hands of allies before it gets used at home: the South Korean military fielded ASEA radar for F15s before it was equipped in US models!

Don't forget about the F-15J, that plane is externally an Eagle, inside its a whle nother bird!

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

The point that I call utter hogwash was the opinon that the Soviets deliberately produced a run of T-72s with substandard armor. Nowhere, in the Congressional Records, Zaloga's books, the Armor Journel and several other mainstream publiciations is this idea confirmed.

Perhaps I missed it, but I don't recall anyone here making the claim that you are refuting. I guess we can chalk this little debate up to simple miscommunication.

[dragoon500ly]

Originally Posted by Raellus

Perhaps I missed it, but I don't recall anyone here making the claim that you are refuting. I guess we can chalk this little debate up to simple miscommunication.

It is I who must apoligize, I was in the midst of a rather heated exchange of private messages and that one went out in error.

What can I say, I type faster than my brain can react!

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitler’s interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.

+1

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Originally Posted by Webstral

I don’t think anybody is claiming that Soviets deliberately cheated the Iraqis. The Soviets went with their established policy of exporting less-capable versions of the state-of-the-art equipment. The Iraqis were unable to make good on the shortfall in capabilities with domestic industry, and the Republican Guard paid the price. In a way, it’s too bad. Just as I am academically curious to see what the Wehrmacht could have accomplished on the Eastern Front without Hitler’s interference, I am academically curious to see what the Republican Guard could have accomplished under different circumstances.


Webstral

It's interesting that you bring up operation Barbarossa, Webstral; there's a theory put forth by Shirer in Rise and Fall of the Third Reich that it was Hitler's interference - at one key moment - that was precisely what saved the Army in Russia. His own "not one step back" order that kept units on the front line through the winter of 1941 rather than letting them trade time for distance probably spared the Army a total crushing rout. The Russians had not yet perfected a "cut off and bypass" strategem yet, and the strong-points and lines of defense the Red Army ran into as they counterattacked through the winter kept them from becoming too agile, and kept supply lines and rear areas from being overcome.

Had Hitler allowed the high command to permit a general retreat, the victory for the Soviets might have come much, much sooner.

(With that said I think that was more happenstance than any brilliance on Corporal Shicklegruber's part...)

Oh...edit...I feel kind of weird saying this but I feel weird NOT saying it, but I feel regardless like I should, especially given my user-handle: I'm not a skinhead, neo-Nazi, white supremacist or anything. That post above up there was not some "yeah the Nazis totally kicked ass but got some bad breaks!" type post.

[Raellus]

Originally Posted by raketenjagdpanzer

Had Hitler allowed the high command to permit a general retreat, the victory for the Soviets might have come much, much sooner.

(With that said I think that was more happenstance than any brilliance on Corporal Shicklegruber's part...)

It should be noted that this early success of Hitler's more "intuitive" style of military leadership simply reinforced Hitler's belief in his own infalibility and led to a long litany of operational and strategic blunders that utimately led to the annihilation of his Third Reich. Stalingrad is probably the best and most widely known example of the kind of military disaster that resulted from Hitler's antiquated understanding of warfare and his belief that willpower- not logistics or the correlation of forces- was the definitive key to wresting victory from the jaws of defeat.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Originally Posted by Raellus

It should be noted that this early success of Hitler's more "intuitive" style of military leadership simply reinforced Hitler's belief in his own infalibility and led to a long litany of operational and strategic blunders that utimately led to the annihilation of his Third Reich. Stalingrad is probably the best and most widely known example of the kind of military disaster that resulted from Hitler's antiquated understanding of warfare and his belief that willpower- not logistics or the correlation of forces- was the definitive key to wresting victory from the jaws of defeat.

Oh I'm completely in agreement with you (and I should have mentioned that was Shirer's thesis, too).

[Sanjuro]

Raellus pointed out:

AFAIK, T-80s were not sold to Iraq. Ever. It was probably a misidentified T-72E that your aquaintance saw.

