In Defense of the Red Army

[Raellus]

I guess I need to find some articles on Soviet AAD doctrine. Maybe I've been too focused on the dizzying array of SAM systems that the Soviets were fielding during the late '80s instead of how they were to be used operationally. The fact that each Soviet division, corps, army, front, etc. had their own subordinate AAD assets lends to the picture that the Soviet AAD network would be both deep and comprehensive. Perhaps this is misleading.

Whereas the U.S. army basically fielded just a few SAM systems- Stinger/Avenger, Vulcan (retired in the early '90s), Hawk (ditto), and Patriot- the Soviets had nearly a dozen operational SAM and AAA systems. To some degree, this was a reaction to the limitations (perceived or real) of some of those systems but, to my understanding, it was also an attempt to cover all of the bases (low, medium, high altitude, various ranges, various types of homing, etc.). I don't think U.S. army divisions had any organic AA other than Stinger/Avenger and Vulcan. Given Patriot's somewhat blotchy combat record (including shooting down a few coalition aircraft in the First Gulf War)*, it just seems that the Red Army placed a much greater emphasis on ground-based air defense systems and operations. Heck, WTO armies still trained their infantry in engaging low flying aircraft with their personal small arms.

As always, please correct me if I'm wrong on any counts. I'm always open to learn!

*This is another case in point regarding the limits of military technology and the deadliness of the modern aerial battlefields.

[fightingflamingo]

FYI - when I went to Basic in the early 1990's here in the US, we were still trained to engage low flying aircraft with massed small arms...

[Webstral]

Originally Posted by fightingflamingo

FYI - when I went to Basic in the early 1990's here in the US, we were still trained to engage low flying aircraft with massed small arms...

Small arms can do the trick. They just have to get some hits. Technically, the roof-mounted MG on most MBT is for air defense. Whether trying to hit a fast-mover with small arms is a good use of ammunition is another question entirely.

Webstral

[avantman42]

Originally Posted by Webstral

Small arms can do the trick. They just have to get some hits. Technically, the roof-mounted MG on most MBT is for air defense. Whether trying to hit a fast-mover with small arms is a good use of ammunition is another question entirely.

A friend of mine was in the Falklands, on an unarmed RFA ship. Apparently when the Argentinian aircraft came over, the helicopter flight deck would be full of marines and sailors firing SLRs, and anything else they could get their hands on, at the aircraft. They were credited with a single kill. Can't remember which ship it was, but I think it may have been the Fort Austin.

[Raellus]

I've been reading a lot lately about the Red Army of WWII and it's gotten me thinking about the Red Army of T2K again.

War Economy and Armaments Production

I'm not an economist so I admit that I don't fully understand the economic factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late '80s/early '90s. My understanding is that the proximal cause of the collapse was attempts to at implementing reforms to "Westernize" the Soviet economy. Perhaps if this had not occured, or had been quickly reversed, the Soviet command economy could have held on.

In WWII Soviet Union's command economy enabled them to increase armaments production steadily throughout the war, even when they were forced to rellocate armaments factories out of the path of the advancing German army in 1941 and '42. The overall Soviet economy was by no means very healthy in 1941. By most accounts, Stalin's Five Year Plans almost led to the entire system's collapse. However, centralized party control of the war industries allowed their rapid mobilization and incredible production rates.

The modern West's privately owned, dispersed, decentralized armaments industries, with dozens of subcontractors producing various components, seems more like the WWII German system which simply couldn't keep up.

One could argue that the T2K Soviet Union's war industries would have been well underway in ramping up production by the time the Germans reunified by force in order to support the war in China. Could the Soviet's afford it?

Tank Design

By all accounts, the T-34 was a fairly crude tank design when compared to the overly sophisticated Panther or Tiger designs employed by Germany. However, their simplicity and reliability allowed them to be produced and employed in far greater numbers than the more complex, expensive German tanks. I see a direct parallel here between the T-34 and the modern Soviet MBTs based on the T-72 design. It is not as sophisticated or effective as modern western MBTs but it is easier, cheaper, and faster to produce than a Leopard II, Challenger 2, or M1A1. Even before the outset of the war in Europe, the Soviets enjoyed a favorable correlation of forces. One could argue that this correlation of forces would become even more favorable to the Soviets as time wore on.

