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#61
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Grant and Sherman wore what amounted to the normal wear of a private with only the insignia on their shoulders denoting their rank. http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-g...rant-field.htm http://www.sonofthesouth.net/union-g...n-portrait.htm And yet, these were the two generals credited with the victory of the North over the South. |
#62
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I'm sure that's what Patton thought, too, re: uniform modifications. Note, that was back in his days as a brigade/division commander.
If he had lost any of his battles, I'm sure he would have been remembered only as the "goggle-eyed maniac" that the 1970 movie almost portrayed him.
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My Twilight claim to fame: I ran "Allegheny Uprising" at Allegheny College, spring of 1988. |
#63
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#64
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#65
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__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#66
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Many of the failed commanders of the forces of the Union in the East were in general with the exception of McClellan were offered to re-take their place in Corps commands, but many refused. Strangely enough McClellan was allowed to do so command twice. Some were transferred from various Department to others after being relieved. McDowell is the only commander of an Army that I know where he went to Division after the First Battle of Bull Run, then became Corps Commander and like many he had an independent command that wasn't part of the much larger Army operating in Virginia. Then when three independent Corps had been formed into the Army of Virgina under General Pope due to defeat of the at Second Battle of Bull Run was strip of his command and was no longer allowed to hold command position even though it wasn't his fault for that that lose. Being a Union General was no treat. You had three career paths of death, force retirement, or success. Then add to the fact that many of them had very little military experience or had been out of the military for years, while others had none. It not surprising that so many Brigadier and Major Generals on both side lost their lives and/or captured during the war. Why for the first couple year the Union went through so many who were forced out. While on the Confederate side not many Generals were forced to retired for failures. Many would lose their position to be place back into similar position again. General Bragg and General Hood remind me of two generals that probably would of done better as Corps commanders but made it to Army Commander and they for a while with several other cast of Generals rotated through the various variation of Armies that fought first along the Mississippi, then what was called the West, and finally in Georgia and the Carolinas. It was funny that the Confederates did have several Lt Generals and I am not sure if they had two full Generals, I think General Johnston who commanded the Army that would become the Army of Northern Virginia before Robert E. Lee took command. After being wounded in rotated between assignment in Richmond, VA and various postings to the West as they continue to fight a losing battle out there. The Union Army in contrast until Grant was made Lt General and moving out of the field to Washington. The one thing is everyone remember Lt General Grant and Major General Sherman as the major two commanders. In fact, Major General Meade on paper was still the Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac. I say on paper since most of the time Grant established a field HQ almost near by to make sure the AoP and the various other independent commands working to take Richmond would cooperate and Meade only had true command at the times when Grant had to be in Washington attending to business that the Chief of the Army had to conduct with the War Department, Department of the Army, and with the President. Even though it wasn't unheard of for the President of the United States to visit the field HQs too. One of the few times in history when sitting President would visit field HQs. |
#67
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Just How Ready Were to Fight Was the Seventh?
One of the many questions about LBH is just how ready were the troopers to fight effectively on 25 June, 1876? This was first brought out in the Reno Court of Inquiry and debated by historians ever since.