In fact, I was trying to remember a conversation from the summer of 1991; I couldn't remember whether he said T-72 or T-80 and went online to find what tanks the Iraqis had on the front line: fancy the internet giving the wrong answer!
The mistake is mine; even at second hand, the clang! is the thing that sticks in the mind!

[Webstral]

Shirer's assertion that Hitler saved the Eastern Front by refusing to countenance retreat has some merit. The Army would have lost huge amounts of equipment that couldn't be moved. Who knows how many men would have been left behind for lack of transport. There were no established positions to fall back on, so the retreat could have gone right back to Poland.
We'll never know, of course; however, there is good reason to believe that a retreat would have finished the German Army on the Eastern Front during the winter.

On the other hand, it was Hitler's decision to keep the campaign going despite the onset of a winter for which the Wehrmacht was not prepared. If he saved the Eastern Front, he saved it from a blunder he made himself. I've never bought off on the idea that turning the panzers aside from Moscow to destroy Soviet forces in the Ukraine was a bad idea. However, I do believe that the rasputitsa should have marked the end of the campaign season on the Eastern Front. Small-scale offensives in lieu of Operation Typhoon could have continued to inflict losses on the Soviets west of Moscow while good winter positions were prepared. Of course, for me to say this flies in the face of Prussia military thinking and the lessons Hitler and his generation of Germans learned from WW1--namely, that only offensive warfare brings victory. Nonetheless, if Hitler saved the Eastern Front during that first terrible winter, he saved it from his own mindless adherence to the strategic offensive and his slavish devotion to the idea that the Russians, being inferior peoples, were just about finished from July, 1941 onward.


Webstral

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Shirer's assertion that Hitler saved the Eastern Front by refusing to countenance retreat has some merit. The Army would have lost huge amounts of equipment that couldn't be moved. Who knows how many men would have been left behind for lack of transport. There were no established positions to fall back on, so the retreat could have gone right back to Poland.
We'll never know, of course; however, there is good reason to believe that a retreat would have finished the German Army on the Eastern Front during the winter.

On the other hand, it was Hitler's decision to keep the campaign going despite the onset of a winter for which the Wehrmacht was not prepared. If he saved the Eastern Front, he saved it from a blunder he made himself. I've never bought off on the idea that turning the panzers aside from Moscow to destroy Soviet forces in the Ukraine was a bad idea. However, I do believe that the rasputitsa should have marked the end of the campaign season on the Eastern Front. Small-scale offensives in lieu of Operation Typhoon could have continued to inflict losses on the Soviets west of Moscow while good winter positions were prepared. Of course, for me to say this flies in the face of Prussia military thinking and the lessons Hitler and his generation of Germans learned from WW1--namely, that only offensive warfare brings victory. Nonetheless, if Hitler saved the Eastern Front during that first terrible winter, he saved it from his own mindless adherence to the strategic offensive and his slavish devotion to the idea that the Russians, being inferior peoples, were just about finished from July, 1941 onward.


Webstral

Yeah I think that the Germans didn't want to set up Static Line anywhere. They realize that it had cost them in WWI dearly. If they were able to set up Static Defensively line, then it would only lead on to believe the Soviet would do the much the same... Meaning the Germans would have much harder time restart their offensive and giving the Soviet breathing room that they need so desperately at that time.

[95th Rifleman]

PG 1 isn't a good example if you are trying to compare NATO/WP equipment.

The Iraqi's fell into the old trap of fighting the last war. They set up fixed, entrenched defensive positions in a similar fashion to how they fought the Iranians in the late 80's. Having a major armoured force drive around your flank tends to cause a few problems with such a defense.

In the late 90's the gap between Western and Russian kit was not as great as many are led to assume, also the tactics devised for fighting in Europe where designed to maximise advantage and minimise weakness of the Russian kit. The game winning card in iraq was total air superiority, this would be MUCH harder to achieve facing frontline Russian air defence systems.

