Survival of the US 5th ID (M)

[schnickelfritz]

The only argument that I have with that analysis is that no mention of pact artillery is made that I can see. That doesn't surprise me, given that it is stated that the 124th lost its Co, XO, and a Regimental Commander (the "three top officers") during that engagement or within the next twelve hours. My money is that it was within minutes of the ambush being sprung. With the loss of command and control, if there was artillery (say a couple of D-30's or 120mm mortars, as it was a low grade formation) still attached to the 124th, or any other artillery that could be brought to bear in support (from the 21st, most likely), it couldn't be called for, much less targeted.

it would certainly seem from this scenario and others (Black Madonna being one) that Pact artillery took fearfull losses againts NATO. before the AVGAS and parts ran out, the jabos must have been busy unlike anything seen since Normandy in 1944!

In addition, it is mentioned that there were significant fires and explosions from ammo vehicles in particular, which tells me that there is at least part of the divisional supply train in attendance at this party.

The status report for the 124th for the next day states that the bulk of the forward supply vehicles of the 124th have been destroyed, which reinforces my perception.

If the US task group/battlegroup/whatever didn't move significantly from it's position until before dawn, my guess is that the losses were encurred in the road killing ground.

Lastly, I think it was mentioned that the counterattack came from the Americans' right flank, which tells me most of the remaining AFV's/Tanks belonging to the 124th were well beyond the killing zone when the shooting started, exposing the division's supply vehicles.

Thanks for the feedback! LOL, this was the highlight of the day!

Thanks-
Dave

[Legbreaker]

Romania in the mid 90's was producing approximately 135,000 barrels per day, or about 27,000,000 litres.
http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.asp...aph=production
Ploesti is a refinery rather than a field and according to wiki http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroch...try_in_Romania refines approximately 3,200 cubic metres of oil per day. That's 3,200,000 litres per day.
At 1% of prewar figures (as we're told in the books) that's still 32,000 litres per day, or close to a million litres a month.
Note that during refinery (a process I don't understand 100%) you can actually get more volume out than you put in!

We also know that an entire months production was dedicated to shifting a couple of divisions. Using my earlier example of about 250,000 litres for the 124th, I think we can agree that the 4th GTA had more than enough to keep them going for weeks of activity.

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by schnickelfritz

In addition, it is mentioned that there were significant fires and explosions from ammo vehicles in particular, which tells me that there is at least part of the divisional supply train in attendance at this party.

This could have been from the combat vehicles themselves. We know from actual real life examples that Soviet style AFVs go pop very easily.

Originally Posted by schnickelfritz

The status report for the 124th for the next day states that the bulk of the forward supply vehicles of the 124th have been destroyed, which reinforces my perception.

Forward supply vehicles - company and maybe battalion. Brigade and divisonal assets would most certainly have been held back/removed from danger at the first sign of trouble.

Originally Posted by schnickelfritz

If the US task group/battlegroup/whatever didn't move significantly from it's position until before dawn, my guess is that the losses were encurred in the road killing ground.

120mm guns and .50cal machineguns can reach out and touch somebody a looooooong way away. Naturally terrain will have significant impact on this.

Originally Posted by schnickelfritz

Thanks for the feedback! LOL, this was the highlight of the day!

You're welcome. It's what we're all here for!

[schnickelfritz]

Forward supply vehicles - company and maybe battalion. Brigade and divisonal assets would most certainly have been held back/removed from danger at the first sign of trouble.

Agreed-whatever forward transport was caught in the killing ground stayed there and either died there or was captured. The 124th's rear area supply dump and hub was listed as Piotrkow. They will have to beg/borrow/steel/trade for trucks to bring what they do have in their supply dump forward, though.

Of course, their most pressing concern is rounding up the scattered and shattered formations and trying to get them back into some form of fighting trim. Given the "Mobilization Only" status (aka "cannon fodder") of the division and the losses at the top of the command structure, this could take a while.

This alone removes them from the pursuit phase of the operation.

After studying the situation further, I'm baffled as to why the division, having had contact with the 5th earlier, seemingly bludered into this ambush in the first place. Yes, there could have been more detail to the story that was left out, and perhaps they DID deploy a recce screen to secure their flanks and try to find the enemy division that was known to be out there somewhere, but it sure doesn't seem like it.

Thanks-
Dave

[Abbott Shaull]

All the more likely for things to be screwed up for the Division, being a Mobilized Only Division, discipline probably wasn't the best. I think by 2000 most of the remaining Soviet troops aren't in hurry to move because the lack of confidence that they will be resupply, so adding transport to follow with a Battalion or Regiment would help ease minds. Of course, these transports have to be protected, hence taking away recon troops from their job, and detail to help protect forward supply transport, could explain why and how it happen.

[Legbreaker]

Note that the "rear services and supply dump of the 124th MRD" (200 men) is located well behind the lines at Piotrkow (along with 4th GTA HQ - 150 men). It seems very unlikely with such a force located there specifically for supply and support that any significant amounts of spare fuel and ammo would have been ambushed by the Americans and therefore be available for salvage.