The historical parallel extends to the Soviet AF as well. In WWII, the Soviet AF was nearly wiped out on the ground in the first few days of Operation Barbarossa. The Germans had complete or local air superiority through the winter of '42 and, sometimes, even after. But, once again, the Soviets proved that they could replace their lost aircraft while the Germans could not.

Operational Experience

The Red Army of '41 was largely incompetent, in almost every aspect of modern (at that time) warfare. Yet, it was able to take advantage of Germany's logistical difficulties, trading space (and lives) for time, while gaining valuable operational experience.

Regardless of whether your T2K timeline includes a Gulf War or not, the Soviet Army of Twilight '97 would have nearly a year's experience in large-scale mechanized manouver warfare in China, in addition to experience gained so painfully in Afghanistan throughout the '80s. They would also have gained experience in all facets of air warfare.

Furthermore, when Germany unifies and, with U.S. support, drives into Eastern Europe, the Soviets could trade its buffer states' soil for time to build up significant operational reserves (new production, newly mobilized units, and veteran mechanized formations transferred from China) in order to mount a strategic counteroffensive against worn-down, encroaching NATO armies nearing the end of their logistically umbilical cords.

In WWII, the Soviets became experts in soaking up German offensive, attriting their best, attacking divisions, and then launching devastating operational and strategic counteroffensives. This could be seen as early as Moscow in the winter of '41-'42, then more spectacularly at Stalingrad a year later and Kursk, the summer after.

Canon describes NATO as able to meet and defeat early Soviet counter offensives in Europe, prompting the Soviets to use tactical nuclear weapons for the first time in the West. This implies that the Soviets were simply not good enough to meet NATO on a conventional footing. I believe there is an alternative to this explanation.

Soviet Strategy

Having already used tactical nuclear weapons to great effect in the East, and having suffered little in the way of retaliation in kind, the Soviets would be greatly tempted to use tac-nukes again in the west. Repeating their previous success would be argument enough for those more hawkish members of the Soviet political and military high command.

I'd like to add a second, political motivation as well. I believe it stands to reason that the Soviets wanted to send a message to its E. European client states. In the wake of E. Germany's treachery, the Soviets may be worred about the loyalty of the rest of the WTO. Using nukes on E. German and Polish soil would send a powerful message that disloyalty could be punished by total destruction. On the other hand, NATO retaliation in kind could be used as a powerful propaganda tool in a sort of carrot and stick approach. To the average Pole or Czech whose city was destroyed by NATO nukes, it would matter very little who "started it". If the Soviet's intelligence apparati detected/suspected other allies were preparing to follow in E. Germany's footsteps, a nuclear option could quickly squash such treason.

So perhaps the Soviet's first use nukes in Europe has less to do with NATO's conventional military superiority and more to do with broader strategic and political considerations.

[Mohoender]

Raellus you have put up here (IMO) some great ideas and some very accurate ones. My comments are, therefore, nothing like critics but they are only inteded to reinforce a point I think well made. Anyone, there is no politics behind it.

Originally Posted by Raellus

War Economy and Armaments Production
I'm not an economist so I admit that I don't fully understand the economic factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late '80s/early '90s. My understanding is that the proximal cause of the collapse was attempts to at implementing reforms to "Westernize" the Soviet economy. Perhaps if this had not occured, or had been quickly reversed, the Soviet command economy could have held on.

It might be very true and it is more than possible that Reagan/Bush policies (1982-1991) tricked them into it.

Originally Posted by Raellus

The overall Soviet economy was by no means very healthy in 1941. By most accounts, Stalin's Five Year Plans almost led to the entire system's collapse. However, centralized party control of the war industries allowed their rapid mobilization and incredible production rates.

This is even an understatement. Stalin's political/military purges (more than the Plan itself which was not implemented) weakened the soviet union as never before. Technical teams had been disbanded, leading strategist (Toukhatchevski) was killed, 2 Field Marshall remained out of at least 50, Stalin delayed the mechanization/motorization programs that were well underway to refocus on the artillery (Stalin was an artillery officer). His purge had virtually destroyed the animal care system that existed and the red army was lacking in horses (millions of horses had been killed or let to die because of unproper care in the late 1930's and because of the purge: collateral casualties).