The Russians where (and arguably still are) the world leaders in battlefield air defence, they had to be considering the NATO air threat. the Russians would of formed concentrations of Armour and spearheaded into NATO lines putting massive local superiorityin numbers to overwhelm NATO defensive positions.
Unless you could knock out these concentrations from the air the would just roll over a position and keep going before NATO forces cold respond in numbers sufficient to blunt the spearhead.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by 95th Rifleman

PG 1 isn't a good example if you are trying to compare NATO/WP equipment.

The Iraqi's fell into the old trap of fighting the last war. They set up fixed, entrenched defensive positions in a similar fashion to how they fought the Iranians in the late 80's. Having a major armoured force drive around your flank tends to cause a few problems with such a defense.

In the late 90's the gap between Western and Russian kit was not as great as many are led to assume, also the tactics devised for fighting in Europe where designed to maximise advantage and minimise weakness of the Russian kit. The game winning card in iraq was total air superiority, this would be MUCH harder to achieve facing frontline Russian air defence systems.

The Russians where (and arguably still are) the world leaders in battlefield air defence, they had to be considering the NATO air threat. the Russians would of formed concentrations of Armour and spearheaded into NATO lines putting massive local superiorityin numbers to overwhelm NATO defensive positions.
Unless you could knock out these concentrations from the air the would just roll over a position and keep going before NATO forces cold respond in numbers sufficient to blunt the spearhead.

True war in Europe NATO would have to over come the Air Defense network, the sheer number of Aircrafts and Tanks that they had in forward positions.

I don't think anyone here is forgetting that PGW1 was very different from the type of war that the troops had trained for, that may have happen in such places as Germany, or Korea...

[dragoon500ly]

I think everyone here pretty much agrees that any NATO/WP fight would have seen bloodletting on a never before seen scale....and that would be prior to any nukes.

PG1 gave just a taste of just how deadly modern weapons can be. And that was, for the most part, directed against military targets. A free fire zone like Europe would become....

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by dragoon500ly

I think everyone here pretty much agrees that any NATO/WP fight would have seen bloodletting on a never before seen scale....and that would be prior to any nukes.

PG1 gave just a taste of just how deadly modern weapons can be. And that was, for the most part, directed against military targets. A free fire zone like Europe would become....

As soon as nations break out the FASCAM to block armoured assaults we can expect to see huge areas of Eastern and central Europe turned into dead zones that would probably exist for decades.

[Abbott Shaull]

No matter who starts it and where. The end will not be good.

[Webstral]

I don't remember my specifications for Soviet scatterable mines, but US FASCAM has a short shelf life. In a fast-moving war, most standard mines are surface-laid and covered by fire to prevent the enemy's vehicles from getting through by driving carefully. The goal with FASCAM and surface-laid mines is canalization, not blocking. It's a fine distinction, but as a result the mines used in highly mobile warfare either commit suicide or are fairly easily handled once the frnt moves away.

In Twilight: 2000 terms, though, we would have seen fantastic stretches of territory invested with complex minefields with mostly buried mines. The Pact would have put tens of millions or hundred of millions into the ground in western Poland. Other nations at war would have done the same in their respective areas. Once the war slowed down in late 1997, buried mines would have gone in around every base camp.

Still, I'd be less concerned about the mines putting large areas off-limits than the rads and chemicals. If it came down to it, I'd put chemicals at the top of the list. During the run-up to nuclear use, I'd expect to see chemical warfare running at full tilt (though obviously there would be pattterns that can be discussed at another time). The use of persistent agents for counter-mobility purposes would leave large areas of Poland, Germany, Austria, the former Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey, and other locations badly contaminated. Chemicals washing into the rivers would end up in the Baltic, the North Sea, the Aegean, the Black Sea, etc. Lethal concentrations might persist for years anywhere the rain didn't wash the chemicals away. Mines tend not to migrate, but chemicals go where they please. In a water-rich environment like Europe... yikes.


Webstral

[Legbreaker]

Good point re the FASCAM and chemicals.
A well planned minefield should however be designed to channel an attacker right onto the covering guns of the defending force. Fire needs to be available all over the field to prevent unopposed lifting, but any obstacle belt should send send the attacker unconsciously right in front of the machineguns and expose vehicle flanks to AT weapons.