One of the stories brought out at the CoI was the presence of a number of untrained raw recruits as well as the fact that the regiment, as a whole, was exhausted by the time it reached the battlefield, thus resulting in the poor showing of the Seventh. The first portion of this argument holds that raw recruits lack sufficient training to fight alongside seasoned veterans. The ability to fight effectively depends upon the foundations of discipline and skills in weaponary and marksmanship. This, of course, requires careful training over a period of time. The records shows that about 150 recruits joined the Seventh in 1875, with about 60 of them having had prior service. Another 62 are claimed to have joined prior to the LBH Campaign, but only 54 can be verified by the records. Most likely these men were untrained as cavalrymen; theor daily activities consisting of guard duty, fatigue duty, and the monotonous garrison routine. The lack of training for these new recruits can be placed onto the failure of Major Reno, who commanded the Seventh during Custer's absence in Washington DC during the preparations for the campaign. Reno neglected to schedule target practise or the rudiments of cavalry tactics. To be sure, the Springfield and Colt designs did not require a rocket scientist to figure out how to load, aim and fire. But the Springfield carbine required a technique of loading and extracting that required proper learning and practise in order to acheive its maximum rate of fire. Training in the basic of horsemanship, other than mucking out stalls, was lacking as well. Upon first examination, the presence of these recruits are a detriment to the ability of the Seventh against the Indians as was stated in the Reno Court of Inquiry. In an article in 1936, 2nd Lieutenant Charles Varnum, a LBH participant stated that the number of recruits who took part in the battle was greatly exaggerated at the CoI in order to aid in Reno's defense. Varnum claimed that most of the recruits had been left at the Powder River base camp and that no company had more than two recruits present on the final march. A search of the regimental records confirms Varnum's statement. At the time of the battle, a total of 37 recruits (those who signed up in 1876) were on detached duty at Powder River. One was at Ft Abraham Lincoln, another was in confinement at the post stockade and two were in route to the fort. Nine were detailed with the pack train escort and only four remained with the companies assigned to Reno's Battalion. No recruits were assigned to the Custer Battalion. Another problem that plagued cavalry units throughout the Indian Wars is the number of "green" horses experiencing combat for the first time. It has been estimated that as many as 50% of the Seventh's mounts were newly acquired. And the reactions of these new mounts tothe sounds, smells and chaos of a battlefield would have had an effect on the ability of the Seventh to fight effectively. The second of Reno's allegations concerned that the troopers were too exhausted to fight effectively. The regiment had traveled 113 miles, with little sleep or nourishment between June 22 and June 25. A long, hard march such as this would certainly create a state of tiredness that would have prevented anyone from operating at peak effectiveness. Field rations of hard bread, bacon and coffee, supplemented with some wild game and mile malnourishment would unquestionably sap the spirit and result in a breakdown of discipline and morale. The troopers of Seventh were Regulars, however, experienced in Indian fighting and could be expected to perform under the worst of conditions. And a number of these troopers had brazed freezing temperatures and a blizzard to successfully attack Black Kettle's village at the battle of the Washita in November 1868. There is another factor to consider when judging combect effectiveness is the one factor that can overcome fatigue and hunger. As any combat veteran knows, adrenaline-fueled engery can play a major role in quickly readying the mind and body for battle. Senses and concentration is heightened and while fatigue may become a factor during a prolonged battle, men trained to fight usually respond quite well in the short term. Whether the Custer Battalion could have faired better had they enjoyed a good night's sleep and a full belly, is a matter of conjecture.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#68
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The Little Big Horn's Medals of Honor
For the troopers pinned down at the Reno-Benteen Defense Site, by June 26, the lack of water was becoming a serious problem. While the troopers had started out with mostly full canteens when the seige began, much of that water had been delpeted and the men were reduced to drinking the juice from a handful of fruit cans or sucking on potatoes, but many of the wounded were now suffering under the hot Montana sun.