[Abbott Shaull]

I smell a canon stickler...

[pmulcahy11b]

Originally Posted by Abbott Shaull

I smell a canon stickler...

Is that some kind of sex toy?

[Legbreaker]

Can we please cease the snide comments and get on with discussing the topic. We have been presented a situation and background material - how about we work with what we've got, hmm?

If somebody has some other possible read of the published info, then lets hear it. If somebody wants to change the info and alter the balance of power, then I would hope that the can back up their changes with reasons why it would work that way.

That is all. Canon/not canon is irrelevant.

[Abbott Shaull]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

That is all. Canon/not canon is irrelevant.

So please re-read and learn to live by it.

The information given in the publications were meant as guidelines for the GM to use as they see fit for their particular campaign. Enough said.

Either way, we can agree the 124th was toast. How much of their supply train will be up to the GM of that particular game to figure out.

[schnickelfritz]

The canon material does state specifically that most of the 124th's forward supply vehicles have been destroyed. They had to be destroyed at some point between the opening of the road ambush (to give it a name) and the end of the active phase of the breakout.

After re-reading the material created by GDW and play tested by GDW all of those years ago, either the designers missed some things (other than seemingly endless grammatical errors and typos), or intentionally left it open for interpretation. My opinion is that it was partially unintentional, mostly intentional.

The only way to definitively answer that is to talk to living members of the original GDW team.

The way I see it is that if anyone wants to adhere to the strict letter of what was written by the folks at GDW, that's fine. Buth I believe we all can and should accept that there is some room for interpretation, some times more than a little, due to intentional or unintentional inconsistencies and sometimes downright poorly executed product.

Thanks to all for their input.

My alternative breakout basically centered on the timely capture of some official disposition/location/planning documents, access to the 4th GTA radio net, some captured fuel, and the chance to delay the 21st MRD and 10th TD (Pol) for between 12 to 24 hours.

It is perfectly reasonable for all to have differences with any and all of it if you wish. I take no offence at all to that.

I've tried to base the probability of what could happen "if" on my studies of the cold war WP military over the years, as well as extensive study of the Western European Campaign in 1944-1945. It never ceases to amaze me how blunders, poor calls, bad communication, and poor luck have influenced warfare since 1914, and from 1939-1945 in particular.

Once I get the chance to update/modify my material (which will take some time due to 2 kids and migraines), I'll post it for you all to read, critique, and hopefully enjoy.

Thanks!
Dave

[Legbreaker]

Exactly, it's up to the individual GM to use the materials presented however they wish. My only argument is, and always has been, changes should not be made to the published material with the expectation by the writer that it be adopted by everyone.

In other words, post any ideas you want, just don't ram it down other peoples throats and demand they adopt it.

Now, getting back on topic, the combat elements of the 124th are definitely toast, at least for the period following the "ambush". Give them a week or two to reorganise and bring up replacement equipment and perhaps a few warm bodies from Divisional HQ and supplies back in Piotrkow and they may be back in the game.

Although it's possible some supplies could be scrounged by the Americans from the wreckage of the 124th, there was roughly 2,000 metres between their immobilised tanks and other vehicles and the kill zone of the roadway. That's a lot of distance to haul jerry cans on foot. Also, it's likely that the Soviet fuel tanks were only about 1/4 full at the time, given the distance they had travelled. Given that, and the fact many of the soviet vehicles went up in flames, and it's likely that only enough fuel could be recovered for a few hours operation, at best. Much better I think to consolidate into a handful of vehicles for the breakout, ensuring sufficient fuel was available for several days of movement. This would certainly mean the loss of all the M1s and probably M2s as well rendering the "Armoured" brigade effectively toothless.

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Originally Posted by schnickelfritz

...It never ceases to amaze me how blunders, poor calls, bad communication, and poor luck have influenced warfare since 1914, and from 1939-1945 in particular.

Dave

You and me both (but I'd say it's been that way ever since we started fighting wars).
If you don't already have it, I think you'll enjoy 'The Hinge Factor: How Chance and Stupidity Have Changed History'. Amazon have a good write-up of the book here
I had a few problems with the author's assumptions in a few cases but overall, it was an interesting and sometimes educational read.
Some details for those looking to order it: -
Paperback: 394 pages
Author: Erik Durschmied
Publisher: Arcade Publishing; 1st Edition edition (April 2, 2001)
ISBN-10: 1559705728
ISBN-13: 978-1559705721

There's a sort of companion book as well called 'The Weather Factor: How Nature Has Changed History' although I haven't read that one.
Again Amazon has a write-up about the book

[Abbott Shaull]

Like they say no Operational Plan survives intact after the first shot is fired. From there until either the Operation succeeds or fails depends on too factors for anyone to really have much control. You can only hope for the other side to have much worse luck that day.