Originally Posted by Raellus

Tank Design
By all accounts, the T-34 was a fairly crude tank design when compared to the overly sophisticated Panther or Tiger designs employed by Germany. However, their simplicity and reliability allowed them to be produced and employed in far greater numbers than the more complex, expensive German tanks. I see a direct parallel here between the T-34 and the modern Soviet MBTs based on the T-72 design. It is not as sophisticated or effective as modern western MBTs but it is easier, cheaper, and faster to produce than a Leopard II, Challenger 2, or M1A1. Even before the outset of the war in Europe, the Soviets enjoyed a favorable correlation of forces. One could argue that this correlation of forces would become even more favorable to the Soviets as time wore on.

True but the T-34 was not so much a crude tank (It was also well in advanced to any world production in 1941 and was matched by no one). It will take two years for Germany to compete. In addition the simple design allowed for easy cheap upgrade going from T-34m41 to T-34m43 to T-34m44 (85mm Gun). A main difference in T2K would be that the west would already have competing designs.

Originally Posted by Raellus

The historical parallel extends to the Soviet AF as well. In WWII, the Soviet AF was nearly wiped out on the ground in the first few days of Operation Barbarossa. The Germans had complete or local air superiority through the winter of '42 and, sometimes, even after. But, once again, the Soviets proved that they could replace their lost aircraft while the Germans could not.

I'll contradict you partly on that one. What you say is true but the problem was not that of the aircraft. Many were indeed out of dates and outmatched but they also met with the most success. However, for a time the newer models proved no matched because of their week points and crew inexperience. Converting from one aircraft to another need time and work investments. The other problem came from the taking over of eastern Poland. Before that events, the RKKA had several airfield well located and well supplied close to the front. When the Red army moved to Poland in early 1940 the frontal aviation couldn't compete anymore. The building of new fields was underway but it was only in its infancy when Germany attacked. That is a problem Russia wouldn't have in T2K (as actually stated in Canon).

Originally Posted by Raellus

Operational Experience
The Red Army of '41 was largely incompetent, in almost every aspect of modern (at that time) warfare. Yet, it was able to take advantage of Germany's logistical difficulties, trading space (and lives) for time, while gaining valuable operational experience.

I'll be more hard on that one because it is a western world legend that has no solid ground to it. Actually, the Red Army of 1941 was full of largely competent officers. The problem was that Stalin Purges had killed tens of thousand of high ranking officers (including almost all field marshall but the two least competent, most army commanders and corps commanders). The younger officers were very good (almost as good as the German ones but they lacked the knowledge to conduct large field operation: this is that field of experience that they had to learn). However, they were highly innovative and the Red army had developped strategies that were soon brought back to life (Parachutist by 1936, Mechanized corps, Cavalry/Army collaboration...). Likewise, while German soldiers were not equipped for the winter of 1941, the soviet trooper was not dying from the cold (Probably thanks to the Finnish war a year earlier). Another problem for the Red army was that of the too influencial political officers who could disrupt proper field command (by early 1942, as he did between 1919-1921, Stalin had understood it and they were loosing ground).

Originally Posted by Raellus

Soviet Strategy
I'd like to add a second, political motivation as well. I believe it stands to reason that the Soviets wanted to send a message to its E. European client states. In the wake of E. Germany's treachery, the Soviets may be worred about the loyalty of the rest of the WTO.

I don't want to criticize your reasoning here (nothing to critic in fact) but E.German treachery is a v1.0 canon assesment which (IMO) is their worse misunderstanding of the Warsaw Pact at the time (also it makes perfect sense in a game and they certainly didn't have the information available to us 20 years later). In fact (IRL) and up to 1989, The E.German army was and remained the most faithful component of the Warsaw Pact. The treachery was not on the side of E.Germany but on the side of Russia (Gorbatchev). When events started in Germany prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the E.German army asked for Russian backing in crushing the protesters. Basically, Moscow refused and told them they were on their own. It's only when they had lost faith in their Russian ally that the E.German turned to the West.