It is believed that heat was one reason that the Indians chose not to launch any serious attackes on the hill. Not only would such an assault caost many Indian lives, but it was evident that soonner or later, the troopers would need to move down a 600 yard long ravine in order to procure water, and that ravine was held by the Indians. Captain Benteen, acting on his own, made the decision to drive the Indians from the ravine. He led a dismounted charge toward the surprised Indians, killing several of them and chasing away the others, without the loss of a man until the return to the line when one trooper was shot and killed. While this cleared the ravine, anyone attempting to reach the river at the mouth would have to cross about 30 feet of open ground, with Indian sharpshooters firing from the opposite bank. Benteen declined to order any man to make the attempt, instead he called for volunteers. After the volunteers had collected every possible container that could hold water, four of the best shots available, George Geiger, Henry Meckling, Otto Voit and Charles Windolph were deployed as a skirmish line and ordered to lay down fire across the river. The initial mission was a success, although one man was killed and seven were wounded. Later water carriers acted on their own until about noon, when the Indian firing decreased and additional troopers were sent to fill canteens and other receptacles. For their bravery, twenty-four Seventh Cavalry troopers were adwarded the Medal of Honor, the largest number ever cited in any single engagement in U.S. history. These men are: Company A: Sergeant Stanislas Roy, Privates Neil Bancroft and David Harris Company B: Sergeants Rufus Hutchinson, Benjamin Criswell and Thomas Murray, Privates Thomas Callan, Charles Cunningham and James Pym. Company C: Sergeant Richard Hanley and Private Peter Thompson Company D: Privates Abram Brant, Frederick Deetline, William Harris, Henry Holden, George Scott, Thomas Stivers, Frank Tolan, and Charles Welch Company G: Private Theodore Goldin Company H: Sergeant George Geiger, Privates Henry Mechlin, Otto Voit and Charles Windolph
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#69
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The Mutilation of the Dead Cavalrymen
After the last of the Custer Battalion had fallen, the Sioux and Cheyenne women and a number of children and older men descended on the field of battle to help their warriors loot and mutilate the bodies in every conceivable manner, many beyond all recognition. The actual extent of the mutilation has always been a subject of debate with many eyewitnesses claiming that there was very little and an equal number claiming that it was widespread. The difference of the testmony can be explained due to the assignment of various troops to bury the dead, and certain postions may have received more postdeath mutilation than others.
The acts of mutilation that can be documented include dismemberment of amrs, legs, hands, fingers and penises; decapitation; scalping, lacrations and slashes from knives, tomahawks and axes; skulls crushed with stone mallets, and multiple gunshots and arrows fired from close range. The battlefield was said to have been littered with hands, heads, feet and legs that had been removed. Those troopers lying facedown were likely killed by a Cheyenne, who were known to believe that it was bad luck to leave an enemy facing the sky. The Sioux traditionally marked a dead enemy with a slashed thigh. The Indians even went so far as to mutilate some of the dead horses. For unknown reasons, the names of the dead had been cut out of the few items of clothing (an undershirt or a pair of socks) not stripped from the bodies. Everything of value, money, watches, rings, and so on was stripped from the bodies. Captain Thomas Custer was singled out for perhaps the worst treatment and he was only identified by tattoos on one arm. First Lieutenant Edward Godfrey described his body: "It was lying face down, all the scalp was removed, leaving only tufts of his fair hair on the nape of his neck. The skull was smashed in and a number of arrows had been shot into the back of the head and in the body. The features where they had touched the ground were pressed out of shape and were somewhat depressed. In turning the body, one arm which had been shot and broken, remained under the body; this was pulled out and on it we saw 'T.W.C.' and the goddess of liberty and the flag. His belly had been cut open and his entrails protruded." The extent of Tom Custer's abuse has caused some to believe that the Sioux warrior Rain-in-the-Face had made good on his threat to cut out Custer's heart and eat it as revenge for his arrest in 1875. Captain Benteen, however, stated that Custer's heart had not been cut out. The naked body of George Custer, from all accounts, was not mutilated. He was found in a sitting position leaning against and between two troopers, his face was said to be wearing the expression of a man who "had fallen asleep and enjoyed peaceful dreams". Custer was found with two wounds, a bullet in front of the left temple and another in the left breast. Chief Gall said in 1886 that GAC had not been scalped "because he was a big chief and we respected him," which is very unlikely because the Indians did not know that they were fighting Custer. Cheyenne Kate Bighead stated that Custer was not mutilated out of respect for their tribal sister Mo-nah-se-tah, who was believed to have gained Custer's affection while working as his translator in 1868. Kate also stated that the women had thrust a sewing awl into Custer's ears to "improve his hearing" because he had not heard the Indians when he smoked the peace pipe with them in 1867. Many historians belive that GAC's body was mutilated, but the truth was deliberately withheld out of respect for the feelings of Libbie Custer.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#70
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The Burial of the Dead
By the time that the Terry-Gibbon Column and the survivors of the Reno-Beteen Battalions marched the four miles north to view Custer's slaughtered command, the more than 200 bodies, along with numerous hourse carcasses, had been decomposing in the summer heat for two days. First Lieutenant Edward Godrey described the scene as the column approached: "We saw a large number of objects that looked liked white boulders scattered over the field and it was announced that these objects were the dead bodies." Captain Thomas Weir exclaimed: "Oh, how white the look! How white!." First Lieutenant Francis Gibson sadly said: "It was the most horrible sight my eyes rested on." Captain Frederick Benteen look down at Custer's body and said, with emotion: "There he is, God damn him, he will never fight anymore!"
