In Defense of the Red Army

[chico20854]

Originally Posted by Raellus

1.) I think the European battlefield would be even deadlier for aircraft than it would be for AFVs. MANPADs and SPAAA would take a heavy toll of helicopter gunships. The Soviet's extensive and multilayered AAD network would give NATO fits. Sure, NATO was able to take out the Iraqi's AAD networks relatively easilty, and the Serbian's somewhat less so (although, IIRC, the Serbs were able to shoot down an F-117 with a Soviet made SAM), but those networks were poor imitations of what the Soviet' s would have had. A better model would be the Egyptian's network during the Yom Kippur war.

The popular media and the companies that manufacture combat aircraft and their weapon systems tend to portray modern air warfare as neat and tidy. NATO, especially, seems to put a lot of faith in BVR first kill ability. Yes, NATO has a technological edge in AWACs, combat aircraft, and missile systems, but only just a slight one. With hundred of aircraft in the air at once, AWAC would quickly break down. Contrary to popular belief, radars are neither all seeing nor all knowing. As recently as the '91 Gulf War, a flight of F-15s had trouble differentiating between a low flying MiG-25 and another flight of F-15s. They had to radio each other to waggle their wings to finally make a visual determination. At that point, any BVR edge is out the window. In a huge furball, a lot of NATOs technological advantages would dissappear. In fact, Soviet helmet mounted sights and aircraft-mounted IR seekers on the MiG-29 and SU-27 (the Soviets fielded these technologies first) would actually give a slight edge to the Soviet fighter pilots.

I think NATO's pilot training was clearly superior to the Soviets', though, so I still think NATO would have an overall advantage in air combat. The Soviet's numbers advantage would somewhat negate that, though. Overall, I think that the skies over central Europe would be particularly deadly for everyone involved, well before the TDM. This is one thing, IMO, that canon got dead on.

A few thoughts on the situation in the air. First, the Pact had an integrated air defense system. That means, for example, that the Polish PVO was concentrated along the Baltic coast, especially in the west, and then in depth as area defenses around industrial and politically important cities. When East Germany leaves the Pact and turns its radars & SAMs east (or at least off, either by design or because the crews are defending their sites on the ground) the integrated system is left with a massive hole. The Pact is forced to quickly throw up an alternative system, which they can do but will be less effective than the pre-existing fixed system, and the assets that are used to do so will not be available to perform their intended role defending forces in the field or some other portion of the Fatherland.

One thing to keep in mind is the distinction between development of Soviet high-tech weapons and their widespread fielding throughout the Pact. There are only four regiments of Su-27 in the west - most of the Su-27s are assigned to the PVO, defending the USSR's borders. The Pact allies had limited SPAA (even a Soviet division has only 16 Shilkas), with most of the Polish army having ZU-23-2s without radars on trucks and SA-7s in limited numbers as their sole air defense.

As to historical examples, I think the 1990s IRL are fairly indicative. The F-117 that the Serbs downed was a hangar queen whose bomb-bay doors were stuck open after its bombing run and it ran the same egress route for 3 nights in a row, giving the Serbs plenty of time to move several SA-3 batteries under its flight path and firing volleys almost blind. The greatest losses in 1973 were due to the fielding of a new, previously unknown system - the SA-6 - which dropped off quite quickly once effective countermeasures were developed.

As far as AWACS and the possible outcomes of large numbers of aircraft in action, I don't see it as that likely. Having hundreds of aircraft on the orbat and launching hundreds of aircraft at the same time are vastly different. In Central Europe air operations will be 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for months on end. At this point other issues begin to trump things like performance of AAMs and radars. Logistics rears its ugly head once again. What are the stockpiles of modern AAMs like? How many missions a day can ground crew maintain for weeks on end? How many spare parts are there? Are replacement pilots forthcoming? How rapidly can replacement ground radars be produced and emplaced? I see both sides having serious issues with these problems - the Pact, for example, has most of its aviation maintenance performed by junior officers, and has been in combat for over a year by the time war breaks out in the west (which has depleted stockpiles of parts and munitions but also allowed some industrial mobilization). On the other hand, the Luftwaffe is probably in pretty bad shape after fighting unassisted for 2 months.