[schnickelfritz]

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

My only argument is, and always has been, changes should not be made to the published material with the expectation by the writer that it be adopted by everyone.

In other words, post any ideas you want, just don't ram it down other peoples throats and demand they adopt it.

-Absolutely....I couldn't agree more. There is no expectation on my part whatsoever that anyone should adopt anything. I'm just soliciting feedback/discourse in the hope that I can make a scenario/narrative developed by me better. If anyone else of a like viewpoint likes it, that's great.

Originally Posted by Legbreaker

Although it's possible some supplies could be scrounged by the Americans from the wreckage of the 124th, there was roughly 2,000 metres between their immobilised tanks and other vehicles and the kill zone of the roadway. That's a lot of distance to haul jerry cans on foot.

I haven't had the blessing of hauling full jerrycans of fuel, but can relate from experience that haulling jerrycans full of water any real distance can get downright exhausting.

Were I the commander on the spot, I would have called for whatever support Brigade/Division could send me in the way of reinforcements, fuel, and supplies, especially after seeing the main body of an enemy division before me. Once the shooting had tapered off I would push across the road to secure it with whatever infantry I could spare from 3-10, plus whatever reinforcements I could get from 3-143 Infantry and 3-77 Armor. If you could drop some mortar and artillery rounds in a light (to conserve ammo) walking barrage for 200-400 yards or so past the road. The goal would be to scare off any members of the 124th that are trying to set up positions and/or reconstitute a skirmish line. Really, the goal is to scare off anyone that hasn't fled already. From there, you could start picking the column's remnants clean.

Thanks-
Dave

[Legbreaker]

Originally Posted by schnickelfritz

Were I the commander on the spot, I would have called for whatever support Brigade/Division could send me in the way of reinforcements, fuel, and supplies...

Well there's the problem I think. There are no reinforcements, fuel or supplies available from Brigade, Division or anywhere else for that matter. Everyone else is already occupied.

As for a walking barrage, by the last day or so of the 5th, it seems that they were almost out of everything. The artillery is likely to be otherwise occupied also, supporting other units in contact with the enemy. Mortars may be available, but after the long fight with the 124th, are likely to be very low on ammo.

If you take the pressure off other units it might be possible to support the 3-70th etc, but that may change the entire dynamic of the scenario and enable a breakout in another direction.

[schnickelfritz]

It is listed that 3-10 Infantry arrives at some point shortly after 1200 hours and assists in defeating several conterattacks by the 124th.

Elements of 4-12 cavalry must have been on scene as well, after all, they spotted the 124th on the road in the first place.

Six howitzers from 2-21 FA are stated to be to the rear of 3-10 and 3-70.

If they did not have ammo, why would they set up? Let's be realistic, there are no endless piles of ammo, but surely there must be a couple dozen shells you could use to scare off some shattered formations on the other side of the column.

I would push across the road with every warm body I could use to secure the road and cut it. With a battalion of infantry on hand...even by the standards of T2K year 2000, I would assume that would mean 200, perhaps 300 infantry. 100 would be a weak skirmish line, but given the situation, it would probably work.

Scream for every body and vehicle you can get...this may be your only shot.

It is stated that there is still an emergency fuel reserve and that the supply-maintenance echelon is to the rear of 3-10/3-70. The remaining fuel and supplies would be distributed and the breakout would kick off. 3-77A, 3-143I, and 3-19FA were just North of Kalisz and would be brought down during the night.

Thanks-
Dave

[Legbreaker]

Anything is possible.

Re the artillery, I'm thinking that the ready supply of ammo was expended during the battle leaving very little for defensive fires should there have bene a counterattack. In that light firing just to create a screen at targets that may, or may not be there or even be a threat seems a little wasteful.

There may well have been the manpower available to conduct a cursory scrounging of the wreckage. I don't believe though that enough would have been recovered quickly enough to resupply the US units in the area.

Given the scenario parameters, it seems likely that the writers considered any PC groups that escaped to have probably come from one of these units . Taking a bit of a leap, it seems probable the horseborne cavalry were effectively wiped out, given that animals aren't an option when equiping beginning characters with transportation.

[Panther Al]

Actually, Horse are an option. Instead of rolling 1D6 per three characters for a vehicle, you get 1D6 horses/mules. I was seriously thinking of going with that in my game. (Page 26, V2.2 BYB)

[Abbott Shaull]

You know that is one thing that hasn't been discussed much that I can remember. Sure month or so well forward of the IX Corps and limited amount of round for the AFV's. The battles with various units during the break through and pursue Polish and then major battle would of drawn down the number of main gun rounds for the tank, but I don't recall much about like Mortar and Artillery rounds.

Again the 5th could carry so much of everything and they already been in running battle more less for at least the last month. Could it be that part of the reason why the 5th was so easy to pick off was due to the fact that ammo for Mortars and Artillery as well the MRLS units of the Battery were at running short and no one was able to get the calls of fires they would of liked.

So throw this into the mix...