The gruesome task of burying the dead began soon after and continued at until the evening of June 28, when the regiment marched away with the wounded on litters to the mouth of the Little Big Horn River. The soldiers on the burial detail, many of whom were quickly overcome with nausea and vomiting, did not possess proper digging implements. Only a dozen or so spades, shovels and picks, found in the debris of the Indian villages, were available, so they used anything that could scoop away the dirt to hasten the job. The soil was described as dry and porous, resembling sugar, so burial was at best a token gesture. The dead were buried where they fell and they were covered over with sagebrush and dirt or rolled into shallow trenches. The officers were identified by writing thier names on slips of paper, which was then stuffed into cartridge cases and hammered into the crude cedar stakes placed near the gravesites. The bodies at the various locations were counted, 42 on Custer Hill, 28 in Deep Ravine and 208 or 210 along Battle Ridge and an approximate total of 263 when all the officers, enlisted, civilians and scouts had been tallied. On June 25, 1877, one year to the day, Captain Henry Nowlan and Company I of the Seventh arrived at the battlefield with the mission of colecting the remains of the officers who had fallen. Nowlan was accompanied by First Lieutenant Hugh Scott, Colonel Michael Sheridan (brother of Phil Sheridan) and all of the Crow scouts that had been with Custer the year before. Fortunately, there would be no need for guesswork to identify the dead officer's, Nowlan had been provided with a map that showed where each officer was buried. Only one officer was reburied on the field. The father of 2nd Lieutenant John Crittenden, an infantry colonel, had said, "Let my boy lie where he fell." Crittenden's body was placed in a coffin and reburied where he fell. In September, 1931, his remains were moved to the nearby National Military Cemetery. The remains of the other officers from both the Reno and Custer battlefields were gathered up and transferred to pine boxes for transport to cemeteries designated by the next of kin. At this time, many of the enlisted men were either reburied individually where they fell or gathered together in mass graves. The group of 28 bodies that were buried in Deep Ravine have never been located. GAC had told his wife that when the time came, he wanted to be buried at the US Military Academy at West Point and she was determined to honor his wishes. Libby was advised to wait until the fall to hold the funeral as West Point was relatively vacant during the summer. Custer's remains were stored at a valult in Poughkeepsie, New York. On October 10, 1877, crowds lined the Hudson River as the bunting-draped Mary Powell, her flags flying at half mast brought Custer's remains to the south dock of the academy. The casket was escorted by a cavalry detachment to the chapel. Shortly after 2pm, Major General John Schofield, commandant of the Military Academy, escorted Libbie into the chapel. Classes had been suspended and the cadets crowded into the chapel to witness the event. The West Point chaplain, Doctor John Forsyth, conducted an Episcopal service, concluding with the 19th Psalm. Afterward, cadets carried the casket to a caisson, which bore it to the cemetery. A lone horse, displaying a pair of cavalry boots with spurs, with the toes pointed to the rear, followed the caisson. The procession halted at the cemetery, the chaplain spoke again, three volleys were fired and George Armstrong Custer was laid to rest. In 1933, Libbie Custer was buried beside her husband. In 1881, the remains of the enlisted men were removed from the scattered graves on the battlefield and reinterred in a mass grave under the base of the imposing granite monument that was erected on Custer Hill. The names of the dead, a number of which are spelled incorrecly, were inscribed on the monument. Marble headstones were placed around the battlefield to provide a rough guide as to where the soldiers had been killed. The final resting places of the officers who were killed on June 25, 1876 are as follows: 1st Lt James Calhoun: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery 1st Lt William W. Cooke: Hamilton Cemetery, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada 2nd Lt John J. Crittendon: Custer National Military Cemetery LTC George A. Custer: US Military Academy at West Point