On the other hand, a real treachery came from the Czech Republics and Hungary who had allowed earlier east german citizens to cross to the west through their borders (fairly logical when you remember the 1956 and 1968 events). Earlier, several treacheries had been done by Poland (Polish communists sending classified information to the West from time to time) but that was not the case in 1989. An important point to Poland would and remained for long its fear of Germany (They feared the Russians a little less).

Bulgaria was the other faithfull ally and could have remain so even to these days if history had taken another path.

Romania is entirely different matter which would deserve more thinking nad more knowledge than I have.

Internaly, outside of the Baltic Republics everything could have stayed in place if Gorbatchev (or anyone else) had been able to come up with some true politics (IMO of course).

[Raellus]

This debate's kind of flared up again in the Iraq thread and so I'd like to un-hijack that thread and revive the debate over here (if anyone's interested).

In order for the v1.0 alternative history to work, one must reconcile the collapse of the Soviet system/Union IRL with its survival in the v1.0 timeline.

I believe that an adequate explanation is a [hypothetical] discovery of large oil and natural gas deposits in the eastern USSR, along the frontier with the PRC, in the mid-to-late '80s. This would both allow the Soviet command economy to remain solvent (and perhaps add an influx of hard currency from exports) and create a causus belli for the canonical war with the PRC. An economic revival would also allow the Soviet military to modernize its major platforms and improve the training of its soldiers, sailors, and airmen. This would make the Red Army a more formidable force, more in line with what the v1.0 timeline describes.

[chico20854]

Originally Posted by Raellus

I guess I need to find some articles on Soviet AAD doctrine. Maybe I've been too focused on the dizzying array of SAM systems that the Soviets were fielding during the late '80s instead of how they were to be used operationally. The fact that each Soviet division, corps, army, front, etc. had their own subordinate AAD assets lends to the picture that the Soviet AAD network would be both deep and comprehensive. Perhaps this is misleading.

I found a quartet of really nice analytical pieces on the Pact strategic (defensive) SAM network on the Central Front:

Poland: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2009/10/...-cold-war.html
DDR: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/08/...ase-study.html
Czechoslovakia: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/09/...r-defense.html
Hungary: http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/10/...ense-cold.html

He notes that in at least the cases of Czechoslovakia and Hungary that there were large gaps in coverage and a reliance on obsolete systems that NATO had developed counters for. When the DDR network goes down the situation for NATO in the air gets better, although as you properly noted the army fields local and area air defense assets.

[Cdnwolf]

Although flawed... Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising still offers a lot of insight into fighting a war in Central Europe and the beginning of the book gives details on how long it would take to get oil and gas production back on line following a major disaster...

It also looks at the effect on the FEBA and modern aircraft...

[StainlessSteelCynic]

Some call it thread necromancy, I call it "revisiting the topic"

After reading through dragoon500ly's post about Soviet equipment and then going back here to reread his thoughts, I am in full agreement with Raellus. Many people too easily dismiss the Soviet Union and the Red Army.

With the benefit of the internet it's easy to find better information about Soviet equipment and better still, with online translation programmes, we can now view a number of Russian sites that give details previously unavailable in the West. One such site has three items of interest, two in particular that could have given NATO something of a surprise.
The following are Google Translate links so be prepared for some weird English.

The ZSU-37-2 This was a contemporary to the ZSU-23-4 with a longer engagement range and meant to support tank regiments. Discontinued from development for unspecified reasons (but probably because the ZSU-23-4 performed better on high-speed targets at lower altitudes)
http://translate.google.com/translat...ate.google.com

The T-74 A proposal for a small-turret tank mounting an external gun. Development ceased due to technical complexity driving up the price of development and production.
http://translate.google.com/translat...ate.google.com

The VAG-73 caseless ammunition pistol
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerasimenko_VAG-73
http://translate.google.com/translat...Fdogswar.ru%2F

There's also the series of 9x39mm silent weapons developed in the late 1980s (VSS Vintorez, AS Val), various weapons for combat divers (ASM-DT, ADS), the very well developed work on variable geometry afterburner nozzles (along with the supersonic VTOL Yak-41M AKA Yak-141), other rifles to replace the AK/AKM series (such as the TKB-0146 bullpup or the AO-38 rifle, the first to use the 'Balanced Automatic Recoil System, other link here or the Soviet equivalent to Project SALVO such as the TKB-059, the Kamov V-100 project for a high-speed attack helicopter, the Mil Mi-30 tilt-rotor project, the 80.002 combination assault rifle & grenade launcher and so on.