The real decider of the war in the air very well might turn out to be the battle of the airfields. The Soviets would likely start to throw Scuds or their more modern replacements, probably with persistent chemical agents, at NATO's airfields at some point prior to the start of the tactical nuclear exchange. At the same time, NATO deep penetrator fighter-bombers - F-15E, F-111 and Tornado - would be gunning for Pact airfields, especially in Poland and Czechoslovakia (the MiG-29 having really short legs). Rough field and highway operations are hard to sustain long term - there's only so much complex maintenance that can be performed in a tent, and the autobahns are desperately needed to move supplies forward to the troops in contact.

I agree, the end result is likely to be that the air over Poland is pretty clear by the early summer of 1997. LOTS of aircraft losses.

Originally Posted by Raellus

2.) IMPO, the Soviet's one clear cut edge, numbers notwithstanding, is artillery. I think NATO would lose a lot of its guns to Soviet counterbattery fire. The Red Army in the '80s still fielded artillery divisions and had gun and rocket systems dedicated exclusively to counterbattery fire.

This is one area where I think NATO's philosophy of technology trumping numbers is the most flawed. MLRS is awesome, but their simply aren't enough of them to negate the Soviet's massive fleets of BM-21s and BM-27s. The respective counter battery radars aren't that different in terms of their capabilities. The Soviet's venerable D30 howitzers are just as capable as the american's M117. The Soviets fielded a lot more large calibre guns (and mortars) than NATO and most of their guns (of all calibres) had a range advantage.

I think NATO counted on taking out Soviet batteries from the air, assuming the establishment of air superiority. I believe this was wishful thinking, on at least two counts. First, I don't think NATO could have achieved anything more than brief, local air superiority. Second, I think Soviet AAD systems would make hitting artillery positions a deady mission for NATO pilots.

I guess all of this reflects my skepticism regarding the ability of technology (as the primary causal factor) to win modern wars.

The Soviets have a truly massive artillery park. Each Front has an artillery division, each army has at least one artillery and one MRL brigade. During the pause before Advent Crown this artillery park will get dug in and targets pre-registered, with mountains of ammo dumped next to each piece. Some NATO corps have almost comparable levels of artillery assigned, although there is no NATO counterpart to the front-level divisions.

NATO's biggest hope has to be the technology - more ICM and FASCAM rounds, better counterbattery radar, fewer towed guns in Central Europe (at least in comparison to the Soviets as a proportion of guns). Shoot-n-skoot gets real tiring real fast (I "jumped" 8+ times a day for a week on exercises when I was in a SP artillery battalion - and that was the service battery, the guns moved much more - and it gets old quick!). Most importantly, though, is the digital fire control systems that allow NATO to get the guns on target faster and move before the Soviets can react. (The aerial equivalent is KAL flight 007, when the 747 overflew the Kamchakta peninsula unhindered and was only intercepted over Sakhalin). I don't think the US army ever put a whole lot of faith into tactical aviation as a counterbattery tool - the development of the helicopter gunship was essentially a reaction to the perceived failure of (and lack of interest in) the USAF in providing adequate CAS in Vietnam. The emphasis on CAS seems to have been on massed armor, with counterbattery performed by artillery (and in mobile operations reaction time matters more than range - if you can deploy a battery of M-109s 10 km from a D-30 battery who cares if the D-30 can outrange you if the M-109s fire first!) As far as Pact AAA defending individual batteries, the force structure isn't there, with 5 batteries of SAMs in a division and a regiment/brigade at army and Front level. In the west its unlikely to see the masses of small-medium caliber AAA that the North Koreans or Iraqis were able to mass - those nations received the guns cast off by the Pact armies when they upgraded to SAMs.

Fundamentally, I agree on the limitations of technology to win wars. I believe that the limitations of logistics (supply, transportation, maintenance, infrastructure and industrial capacity) and the nexus of force structure with technology, morale/organization/training and mass are the prime factors that determine the outcome. And in Europe in 1996-7 those factors are greatly tested on both sides.