Cemetery Capt Thomas W. Custer: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery Dr. James M. DeWolf: Woodlawn Cemetery, Norwalk, Ohio 2nd Lt Henry M. Harrington: body never found 2nd Lt Benjamin H. Hodgson: Laurel Hill Cemetery, Philadelphia, PA Capt Myles W. Keogh: Fort Hill Cemetery, Auburn, NY Dr. George E. Lord: Custer National Military Cemetery 1st Lt Donald McIntosh: Arlington National Cemetery, Washington DC 1st Lt James E. Porter: body never found 2nd Lt William V.W. Reilly: Mount Olivert Cemetery, Washington DC 1st Lt Algernon E. Smith: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery 2nd Lt James G. Sturgis: body never found Capt George W.M. Yates: Fort Leavenworth National Military Cemetery
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#71
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So their bodies weren't found, or were they unable confirm their bodies from the rest of troops?
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#72
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More like they were unable to confirm their bodies from the rest of the troops. The body of one of the intererperters, Mitch Boyer, was only discovered in 1987. They were able to ID it due to skull/facial reconstruction As it stands right now, there are still 28 bodies missing, the men who died in Deep Ravine.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#73
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I think you are making all of this up. They didn't have CSI in the civil war.
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#74
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That is what I figured. Shame they couldn't use modern stuff to id them all. Yeah, it understandable that they could lose the position for the 28 buried. Probably they believed they were in one place and actually in another place completely.
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#75
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The body he referenced identified in this manner was found in 1987 (see the previous sentence in his port). They did have CSI then. I am assuming they had a photograph to compare the reconstruction to.
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#76
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As the part of the 7th under Custer attacked the village, the soldiers suddenly stopped and retreated after a period of confusion. This activity was confirmed by the archeology of LBH battlefield. Was Custer already dead? Seriously wounded, then moved to top of Last Stand Hill? Could this be why the Doctor with GAC's Companies set up in the Last Stand Hill area? Unknown, but the sudden incapacitation of GAC could explain why the 5 companies with GAC seemed to loose agressive action after the attempt on the village. Something else to consider, General Terry stated that the wound to the head was "blackened". Self inflicted? Shot by some last member of the 7th to make sure GAC was dead before the over run by the Indians? Mike |
#77
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Or, Stitch2.0 lives in an alternative timeline where the US Civil war lasted until 1876/1877 or indeed, 1987 and forensic science therefore remains underdeveloped. Obviously some quantum internet error! Regarding the blackening that Mike mentions, it could have been a coup-de-grace administered post-mortem by the Indians. Tony |
#78
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They have also used this technique to sculpt seven faces of troopers who were found in the recent digs, to date, the remains of Sergeant Miles O'Hara; Sergeant Edward Botzer; Corporal George Lell and Private Vincent Charley have been identified by this method. Another technique that is being used is one developed by the FBI. They take a photo of the skull and then run known photos of troopers to find a match. This software was developed to ID missing persons when human remains were found. As for me making this up....may I take the time to refer you to a most excellent resource, the book "They Died With Custer" by Douglas D. Scott, P.Willey and Melissa A. Connor. Its an excellent examination of the Seventh Cavalry and goes into this process in much greater detail. And next time, when you decide to call someone down who has taken the time to research the subject, please, take the time to research it for yourself. It will save you the embrassment. Have a Nice Day!