For example, a barbed wire entanglement is not placed parallel to the defenders positions, but is on an angle. The attacker will naturally drift towards the end furthest from their start line, probably bunching up in the process and giving the machineguns an easy target.

As minefields must be marked (with at least a single strand of wire on the enemy side with mine signs every so often) they too have the ability to channel. Note that the wire surrounding a field does not have to be of the same shape as the field - it can be much larger and mislead the enemy regarding the true extent of the danger area.

Anti vehicular obstacles such as dragons teeth could be positioned so that the only clear route requires the vehicle to take a right angle turn and expose their side the the defenders.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Good point re the FASCAM and chemicals.
A well planned minefield should however be designed to channel an attacker right onto the covering guns of the defending force. Fire needs to be available all over the field to prevent unopposed lifting, but any obstacle belt should send send the attacker unconsciously right in front of the machineguns and expose vehicle flanks to AT weapons.

For example, a barbed wire entanglement is not placed parallel to the defenders positions, but is on an angle. The attacker will naturally drift towards the end furthest from their start line, probably bunching up in the process and giving the machineguns an easy target.

As minefields must be marked (with at least a single strand of wire on the enemy side with mine signs every so often) they too have the ability to channel. Note that the wire surrounding a field does not have to be of the same shape as the field - it can be much larger and mislead the enemy regarding the true extent of the danger area.

Anti vehicular obstacles such as dragons teeth could be positioned so that the only clear route requires the vehicle to take a right angle turn and expose their side the the defenders.

Back in WW2 both sides had a habit of "forgetting" or moving mine markers, especialy in a retreat. The Israelis didn't even bother to mark many of their minefields in Lebanon and neither did the Argentines in the Falklands.

The problem with the rules of war is that it is almost always the first thing to be disregarded when things start to go wrong.

[Abbott Shaull]

Very true there are quite a few things that everyone seems to "forget" once the shooting starts...

[Legbreaker]

Depends on how well trained the troops are. Nobody wants to stand in front of a court answering charges of war crimes because they "forgot" to mark a minefield and some civilians blundered their way into it....

That idea might fade away post nuke, but I'm fairly sure those with more than just a few months training will stick to their old habits and do the right thing.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Depends on how well trained the troops are. Nobody wants to stand in front of a court answering charges of war crimes because they "forgot" to mark a minefield and some civilians blundered their way into it....

That idea might fade away post nuke, but I'm fairly sure those with more than just a few months training will stick to their old habits and do the right thing.

In an ideal world I'd agree with you, but the problem is things are not ideal. You only really get charged with warcrimes if you lose and many nations today just ignore international law relying on either thier status as superpowers or the backing of such to bail tem out.

Israel is a classic example, many of their tactics break international law but nobody can get past the security council in the UN to bring them to book. Examles include unmarkd mindfields and using AAA weapons against civilian buildings (that caused quite a stir back in the 80's).

"The right thing" doesn't really hold meaning in major conflicts, history has proven this. In a major world war III situation I think we'd find all sides playing fast and loose with international law, especialy if things where going bad.

[Legbreaker]

For my part I don't see civilisation, or at least attempts at organisation slipping away all that easily. Yes there will certainly be instances of barbarism and chaos, but humans as a whole prefer order.

Where there is a working command structure, whether that be civilian or military, Division sized or platoon, you'll see attempts to follow pre-war rules. In fact I see an increase in discipline being vital to survival. If you have individuals doing their own thing, breaking the laws, traditions, habits, etc then the whole unit is weakened. A good commander/politician will see that right from the beginning and take the necessary steps.

This may be the implementation of a democratic system where everyone gets a say and vote thereby instilling a sense of community and individual worth, or raising of a brutal police force with no qualms about beating the populace down and into line, or something in between. In military units I can see MPs being very busy, and senior NCOs having a number of "quiet talks around back" with the less cooperative soldiers in their unit.