I hope that what's illustrated here is that the Soviets were not simply sitting back and constantly improving old designs to try and hold out against the West, but that they too indulged in a varied R&D programme to explore other ideas in an effort to compete and maybe beat, the West.
I'm not saying that the Soviets would have easily beaten NATO or even that they could have beaten NATO at all but I am saying that measuring the Soviet Union by the standards of the Gorbachev era leads to an easy dismissal of their abilities.

[Legbreaker]

I 100% agree. It would be interesting if we had a similar amount of input from 1970-80 era ex Soviet soliders as we do from western forces (mainly US). On the other hand, national pride might end up with numerous flame wars...

[Raellus]

I think another reason it's tempting to underestimate the Soviet military is that, for a time in the early '90s, their military org/tech/training etc. was "frozen in time" while the West was making strides forward in the wake of the wildly successful Desert Shield/Storm campaign. In fact, if anything, the Russian military in the early '90s was regressing as military funding dried up and new strategic realities started sinking in. It's easy to remember the beaten MRDs withdrawing across that last bridge between Afghanistan and the soon-to-ex-Soviet republics in '89, or the loyalist Russian tanks shelling the rebellious troops in the high-rise ministry, or the rusting hulks of ex-Soviet navy ships and submarines stuck in port. Those last images are pathetic and really don't do the Soviet military justice.

It's easy to forget that a v1.0 Soviet military would have been moving forward during the '90s, if not keeping pace with the West, then at least trying their damnedest to do so.

This is why I prefer to remember the Soviet Military as they seemed during my childhood (the '80s)- a huge, somewhat mysterious entity that posed a clear and present danger to the NATO countries.

[pmulcahy11b]

If nothing else, one should never underestimate their opponents.

[raketenjagdpanzer]

Originally Posted by Raellus

This is why I prefer to remember the Soviet Military as they seemed during my childhood (the '80s)- a huge, somewhat mysterious entity that posed a clear and present danger to the NATO countries.

"clear and present danger"? Holy crap, man, by your estimation we should've just surrendered outright since not only were they numerically superior they were up to par in every other way as well.

I mean, if they really had the drop on us that bad, why didn't they just send the balloon up? Surely they had a vastly more cavalier attitude vis-a-vis "getting our hair mussed" in "toe-to-toe nuclear combat". I mean, they had everything the Walkers had leaked to them, they obviously had the numbers and they apparently had the tactics and troop quality to beat us at every turn. Why no statue of Lenin in Antwerp, then?

(Erm...that sounds ill-tempered but it's not meant to be, I promise.)

[dragoon500ly]

[QUOTE=StainlessSteelCynic;27375]Some call it thread necromancy, I call it "revisiting the topic"

After reading through dragoon500ly's post about Soviet equipment and then going back here to reread his thoughts, I am in full agreement with Raellus. Many people too easily dismiss the Soviet Union and the Red Army.[\QUOTE]

LOL

And to think I was always getting my tail end chewed off for showing the Soviets as "Supermen" in the OPFOR classes!

The two things that have always impressed me about the Soviets is the quantity and simplicty of their equipment and the workmanlike approach that they follow as far as tactics go.

[Legbreaker]

The Soveits really knew how to boil it all down to the KISS principle...

[Tackleberry]

Quantity does have its own quality though.

Even with the Challengers, M1's and Leopards the North German plain would have been a very interesting punch up.

If you consider that in every exercise I took part in in the 80's Royal Air Force in Germany, we went "Chemical" straight away and "Nuclear" after 3 days.

IF the Russians had come over the border in either August (summer holidays) or at Xmas time, with everyone at skeleton manning. And without the time to reinforce I think the Red army would have made it to the Rhine, in the perfect Tank country of North Germany.

Once their supply lines got that extended it would have stopped them, but it would certainly have been close.