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#79
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Dr. Fox has conducted at least three digs around the location indicated on the burial map and only bone fragments have been recovered.
__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#80
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When Captain Weir led the abortive move of Company D from the Reno-Benteen position to what is now called Weir Point, it was observed that there were a large group of Indians still firing towards Last Stand Hill. Weir and his party assumed that Custer was still fighting. This is a possibility, but more likely, this was the Indians making sure that any one on LSH was dead. Just offered the "blackening" as a discussion point. Mike |
#81
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It is known that the Custer Bn fell back to the line Custer Hill-Battle Ridge-Calhoun Hill shortly afterwards, was this due to the wounding/death of GAC? Or is it simply a move to the higher terrain? Both can be argued. As for the position of Doctor George Lord on Custer Hill, this can also be explained. Dr. Lord was a member of the regimental staff, he would have been near GAC as a matter of course. Once again Indian oral tradiations hold that the end of the Custer Bn, after the start of the attacks led by Chief Gall and Crazy Horse came "as swiftly as a herd of buffalo can run." There would have been no time for Dr. Lord to move anywhere else on the battlefield. While there is no doubt that the Custer Bn went on the defensive early on. This does not indicate that Custer being wounded/killed had caused it. For example, the senior company commander's, Captain Myles Keogh, Captain Thomas Custer and Captain George Yates were all experienced Indian fighters and fully capable of taking over the command of the battalion. Please remember that Indian oral traditions hold that many of the cavalry mounts were run off early; Custer had also dispatched a message to Benteen to bring up the packs as quickly as possible, a possible indicator of an ammunition shortage, finally, the positions of at least three companies stretched down Battle Ridge-Calhoun Hill, indicate an attempt to open a path for the movement of Benteen's Battalion and the pack train. And finally, General Terry mentioned that the wound to Custer's head was blackened, several years afterwards. All accounts of those officer's who were present when GAC's body was found, stated that neither wound was blackened, indicating long range fire was responsible. Even Captain Benteen, who was noted as hating Custer, never stated that Custer committed sucide. This does not mean that the possibility did not exist, but IMO, I feel that Custer was wounded earlier in the fight and then killed when the position on Custer Hill was overrun. Terry's observation of the blackening has always been felt by many historians as just another way of blackening GAC's reputation.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#82
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__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#83
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One of my old history teachers when I was in the south absolutely refused to call the war of northern aggression anything but, and said the same thing about resting up. The really amusing part is when he actually brought up the size and quality of southern national guard units and compared them with "those peoples" units. Almost made me a believer he did.
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Member of the Bofors fan club! The M1911 of automatic cannon. Proud fan(atic) of the CV90 Series. |
#84
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__________________
The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#85
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Civil war is ancient history. CSI is cooler.
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#86
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Stich2.0:
HA! Quote:
Well get on with it, already! What's the bloody hold up? I can see the natural end-game right now: Tony Last edited by helbent4; 12-23-2010 at 11:20 PM. |
#87
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LOL.
That is soooo wrong its right. Though I think we could have at least grabbed Alberta and SK without too much trouble. Not sure where the newfies would jump, but the frenchies would jump ship at the least. (And I can call them newfies, for I am a son of one!)