Without discipline and order a unit is sure to fall apart and become either marauders of their prey. Without unit cohesion that unit is in serious danger of being wiped out by other units with perhaps less resources, but better command and control.

The same ideas apply to such things as marking minefields. If a unit fails to mark them, especially around their cantonment, or located within their area of support (ie the farmland that feeds them), they'll very quickly find themselves at odds with the civilian population. Without that population chances are the unit will starve, have great difficulty acquiring necessary raw materials, parts etc and suffer continuous sabotage attempts from the disaffected locals.

[95th Rifleman]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

For my part I don't see civilisation, or at least attempts at organisation slipping away all that easily. Yes there will certainly be instances of barbarism and chaos, but humans as a whole prefer order.

Where there is a working command structure, whether that be civilian or military, Division sized or platoon, you'll see attempts to follow pre-war rules. In fact I see an increase in discipline being vital to survival. If you have individuals doing their own thing, breaking the laws, traditions, habits, etc then the whole unit is weakened. A good commander/politician will see that right from the beginning and take the necessary steps.

This may be the implementation of a democratic system where everyone gets a say and vote thereby instilling a sense of community and individual worth, or raising of a brutal police force with no qualms about beating the populace down and into line, or something in between. In military units I can see MPs being very busy, and senior NCOs having a number of "quiet talks around back" with the less cooperative soldiers in their unit.

Without discipline and order a unit is sure to fall apart and become either marauders of their prey. Without unit cohesion that unit is in serious danger of being wiped out by other units with perhaps less resources, but better command and control.

The same ideas apply to such things as marking minefields. If a unit fails to mark them, especially around their cantonment, or located within their area of support (ie the farmland that feeds them), they'll very quickly find themselves at odds with the civilian population. Without that population chances are the unit will starve, have great difficulty acquiring necessary raw materials, parts etc and suffer continuous sabotage attempts from the disaffected locals.

The cantonment system wouldn't go into effect till the later half of the conflict. Before that you would see some pretty desperate battles before lack of resources and broken chains of command mean that units have to base themselves around a wider community. Sldiers would still be expecting ultimate victory before being sent back home so nobody would care too much about the piece of foreighn turf they are fighting over, I would imagine Russian, American and British soldiers would care the least while Plish, Czech and German soldiers would probably be more mindful.

I'm sure many would come to regret their actions in seeding vast areas of central and eastern Europe with munitions and when the cantonment system goes into effect everyone would be VERY careful to police their areas of control and mark mine fields.

We need to remember that the Twilight conflict has 3 very distincy stages. First it would be a convetional, fluid campaign. Secondly things would become more desperate, nukes and chemical weapons start flying and the focus is on destroying or blunting enemy capabilities. only in the last phase of the war when soldiers begin to realise they are stuck in theatre for the long haul and require the co-operation of locals will hey be more area of the need to mark thins properly and use caution with area denial munitions.

[Webstral]

I agree completely that some minefields are going to go unmarked and forgotten. However, mines tend to reveal themselves fairly quickly. Some will go undiscovered for extended periods, but the mines laid in places used habitually will be discovered and marked promptly.

We should expect a deliberate use of mines to defend base camp areas in Europe beginning in 1997—perhaps earlier. The pre-war minefields may be hash by late 1997, but once the pace of war starts to slow the emplacement of permanent fields will accelerate. The Summer 1998 fighting will demonstrate to the European commands that peace is still some way off; whatever local and temporary arrangements that were made up to that point will be expanded into a series of measures to create safe base areas for all units. Also, the use of mines to canalize the next enemy’s offensive will gain importance. These mines will be marked for more practical reasons than the Geneva Convention; friendly casualties and losses among local civilians are to be avoided. Even the Soviets in Poland will realize that maintaining the good will and cooperation of the locals is a combat multiplier.


Webstral


P.S. Of course, not everybody is going to think in such rational terms. There is plenty of room for soldiers to treat the locals like hosts for uniformed parasites.