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Member of the Bofors fan club! The M1911 of automatic cannon. Proud fan(atic) of the CV90 Series. |
#88
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[QUOTE=Abbott Shaull;28710]Many of the failed commanders of the forces of the Union in the East were in general with the exception of McClellan were offered to re-take their place in Corps commands, but many refused. Strangely enough McClellan was allowed to do so command twice. Some were transferred from various Department to others after being relieved.[QUOTE]
And the only reason why "Little Mac" was brought back was that the available pool of generals was so poor. What finally nailed McClellan's coffin shut was his piss-poor performance at Antitem. Had the chance to smash the Army of Northern Virgina, but, in essence, let each of his corps launch its own attack, none of which were coordinated by McClellan. Cany we say defeat in detail? [Quote]McDowell is the only commander of an Army that I know where he went to Division after the First Battle of Bull Run, then became Corps Commander and like many he had an independent command that wasn't part of the much larger Army operating in Virginia. Then when three independent Corps had been formed into the Army of Virgina under General Pope due to defeat of the at Second Battle of Bull Run was strip of his command and was no longer allowed to hold command position even though it wasn't his fault for that that lose.[QUOTE] One almost has to admire General Pope, he gets his army cut to pieces, and yet was able to push a lot of blame for his own failures onto the shoulders of McDowell. At least Lincoln was able to read through Pope's BS. [QUOTE]While on the Confederate side not many Generals were forced to retired for failures. Many would lose their position to be place back into similar position again. General Bragg and General Hood remind me of two generals that probably would of done better as Corps commanders but made it to Army Commander and they for a while with several other cast of Generals rotated through the various variation of Armies that fought first along the Mississippi, then what was called the West, and finally in Georgia and the Carolinas.[QUOTE] Being a Confederate General was no joke either. A lot of people point out the failures of the Union command, but since they were attacking most of the war, the failures of their Generals was much more obvious. The Confederates were able to fight defensively and this concealed the weakness of their own generals. General Johnson was always considered to be a better general than Lee, but when Johnson launced his attack at Shiloh, he had so little control that Beauregard was able to force a pure Napoleonic assault on the Confederates, in terrain that can only be described as "cut-up". While the Rebels were able to inflict major losses on Grant and force him into a small perimeter, the timely reinforcements by the Union Army of the Ohio allowed Grant to counterattack and win a bitter victory at Shiloh. As for John Bell Hood....he was a great brigade commander, a fair division commander and as an army commander, he was the best thing that happened to the Confederate Army of Tennessee, at least as far as the Union was concerned. During the Union retreat to Nashville, Hood took a chance to nail the Union rear guard at the Battle of Franklin, the result, Hood lost a quarter of his army and didn't even delay the rear guard. Yet Hood felt that it was a victory because he had taught his men how to fight!?!?!?!?!?? At the Battle of Nashville, General Thomas scored the only total destruction of a Confederate army when his attack smashed Hood's defenses. By the end of the summer, the Army of the Tennessee, back at its start point in Georgia, could muster a little over 5,000 men...and they were assigned the mission of stopping Sherman's March...
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#89
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[QUOTE=helbent4;28774]Stich2.0:
HA! Lee, Well get on with it, already! What's the bloody hold up? I can see the natural end-game right now: Tony[/QUOTE} It should read the Republic of Texas...I can see they left out the New England states....there has to be a reserve for the liberals to roam, I guess.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
#90
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Tobacco Use in the Seventh
Nowdays, the use of the brown leaf is considered to be a filthy, disease-ridden habit. In the nineteenth century, tobacco was considered to be a necessary habit. It helped to relive fatigue and hunger, and it also helped to relive boredom.
During the 1870s, it was possible for a trooper to draw a Tobacco Ration from the government. This amount to one pound per man, per month. The trooper had to reimbused the government for the cost of the tobacco, but this was at the rate that the government had purchased it, amount to about $1.14 a pound in 1876. Only enlisted men were able to draw the ration although officers could make their purchases direct from the commissery. During 1878, the army sold 43,285 pounds of chewing tobacco and 27,282 pounds of smoking tobacco. According to the FDC, about 35% of Americans use tobacco...in contrast, in the Seventh Cavalry, the usage is well over 90%! Even in today's army, tobacco usage is heavier than with civilans, but it only averages about 44%.
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The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis. |
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